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Abstract 
	
This thesis offers a novel interpretation of the Spanish housing crash, the most 
extreme instance of a housing boom and bust in contemporary capitalism, developing 
a narrative that stresses the historical specificity of this experience. Whereas 
neoliberal approaches have stressed the role of political ‘distortions’ to an otherwise 
perfect market economy (e.g. corruption, profligacy, etc.), critical approaches have 
responded to this framing by extricating political factors from their analyses 
altogether: either by representing the Spanish crash as the product of an external 
economic imbalance, or by reducing the Spanish crisis to a generic outcome of the 
laws of capital accumulation. The purpose of this thesis is to reclaim the political away 
from neoliberal approaches in order to flesh out an alternative critical narrative of the 
crash. To do so, I draw from the tradition of political Marxism, an approach that 
stresses the historicity of political dynamics at the expense of structural laws of 
causation. Contra the existing literature, I argue that the Spanish experience was the 
result of an interplay between two historically-specific processes: (1) the layering of a 
particular apparatus of residential provision to address a near-perennial housing 
deficit, and (2) the evolution of the clientelist nexus binding together the political 
class and the propertied classes. The thesis demonstrates how these processes are the 
consequence of a long trail of sedimented political agencies that stretch back into the 
nineteenth century. This history is teased out in the empirical chapters of the thesis, 
which are structured as historical studies into different themes around the Spanish 
property market: the peculiarity of Spain’s urban planning practices; a housing 
system dominated by ownership and mass speculation; a highly politicised financial 
system; and widespread patterns of political corruption in urban governance.  
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Introduction 
 
In a society as propertied as the Spanish, the loss of one’s home tends to be experienced 
as a trauma, coupled with feelings of having failed as a citizen: ‘evictions, in subjective 
terms, mean a lot more than simply losing a property. They are a kind of civic death, a 
condemnation to social exclusion’ (Coq-Huelva, 2015). The design of the housing 
market ensures such reactions. Consider the case of Igone and Antonio, a young couple 
with four children, who upon losing their jobs became unable to meet their mortgage 
payments. The couple found that their bank, the all-powerful Santander, left them in 
the dark about what fate awaited them: ‘our local branch gives us vague answers as the 
bank sends threatening letters from Madrid’, Igone stated to El País newspaper 
(Landa, 2012). In the years preceding the crash, it had become common for mortgage 
providers to abuse their debtors’ lack of technical knowledge, concealing abusive 
clauses in their contracts and transferring upon them a disproportionate amount of 
risk – a lack of transparency that would continue once their debtors could no longer 
face their debt. Legally, the bank had the power to swiftly repossess the property and 
auction it off to the highest bidder (a process that would often occur unbeknownst to 
the occupiers), and then proceed to evict them (Alemany & Colau, 2012:181). To make 
things worse, if evicted, Antonio, Igone, and their children, would not only face the 
prospect of being homeless, but they would also have to continue carrying the burden 
of their negative equity: the collapse of house prices meant that their home no longer 
covered the original mortgage debt, and Spanish mortgage laws did not contemplate 
the prospect of limited liability. These extant debts could ripple out to engulf their 
elderly relatives, such as Igone’s 80-year old grandmother, who had put down her own 
home as collateral: ‘I don’t want them to touch my grandmother. Her house is already 
paid for, she shouldn’t end up on the street for being my guarantor’ (quoted in Landa, 
2012).  
 
At the height of the crisis, more than 500 families were being evicted on a daily basis 
for not meeting their housing costs (BBC, 2012a). Alongside this sat the largest rate of 
vacancy in Europe – between 5 and 6 million houses, nothing less than 20% of the 
entire Spanish housing stock. This paradox begs the question: if not for people to live 
in, what were so many houses built for, and for whom? This thesis traces the origin 
story of the Spanish crash, explaining how the shape of the housing market was built 
upon a long history of political struggles.   
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The political nature of housing is patent in the struggles that unfolded in the ruins of 
Spanish capitalism. Like many others in their situation, Antonio and Igone turned to 
the activists of Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH) for legal advice, a 
process that inflected the language of their struggle with political overtones: ‘Housing 
is a basic right. […] The mortgage law is obsolete and needs to be adapted to a time of 
crisis’ (quoted in Landa, 2012). These patterns of mass dispossession struck a nerve in 
Spanish society, to the point that the eviction crisis became the main battleground 
against austerity after the mass protests of 2011. Under the leadership of PAH, 
grassroots resistance became more militant. Protestors would gather outside homes 
expecting evictions to block the way of the bailiffs, who often required the assistance 
of riot vans to enforce these procedures. PAH activists would regularly barricade 
themselves inside these properties with the occupiers, a strategy to which the police 
would respond by axing down the door or by busting it open with a battering ram. But 
even when the police succeeded in breaking in and physically removing everyone 
inside, the home in question would sometimes be squatted right away. The point of 
these acts of sabotage was to force the legal suspension of an eviction, in which case a 
window of time would open up – usually around four months – to put pressure on 
public authorities, all in an effort to force local councils to find a more humane solution 
for the dispossessed (Alemany & Colau, 2012:181-3).  
 
Despite an evident politicisation of housing issues in the wake of the crisis, the way in 
which the Spanish housing system has been shaped by political antagonisms in the 
path to the crisis is not as apparent in existing narratives of the crash. In theory, a focus 
on ‘the political’ is foundational to a discipline like political economy, which defines 
itself against the antiseptic modelling of economics. But in practice, the role of ‘the 
political’ in political economy is too often obscured by a focus on abstract economic 
forces. In the case of the literature on the Spanish crash, this is often a reaction to 
neoliberal accounts, which tend to frame the crisis as an outcome of political 
distortions of an otherwise perfect market economy. In response, critical narratives 
have tended to deflect causation from political determinacy to structural causes, either 
by pointing ‘upward’ – to the macroeconomic imbalances of the European Monetary 
Union – or ‘inward’ – to the internal logic of capital accumulation. The result are 
accounts that often render invisible the role of political agency as a vector of historical 
change. Paradoxically, this omission only serves to confirm the fatalist conclusions of 
neoliberals – that, indeed, there is no alternative – while surrendering the analysis of 
the political to their gaze.  
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Against this, the point of this thesis is to recast a critical narrative of the crash that is 
firmly grounded in ‘the political’, which is to say that it seeks to highlight how power 
struggles between social actors give shape to social structures. This is a broad concept 
that in this thesis manifests in three different ways: (1) the political as layered struggle, 
(2) the political as social conflict, and (3) the political as the everyday.  
 
TABLE 1. THE POLITICAL: A SYNOPSIS 
 
The Political: the enactment of agency through power struggles over the shape of 
social structures 
 
 
(1) Layered Struggle 
 
 
(2) Social Conflict 
 
(3) Everyday 
 
Crystallisation of 
historically-situated 
struggles into lasting 
outcomes 
 
 
Mostly organised 
collective struggles over 
the shape of institutions  
 
Renegotiation of social 
structures at the level of 
daily practice/discourse 
 
(1) The political as layered struggle focuses on the historicity of social structures, 
teasing out how they are created and shaped by historically-specific contingencies that 
may have lasting path-dependent effects. Its main purpose is to examine how the 
layering of past struggles shapes the terrain for the unfolding of the other two 
dimensions of the political. Given the longue durée scope of the analysis, this 
dimension of the political figures most prominently in this thesis. (2) The political as 
social conflict refers to processes of collective struggle, by the hand of collective 
subjects such as groups and classes. This dimension of the political mostly, though not 
only, refers to organised agencies that bear a specific relation to formal institutions: be 
it because they are trying to enforce, subvert, circumvent, or renegotiate existing social 
structures. (3) The political as the everyday realm traces power struggles all the way 
down to the reshaping of existing social structures by daily practices and discourses. 
This dimension of the political most often bears relation to informal institutions, and 
thus has a distinctive cultural flavour. Nevertheless, its purpose is to trace how social 
structures ‘react’ against agencies that seek to – once again – enforce, subvert, 
circumvent, or renegotiate social structures. Overall, these three dimensions of the 
political seek to capture how social structures evolve through the sedimentation of 
political agencies, rather than via the impersonal unfolding of their own internal logic.  
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0.1. The Case: Why it Matters 
 
At the source of the Spanish debacle was the implosion of a property market that had 
driven much of the country’s growth throughout the 2000s. Fuelled by European 
capital imports and record-low interest rates, in the decade preceding the crash the 
real-estate market boomed, with 9 million property transactions and the construction 
of 6 million new homes (von Zeschau, 2011). As long as it lasted, the property boom 
delivered positive rippling effects: 50% new job posts were created, the majority in the 
service and construction industries. House prices experienced a breathtaking 197% 
increase, which translated into a hefty boost of wealth for the 87% of households that 
owned their own homes – the largest rate of ownership in the OECD at the time (López 
& Rodríguez, 2011b). In these years, the Spanish economy was the posterchild of 
European neoliberalism: ‘we have a lot to learn from the Spaniards when it comes to a 
smart and effective use of the opportunities offered by European integration’, 
expressed a Commissioner as late as 2007. Or as the American magazine Newsweek 
put it: ‘[w]ith the economy booming – in stark contrast to the rest of Europe – […] 
Spain is the new princely peacock, after being looked down on by the northern 
Europeans as a poor Mediterranean country’ (McGuire & Radcliffe, 2004). Indeed, 
unlike other countries of the European south, up until the crash itself Spain exhibited 
current account surpluses and exultant levels of growth.  
 
This only made the spectacular economic collapse that ensued more dramatic, 
shocking Europe and beyond. In the wake of the global financial crisis, the Spanish 
economy became responsible for half of all the job destruction in the European Union 
at large (Missé, 2009). At its peak (2013), unemployment stood at levels identical to 
those of Greece’s battered economy: a general rate of 26% and an astronomical 56% 
amongst the youth (datosmacro.com). The Spanish economy, however, was six times 
larger than the Greek, making it an even greater cause for concern for their monetary 
partners. When fears of sovereign default loomed between 2010-2012, the prospect of 
the fourth economy of the Eurozone requiring a Greek-style bailout placed the 
European Monetary Union on the verge of collapse.  
 
The sudden turn of fate of Spanish capitalism hinged upon an immense ‘speculative 
bubble’, a term that has gained wide currency in the Spanish imaginary ever since: ‘Are 
we about to witness the burst of the superhero [film] bubble after years of 
disproportionate growth?’ (Prieto, 2014). For the sake of analytic precision, I will try 
to ‘deflate’ the meaning of this term. Speculation refers to a specific investment 
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strategy which informs the acquisition of an asset (e.g. a house) only to profit from 
expected changes in the value of that asset. A bubble denotes a phase when patterns of 
speculation acquire a collective dimension and enter a self-reinforcing dynamic: e.g. 
the price increases attracting speculative investment are sustained because speculative 
investments are driving prices up – and so on (Knafo, 2009). Faith in continuing asset-
price increases becomes essential to maintaining this spiral, a function that in Spain 
was carried out by economic authorities and media pundits, who repeated time and 
time again that ‘property prices are never going to go down’ (see Martín, 2015). Finance 
is also crucial, both in jumpstarting this process and for prolonging the demand for the 
speculative asset; a role that in Spain was fulfilled by cheap European capital and 
modern techniques of mortgage securitisation. Yet, sooner or later, the bubble always 
‘bursts’ because the amount of new investment needed to sustain the same rate of price 
inflation increases exponentially over time, much like a pyramid scheme (Knafo, 
2009). In other words, at some point there simply will not be enough capital to inject 
into the market, and the whole edifice will collapse like a house of cards.1 This is what 
happened when home prices peaked in the summer of 2007: investors fled, and prices 
gained downward momentum. In less than two years, the real estate industry 
imploded, churning up millions of jobs in the process, mostly in the construction 
industry (Fig.1), and rendering many households unable to pay off their mortgage 
debts.  
 
Speculative bubbles have become central to the study of political economy due to their 
increasing recurrence across global capitalism. This is traditionally associated with the 
expansion of finance in recent decades, a process often traced back to the exhaustion 
of the postwar cycle of industrialisation around the 1970s (Arrighi, 2005; Brenner, 
2006; Foster, 2007). Following the crisis of ‘stagflation’ in these years, neoliberal 
strategies of deregulation, liberalisation, and privatisation were deployed to break the 
back of organised labour and restore the profitability of capital (Harvey, 2007). This 
                                                        
1 This view is rather different to that of the neoliberal orthodoxy, according to which speculation is an 
inherently stabilising practice that contributes to formation of accurate price signals. For Milton 
Friedman, speculation is the noble pursuit of rational price returns: unsuccessful investors get weeded 
out by the market, successful ones ‘discover’ efficient prices and reveal them to the world (Watson, 
2007:32). This view is built into modern financial economics, down to its very founding stone, Eugene 
Fama’s ‘efficient-market hypothesis’, or the notion that the price of a given financial asset condenses all 
relevant, generally available information. This way of looking at financial speculation carries an important 
implication: any notion of ‘market failure’ is conceptualised away from the start. Phenomena such as 
‘bubble bursts’ are merely price corrections that happen to be more sudden than usual. Fama himself 
expressed incredulity towards the notion in the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis: ‘I don't 
even know what a bubble means. These words have become popular I don't think they have any meaning’ 
(quoted in Mirowski, 2013:253). That being said, some orthodox neoliberals do concede the existence of 
such a thing as bubbles, but only to argue that these are the product of rational investors being misled by 
distortive incentives, almost invariably the result of state intervention (e.g. Garber, 1990). 
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process was coupled with an explosion in innovative financial practices, reorienting 
accumulation towards short-term speculative profits and increasingly away from the 
needs of the ‘productive’ economy (Stockhammer, 2004). This translated into a 
deepening of inequality, concentrating enormous cash pools in the hands of a global 
elite of rentiers, which were then funnelled offshore beyond the tax radar. These cash 
pools then became the basis of vast swarms of capital flows at the command of 
institutional investors (Lysandrou, 2011; Goda and Lysandrou, 2011). Ever since, the 
deployment of these swarms of capital for speculative ventures around the world has 
left a trail of destructive bubbles along their way.  
 
FIG.1. RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION VS. UNEMPLOYMENT IN SPAIN 
 
Source: INE, base=1990.  
 
But beyond their recurrence, equally important to political economy is the fact that 
global capitalism has become increasingly dependent upon speculative bubbles for 
growth, a process in which housing has become central. To designate the breath-taking 
expansion of speculative finance and its colonisation of areas of the economy that were 
previously outside of its orbit, the term ‘financialisation’ has gained currency over the 
last decade or so (Krippner, 2005; Orhanghazi, 2008). The neoliberal dismantlement 
of Keynesian mechanisms of demand management (i.e. the old trade-off of high wages 
for consumer demand), was succeeded by a deepening of consumer credit to counter-
act the effects of stagnating wages on consumption. The expansion of mortgage-backed 
debt has been central to this process, as home equity usually constitutes the most 
valuable asset that households can use to borrow against. This translated into an 
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into an increase in the borrowing power of the home-owning layers (the so-called 
‘wealth effect’). By the late 1990s, states began to keep interest rates deliberately low 
in an attempt to exploit the bond between asset-price increases and disposable income. 
This gave rise to a new paradigm of demand management, sometimes referred to as 
‘asset-price Keynesianism’ (Brenner, 2002, 2006), ‘privatised Keynesianism’ (Crouch, 
2009), or ‘house-price Keynesianism’ (Watson, 2010). In any case, the result has been 
the historic integration of the everyday people, primary through their mortgage debts, 
into the circuits of mass speculation (Langley, 2009; Konings, 2009, 2011; Knafo, 
2009).  
 
FIG.2. GROWTH IN EUROPEAN HOUSE PRICES SINCE 1980 
 
 
 
Source: The Economist House-Price Index, base=1980Q1. 
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0.2. The Problem: Research Puzzle and Questions 
 
Neoliberal analysts have tended to look at the Spanish crisis through the prism of the 
Eurozone crisis of 2010-2012, situating the Spanish case within a broader crisis of the 
Eurozone’s ‘weakest links’: the ‘periphery’, sometimes also identified by the 
unflattering acronym ‘PIIGS’ (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain). Though each 
country is said to have an origin story of its own, the problems alluded to are always 
the same: an immature market economy distorted by political factors (e.g. excessive 
rigidity, fiscal indiscipline, corruption) (The Economist, 2010; JP Morgan, 2013; 
Alesina et al., 2017). In the specific case of Spain, a special emphasis is placed upon the 
dysfunctionality of a politically-controlled savings banking sector, the now notorious 
cajas de ahorro. The cajas are said to have pumped excessive credit into the property 
market just so that their political patrons could reap the electoral benefits of the bubble 
(Garicano, 2012; Royo, 2014). This analysis informed the ‘austerity’ reforms enacted 
at the height of the crisis and the abolition of the savings banks, transformed into fully 
private commercial banks for the sake of economic efficiency.  
 
To challenge this neoliberal perspective, political economists have crafted two 
alternative narratives of the crash. (1) On the one hand, there are those who denounce 
the scapegoating of the PIIGS and seek to identify the causes of the crisis in external 
factors, namely, the macroeconomic imbalances occasioned by the Euro (e.g. Lucarelli, 
2011; Lapavitsas et al., 2012; Stockhammer, 2016). Whatever the exact interpretation, 
proponents of this narrative converge on the view that the structure of monetary 
integration made the countries of the periphery dependent upon the import of 
wholesale credit from the countries of the ‘core’ (a loose concept that usually boils 
down to ‘Germany’). Thus, the formation of the Eurozone around the turn of the 
millennium resulted in a burst of cheap capital that flooded the economies of the 
periphery. The influx of wholesale credit from abroad spilled over into speculative 
ventures, occasioning the inflation of housing bubbles in countries like Spain or 
Ireland. (2) On the other hand, there are those who, instead of deflecting accusations 
of economic instability ‘upward’, they prefer to turn these ‘inward’, to the inherent 
contradictions of capital accumulation. The argument here is that the tendency toward 
speculative investments in the Spanish real estate sector can be traced to long-term 
industrial decline (e.g. López and Rodríguez, 2010; Delgado, 2011; Charnock et al., 
2014). According to the theory of the ‘spatial fix’, whenever overaccumulation builds 
up in manufacturing, there is a tendency within capitalism to syphon capital out of this 
sector and pump it into the built environment instead. This transfusion of capital is 
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assisted by different scales of the state and by the financial sector. However, 
overaccumulation is bound to build up in the built environment too, leading to the 
emergence of destructive housing bubbles like the Spanish. 
 
For all their successes in challenging neoliberal perspectives, these approaches also 
have their own analytical flaws. These can be summarised as an inability to grapple 
with the determinacy of the political, largely due to their emphasis on abstract 
structural mechanics of causation. Rather than historicising concrete patterns of 
political conflict and their institutional outcomes, these approaches tend to read from 
an abstract theoretical plane a number of conclusions about a specific social formation 
like the Spanish, but either without any substantial treatment of that social formation 
or by looking at historical evidence in a relatively ad-hoc manner. Though these 
approaches shall be dissected in greater depth in the next chapter, for now I shall point 
out their explanatory limits with a comparative perspective: 
 
 (1) Framing the Spanish crisis as the product of an external economic imbalance 
requires us to blur very diverse experiences into the aggregate category of the 
European ‘periphery’. Whereas this notion may work to explain the broadest 
regularities across these countries, such as the commercial deficits of the 
Mediterranean countries with the advent of the Euro, it also runs into problems when 
we start asking questions about the differential paths into the crisis of each one of these 
countries. If the periphery was truly struck by a single crisis, then why did Portugal 
slug into the crisis after a decade-long recession, while neighbouring Spain came 
crashing down from a decade-long economic boom? Of course, the main difference 
between these two countries was Spain’s massive property boom, a differential feature 
that core-periphery narratives tend to explain away with a one-size-fits-all 
explanation: during the 2000s, finance from the core flooded the economies of the 
periphery and inflated bubbles in the process. Yet if we zoom out of the macroscopic 
plane once again, we are confronted by some puzzling specificities of the Spanish 
bubble: (a) The timeline of the one-size-fits-all explanation has a telling flaw – while 
there is no doubt that European capital imports accelerated and magnified the growth 
in house prices, the start of the Spanish bubble predates the formation of the Eurozone 
itself. Its immediate origins date to a reform in land-use designations enacted in 1997-
1998, commonly known as the ‘build-anywhere law’. This leads us to a second 
peculiarity: (b) the Spanish housing bubble was coupled with a unique wave of 
residential overproduction. Indeed, at its peak, Spain was building more homes than 
Germany, France and Italy combined – countries which together have a population 
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more than quadruple that of Spain (El País, 2005b). This raises further questions: most 
often, housing bubbles are sustained by an insufficient supply of homes to keep prices 
high (e.g. in the United Kingdom) (Watson, 2009). How, then, could Spain combine a 
house-price bubble with such a gigantic increase in residential supply? 
 
FIG.3. GROWTH IN RESIDENTIAL BUILDING PERMITS ACROSS EUROPE  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, base=2010 
 
(2) Explaining the crisis as a generic function of the logic of capital neglects how the 
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these corruption cases have radiated out of the clientelist nexus between local 
governments and property developers. Yet without an analysis of these practices it is 
hard to explain important phenomena of the property market, such as the ‘stickiness’ 
of land prices despite the declining trend in land transactions (Fig.4). Whereas 
aggregate land exchanges have lost more than 80% of their value between 2004-2013, 
land prices have stayed roughly the same, regardless of the crash. To understand this 
disconnect between supply and demand, it is worth noting that Spanish municipalities 
have a considerable amount of power in setting the price of land, a crucial input 
determining the cost of new housing.  
 
FIG.4. EVOLUTION OF LAND PRICES VS. LAND TRANSACTIONS 
 
Source: INE, base=2004Q1. 
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Ø What were the political drivers of asset-price inflation in the Spanish 
property market? 
  
Ø What role did historically-specific factors play in the Spanish pathway 
into the crisis?  
 
Ø How should we examine the specificities of Spanish capitalism in an age 
of global financialisation? 
 
0.3. The Approach: Method of Analysis  
 
To address this puzzle, this thesis will rely on a framework based on ‘political Marxism’, 
a lesser-known approach within the Marxist tradition (Wood, 2016; Blackledge, 2008; 
Knafo & Teschke, 2017). Political Marxism traces its roots to the long-standing debate 
on the origins of capitalism, and in particular to Robert Brenner’s theorisation of how 
the transition from feudalism to capitalism took place (Brenner, 1976, 1977, 1982). 
Challenging his predecessors for an excessive focus on ‘objective economic forces’ (e.g. 
demographic growth, rise of long-distance trade), Brenner deployed a comparative 
historicisation of patterns of social conflict in late medieval Europe to demonstrate that 
the most determining factors in such a world-historical change were the contingent 
outcomes of political conflict, as well as their subsequent crystallisation into what he 
termed ‘social-property relations’ – institutions mediating relations of property and 
domination. The implications of Brenner’s analysis, as well as the considerable debate 
that it stirred (Aston & Philpin, 1985), spawned a Marxist current with a strong 
‘historicist’ persuasion; i.e. a theory ‘which grounds the historicity of phenomena not 
in abstract laws, but in specific historically situated social practices’ (Teschke, 2014:3). 
 
Political Marxism was largely inspired by Ellen Meiksins Wood (1981, 2002, 2016), for 
whom the purpose of a ‘political’ Marxism was to provide a response to structural 
Marxism, which she criticised for an ahistorical bent that resulted in a highly 
deterministic perspective of social change. Structuralism, she argued, refelects a mode 
of inquiry that privileges explanations of social phenomena grounded in the internal 
logic of social structures; the formal and informal rules mediating social relations. This 
mode of reasoning implies an erasure of political agency and history from Marxist 
theory. On the one hand, human subjects cease to be living, creating subjects, for their 
rationality appears as the function of a particular structure. On the other hand, the past 
becomes predictable, as patterns of historical change can then be simply deduced out 
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of the mechanics of structural pressures. The point of ‘political’ Marxism, thus, is to 
invert this formula: to privilege a historicisation of political agency and contingency at 
the expense of macro-structural laws of causation.  
 
This mode of analysis requires theoretical frameworks that are sufficiently broad and 
open-ended to be adapted to concrete historical evidence (rather than, say, rigid ‘laws’ 
of development that tell historical evidence what it needs to tell us in advance). Beyond 
the broad analytical categories and procedures of political Marxism, which are 
designed to highlight how political agency drives historical change, the thesis will also 
draw from the respective historicist methods of Michael Foucault (1991) and E.P 
Thompson (2013), and will borrow conceptual tools from historical institutionalism 
(Steinmo & Thelen, 1998; Pierson et al., 2002; Streeck & Thelen, 2005) and 
performativity (Butler, 2010; Konings, 2015; Cooper and Konings, 2016). These 
traditions will equip the analysis with a language capable of representing how the 
sedimentation of political agency shapes structural change, both at the level of material 
practices and at the level of immaterial discourses.  
 
The deployment of these instruments will result in genealogies of the social-property 
relations of the Spanish housing market, to demonstrate that ‘the residential is 
political’ – i.e. that the shape of the housing system is always the outcome of layered 
struggles between different groups and classes (Madden & Marcuse, 2017:4). In a way, 
this approach puts this thesis at the intersection between political economy and 
historical sociology: while it seeks to answer the questions of the former, it does so 
with methods closer to the latter.  
 
0.4. The Argument: Contributions to Knowledge 
 
The main contribution to knowledge made by this thesis is a new narrative of the 
Spanish crash centred around the political. It provides a historicist narrative that 
focuses on how Spain developed a particular form of residential capitalism that became 
simultaneously geared towards housing overproduction and housing-price 
speculation. Contra the existing literature, this story represents the Spanish experience 
as the product of the interplay between two historically-specific processes: (1) the 
evolution of an apparatus of residential provision to address a near-perennial housing 
deficit, and (2) the evolution of patterns of political accumulation forming a clientelist 
nexus between public officials and the propertied classes. By focusing on the political 
history of the Spanish housing market, this narrative of the Spanish bubble reveals the 
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prominence of factors that are heavily neglected in the existing literature: the politics 
of housing shortages and the importance of political corruption in the inflation of the 
bubble itself. 
 
(1) Residential apparatus: The term ‘apparatus’ here is borrowed from Foucault, who 
uses it to refer to a set of institutions that are mobilised in a given historical period to 
address what is perceived to be an urgent need – in this case, the sustained housing 
deficits that have afflicted Spain since the advent of industrialisation. Of course, the 
urgency of this ‘need’ has been interpreted through the prism of elite interests, usually 
with the explicit purpose of working around the problem without threatening the 
liberal property rights that had given birth to it (something that shall be discussed in 
depth in chapter 3). The result was a haphazard edifice of ‘fixes’ in response to 
changing political pressures – e.g. chokeholds on industrial development, working-
class unrest, electoral decline, etc.  
 
A historicisation of how these fixes have layered on top of one another over time casts 
light onto the differential features of the Spanish housing market, which are 
fundamental for understanding the distinct housing bubble that Spain incubated 
during the 2000s. Perhaps the most striking is a unique peculiarity that has been 
overlooked by the political economy literature: a system of land valuations without 
parallel in Europe, one which values urban land plots according to the potential worth 
of the property and infrastructure they could host, even before any construction 
operations took place. Crystallising in the nineteenth century to encourage urban 
landowners to build (allowing them to use the potential value of their lands as 
collateral to borrow), this system has had great path-dependent effects, as it 
unexpectedly served to inflate house prices in the 2000s to exorbitant levels. The 
history of responses to housing deficits is also crucial for understanding the early (and 
rapid) rise of homeownership tenure in Spain, a feature that figures prominently in the 
existing literature, though usually without any reference to the pressures to which it 
was a response. The fast rise of a propertied society between 1950-1980 was the 
culmination of a series of successful efforts by the state to engineer a property market 
sufficiently dynamic to encourage developers to build homes as well as to encourage 
banks to lend mortgages (as rent tenure afforded them a riskier and slower return on 
their investments). Similar concerns drove the regulation of securitisation techniques 
in mortgage finance or the drafting of the build-anywhere law in the late twentieth 
century. In short, the shape of the housing market was in many ways the result of a 
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long evolutionary process, built upon political efforts to refract the pressures of a near-
constant housing deficit.  
 
(2) Political accumulation: The notion of ‘political accumulation’ is borrowed from 
Brenner (1985:236-246), who used it to describe the patterns of elite competition by 
non-commercial means in late medieval/early-modern Europe (e.g. conquest, 
improvement of mechanisms to tax the peasantry), dynamics which developed a 
symbiotic relation with a nascent capitalism. The concept is here transposed onto a 
very different context to describe patterns of electoral competition between political 
elites through the exaction of bribe monies from property developers, dynamics that, 
in turn, rewarded Spain’s construction firms with political favours and inflated profits.  
 
The ‘political’ logic of these clientelist dynamics was immanent to the ‘economic’ logic 
of the bubble, and yet it always appears as an afterthought in the political economy 
literature. Since the nineteenth century, there has been a strong clientelist nexus 
between an elected political class and the propertied classes. However, it was only 
under the dictatorship of Francisco Franco that political elites forged such a nexus with 
the property developers of a rising residential capitalism. With the advent of 
democracy in the late 1970s, these clientelist networks adapted themselves to the new 
shape of the state, in which decision-making power over the built environment was 
decentralised to a myriad of regional and local nodes, and in which political elites were 
engaged in a permanent electoral competition to renew their access to state power. The 
result was a pattern in which political parties used their access to local and regional 
nodes of state power to trade vital political favours (e.g. tailored land designations, 
public contracts, savings bank credit) in exchange for a regular stream of bribes, 
usually exacted in the form of a small percentage of the profits they had secured their 
clients (i.e. ‘kickbacks’). Political parties directed these monies to the ‘war chests’ 
financing their electoral campaigns in an effort to outcompete one another and 
renovate their access to state power. The implication here is that the overproduction 
of the built environment needs to be understood through the complicity of a political 
class that enabled it in order to meet its own competitive pressures. 
 
My analysis of contemporary patterns of political corruption in Spain is a contribution 
of distinct importance. This phenomenon is not merely ‘undertheorised’ in the existing 
political economy narratives of the Spanish crash, it is virtually absent. Recent 
scandals, which in the last few years have revealed the sheer scale and systematic 
nature of bribing practices, make untenable the continuity of this gap in our 
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understanding of the crisis, an urgent need that this thesis addresses. Arguably, 
investigative journalists have already uncovered a critical mass of evidence about the 
criminal nexus that for decades has bound together party finance and bribes by the 
real estate industry. However, the recent nature of these scandals has meant that 
academic studies have not yet fleshed out these dynamics. This thesis is perhaps the 
first academic study that attempts to chart this territory: analysing a large volume of 
‘primary’ sources, from news data to legal documents, chapter 7 presents a 
reconstruction of the mechanics of illicit party finance and their relationship to the 
political economy of the bubble. In other words, the analysis of the political economy 
of political corruption contained in this thesis is not just a ‘theoretical’ contribution, 
but also an ‘empirical’ one, making it of potential interest to fields beyond the scope of 
political economy (such as corruption studies).  
 
The thesis also carries implications for the study of the Euro crisis, both within and 
without political economy. The domestic focus of this thesis poses a challenge to the 
dominant political economy accounts of the Euro crisis, Marxist or otherwise. Rather 
than treating the crisis of a peripheral country as the function of Eurozone 
macroeconomics, it historicises its national social formation and inquiries into its 
distinctive, home-grown path towards the crisis. This is not to say that the Euro did 
not matter in the inflation of the Spanish bubble; had it not been for the Eurozone, it 
is unlikely that the asset-price inflation would have acquired the magnitude that it did. 
What this thesis demonstrates is that the Euro itself remains an insufficient 
explanation of the crisis of the European ‘periphery’, for Spain had a crisis of its own, 
and that macro-structural explanations lack sufficient analytical space to take 
domestic factors seriously. Rather than a Euro crisis, it is perhaps more accurate to 
speak of a series of Euro crises that were coordinated (rather than caused) by 
European macroeconomics. At the same time, this thesis also challenges neoliberal 
accounts of the crisis by focusing on the primacy of political factors (including 
corruption), while disturbing their assumption that ‘politics’ are distortive to the 
market economy. On the contrary, as successive chapters will show, clientelist 
dynamics were perfectly compatible with market success.  
 
The final contribution is the development of a political Marxist framework to apply to 
contemporary political economy. One of the reasons why political Marxism is less 
known in political economy than other ‘cousin’ approaches (e.g. neo-Gramscianism, 
autonomism, etc.) is because it has remained mostly concerned with historical-
sociological themes: the origin of capitalism (Wood, 2002a, 2002b), the English Civil 
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War (Brenner, 2003), the French Revolution (Cominel, 1991), etc. When political 
Marxists have taken a leap to contemporary political economy, they have tended to do 
so in disguise, without explicitly addressing how political Marxism informs their 
perspectives (e.g. Knafo, 2013). Moreover, in the few occasions that political Marxists 
have transposed the language of their tradition onto contemporary affairs (e.g. 
Brenner, 1998, 2006; Wood, 2005), they have tended to relapse into the kind of 
reasoning they once criticised: a privileging of structural determinations at the expense 
of political contingencies in the process of historical change (for a discussion, see Knafo 
& Teschke, 2017). This thesis has sought to do precisely the opposite, applying the 
conceptual instruments of political Marxism to a concrete case of interest to 
contemporary political economy while attempting to stay true to its historicist 
promise, providing insights for others who might wish to do so as well.   
 
0.5. The Structure: Chapter Outline 
 
The thesis is divided into two parts, themselves split into three and four chapters 
respectively. The chapters of the first part deal with theoretical issues: (1) examining 
the literature and presenting the research problem, (2) developing a historicist method 
of analysis to address the problem, and (3) outlining an alternative to existing 
approaches on the basis of that method.  
 
Chapter 1 is a review of the existing literature on the Spanish crash, identifying three 
broad paradigms centred around a particular ‘narrative’ of the crisis. (1) The 
immaturity narrative, the story of choice of most schools of economics, represents the 
Spanish crisis as the product of the domestic weakness of the Spanish economy, and, 
in particular, of the political control that political parties exerted over the savings bank 
sector – the main mortgage providers of the country at the time. (2) The core-
periphery narrative sees the Spanish boom and bust as a symptom of the 
macroeconomic imbalances built into the structures of the European Monetary Union. 
(3) The spatial fix narrative, the most popular amongst authors with a political 
geography bent, represents the Spanish bubble as the logical culmination of a 
specialisation in real estate speculation after the crisis of its manufacturing base in the 
1970s. The chapter ends with a critique these narratives, arguing that, for all their 
differences, they share a difficulty to accommodate the political in their accounts of the 
crash. Whereas the first narrative awards a prominent role to the political in its 
account, it presents this role as inherently distortive to an otherwise perfect market 
economy. In response, the second and third narratives have constructed critical 
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accounts that emphasise macrostructural factors, but they have done so at the expense 
of discarding the political from their theories.  
 
Chapter 2 opens with the question of how to represent the political, seeking to build a 
critical (i.e. Marxist) narrative of the Spanish crash centred around the imprint left by 
power struggles over time. The chapter traces the problems of narratives 2 and 3 to 
their structuralist roots, building a Marxist framework of analysis that seeks to 
transcend the ahistoricism of structuralism. From this discussion emerges a historicist 
method heavily inspired by the tradition of political Marxism, but also enriched with 
insights from other traditions.  
 
Chapter 3 showcases the ‘application’ of this historicist method to the Spanish case, 
sketching out an alternative narrative of the Spanish crash. As addressed above, this 
narrative revolves around two historically-specific processes: (1) the layering of an 
apparatus of residential provision, and (2) the evolution of patterns of political 
accumulation binding together the political and the propertied classes. The chapter 
traces the complex interplay between these two historical processes from the 
nineteenth century to today, teasing out the political agencies that have mediated this 
relationship, and ultimately demonstrating how the peculiarities of the Spanish crash 
were a culmination of this history.  
 
The second part offers a more detailed examination of the themes introduced by 
chapter 3. Each of the four chapters of this second part advance a more detailed 
historical study of a particular area of the Spanish real estate market: urban planning 
practices (chapter 4), the housing system (chapter 5), the financial system (chapter 6), 
dynamics of political corruption (chapter 7).   
 
Chapter 4 provides a genealogy of urban planning. It argues that the Spanish bubble 
would be incomprehensible without the peculiar set of land-use planning institutions 
that enabled the wave of residential overproduction sweeping the country during the 
2000s. The chapter identifies the origins of these unique institutions in the nineteenth 
century, and traces the long legacy of problems of residential provision that they 
generated thereafter. Mapping the layering of political efforts to address these 
problems, the chapter culminates in a demonstration of how the land-use planning law 
of 1997-8 – the piece of legislation that initiated the bubble – was only the latest of 
these agencies, as well as the one with the most radical consequences.  
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Chapter 5 explores the evolution of the Spanish housing system, tracking the 
formation of a culture of mass speculation around it. The chapter opens with an 
examination of the formation of a housing sector dominated by homeowning tenure 
and without price constraints in an effort to encourage property developers to build 
housing, giving rise to a housing system that acted as the contextual precondition 
towards house-price inflation. The chapter then proceeds to examine how, in this 
context, a ‘common sense’ of mass speculation developed through decades of cultural 
change. These included: a strong attachment to property development, the 
identification of reckless urbanisation with socioeconomic progress, and the 
association of house-price speculation with economic stability.  
 
Chapter 6 is a genealogy of the Spanish financial system, with a particular focus on the 
development of mortgage finance, and on the role of the savings banks in real estate 
credit. The purpose of this chapter is to show how finance has developed in tune with 
the patterns of political accumulation of the epoch under consideration. It is argued 
that the role of the semi-public savings banks (the cajas de ahorros) in the inflation 
bubble was but the expression of the patterns of competition within the political class 
in the context of the federal liberal democracy that emerged after the late 1970s. The 
role of political accumulation in the cajas’ specialisation in real estate business 
segments was the reason behind their decades of competitive success, as well as of their 
eventual downfall.  
 
Chapter 7 explores the patterns of widespread political corruption that accompanied 
the Spanish bubble. Building on the argument of the previous chapter, the chapter 
dissects the patterns of political accumulation underpinning an ‘iron triangle’ in the 
Spanish real estate market – a three-way clientelist dynamic between the state 
bureaucracy, an oligarchy of construction firms, and political parties. It will be argued 
that corruption was not a mere outgrowth of the ‘economic’ logic of the bubble (i.e. 
market competition between firms and cities), rather, corruption represented a 
‘political’ logic that was constitutive of the bubble itself. The crux of this argument is 
an analysis of the strategies through which political parties were systematically 
involved in contracts-for-kickbacks schemes, practices that encouraged them to 
engage in real estate clientelism in order to raise illicit campaign finance.  
 
Together, these chapters will flesh out an alternative narrative of the Spanish crash, 
one that is grounded in the historicity of political dynamics rather than in structural 
laws of causation.  
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Part One 
 
 
The residential is political – which is to say that the shape of the housing system 
is always the outcome of struggles between different groups and classes. 
Housing necessarily raises questions about state action and the broader 
economic system. But the ways in which social antagonisms shape housing are 
too often obscured. 
            
Peter Madden & David Marcuse (2016:4) 
	
 21 
1. Three Narratives of the Spanish Debacle 
 
1.0. Introduction 
 
Early in 2007, after a decade of insatiable demand for property, the real estate industry 
stood at the forefront of Spanish capitalism. Pundits had warned that the conjuncture 
would not last forever, but the worst-case scenario envisioned was a ‘soft landing’ in 
the mid-term. That summer, however, the world was stunned by the outbreak of 
subprime mortgage crisis in the United States, sending violent shockwaves throughout 
the circuits of global finance. First in line were the banks of the United Kingdom, 
heavily exposed to American mortgage-backed debt, strangling the British housing 
market in the process. A knock-on effect was the slump in demand for homes in the 
favourite retirement destination of Britain’s expatriates: the Spanish Mediterranean 
coast. In the coming months, Spanish home prices peaked and entered a downward 
trend, gaining momentum on their way down (Naredo, 2010). At the time, the 
government was in the control of the centre-left Partido Socialista (PSOE), headed by 
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who had presided over the booming years of the middle 
of the decade. Zapatero was re-elected in March 2008, before the worst effects of the 
crisis manifested and after repeatedly denying the gravity of circumstances (Ayala, 
2010). But that summer, the country’s titanic construction industry finally imploded, 
destroying millions of jobs in the process. In line with European prescriptions at the 
time, the government responded with a stimulus package (Plan E); a poorly executed 
measure that proved to be a highly tenuous fix. The housing market continued to 
unravel, and, as it spun out of control, thousands of families were gusted out of their 
homes and a debris of billions worth of toxic assets landed on the books of financial 
institutions. The great crisis of residential capitalism had begun.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a critical review of the accounts explaining 
this generation-defining moment.  It will identify three broad ‘narratives’ in the telling 
of the story, unpacking their arguments against the unfolding of the crisis for better 
context. The broad contours of each narrative will be outlined in a series of premises, 
taking care to acknowledge the different versions of the story within each paradigm. 
The first discussed is the immaturity narrative (1.1), which blames the crisis on 
political distortions of the market economy; a pathological pattern of development that 
is said to be shared by other countries of the European periphery. The second is the 
core-periphery narrative (1.2), which situates the Spanish crash within the broader 
crisis of the European periphery and allocates causal primacy to external economic 
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imbalances occasioned by the design of the European Monetary Union. The third is the 
spatial fix narrative (1.3), which explains the crisis through the specialisation of 
Spanish capitalism on real estate after the crisis of manufacturing of the 1970s. The 
chapter concludes with a critical analysis of the limits of each narrative (1.4), arguing 
that they all are underequipped to represent the role of the political in their recounting 
of the Spanish path into the crisis. Either because the political is reduced to the 
cartoonish role of always distorting an otherwise perfect market economy, or because 
the political is reduced to a function of a macrostructural logic, the role of power 
struggles in the shaping of the Spanish experience tends to disappear into the 
background of these narratives.   
 
1.1. The Immaturity Narrative 
 
The global financial crisis morphed into the European debt crisis in December 2009, 
when the Greek government revealed the critical state of that country’s national 
accounts. In the process, they admitted what many had long suspected: for years, 
successive administrations had been obscuring the true scale of the Greece’s public 
debt (BBC, 2012b). Credit-rating agencies swiftly downgraded the worth of Greek 
bonds. Six months later, at the incredulity of capital markets as to their solvency, the 
Greek government applied for funds from the so-called ‘Troika’.2 The prospect of a 
sovereign default in the heart of Europe – and, by extension, of a breakup of the 
Eurozone – started to seem like a real possibility. Alarms were raised about other 
European economies in distress, prompting the devaluation of their bonds as well: the 
feared ‘contagion effect’. To designate these rogue nations, an unflattering acronym 
gained currency: PIIGS – Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and of course, Spain.3 
 
The narrative of the crisis disseminated by mainstream media outlets became 
refocused around the creditworthiness of these countries (see Mirowski, 2013). From 
the start of 2010, pressure began to build against the governments of the PIIGS to take 
measures that would restore their credibility with investors. Under pressure from the 
ECB, in May 2010 Zapatero reversed his previous stimulus policies to introduce harsh 
austerity measures. The axe fell on civil servants, pensions, and on a vast array of social 
expenditures. Zapatero justified his capitulation from the grandstand of the Spanish 
                                                        
2 The triad of formed by the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary 
Fund.  
3 The acronym ‘PIGS’ originated in the world of financial trading, where it appears to have already been 
in usage in 1979 to collectively refer to the economies of the European south (Koba, 2012). It rose to 
popularity in the aftermath of the global financial crisis to refer to the debt-stricken European periphery. 
At the time, an additional ‘I’ was added to include Ireland.  
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Congress: ‘It is now more than ever that we need investors on our side, to offer an 
image of stability’ (Romero, 2010). Echoing the arguments of neoliberal governments 
elsewhere, one of his ministers went further: ‘we have been living beyond our means 
and it is now time to buckle up’ (Blanco, quoted in Recuero & Delgado, 2011). The 
conservative Partido Popular soon appropriated this discourse and turned it against 
the socialists, accusing them of not having adopted the necessary measures in time. In 
the process, the conservative opposition styled themselves as the sole credible 
interpreters of the word of ‘the markets’, which they referred to almost as a force of 
nature. In September, to the dismay of Zapatero’s electorate, the Spanish parliament 
passed a labour reform to flexibilise employment contracts and a constitutional 
amendment to cap future budget deficits, all to reassure ‘the markets’ (BBC, 2012b). 
But Zapatero’s offerings did not deliver the favour of these faceless deities. The 
opposition’s discourse gained credence, and in a general election two months later, the 
conservative candidate, Mariano Rajoy, won a huge landslide victory. In the coming 
months, the new government proceeded to undertake aggressive structural reforms in 
accordance with the dictates of European elites. In the words of the European Finance 
Commissioner Pierre Moscovici, Spain was to become their ‘model pupil’ (quoted in 
Tahiri, 2016).  
 
This chain of events reflects the rise of a particular way of telling the story of the crisis 
in this period: the immaturity narrative. Put simply, this view attributes the causes of 
the Euro crisis to supposed malformations within the countries affected (The 
Economist, 2010; Krugman, 2010; Stiglitz, 2014; JP Morgan, 2013; Alesina et. al., 
2017; for a discussion see Dooley, 2015; Togati, 2011). The broad contours of this story 
can be summarised as follows: (1) Pathological patterns of development within the 
PIIGS made them diverge from advanced European standards, rendering them fragile 
to the shocks of the global financial crisis. These national legacies vary from country to 
country, though they all share a negative influence on the economic performance of 
their country. (2) This negative influence manifests in similar symptoms across the 
PIIGS. In particular, the countries of the European south are said to be overly attached 
to their inefficient labour standards and bloated welfare states. (3) The elites of these 
countries have demonstrated a short-sightedness to correct these structural 
weaknesses, and even complicity with the sources of the problems, be it for electoral 
reasons or due to outright corruption. (4) The PIIGS need to demonstrate a willingness 
to ‘grow up’ and undertake long overdue structural reforms. The goal should be to 
converge with the neighbours of the European core, even if this requires the 
technocratic imposition of measures unpalatable for the masses.  
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There are two different versions of this story, reflecting a factional divide at the apex 
of European politics. One the one hand there is the ordoliberal version of the 
immaturity narrative, informed by the neoliberal orthodoxy of new neoclassical 
economics. On the other hand, there is the dirigiste version, informed by the neoliberal 
heterodoxy of new Keynesian economics (Togati, 2011:92-94).4 The main divide 
between these two strands revolves around the role of European institutions, both in 
the run-up to and during the management of the crisis.  
 
Backed by theorists of the ‘Optimum Currency Areas’ (Krugman, 2010; 2015a; 2015b; 
Stiglitz, 2014), the dirigiste thesis urges the creation of pan-European mechanisms of 
macroeconomic stabilisation. According to this view, successful monetary unions 
require a certain homogeneity between their constitutive parts (e.g. synchronised 
business cycles, similar wage and price flexibilities, labour mobility) as well as a fiscal 
union on the same scale to offset the geographical imbalances caused by monetary 
unification. For proponents of this view, the European Monetary Union was launched 
prematurely, as it lacked the necessary convergence between its member states, as well 
as a fiscal union and a central bank with lender of last resort functions.5  
 
By contrast, the ordoliberal thesis is sceptical of any need for pan-European 
mechanisms of macroeconomic stabilisation. This view is informed by ‘Say’s Law’, the 
neoclassical belief that, with the right incentives, supply generates its own demand. In 
other words, provided that markets are flexible enough, market success will translate 
into wealth creation and this alone should boost economic growth. Any other form of 
demand management – say, a continent-wide stimulus package – will only serve to 
crowd out private investment and hamper growth.  The response to the crisis should 
be restricted to domestic shock treatments of market liberalisation, tight demand 
policies, and disinflationary restrictions. Beyond some academic supporters (e.g. 
Alesina, 2012), these prescriptions were most clearly articulated in the editorials of the 
specialist press (e.g. The Economist, 2010) and in the reports of institutional investors:   
 
[It] has become apparent that there are deep seated political problems in the 
periphery, which, in our view, need to change if EMU is going to function 
                                                        
4 It may appear harsh to lump together new Keynesian thought under the neoliberal label. However, this 
strand of Keynesian thought shares a great deal with neoliberal reason. In the words of Paul Krugman 
himself: ‘the brand of economics I use in my daily work […] combines the grand tradition of 
microeconomics, with its emphasis on how the invisible hand leads to generally desirable outcomes, with 
Keynesian macroeconomics’ (emphasis added, quoted in Mirowski, 2013:21). 
5 By design, the ECB was never equipped with lender of last resort functions. See below for more details.  
 25 
properly in the long run. […] Constitutions tend to show a strong socialist 
influence, reflecting the political strength that left wing parties gained after the 
defeat of fascism. Political systems around the periphery typically 
display several of the following features: weak executives; weak central states 
relative to regions; constitutional protection of labor rights; consensus building 
systems which foster political clientelism; and the right to protest if unwelcome 
changes are made to the political status quo (JP Morgan, 2013). 
 
Yet, whether the solution is ‘austerity plus market liberalisation’ (ordoliberal thesis) or 
just ‘stimulus plus market liberalisation’ (dirigiste thesis), in both cases a fundamental 
point remains the same: the lagging periphery of the PIIGS ought to come to its senses 
and undertake supply-side reforms to converge with the more advanced core, generally 
exemplified by Germany. This narrative was often embraced by the general press, 
which did not hesitate to resort to patronising stereotypes to conjure up a fundamental 
antagonism between the cold and disciplined national cultures of the north and the 
inherent indolence of the south. For example, an article in the German magazine Der 
Spiegel (hardly a tabloid) described changes in Spanish labour legislation as a Troika-
imposed abolition of the siesta, claiming that the country had come to realise that ‘it 
could no longer afford to “lounge about” in the midst of a national bankruptcy’ (Höfer, 
2013). Even though the labour reform addressed nothing of the sort, the article went 
on to discuss Spanish sleeping patterns and the country’s supposedly laid-back 
lifestyle. The irony is that the article was written in good faith, as a defence of the ‘Latin 
culture of rest and leisure’ in its ‘cultural struggle’ against ‘Prussian virtues’.   
 
Following the schema outlined earlier, the Spanish rendition of the immaturity 
narrative goes as follows: (1) The performance of the Spanish economy is distorted by 
long-entrenched inefficient institutions. These include: (a) a highly decentralised 
state, with a weak executive relative to regions, in which important economic functions 
are devolved to a large number of regional administrations (JP Morgan, 2013:12-13; 
Royo, 2014:2). The multiplicity of this complex political structure complicates the 
coordinated implementation of necessary structural reforms. (b) An excessively rigid 
labour market, built upon an inflexible system of collective bargaining and a stark 
contrast between permanent and temporary contracts (Ortega & Peñalosa, 2012). This 
harmed the overall competitiveness of the Spanish economy and encouraged firms to 
rely heavily on temporary work, rendering the labour market fragile to shocks. (c) A 
large and highly politicised savings banks sector, the now infamous cajas de ahorro, 
which amounted to almost half of the financial system at the time of the crisis. These 
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institutions are the focus of most immaturity accounts (Cuñat & Garicano, 2009; 
Monter, 2011; Garicano, 2012; Royo, 2014; Quaglia & Royo, 2015). 
 
(2) The property boom of the 2000s concealed the problems of the Spanish economy 
lurking beneath the surface. Unlike other peripheral countries, Spain entered the 
global financial crisis on the back of sustained current account surpluses and with a 
low public debt to GDP ratio. Due to this characteristic, accounts of Spanish 
immaturity have tended to focus less on Greek-style ‘chronic fiscal misbehaviour’ and 
more on why the symptoms of immaturity were not immediately apparent.6 This 
paradox is usually explained away with the burst of cheap credit brought on by the 
formation of the Euro: the influx of finance facilitated by the single currency delivered 
high levels of growth and rising property values. This created illusory wealth effect that 
only served to conceal underlying problems of competitiveness which then surfaced 
during the crisis. Often cited as a manifestation of this structural weakness is the 
enormous scale of job destruction after 2007, which exposed the lack of resilience of 
vast swathes of the economy (Ortega & Peñalosa, 2012:19; Royo, 2014:12).  
 
(3) The political distortion of the financial system, and in particular of the savings 
banks, underpinned an excessive expansion of credit in the decade preceding the crisis. 
The main target of this analysis are the distinct corporate governance structures of the 
cajas de ahorros, which granted local and regional governments the power to appoint 
subordinates, often without the necessary qualifications, into their executive boards 
(Cuñat & Garicano, 2009). The political capture of these institutions meant that the 
savings banks often allocated credit with the electoral interests of their regional 
political patrons in mind. The boost of real estate credit played a central role in this 
process. Acting as a quantitative easing of sorts, the property boom ‘had an effect on 
policy choices because no government was willing to burst the bubble and risk 
suffering the electorate’s displeasure’ (Royo, 2014:12). But political meddling is also 
blamed for the management of the crisis itself: ‘Even more important was the role of 
these political connections in diluting the role of the supervisor after the crisis started, 
in what was meant to be the crisis resolution stage but which was in fact a crisis cover 
up stage’ (Garicano, 2012). Despite overwhelming evidence that the cajas were busy 
reclassifying, refinancing and extending loans to conceal their losses between 2008-
                                                        
6 There are exceptions, of course. Neoliberal hardliners Ángel Gavilán et al. (2011:90-92) still manage to 
cast the blame on excessive government spending. For these authors, the Spanish bubble can simply ‘be 
rationalised as the natural reaction of the economy to the observed developments in interest rates and 
demographic variables. However, it could be argued that alternative policies could have been adopted to 
prevent such a large accumulation of private indebtedness’. What would these alternative policies be? ‘a 
reduction in government consumption’ and ‘a structural reform in the product market’.  
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2010, the Bank of Spain looked the other way to avoid confronting and exposing the 
political interests underpinning these losses. 
 
(4) From this logic follows the necessity of certain measures, including a labour market 
reform and a ‘depoliticisation’ of the savings banking industry, to let the market 
operate optimally. Immaturity theorists have recurrently noted the ‘urgency to adapt’ 
Spain’s factor markets, i.e. the need for greater flexibility in employment practices 
(Ortega & Peñalosa, 2012). The differential impact of the crisis on credit institutions is 
also cited as evidence of the need to align the corporate governance of the cajas to those 
of the commercial banks. Although the largest commercial banks (Santander and 
BBVA) faced serious losses during the global financial crisis, the European stress tests 
of 2010 revealed a great capacity for resilience, and overall no major bank would come 
to require public capitalisation during the crisis (Poveda, 2012:261). By contrast, when 
the real estate market collapsed, the cajas de ahorro were left holding a giant bag of 
toxic property assets. The three largest cajas in distress alone required an amount of 
public capitalisation equivalent to 5% of GDP (Garicano, 2012). The uneven effects of 
the crisis amongst banks and cajas are universally ascribed to the political meddling 
of local and regional governments in the management of the savings banks. 
  
1.2. The Core-Periphery Narrative 
 
In February 2012, in a moment perfectly staged for the cameras, Spanish Finance 
Minister Luís de Guindos whispered into the ear of European Commissioner Oli Rehn: 
‘Tomorrow we approve the reform of the labour market, you will see that it is going to 
be extremely aggressive, with a lot of flexibility around collective bargaining 
agreements and a reduction in severance payments’ (Pérez, 2012). This was a veiled 
message to investors in an effort to regain their confidence. However, the stunt did not 
work out as expected: in May, Bankia, a large bank recently formed out of the merger 
of several cajas, collapsed. The worth of Spanish bonds began to devaluate quickly, and 
in yet another desperate attempt to appease the wrath of the markets, the government 
approved the largest cut to public spending in recent history. In exchange for these 
measures, in the summer the European Union agreed to a €100bn loan to recapitalise 
the Spanish financial system. In an effort to save face, Guindos insisted: ‘In no way is 
this a bailout, it is a loan with very favourable terms’ (Abend, 2012). The international 
press (Time magazine) responded: ‘you say tomato, I say bailout’. Spanish bonds got 
no respite from capital markets.  
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The storm ended in August, quite abruptly and for reasons quite different to those 
expected. All it took was for Mario Draghi, chairman of the European Central Bank, to 
pronounce a few seemingly magic words: ‘the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to 
preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough’ (ECB, 2012). As it turned out, the 
turbulence in European bond markets was caused by a large-scale speculative attack 
on peripheral debt. Knowing that the ECB lacked the mechanisms to act as lender of 
last resort, institutional investors had been betting on the prospect of the PIIGS 
defaulting on their debt (Wahl, 2012). To do so, investors purchased credit default 
swaps, derivative contracts that insured them against the default of a sovereign nation, 
only to sell their peripheral bonds en masse, prompting their devaluation on capital 
markets. The point was to create a self-fulfilling prophecy: by pushing entire countries 
to the verge of bankruptcy, they were seeking to cash in on their insurance that those 
countries would indeed go bankrupt. When Draghi suggested that the ECB would do 
‘anything’ to save the Eurozone from disintegration, it was understood that the central 
bank would step in to prevent a sovereign default if it had to. The game was over.  
 
The ordoliberal side of the story was highly discredited by these events: since 2010, the 
‘Brussels-Frankfurt consensus’ had insisted that individual structural reforms would 
suffice to appease capital markets (Pérez, 2014). However, not only were investors not 
responding as they should, but their speculative attacks were being rallied by the crown 
jewel of German finance: Deutsche Bank (Wahl, 2012). The effectiveness of the ECB’s 
intervention vindicated those who had all along argued that the EMU needed strong 
institutions if it was to survive. Yet warnings about the usage of credit default swaps to 
engage in speculative attacks had been circulating in the financial press for some time 
(see Alloway, 2011; Wallace, 2012). The passivity of European elites at the predatory 
behaviour of institutional investors opened the door to more critical narratives.  
 
Over the years, a different interpretation has gained salience in academia: the core-
periphery narrative. Embraced by a fairly broad spectrum of academic studies, this 
paradigm refocuses the story around the structures of monetary integration, which are 
said to have confined the periphery to a position of subordination from the core (see 
van Apledoorn, 2009; Lucarelli, 2011; Lapavitsas et al., 2012; Rodrigues and Reis, 
2012; Overbeek, 2012; Becker and Jäger, 2012; Gambarotto & Solari, 2015; Bieling, 
2015; Stockhammer, 2016). According to this view, the boom and bust of the European 
periphery in general, and of the Spanish economy in particular, can be attributed to 
the workings of exogenous macro-structural factors.  
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For all its internal diversity, the main thrust of this narrative can be summarised in 
three points: (1) The starting premise of the core-periphery story is that the economic 
imbalances mounting in peripheral economies during the run-up to the crash have 
their origin in the structural design of the Eurozone. On this point, core-periphery 
theorists agree, to some extent, with the new Keynesians. The foundations of the EMU 
– as laid down by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 – did not envision the need for 
substantial coordination amongst member states on economic matters other than in 
monetary policy, which was tasked with a strict, continent-wide control of inflation. 
The levers of monetary policy were insourced to a central bank modelled along the 
lines of the German Bundesbank, an institution independent from government 
control, designed to guard its anti-inflationary mission from ‘political’ interference. On 
top of this, the Stability Pact of 1997 ensured that the nascent European Central Bank 
could not engage in quantitative easing or act as a lender of last resort. Thus, when 
prospective member states passed the disinflationary test of the Maastricht criteria, 
they gave up their monetary sovereignty to join a currency union without a 
corresponding fiscal framework on the same scale and in which continent-wide 
stimulus policies had been ruled out from the start (Lucarelli, 2011; Lapavitsas et al., 
2012).  
 
Bailey et al. (2017:9) summarise it this way: ‘critical political economists could declare 
[that] the European Union is imposing disciplinary neoliberalism on radical Greek 
dissidents, not because of an inherent antipathy between “hardworking Germans” and 
“lazy Greeks”, but precisely because the European Union has been created as a 
neoliberal institution and therefore knows no solution to neoliberal problems other 
than neoliberal ones’. However, different perspectives explain the rationale of this 
neoliberal design differently. Depending on the approach, it is said to be either (a) a 
design flaw informed by the spell of macroeconomic theories (Togati, 2011; Hall, 
2014:1224), or (b) a deliberate skew reflecting the interests of the leading elements 
within the European transnational capitalist class (van Apledoorn, 2009; Rodrigues 
and Reis, 2012; Bieling, 2015).  
 
(2) From this structural design emerged two economic poles in the continent. The loss 
of monetary sovereignty within the currency union prevented its southern members 
from resorting to strategies of currency devaluation to heighten the competitiveness of 
their exports (Lapavitsas et al., 2012). In this context, and without fiscal transfers at a 
continental scale to balance out the uneven effects of a single monetary policy, the 
Eurozone became divided between those economies that responded better to the 
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disinflationary impulse hardwired into the design of the Eurozone (the core) and those 
who lost out because of it (the periphery). Beyond this point there is heated debate as 
to the exact source of this divergence. For authors from the ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
tradition (Hall, 2014; Johnston et al., 2015), the core-periphery divide reflects basic 
differences between the political economies of northern and southern Europe. 
Whereas the northern variety of capitalism is underpinned by ‘high levels of wage 
coordination, sophisticated systems of vocational training, the inter-firm relations 
necessary to operate collaborative research and development, and intra-firm 
relationships that promote continuous innovation and quality control’, in the 
Mediterranean variety ‘wage bargaining is difficult to coordinate because trade unions 
are relatively strong’ and ‘employer associations are less deeply institutionalised’ (Hall, 
2014:1225). By contrast, for Marxists like Lapavitsas et al. (2012), the competitive 
advantage of the core lies in its capacity to entertain a ‘beggar thy neighbour’ strategy. 
Focusing on Germany, this account focuses on the take-off of German exports around 
the turn of the millennium. This development is explained by the labour reforms of 
this period (Hartz Plan), which repressed wages and flexibilised the labour market in 
order to reduce labour-units costs. In turn, these measures gave rise to a ‘neo-
mercantilist policy’: in supressing domestic demand, self-imposed austerity prevented 
the penetration of foreign imports into the domestic market and maximised surpluses 
in external accounts (Lucarelli, 2011; Bellofiore & Halevi, 2010; Bellofiore, 2013). 
 
It is worth remarking that, whereas the countries of the periphery are very clearly 
delimitated (i.e. the PIIGS), the core has a much more imprecise definition and varies 
considerably from author to author. For Overbeek (2012), the core is essentially 
constituted by the members of the former Deutschmark-zone: Germany, the 
Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium. Hall (2014) agrees with this list but supplements 
it with Finland. Lapavitsas et al. (2012) add France to the equation but drop Austria. 
By contrast, Gambarotto and Solari (2015) boil the core down to its very essence: West 
Germany and some other urban areas of the continent (e.g. Milan). In short, beyond 
West Germany, which unambiguously forms ‘the core of the core’, the geographical 
contours of this notion stretch in a nebulous arc across the European north-west.  
 
(3) The export-led models of the core and the debt-fuelled models of the periphery 
developed a symbiotic interrelationship. Put simply, the trade surpluses piling up in 
the core were recycled as capital exports to the deficit countries of the periphery, 
something that in turn ensured their continued absorption of the core's exports 
(Becker & Jäger, 2012; Lapavitsas et al., 2012; Stockhammer, 2016). This funnelling of 
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capital towards the banks of the periphery facilitated the overflow of investment 
towards speculative ventures: ‘At the root of the crisis is a build-up of debt, fuelled by 
debt-driven and export-driven variants of neoliberal growth models’ (Stockhammer, 
2016:374).  This was particularly the case in those peripheral countries that joined the 
Eurozone with overvalued currencies, like Ireland or Spain, allowing capital flows to 
meet negative interest rates as they landed. This flooded these economies with cheap 
credit, resulting in the inflation of property bubbles (Angelini & Farina, 2011; Febrero 
& Bermejo, 2013; Garcia Arias et al., 2013; Baccaro & Tober, 2017). The illusory effects 
of their property bubbles are the reason why these countries were able to combine 
current account surpluses and high levels of growth with a mounting balance of trade 
deficit.  
 
It is worth noting that some studies frame the core-periphery dynamics of the 
Eurozone within the broader cartography of the global economy. According to this 
view, European core-periphery dynamics are a mere meso-level reflection of a pattern 
by which a handful of privileged countries everywhere – the European core amongst 
them – perpetuate their power by cornering the most remunerative forms of 
commodity production and subjugate the global periphery into never-ending spirals of 
debt (Fouskas & Dimoulas, 2013; Gambarotto & Solari, 2015). Another ‘global’ take 
represents European core-periphery dynamics as a symbiosis between two global 
‘varieties of financialisation’. As Álvarez (2013:1) puts it:  
 
On the one hand, some economies have presented strong capital inflows 
resulting in relatively high economic growth, huge credit and real estate 
bubbles and significant current account deficits (U.S., Ireland, Spain, Portugal, 
Iceland). Other developed countries (Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Japan) 
experienced an export-led growth model with modest investment, 
consumption and GDP growth rates, and with trade surplus that have been 
used to finance credit bubbles of the first group. 
 
Along these lines, Varoufakis (2011) has argued that the European periphery acts as a 
consumer of last resort for German exports, emulating the role the United States has 
performed since the 1970s for global capitalism as whole. Back then, the Unites States 
began to allow its balance of trade to deteriorate, absorbing the industrial surpluses of 
its trading partners –Germany, Japan, and later, China – in exchange for the 
reinvestment of their profits in US government bonds. This constant influx of financial 
flows allowed the American state to sustain enormous levels of public debt, and to 
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deepen the supply of credit at home. Germany's role in Europe was an attempt to 
extend this process to the Eurozone, using the economies of the south as a consumer 
of last resort for its exports, and as recipients of its recycled profits (ibid.:261-5).  
 
1.3. The Spatial Fix Narrative 
 
Around 2013, images of dramatic home repossessions started to recur in the news on 
a daily basis. The eviction crisis struck a nerve in a society as propertied as the Spanish. 
But all the more harrowing was the absence of limited liability in Spanish mortgage 
laws: property repossessions did not cancel out one’s debt with the bank, and given the 
dramatic drop in real estate prices, negative equity often meant that the repossessed 
had to continue paying their mortgages despite having lost their homes (Coq-Huelva, 
2013). All of this was coupled with a growing realisation that neoliberal solutions no 
longer made sense but nevertheless kept stumbling forward amid growing repression. 
The austerity measures introduced after 2010 had only served to depress effective 
demand and to aggravate the fiscal position of the state. Successive labour market 
reforms in 2011 and 2012 failed to curtail unemployment, which continued to surge to 
new heights.7 The discourses appealing to the populace to make sacrifices for the sake 
of the economy contrasted with the indifference of investors. The logic of ‘austerity’ 
championed by the government clashed with the extravagant corruption scandals 
afflicting the local officials of the party in power. Urban space became the locus of the 
anti-austerity movement, as protestors occupied public areas to achieve visibility, 
blocked streets to prevent the enforcement of the evictions, and squatted abandoned 
buildings to house the dispossessed (Alemany & Colau, 2012; García-Lamarca & Kaika, 
2016). These events have sparked a growing critical inquiry around the role of space in 
the boom and bust of Spanish capitalism, spawning a small but highly sophisticated 
body of literature around this issue (López & Rodríguez, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Delgado, 
2011; Coq-Huelva, 2013; Charnock et al., 2014).  
 
All of these studies are inspired by the highly influential work of Marxist political 
geographer David Harvey, whose prolific writings have explored the spatial 
dimensions of Karl Marx’s theory of capital accumulation (e.g. Harvey 1978, 1982, 
2003). To do this, Harvey abstracts the process of capital accumulation into three 
separate but interconnected circuits (Harvey 1978:106-108). According to this 
conceptualisation, traditional patterns of investment in commodity manufacturing – 
                                                        
7 Between 2011 and 2013, unemployment climbed up from 20% to 26%. The figure surged from 44% to 
56% amongst the under 25 (datosmacro.com). 
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the locus of Marx’s Capital – merely constitute the primary circuit of capital 
accumulation. By contrast, investment in the ‘built environment’ – a term that 
encompasses all the infrastructure necessary for continued production and 
consumption – constitutes the secondary circuit, whereas investment in upgrading 
the work process (e.g. technology or ‘human capital’) constitutes the tertiary circuit. 
Central to Marx’s theory of capital accumulation is the idea that capitalist competition 
compels the development of the productive forces regardless of the capacity of the 
market to absorb the output; a contradiction that results in recurring overloads and 
blockages in the circuit of capital (i.e. overaccumulation). Predictably, when crises of 
this sort arise, firms struggling to secure a turnover will try to eschew their losses by 
getting rid of their assets. But equally likely is that, as soon as the first signs of 
overaccumulation appear (i.e. thinning profitability), capitalists will manoeuvre in 
anticipation of the coming shock. Here, Harvey’s work introduces an important 
corollary: to deflect the effect of coming crises, capital accumulation ‘switches’ between 
circuits of accumulation. The tempo of these switches form the backbone of Harvey’s 
theory of the urban process under capitalism: the acceleration of investment in the 
built environment is a manifestation of mounting overaccumulation elsewhere in the 
economy. 
 
The switch between circuits forms part of Harvey’s broader notion of the ‘spatial fix’, 
later expanded to ‘spatio-temporal fix’, a concept that seeks to flesh out the ways in 
which capital displaces or delays the effects of overaccumulation. The term ‘fix’ has a 
double meaning here: on the one hand, the switch to the built environment implies 
that investment flowing out of the primary circuit becomes ‘literally fixed in and on the 
land in some physical form for a relatively long period of time’ (Harvey, 2003:115). On 
the other hand, the fix also implies a temporal solution to problems of 
overaccumulation building up in the primary circuit. Of course, these fixes are neither 
simple nor automatic and require a considerable intervention by finance to syphon 
capital out of one circuit and funnel it into another. In other words, the mechanics of 
Harvey’s model presuppose the existence of a functioning capital market or a state 
willing to finance and guarantee investments in the built environment. Together, these 
mediating institutions form the ‘collective nerve centre’ of capital accumulation and 
any considerable alteration in these structures will predictably affect ‘both the volume 
and direction of the capital flows by constricting movement down some channels and 
opening up new conduits elsewhere’ (Harvey, 1978:107). However, chronic 
overaccumulation is bound to build up in the built environment too (e.g. housing 
bubbles), leading to short-circuits in the collective nerve centre that will manifest as 
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banking crashes or as public debt crises.  
 
The adaptation of Harvey’s schema to the Spanish experience could be summarised as 
follows: (1) The story begins with a crisis in the primary circuit of accumulation: the 
exhaustion of the wave of industrialisation of the 1960s. In this period, the dictatorship 
of General Franco (1939-1975) embarked upon a policy of French-style plans of 
industrial development that was styled as ‘developmentalism’ (desarrollismo). After 
more than a decade of extremely fast growth – 7% GDP growth between 1961-1974 – 
the country succeeded in climbing up the value chain by developing an industrial base 
around the production of automobiles and electrical appliances (Amodia et al., 1998; 
Catalán, 2003). The speed of these advances owes to the initial backwardness of 
Spanish industry, which imported obsolete equipment from Western Europe to catch 
up with its neighbours at a breath-taking pace. This ‘leapfrogging’ process ran out of 
steam during the stagflation crisis of the 1970s and was followed by de-
industrialisation efforts in the coming decade.   
 
The crisis tends to be framed as an outcome of the inherent contradictions of this wave 
of industrialisation: ‘[it] was always doomed to failure’ (Charnock et al. 2014:44). 
Writing from a regulationist perspective, López & Rodríguez (2010:137-142) argue that 
the root of the problem was that Spain embarked upon a project of Fordist mass 
production without the stabilisers that elsewhere supported this regime of 
accumulation.8 Without a system of high wages and collective bargaining to ensure 
that labour could act as a domestic market for mass produced goods, Spanish Fordism 
always carried a fragile dependence on foreign demand that was quickly shattered 
when the stagflation crisis ravaged its markets abroad. Charnock et al. (2014:35-58) 
put it slightly differently: rather than Western-style Fordism, Francoist 
developmentalism would have displayed features much closer to that of Latin 
American Import-Substitution Industrialisation (ISI).9 The comparison with Latin 
America arises from a shared reliance on ground-rent extraction and the exploitation 
of irreplaceable geographical factors in order to transfer resources to the nascent 
                                                        
8 ‘Fordism’ denotes a specific social formation (or mode of regulation) incubated in the United States 
during the interwar years that then spread to Western Europe in the midst of post-war reconstruction 
(Harvey, 1991). It denotes a social pact by which industrial capital and proletariat strike a class 
compromise to exchange high wages, full employment, and social provision for high levels of effective 
demand and diminished unrest, something that temporarily suspends the social contradictions of 
capitalist accumulation (Aglietta, 1998). 
9 ISI refers to the developmental strategies that became popular amongst late industrialisers in the post-
war period, often in the Global South but also in the authoritarian states of southern Europe, to escape 
their dependence on manufactured imports and overturn their ‘peripheral’ status in the world economy. 
The ultimate objective was to nurture an autochthonous industrial base with the aid of tariffs, import 
controls, fiscal policy, and public finance (Kiely, 2007:52). 
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industrial sector (Charnock et al., 2014:38). In Spain, this happened through the 
exploitation of the Mediterranean coast as a magnet for northern European tourism to 
secure the foreign reserves needed to purchase industrial equipment abroad. In any 
case, the upshot of the argument remains fairly similar in both cases: due to the deficits 
of its industrial base, Spanish industrialisation had to be balanced with external 
lifelines and was thus particularly exposed to the recession that hit its trading partners 
in the mid-1970s.  
 
(2) When the primary circuit of accumulation faltered, the secondary circuit kicked in. 
There are two different interpretations of this process. (a) The fix as cyclical phases of 
accelerated investment in the built environment. This is the account put forward by 
Charnock et al. (2014, 92-93), which most strictly follows Harvey’s schema. For these 
authors, long-term industrial decline has triggered three ‘fixes’ since the 1970s, each 
occurring in the crest of increasingly shorter business cycles, anticipating and delaying 
downturns in the primary circuit. The first (1969-1974) overlapped with the final years 
of developmentalism, when urban areas sprawled uncontrollably to accompany the 
needs of a (still) booming industrial base. Following a weak industrial recovery, the 
second (1986-1992) kicked in with the influx of capital that came with Spain’s 
accession to the European Single Market, a process that resulted in the inflation of a 
housing bubble. Finally, the third fix (1997-2007) was the large housing bubble that 
burst with the global financial crisis. (b) The fix as a single continuous process. Most 
authors are less orthodox in their application of the capital switching framework, and 
rather than cyclical surges, they tend to characterise the focus on the built environment 
as a constant feature of Spanish capitalism since the 1970s (Delgado, 2011; López & 
Rodríguez, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Coq-Huelva, 2013). According to this second reading, 
the switch coalesced around the 1980s, when the state assumed a more active role in 
channelling investment into the real estate sector. A pivotal measure in this process 
was the so-called ‘Boyer Decree’ of 1985, which provided strong fiscal incentives for 
home-ownership in an effort to stimulate the housing market (López & Rodríguez, 
2011a). Over the years, the state marginalised alternative forms of tenure (e.g. rent, 
social housing) and designed land-use policies in an effort to create a good business 
climate to attract private investment.  
 
(3) The functioning of the secondary circuit was mediated by competition between the 
local scales of the state. The collapse of General Franco’s centralised state in the late 
1970s was followed by a constitutional restructuring that created a federal liberal 
democracy. The management of the built environment was devolved to a multiplicity 
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of political nodes. For example, each regional parliament was put in charge of 
legislating its own land-use regulations and local councils gained the capacity to exact 
different property taxes. These new scales of the state became units of inter-urban and 
inter-regional competition. López and Rodríguez (2010:331-354) capture this process 
by borrowing Harvey Molotch’s notion of the ‘growth machine’ (1976; with Logan, 
2007), which conceptualises the alliances formed between public officials and business 
interests to turn their areas into spaces attractive for capital investment. However, 
other authors (Charnock et al., 2014; Coq-Huelva, 2013:1214-1219) prefer to 
conceptualise this dynamic through David Harvey’s own notion of ‘urban 
entrepreneurialism’ (2001 [1989]), which includes other aspects of urban governance 
into the process of inter-urban competition, with a particular emphasis on ‘local 
boosterism’ efforts. Delgado (2011) strikes a similar note in her stress of the 
importance of cultural infrastructure in this process (e.g. gentrification, museums, 
theme parks). Coq-Huelva (2013:1217-1219) has added a layer of Foucauldian 
‘governmentality’ to this analysis, arguing that the new scales of the state became sites 
for the creation and reproduction of subjects well-suited for neoliberal patterns of 
accumulation in the built environment.  
 
(4) The secondary circuit was boosted by developments in European integration and 
in global finance. On this point, authors working within this paradigm tend to intersect 
with the core-periphery narrative. For instance, Charnock et al. (2014:58-81) argue 
that European integration entrenched the Spanish economy in an increasingly 
peripheral position within the international division of labour that emerged after the 
crisis of the 1970s. Entry into the common market accelerated the decline of 
manufacturing in exchange for large waves of foreign investment that ended up in the 
real estate sector. A similar supporting role is reserved to ‘financialisation’ and the 
diffusion of mortgage-backed debt as a mechanism of demand management (López 
and Rodríguez, 2010:85-108). For Coq-Huelva (2013:1226), the clientelist practices 
associated with Spanish urban entrepreneurialism ‘can only be understood in the 
context of a marked affluence in financial resources’. Capital markets abroad became 
a major source of wholesale finance for the cajas, which then channelled cheap credit 
towards construction companies and mortgage loans. In turn, regional politicians 
would use real estate development for local boosterism, selectively ‘chang[ing] land 
designations in agreement with developers who had close relations with financial 
agents’, usually from the local caja (Coq-Huelva, 2015:1222).   
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1.4. Representing the Political: A Critical Review 
 
For all the differences between these narratives (Table 2), they all share a deficiency in 
their lack of representation of the political – the way in which power struggles shaped 
the Spanish path into the crash – even if for different reasons. In what remains of this 
chapter, I will trace the limits of each narrative to its theoretical underpinnings, 
assessing how this affects its perspective of the Spanish debacle.   
 
TABLE 2. SYNOPSIS OF THE THREE NARRATIVES  
  
Immaturity 
Narrative 
 
 
Core-Periphery 
Narrative 
 
Spatial Fix 
Narrative 
 
Sources of Crisis 
 
Endogenous; 
domestic 
weaknesses 
 
Exogenous; 
macroeconomic 
imbalances 
 
Endogenous;  
generic mechanics of 
capital accumulation 
 
 
View of the 
Eurozone 
 
 
Defective, due to a 
lack of 
convergence 
 
 
Defective, due to a 
lack of 
coordination 
 
Aggravator of 
domestic imbalances  
 
Role of Historical 
Institutional 
Legacies 
 
National 
pathologies 
 
 
Competitive 
advantages/ 
disadvantages 
 
 
Policies assisting the 
transfer of capital into 
the built environment 
 
 
Role of Political 
Agency 
 
 
Distortion of the 
market economy 
 
Domination of the 
periphery/  
management  
of competitiveness 
 
 
Enforcement of the 
switch between 
circuits of 
accumulation 
 
 
 
1.4.1. Against Immaturity: The Pitfalls of Neoliberal ‘Politics’ 
 
The immaturity narrative has a complicated relationship with the political due to the 
neoliberal doctrines that underpin this paradigm. Like classical liberals before them, 
neoliberals exalt the virtues of ‘the market’ and are highly suspicious of political agents, 
narrowly defined as non-market actors (trade unions, bureaucrats, policy-makers, 
etc.), which they accuse of being ‘irrational, self-serving, [and] blind to the merits of 
competition’ (Davies, 2018:275). Yet, the paradox is that this libertarian suspicion is 
coupled with the  
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admission, contrary to classical liberal doctrine, that their vision of a good 
society will triumph only if it becomes reconciled with the fact that the 
conditions for its existence must be constructed, and will not come about 
“naturally” in the absence of concerted political effort and organisation 
(Mirowski, 2013:53). 
 
‘The political’ thus constitutes a dangerous but necessary evil, something neoliberals 
can live neither with, nor without (Peck, 2008). Neoliberal thought allocates to the 
state important functions in the defence of the market order, such as enforcing 
property rights and anti-monopoly regulations. But to prevent ‘political’ distortions, it 
becomes imperative to re-imagine public institutions ‘along competitive principles 
where possible, reducing the state’s monopoly power’ (Davies, 2018:278). This seeks 
to curtail the discretionary powers of political actors, but also to protect the market 
from the masses, for whom the benefits of competition are often invisible and who are 
prone to getting carried away by populist demagoguery. In short, for optimal efficiency, 
the rules of competition should be placed out of reach of the whims of democracy, 
beyond the scope of ‘the political’, and confined to the cold reason of technocracy.  
 
This political theory runs through the immaturity narrative in all its forms. Its 
inspiration is plainly evident in its proponents’ diagnosis of the crisis, which identifies 
the PIIGS as pathological market economies distorted by politics. Indeed, there is a 
strong continuity between post-crisis immaturity theories and the pre-crisis 
complaints of Europe’s neoliberal elites, who often expressed their ‘frustration at their 
own inability to achieve what were routinely referred to necessary welfare and labour 
market reforms’ in the formative stages of the Eurozone (Bailey, 2017:8). In this period 
(1985-2007), the efforts to coordinate disinflationary policies via deficit reduction, and 
to increase productivity in the workplace via labour market flexibilisation, were 
regularly floundered by a myriad of ‘political’ reasons, such as working-class unrest.10 
This view lives on in the technocratic lamentations of immaturity accounts, which 
regularly note that governments know what reforms are necessary, but can only hope 
to ‘muddle through’ them (The Economist, 2010). Carlo Bastasin (2012) has gone as 
far as to argue that the problems of the Eurozone lie in the nation-state itself, as 
                                                        
10 It is also worth noting that this same period saw a parallel experimentation with such ‘structural 
reforms’ in the laboratory of the Global South. In the aftermath of the debt crises of Latin America, the 
Bretton Wood Institutions (i.e. International Monetary Fund and World Bank) became the enforcers of 
neoliberal reform through ‘bailout’ packages: the so-called ‘structural adjustment programmes’ (Kiely, 
2007). In many ways, the discourses and practices rolled out to address the European crisis continue this 
tradition folding back upon the Global North.  
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domestic political elites would have not side-lined their convergence commitments 
were it not for the pressures of their domestic electoral cycles. Needless to say, the 
neoliberal conception of ‘the political’ is also patent in the technocratic solutions 
upheld by proponents of immaturity, including the constitutional depoliticisation of 
deficit caps cited earlier.  
 
In turn, this neoliberal conception of the political underpins the unilineal conception 
of development at the heart of immaturity theories. Like modernisation theory during 
its heyday (e.g. Parsons, 1964), immaturity accounts look at internal factors preventing 
backward countries from replicating the patterns of development of advanced nations, 
in this case exemplified by Germany. Whereas in the mid-twentieth century the idea of 
‘modernisation’ was associated with industrialisation and the welfare state, in recent 
decades the standard of progress has become re-centred around policies associated 
with neoliberal globalisation (Streeck, 2010; Srnicek & Williams, 2016). Deviance from 
the norm, as exemplified by the European PIIGS, is assumed to be a consequence of 
political distortions preventing the full realisation of the free market. The insistence to 
blame the ills of the Eurozone on a failure of convergence rests upon the fallacious 
perception that politics is a nuisance to economic development. This assertion is only 
possible when looking at economic relations in the petri dish of economics, a discipline 
founded on the assumption that the laws of the market can be separated from the 
impurities of the political. But once we look at economic relations beyond this 
controlled environment, the modernisation model of immaturity narratives quickly 
breaks down. As McNamara (2015) reminds us, no monetary union has ever been built 
– nor has been attempted to be built – upon optimum technicalities. Currency unions 
are not antiseptic experiments, but messy political projects built with political 
objectives in mind. Only a quick look at the historical record shows how time and time 
again successful currency areas, from the informal Deutschmark-zone to the current 
dollar-zone, have been sustained despite highly heterogeneous foundations 
(Varoufakis, 2015:254). In short, the standard of modernisation expected by 
immaturity accounts is often an impossible one.  
 
But this biased view of the political conceals an even greater problem: contrary to their 
assumptions, there is nothing to suggest that political distortions and market success 
are incompatible. Within the field of corruption studies, a body of literature specialised 
in the highest of all political distortions, recent studies suggest that political corruption 
is not a hindrance to economic development (Okada & Samreth, 2014; Huang, 2016), 
and some have even gone to the chilling length of suggesting that it may even facilitate 
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it (Uberti, 2016). To denounce the Spanish cajas as institutions always bound to self-
destruct is an easy post-fact reconstruction. But for all the corruption they festered, 
even economists admit that ‘up until the current crisis the savings banks had achieved 
very satisfactory results’ (Vives, 2012:48). Unlike the savings banks of other countries, 
the cajas de ahorros successfully weathered the pressures of financial 
disintermediation and, for decades, ‘wrestled market share away from the banks, 
maintained high levels of profitability, and under(took) significant amounts of 
community work’ (ibid.). 
 
Moreover, the same distortive political dynamics that immaturity theorists identify in 
the periphery are also to be found in the core. One ought to look no further than 
Germany itself. Like the Spanish, The German state is highly decentralised, in which 
considerable economic functions are devolved to sixteen federal governments and 
hundreds of local councils, each one equipped with a semi-public savings banks of their 
own (Sparkasse). The structure of the German Sparkassen is remarkably similar to 
that of the Spanish cajas: put simply, local politicians are allowed to handpick 
executives into their boards, granting them a great degree of influence over their 
operations. Much like the cajas used to do in Spain, there is robust evidence that these 
institutions systematically pump finance into the economy ahead of local elections so 
that their political patrons can reap the electoral benefits of this process (Englmaier & 
Stowasser, 2017). Moreover, oversight of the Sparkassen is performed by a handful of 
regional public banks (Landesbanken), which already in the run-up to the crisis were 
known for their ‘long history of corruption and mismanagement’ and their tendency to 
invest ‘in seemingly every bad asset that came their way’ (Ewing, 2013). It is also 
noteworthy that the German financial system required an enormous amount of public 
capitalisation during the crisis. It appears that the main difference between Spanish 
and German banks is that ‘German banks have benefited from a strong national 
economy. They have not had to cope with as many bad home loans and have generally 
not had trouble raising money to lend to their customers’ (ibid.). Perhaps the real 
question, then, should be: why did Spain inflate a destructive property bubble and 
Germany did not?  
 
This takes us back to the research questions outlined earlier: Can the immaturity 
narrative explain the differential features of the Spanish path into the crisis, such as 
the wave of residential overproduction that accompanied the housing bubble? The 
answer is no.  Immaturity accounts remains too committed to a unilineal conception 
of economic development to take seriously the question of why ‘divergent’ paths of 
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development happen – these are generally seen as deviances caused by ‘political’ 
distortions. This neglect, in turn, has a negative knock-on effect on the other sub-
questions of this thesis: the immaturity narrative offers a caricatured picture of 
political drivers of asset-price inflation underpinning the bubble, it neglects the 
historically-specific factors of the Spanish pathway to the crash, and fails to provide 
an accurate depiction the particularities of Spanish capitalism within global 
financialisation. 
 
Ultimately, all these problems stem from an almost cartoonish representation of ‘the 
political’ – a realm that is said to be separate and inherently distortive to an otherwise 
perfect market economy. This narrow representation serves to enshrine market 
competition as the solely acceptable form of struggle and to delegitimise alternative 
forms of struggle as an abnormal nuisance (e.g. electoral competition). While this 
arbitrary distinction may be convenient for the objectives of neoliberal technocracy, 
the idea that ‘the market’ could ever exist without the assistance of non-market logics 
is a fantasy that does not hold up to scrutiny.  
 
1.4.2. Against Core-Periphery Analysis: Blind Spots for Peripheral Difference 
 
The core-periphery narrative is a confluence of much more diverse intellectual sources 
than the immaturity narrative. At least three different theoretical lineages can be 
identified in this story: (a) dependency theory, (b) varieties of capitalism, (c) post-
Keynesian economics. (a) Dependency theory sinks its roots in a mid-twentieth 
century Marxist-inspired critique of modernisation theory, which its proponents 
accused of being founded on the false promise that all economies can achieve 
‘development’. On the contrary, foundational to dependency theory is the belief that 
the development of the global economic core is inversely proportional to the 
underdevelopment of the global periphery (Frank, 1966). This inequality is 
perpetuated over time through the structures of world trade, which reproduce the 
periphery’s subordination to the core’s commercial and financial power. (b) The 
varieties of capitalism approach emerged from an institutionalist critique of 
modernisation theory in the age of globalisation (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Writing at the 
turn of the millennium, this approach argued for the continued success of economies 
less influenced by Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism, seeking to demonstrate ‘a coincidence 
of moral and economic virtue in national economic systems’ and the ‘opportunity to 
choose a more humane alternative to Anglo-American standard capitalism’ (Streeck, 
2010:15). Identifying two main typologies of capitalism – the famous distinction 
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between ‘liberal market economies’ and ‘coordinated market economies’ – each one is 
said to be equipped with a different set of institutional complementarities and 
comparative advantages. (c) Post-Keynesian economics refers to a tradition of 
Keynesian thought that refused to blend with neoclassical economics in the mid-
twentieth century. Unlike its neoliberal cousin (i.e. new Keynesianism), it continues to 
emphasise ‘fundamental uncertainty as a pervasive feature of a capitalist economy’, 
and ‘uses a class-analytic macroeconomic framework’ (Stockhammer, 2016:366). 
Central to the post-Keynesian approach is a focus on effective demand, which its 
theorists use to model growth regimes, as well as the tendency of economies to be 
driven into debt and liquidity over-hangs.  
 
What unites this theoretical diversity into a shared narrative is an ‘exogenous’ 
approach to the causes of the Euro crisis: the idea that the crisis of the European 
periphery has its sources in external economic imbalances occasioned by a macro-
structural relationship between different economic regimes, all mediated by the fiscal 
straightjacket of the monetary union. Varieties of capitalism theorists look at how the 
coordinated economies of the north have outcompeted the Mediterranean economies 
of the south. Dependency Marxists look at how the core uses its structural power to 
subjugate the periphery to its commercial and financial prowess. Post-Keynesians look 
at how the exporting economies of the north dumped their surplus capital onto the 
indebted economies of the south. Though emphases vary, the main takeaway here is 
that the financial crises that ravaged the edges of the continent should be primarily 
understood as a function of external macro-level structures.  
 
The problem with this perspective is that it is tends to ignore the domestic specificities 
of each country. This is most patent in dependency and post-Keynesian approaches, 
for which the crisis of the European periphery ‘landed from the sky’, so to speak. Both 
takes insist that the housing bubbles that formed in countries like Ireland or Spain 
should be seen as knock-on effects of the core’s trading surpluses, which were recycled 
in the form of capital exports to the periphery. That the resulting burst of cheap finance 
would translate into housing bubbles in home-owning societies like those of the 
periphery, where property is in high demand, admittedly makes sense. But this does 
not explain the patterns of residential overproduction that these countries 
experienced, as house-price bubbles are traditionally sustained by a scarcity of 
residential supply (e.g. the UK; see Watson, 2009). Another question begs answering: 
why did other peripheral countries, like Portugal or Italy, not experience analogous 
construction booms of their own?  
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The inability of this narrative to represent peripheral difference is further captured by 
the fact that this model, by which the periphery’s debt originates from the trading 
surpluses of the Eurozone’s core, only holds up if one measures the periphery in 
aggregate. Once we unpack the periphery into its constituent countries, we see 
substantial differences in the origin of their foreign claims (see Fig.5). The core-
periphery model fits the Spanish and Greek cases best, but only if one considers France 
to be part of the Eurozone’s core – which, as we have seen, most authors do not. At 
first glance, the Italian case suggests a similar debt structure, but one must remember 
the notable self-reliance of Italian finance: even at the height of the Euro crisis, Italy's 
foreign debt to GDP was still smaller than that of Germany, and around two thirds that 
of France (BBC, 2011). In the case of Ireland, most foreign finance comes from a non-
Eurozone member state, and, in the case of Portugal, from Spain, another peripheral 
country, disturbing the script core-periphery dynamics altogether. Perhaps Spain’s 
financial dependence on the core is more an exception than the norm? 
 
The problem of representing domestic histories is also patent in the case of the 
varieties of capitalism approach, particularly given its well-known limitations in 
capturing social change (Hancké, 2009:6-12). Theses issue stem from its ‘ideotypical’ 
method. The varieties approach identifies the functional equilibria underpinning 
different institutional formations and classifies them into purified, heuristic typologies 
(Jessop, 2014). The problem is that these taxonomies are ‘still shots’ of history, reified 
representations of a temporary equilibrium that tends to conceal the fundamentally 
processual nature of social institutions. Symptomatic of these limitations is the 
insistence of some of its theorists to continue describing Germany as a ‘coordinated 
market economy’, something that, given how the German economy has become the 
bastion of neoliberal Europe in the meantime, has raised eyebrows even amongst some 
of the earlier adherents of this approach (Streeck, 2010). It should also be noted that 
the criteria informing the original criteria chosen to distinguish between ‘liberal’ and 
‘coordinated’ market economies excluded housing altogether.11 This prism renders us 
blind to the dynamics of residential capitalism and thus seems of little help in 
explaining the particularities of cases such as the Spanish. 
                                                        
11 Ahead of the meltdown of residential capitalism, Schwartz and Seabrooke (2009) crafted a typology of 
‘varieties of residential capitalism’. Their purpose was not so much to explain to crisis as it was to craft a 
new taxonomy and thus they have not been included in this discussion. Their new taxonomy classifies 
residential capitalisms along the axes of owner-occupation and financial structure to create four ideal-
types of housing regimes. Suffice to say that Spain is classified as a ‘familial’ regime, with high levels of 
ownership but, supposedly, with low levels of commodification (i.e. reliance upon mortgage-backed debt). 
An important detail is airbrushed out of the picture: Spain was the second largest issuer of mortgage-
backed securities in the Eurozone when the crisis struck. The problem of representing specificity remains.  
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FIG.5. FOREIGN CLAIMS OF PERIPHERAL BANKS BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
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Source: Bank of International Settlements 
Note: Due to the highly fragmentary data after 2012, the graph has been cut short for Greece, 
Ireland and Italy. The data from France of Q4 2010 Q4 was missing – the data for this quarter 
has been patched up by averaging out the data of 2010 Q3 and 2011 Q1. 
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If, as the old saying goes, history is past politics and politics is present history, then 
one can read into this incapacity to represent peripheral history an inability to take 
peripheral politics seriously. As Bailey et al. (2017:16) note, the Marxist core-periphery 
narrative tends to overstate the European Union as a site of domination, eliding 
moments of working-class resistance on the ground. The same could be said about the 
representation of core-periphery dynamics: like the mid-twentieth century theories 
that preceded them, dependency accounts of the Euro crisis leave very little analytical 
space for the political agency of the periphery other than that of partaking in its own 
domination. In the case of the varieties approach, the problem of representing political 
agency arises from its rational-functionalist bent (Streeck, 2010:21-25). This tradition 
confines its view of the political to (state) interventions seeking to optimise the 
framework within which firms pursue their competitive strategies. Inevitably, this 
tunnel vision reduces the complexity of politics to a managerial function. It is highly 
symptomatic of this difficulty to grapple with the political that an important detail has 
eluded all core-periphery approaches: the Spanish property boom began in 1997, prior 
to the formation of the Eurozone, on the back of a highly controversial piece of land-
use legislation. As it will be shown, this institutional innovation was the result of a long 
history of struggles between groups and classes, and was built upon a century of urban 
planning institutions without parallel in Europe.  
 
This takes us back to the research questions of the thesis. To reformulate the main 
question in a manner that is tailored to this narrative: If the Spanish crash can be 
explained by looking at the external economic imbalances afflicting the European 
periphery as a whole, then why did the Spanish path into the crisis manifest in such a 
unique a way, namely, as a wave of residential overproduction? This narrative seems 
unable to provide a convincing answer to this question, a silence that also leaves the 
auxiliary research questions unanswered. If the bubble was inflated ‘from above’, i.e. 
by exogenous economic forces, then what room is there to accommodate domestic 
political drivers of the bubble? Does not the timeline of the Spanish bubble, which 
began prior to the formation of the Eurozone, suggest that there were historically-
specific factors at play? Are there no relevant particularities to Spanish capitalism to 
take into account in this story?  
 
The inability of the core-periphery narrative to address these questions arises out of its 
depiction of the political, which subordinates the contingencies of struggle to external 
economic structures. Political agency is either a privilege of the European core, which 
uses it to subordinate the periphery by hollowing it out of any of its own, or it is 
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assumed to fulfil certain managerial functions to navigate the pressures of monetary 
integration in a particular way. Either way, conclusions about the European periphery 
are derived from the macro-structural plane (in this case, the Eurozone) but without 
substantial treatment of the social formations that make up the periphery. In the end, 
politics – past and present – can be safely ignored.  
 
1.4.3. Against the Spatial Fix: The Limits to Structural Reasoning 
 
David Harvey’s elaborate theoretical framework, the central thrust of the spatial fix 
narrative, should be contextualised within the debates out of which it emerged. First, 
his theory of capitalist urbanisation should be read against that of the Marxist 
philosopher Henri Lefebvre. Theorising the advent of a post-industrial urban society, 
Lefebvre had reached the conclusion that there was no ‘strict correspondence between 
modes of production and the space they constitute’ (quoted in Katznelson, 1994:96). 
Harvey challenged Lefebvre’s abandonment of capitalism as a frame for urban inquiry 
and instead sought to bring the mode of production back into the analysis of the ‘urban 
process’. This culminated in the philosophical system outlined earlier, through which 
Harvey theorised that the built environment acted as a pressure valve for excess capital 
piling up elsewhere in the economy.  
 
Second, it is important to note that Harvey embarked on this project by emulating the 
logical-abstract method of Marx’s Capital, which deploys a deductive form of 
reasoning to elucidate the ‘laws of motion’ of capital accumulation. This project was 
very much in line with the dominant trend in Marxist theory at the time, structuralism, 
a tradition built upon the conceptual separation between abstract economic structures 
and actually-existing history (e.g. Althusser, 2005 [1965]). Though I shall deal with 
structuralism in greater detail in the next chapter, for now it suffices to say that this 
philosophy focused on developing sophisticated, if highly mechanical, models of the 
economic structures at work under capitalism, all while admitting that these structures 
only existed in a Platonic realm of pure theory. Their only purpose was the ‘rigorous’ 
exposition of the deep, internal logic of the capitalist mode of production. By contrast, 
actually-existing social formations were said to be capable of combining multiple 
modes of production and thus seen as inherently disorderly and irreducible to 
structural determinations.  
 
From this modelling emerges a duality between heuristic devices, such as the ‘mode of 
production’, and messy historical subjects, such as class struggle, which are confined 
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to separate analytical realms (Wood, 2016:49-52). In the work of Harvey, this 
separation manifests in constant ‘quantum leaps’ between instances of supreme 
structural functionalism and invocations of agency and contingency (Knafo, 2002:147-
9). Within the same text, one can find that the advent of the spatial fix recurs every 15-
25 years, like a tide moving with the gravitational pull of celestial bodies, only to 
discover shortly after that ‘the broad lines of class struggle around the “housing 
question” have had a major impact upon the urban process’ (Harvey, 1978:116,126). 
The problem is that whenever these two spheres (i.e. structural determinations and 
agential contingency) are coupled again, the resulting combination tends to come with 
a powerful deterministic skew. For instance, Harvey asserts that the state is an active 
field of struggle and that capitalists may not always resort to switches between circuits 
with equal vigour, for this will depend ‘upon the degree of their own organization, the 
institutions which they have created and the objective possibilities dictated by the state 
of production and the state of objective possibilities dictated by class struggle’ (Harvey, 
1976:107-108). Yet soon enough we are told what this truly means: that an alteration 
in the mediating structures of the switching circuits (e.g. the state) ‘can therefore affect 
both the volume and direction of the capital flows by constricting movement down 
some channels and opening up new conduits elsewhere’. In short, ‘in order to make 
possible the analysis of history from the viewpoint of theory’, the result is merely a 
supremely deterministic model ‘which is only later somewhat “adjusted” according to 
class struggles’ (Knafo, 2002:147-9). Harvey’s philosophical system constitutes a 
formidable thought experiment of impeccable logic, but much like the neoliberal 
economists considered above, it misses the fundamental point that the political is ‘an 
immanent necessity for every capitalist economy, without which the latter could not 
appear as a “closed” and self-reproducing system’ (Jessop, 2006). 
 
The lure of Harvey’s schema to explain the Spanish case makes sense. Its focus on the 
subterranean mechanics of capital accumulation allows for an ‘inside-out’ perspective 
to supplement the externalism of core-periphery approaches. After all, the Spanish 
housing crash would hardly be intelligible without long-term domestic determinations 
that predate European integration. Yet, paradoxically, the theoretical formula of the 
switching crises carries an in-built negation of historical specificity, since, in the final 
analysis, the story boils down to the universal laws of motion of capital accumulation.  
 
Some of the proponents of the spatial fix narrative have taken provisions against the 
limitations of Harvey’s perspective (see López & Rodríguez, 2010:120-3), but have had 
little success in escaping the pitfalls of its gaze. On the one hand, we see how the 
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succession of eras in capital accumulation are largely determined by the internal logic 
of the mode of production, airbrushing social agency out of the picture. Whichever 
conceptualisation is chosen to describe the last wave of fascist industrialism, the point 
remains that the crisis of manufacturing of the 1970s was largely a result of the 
system’s own structural contradictions. Growing agitation for better wages and living 
conditions in the 1960s, and its consequent impact on the rate of profit on capital, have 
no role to play despite sabotaging the main input of the industrial economy under 
Spanish fascism: a tame and super-exploited workforce. On the other hand, we also 
find that historical events are picked on a relatively ad hoc manner so that they fit the 
formula. The spatial fix narrative insists that the turn to real estate speculation grows 
out of the crisis of the manufacturing sector, a process that the state manoeuvred to 
assist and facilitate. However, the lack of mention of the housing shortages of this 
period is extremely suspicious. After peaking in 1975, home construction entered a 25-
year period of decline, and the creation of a good business climate in real estate had 
much to do with attempts to overturn this long crisis. The land law of 1997-8, which 
kicked off the bubble, was not a mere infrastructural reflex, but the culmination of 
nothing less than a quarter of a century of policy experiments in this regard.  
 
Another important omission of the political in this narrative is the absence of the very 
real role of clientelism in real estate politics. Over the last decade and a half, Spanish 
politics has been shaken by a relentless cascade of corruption scandals, the majority of 
which have radiated out of local councils. Revealing widespread illicit connections 
between local bureaucracies, construction firms, and political parties, the picture that 
emerges is that of an ‘iron triangle’ of real estate at the centre of the Spanish economy. 
Yet, political corruptions rarely figure in this literature. Whereas López & Rodríguez 
(2010) award the term ‘corruption’ only a few passing mentions in their monolithic 
study, Charnock et al. (2013) do not mention it even once in their book. In general, on 
the rare occasions that corruption is cited in this literature, it tends to be described as 
a consequential phenomenon. In line with the functional bent of this paradigm, for 
López & Rodríguez (2o1o:254) the ‘overabundance of corruption cases over the last 
years is only the extra-legal ramification of [a] mutual dependence’ between corporate 
agents and local governments, whereas for Coq-Huelva (2013:1223) corruption is 
merely ‘the outcome of a failed institutional design based on neoliberal 
governmentality’. This fails to see that political corruption was not a tangential effect 
of the bubble that was only externally related to its logic. The Spanish bubble could 
have hardly occurred without the discretionary role of local councils in determining 
land values, the role of construction firms in providing illicit finance to political parties 
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holding local power, and the use of this bribe money by political parties to commit 
systematic election spending fraud in an attempt to renew their grip over public office. 
In the midst of these power flows, ‘economic’ accumulation became inseparable from 
a parallel process of ‘political’ accumulation. How many infrastructural projects were 
approved just so that political parties could raise cash for their elections? How much 
would have home prices risen were it not for the deliberate inflation of land values? 
 
This takes us back, once again, to this thesis’ research questions. If the Spanish crash 
is the product of generic laws of capitalism, then why did it manifest in such a unique 
way – with a housing bubble accompanied by a wave of residential overproduction? 
The lack of an answer to this central question has a rippling effect on the remaining 
research questions. Does the peculiarity of the Spanish experience not suggest that 
there may be particularities to Spanish capitalism that are irreducible to structural 
pressures universal to capitalism? Is there room in this framework to integrate the role 
of political agencies in the inflation of the bubble beyond the functional script of the 
switching circuits? Indeed, is there room to accommodate historical specificity at all 
in this narrative? 
 
The difficulty of answering these questions arises out of a problematic representation 
of the political. The spatial fix narrative starts from the assumption that ‘the economic’ 
can be thought of as a closed system in which the political provides extrinsic assistance 
to an otherwise self-propelling circuit. This representation of social structures as self-
reproducing entities results in an inevitable erasure of the role of power struggles in 
their constitution and operation. In turn, this results in a neglect of historical 
specificity, as particular outcomes can simply be read from generic laws of causation 
that are structurally determined. Paradoxically, then, the political has a more 
prominent role in the immaturity narrative than in the spatial fix narrative (or in the 
core-periphery narrative, for that matter), as at least neoliberalism reserves to the 
political some sort of agency, even if in its own caricatured way. 
 
1.5. Conclusion 
 
A critical review of the three narratives suggests that they all display important 
limitations to represent ‘the political’ – the way in which power struggles shape social 
structures – a problem that renders invisible important facets of the Spanish 
experience. The immaturity narrative traces the source of the Spanish crisis to 
structural weaknesses arising from political distortions of the market. According to 
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this view, these irregularities stem from deep-seated pathologies that have prevented 
Spain – and peripheral countries in general – from converging with the standard of 
more advanced European economies. This narrative is incapable of grasping how 
politics – corruption included – is immanent to the functioning of the market itself, 
offering a warped perspective of the crisis that serves to confirm neoliberal theses, but 
that lacks analytical depth. The core-periphery narrative outsources causal primacy 
to external macroeconomic imbalances. These imbalances are ascribed to the failures 
of European monetary integration and to the interrelationship between different 
economic regimes coexisting under its roof. The problem with this narrative is that it 
reduces the crisis of the European periphery to the intervention of exogenous forces, 
seemingly fallen from the sky. In the process, peripheral difference – and with it 
domestic politics and history – are blurred out of the picture. The spatial fix narrative 
traces the origins of the crisis to endogenous sources, concretely to the buried 
mechanics of capital accumulation, which are said to have a tendency to push capital 
into the built environment to escape pressures of overaccumulation mounting 
elsewhere in the economy. Here, the problem is a tendency to abstract politics and 
history away from the structural logic of capitalist accumulation, something that 
encourages the consideration of ‘extra-economic’ features on a relatively ad hoc 
manner.  
 
Reached this point, the main research question of the thesis needs to be revisited – 
Why did the Spanish path into the crisis manifest as two seemingly contradictory 
processes: as a house-price bubble and as a wave of residential overproduction? Not 
only do all three narratives fail to answer this question, but, due to the inadequate role 
that the political plays in these accounts, they also lack the very means to answer it. In 
the case of the immaturity narrative, an insistence on focusing on how the political 
distorts otherwise optimal paths of economic development results in an inability to 
grasp historically-divergent trajectories. As a result, the peculiarity of the Spanish 
bubble is not adequately problematised nor explained – Spain merely had its version 
of a universal predicament. In the case of the core-periphery narrative, the 
subordination of the political to external economic functions represents the Spanish 
bubble as a product of Spain’s peripheral position within the Eurozone. In doing so, it 
fails to grasp the uniqueness of the Spanish construction boom within the European 
periphery, as well as the domestic political drivers of this phenomenon. In the case of 
the spatial fix narrative, the political appears subordinated to structural 
determinations that are said to be universal to capitalism. In focusing on generic 
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structural laws of causation, this narrative fails to problematise the historical 
specificity of the construction boom of the 2000s, or to understand its political causes.    
 
The limitations of these narratives point to the task ahead: fashioning a narrative of 
the Spanish crash capable of taking political agency seriously. However, before doing 
so, I will pose the question of method: how can we rethink existing accounts without 
falling into the pitfalls of representing the political? This is the purpose of the next 
chapter, which will argue that this can only be done with a historicist method of 
analysis.  
 
 53 
2. The Political in Political Economy: Theory 
and Method 
	
2.0. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has shown how existing narratives of the Spanish crash struggle 
to accommodate ‘the political’ within their accounts: i.e. how power struggles give 
shape to social structures, the formal and informal rules governing social relations. 
Instead, there is a tendency to focus upon the workings of social structures themselves, 
which come to be imagined as autonomous entities with a life of their own. This is 
particularly pronounced in Marxist narratives, which tend to award analytical priority 
to a macrostructural plane. In some cases, this plane takes on the form of a global 
economic logic, from which they assume that conclusions can be derived about specific 
national social formations (e.g. the core-periphery narrative). Indeed, these national 
social formations can be known even without any substantial treatment of them, as the 
global logic overrides the petty significance of domestic politics. In other cases, the 
macrostructural plane assumes the form of a universal internal logic, which can be 
used as a generic prism to understand phenomena across different contexts (i.e. the 
spatial fix narrative). Starting out from the conviction that this structural logic is at 
work, we are encouraged to only look for historical phenomena that befit that logic, 
making political actors appear as if they were merely acting out a pre-ordained script. 
Either way, history becomes a rather predictable affair, in which the capacity of 
political agency to bring unintuitive outcomes is written out from the start. Equipped 
with this analytical outlook, the analysis of the political is thus surrendered to the 
neoliberal bent of immaturity narratives. In these accounts, political agency figures 
very prominently (e.g. pressure groups, informal clientelist networks, elite 
competition), but only to fulfil the almost cartoonish function of ruining an otherwise 
perfect market equilibrium.  
 
The question ahead, then, is the following: how do we reclaim the political away from 
immaturity narratives in order to build a Marxist narrative of the Spanish crash around 
it? This chapter will argue that to award analytical priority to the political requires a 
commitment to a historicist method, one that ‘grounds the historicity of phenomena 
not in abstract laws, but in specific historically situated social practices’ (Teschke, 
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2014:3).12 Rejecting the determinacy of structural laws of causation, historicism gives 
primacy to the contingencies of the past when explaining the present. Put differently, 
historicism starts from the premise that ‘the past is unpredictable’, forcing us to 
thoroughly examine the history of social phenomena before making any claims. In 
making an active use of historical evidence to explain social developments (rather than 
to merely illustrate theory), the gaze of historicism opens up room for the political. In 
other words, a closer attention to historical contingency enables moments of political 
agency to be acknowledged and suitably accounted for. 
 
To explore this methodological outlook, this chapter will draw from the critique of 
structural determinism advanced by an approach known as political Marxism. The 
epistemic premise of political Marxism is that social structures should not be treated 
as if they had a life of their own, but as they actually confront the people who must act 
in relation to them – either by reinforcing, renegotiating, circumventing, or subverting 
them. The result is a heightened sensitivity for agency and historicity, with a particular 
focus on power struggles over ‘social-property relations’, and a deep scepticism toward 
narratives of social change centred around the workings of ‘objective economic forces’.  
 
This methodological exploration is divided into four parts.  The first two parts will set 
the stage for political Marxism by providing some theoretical background to questions 
of structure/agency and historicity around the Marxist tradition. Indeed, given its 
lasting reputation for structural determinism, it is necessary to dedicate the first part 
of the chapter (2.1) to an overview of how Marxists came to extricate the political from 
their thought, allowing us to identify more clearly where the problems lie. The next 
section (2.2.) will explore how the political can be brought back in, examining the 
thought of two prominent critics of Marxist structuralism, Michel Foucault and E.P. 
Thompson, whose methodological pronouncements will inform my historicist ethic. 
The third section (2.3) will delve into political Marxism proper. The contributions of 
this approach will first be outlined along with the historical-sociological debate that 
gave birth to it: the dispute on the origins of capitalism and Robert Brenner’s famous 
contribution to it. After teasing out some lessons from its historiographical method, 
the chapter will then move on to examine Brenner’s relapse into structural reasoning 
                                                        
12 The choice of ‘historicism’ may seem peculiar given that the concept has very diverse meanings in 
circulation (Teschke, 2014:3): (1) The term historicism was used by Karl Popper to accuse orthodox 
Marxism of its teleological conception of history. Though now popular, it must be noted that Popper’s 
choice of words was highly idiosyncratic at the time. (2) Historicism may also refer to the nineteenth 
century German historical school of economics (Historismus), which emphasised the historical and 
cultural specificity of economic phenomena and was known for its aversion to abstract theory. (3) The 
term is also used in the Marxist tradition to refer to theory that prioritises concrete historical contexts 
over universal laws of development. The definition used here is the latter.  
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and the historicist corrective provided by Samuel Knafo and Benno Teschke. 
Altogether, this discussion will serve to provide a basic matrix for my method, a 
practical procedure for historicist analysis. The final section (2.4) will then 
complement my political Marxist method by borrowing some conceptual instruments 
from non-Marxist traditions: the terminology of historical institutionalism, and the 
framework of performativity to capture the mutability of culture and ideas through 
social agency.  
 
2.1. The Erasure of Politics from Marxism: The Problem 
 
Given Marxism’s lasting reputation for structural determinism, I will start my 
methodological inquiry by exploring why this is so. The first step will be to trace the 
source of Marxist structuralism to certain ambiguities within the thought of Marx 
himself. This will be followed by an exploration of how subsequent theoretical 
developments have built upon Marx’s more deterministic passages, extricating the 
political from their analytical frameworks. This inquiry will serve to identify the pitfalls 
of this tradition, allowing me to identify more clearly the problems that need to be 
addressed by a historicist corrective.  
 
2.1.1. The Janus Face of Marx 
 
Karl Marx left an enormous legacy to his followers, even if a contradictory one. It is no 
secret that Marxists after Marx have struggled to couple together the ‘structural’ 
(abstract-formal) and the ‘historical’ (real-concrete) elements of his reasoning (Knafo 
and Teschke, 2017). This has given rise to the perception that there are two different 
‘Marxes’ running in parallel, an ‘economic’ and a ‘political’ one. The economic Marx is 
said to appear in texts such as the German Ideology and Capital, where the movement 
of history is understood through the reflexes of an underlying economic logic, whereas 
the political Marx appears in texts such as The Eighteenth of Brumaire or The Civil 
War in France, where he most clearly identifies the contingencies of political struggle 
as the prime mover of social change (Knafo, 2002).  
 
To understand this dilemma, one needs to situate Marx’s thought in his own context. 
In his youth, Marx was a staunch critic of G.W.F. Hegel, whose philosophy represented 
the march of history as an intellectual journey in which the ‘spirit’ of human 
consciousness – spoken of as an agent with its own goals and predispositions – realised 
itself through the resolution of successive conceptual antagonisms. Marx admired 
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Hegel’s insights into how the movement of history operated (i.e. through contradiction 
and conflict), but he believed that the vector of this movement lied not in the god-like 
providence of reason, but in material forces (van der Pijl, 2009:195-204). At the same 
time, Marx also rejected Hegel’s ‘materialist’ critics such as Ludwig Feuerbach, for 
whom history was merely a process of matter in motion, where humans merely act out 
their biological script (Marx, 1969b). Rather, for Marx the exploitation of nature gives 
rise to societies that constitute an additional layer of historical determination, a second 
nature that shapes the consciousness and actions of social agents beyond their 
biological impulses. The implication here is that people are capable of reflecting 
critically on their circumstances to ‘make their own history’, even if ‘they do not make 
it just as they please; under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past’ (Marx, 
1969a:360). This claim is often regarded as the basis of Marx’s original contribution, 
what has come to be known as historical materialism, a theory of historical 
development centred around historically-situated agency and political struggle.  
 
In turn, Marx located the basic source of historical dynamism in the antagonism 
between social classes, defined by the social relations of a given historical mode of 
production; the ways in which humans organise the forces for the exploitation of 
nature to provide for themselves (e.g. feudalism, capitalism, etc.). This materialist 
conception of history was largely influenced by the thought of eighteenth-century 
political economists like Turgot or Smith, who saw history as the linear succession of 
‘modes of subsistence’ (e.g. pastoralism, agriculture, commerce), each defined by a 
particular division of labour, and by forms of property specific to it (Comninel, 
1991:104-121; 2012:214). Yet for all his debt to these thinkers, Marx was also extremely 
suspicious of their triumphalism. According to these political economists, each mode 
of social organisation corresponded to a stage in social development, and progression 
through these stages corresponded to a process of universal improvement that had 
concluded with the advent of their own commercial era. Though Marx concurred that 
the capitalist mode of production was superior to all previous modes, he also rejected 
their belief that ‘there has been a history but there is no longer any’ (Marx, 1975:113). 
In other words, he rejected the widespread assumption that capitalist practices were 
the unfettered expression of human nature, an essential drive that could finally realise 
itself. Instead, Marx stressed the historicity of the capitalist mode of production – a 
phenomenon with a beginning, and, potentially, an end.  
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For Marx, the point was to elucidate how the dynamics of capitalist society were 
generated by its specific relations of production, a project that culminated in his 
unfinished critique of political economy: Capital. To do so, he employed a method of 
‘abstraction’, which involved devising thought experiments to separate ‘the analytically 
essential and necessary qualities of social phenomena from the effects of contingent or 
“extraneous” processes, circumstances and interactions’, an exercise that helped him 
reach ‘a theoretical understanding of social relations as they operate in their “pure” 
form’ (Gruffydd-Jones, 2012:224; see also Ollman, 2003). This method of analysis 
involved deliberately holding back certain intervening processes (e.g. foreign trade) in 
order to emulate the controlled environment of a laboratory (Harvey, 2010:16). Via 
this process of theoretical inquiry, Marx purified the ‘laws of motion’ of capitalist 
development and its tendencies towards crisis (as outlined in the previous chapter). It 
is important to note that Marx did not presume the outcomes of this method to prevail 
in any specific context. Rather, the laws of motion were mere platonic representations 
of the basic properties of capitalist development only. 
 
The legacy of Marx’s intellectual trajectory was immense, through not particularly 
coherent: ‘[h]aving broken with a certain form of philosophy, Marx was not led by [his] 
theoretical activity towards a unified system, but to an at least potential plurality of 
doctrines which has left his readers and successors in somewhat of a quandary’ 
(Balibar, 2014:4). The question remains how we can reconcile a vision of historical 
development that focuses, simultaneously, on the volution of class struggle as well as 
on self-propelling laws of motion. How are these two vectors to be reconciled? Does 
one take primacy over the other? This ambiguity has trapped the Marxist tradition in 
‘quantum leaps’ between invocations of social agency and structurally-determined 
patterns of change. An aforementioned example is David Harvey’s work, describing the 
process of urban development under capitalism as the mechanical reflex of a structural 
logic (e.g. the spatial fix recurs in ‘Kuznets waves’ of 15-25 years), as well as a 
consequence of class struggle, which leaves its imprint over time (Harvey, 1976:107-8; 
116). As Harvey himself admits, how one is supposed to bridge structure and agency 
remains unclear: ‘[i]t is fair to say that the duality of worker as “object of capital” and 
as “living creative subject” has never been adequately resolved in Marxist Theory’ 
(Harvey, 1982:114).  
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2.1.2. Marxism and Structuralism 
 
The problem is that an ambiguity between structure and agency tends to slide almost 
invariably into structural determinism (‘structuralism’). As Knafo (2017:97) puts it, 
‘the problem is mostly one of perspective’: 
 
agency is difficult to perceive because of the asymmetry which exists between 
structural conditions […] and the impact that a single agent can make on 
society. […] Indeed, it is easy to see what difference an individual can make to 
their immediate surroundings, but much more difficult to specify what 
difference people make to the broader social processes we are interested in 
when doing global political economy. 
 
It is thus insufficient to claim that ‘agency matters’ without making any analytical 
provision to accommodate it, as there is a certain inertia in the social sciences to 
‘fetishise the structures that govern social life assuming that they are imbued with a 
life of their own, as if they impose their own logic on society’ (ibid.). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the Marxist tradition has too often resolved the tension in Marx’s 
legacy by subordinating political struggle to structural determinations that deprive 
political agency of any meaningful autonomy. To illustrate this problem one can name 
at least three common forms of Marxist structuralism:  
 
(1) The crudest example is the infamous base-superstructure model. According to this 
model, all political, cultural, and legal developments in history are a ‘superstructure’ 
that can be interpreted in relation to the mechanical reflexes of an underlying 
economic ‘base’. As Marx (1996:160) famously put it in a highly deterministic passage 
of his oeuvre:   
 
At a certain level of their development the material productive forces of society 
come into contradiction with the already existing relations of production, or in 
what is merely a legal expression for this, with the property relations within 
which they had previously functioned. From forms of development of the 
productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then an epoch of social 
revolution commences. With the alteration of the economic foundation the 
whole colossal superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.  
 
 59 
Paradoxically, this metaphor did not figure prominently in the works that Marx 
published in his lifetime. Rather, it rose to prominence after his death, by the hand of 
his companion Friedrich Engels, who turned passing statements of this sort – many 
unpublished in Marx’s lifetime – into doctrine. Indeed, perhaps due to the necessities 
of working-class organising, Engels’ late nineteenth-century writings came to simplify 
Marx’s philosophy into a theory of economic causation in line with the natural sciences. 
As his critics already noted at the time, Engels’ rewrote Marx’s materialism into 
something ‘more positive, objective, and obeying a compulsive logic, than anything 
Marx (and he himself in an earlier phase) had ever contemplated’ (van der Pijl, 
2009:217). In turn, the socialist movement that Engels’ work inspired came to reduce 
political agency to a function of underlying laws of economic (or technological) 
development, often to speak of the historical necessity of a coming collapse of 
capitalism. Eventually, the base-superstructure model, in its starkest and most 
positivistic form, became enshrined as state ideology by the totalitarian Soviet Union. 
In the words of Stalin himself (1952:238):  
 
Marxism regards laws of science — whether they be laws of natural science or 
laws of political economy — as the reflection of objective processes which take 
place independently of the will of man. Man may discover these laws […] but 
he cannot change or abolish them. Still less can he form or create new laws of 
science. 
 
(2) More historically-sensitive Marxist approaches rely instead upon what could be 
called ‘suspend and resume’ models (e.g. Wallerstein, 1974; Aglietta, 1998). According 
to this view, the historical process is congealed into long phases in which political 
autonomy is overridden by socioeconomic systems. These systems are usually 
presumed to have laws of their own, as well as a tendency to exhaust themselves, 
resulting in cyclical breakdowns. It is in these interstitial moments – and only then – 
that the plasticity of history resumes, opening up windows of political agency that will 
determine what the next system will look like. Sooner or later, a new system will 
crystallise and the window of agency will close down until the internal contradictions 
of the system bring about the next crisis.   
 
In short, political agency only attains a certain autonomy ‘when the stars align’, so to 
speak. There is little irony in the astronomical metaphor, as it is sometimes explicitly 
invoked, for example, in Immanuel Wallerstein’s ‘world-systems theory’. Wallerstein’s 
analysis starts from the picture of a global capitalist economy defined by a rigid 
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structure of core-periphery relations with a logic of their own. This analysis encourages 
a macrostructural perspective, as there is little possibility to escape the gravitational 
pull of world-system on the ground – or at least until the world-system decays, opening 
up possibilities for change. In order to elucidate when the portal of agency will open 
up next, Wallerstein (1974:7) tracks the ‘epicyclical’ fluctuations of the world-system 
with a method inspired by astrophysics:  
 
I was inspired by the analogy with astronomy which purports to explain the 
laws governing the universe […] They use of laws derived from the study of 
smaller physical entities, the laws of physics, and argue that (with perhaps 
certain specified exceptions) these laws hold by analogy for the system as a 
whole. 
 
To do so, he devised a schema of world-systemic cycles derived from smaller sets of 
business cycles, such as Kuznets waves (spanning 15-25 years) or Kondratiev waves 
(45-60 years) (Wallerstein, 2016:188). Normally, these cycles land out of synch in time 
and place, resulting in localised crises across the world economy. However, in some, 
historically rare, occasions, several downward phases align and bring about the 
eschaton: a world-systemic crisis opening up possibilities for historical change. For 
Wallerstein, we are living through one of such seismic periods. According to him, the 
global financial crisis was a pre-determined event signalling the irreversible twilight of 
the world-system: ‘we can be certain that we will not be living in the capitalist world-
system in 30 years […] the new social system that will come out of this crisis will be 
substantially different’. Only because of this, whatever the next system might look like 
‘is a political question and thus open-ended’ (Wallerstein interviewed by Iglesias & 
Errejón, 2009).  
 
(3) A more methodologically sophisticated structuralism is that of Louis Althusser and 
his followers, for whom the role of structural determinism is merely that of Platonic 
speculation. For Althusser (2005), Marx’s distinct contribution was a science of history 
capable of uncovering the deep structural determinations at work in society (i.e. the 
logic of the mode of production), a view Marx had reached after an ‘epistemological 
break’ with the more agential analyses of his youth, and which he would develop to full 
maturity in Capital. Althusser would later complete this erasure of politics from 
Marxism with his notion of ‘ideology’, according to which every mode of production 
exudes certain ideologies that are functional to their reproduction. The function of 
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these ideologies is to ‘interpellate’ social actors to assume their designated role in 
society, ensuring the continuation of patterns of exploitation (Eagleton, 2007:143-5).  
 
Though it may seem paradoxical, Althusserian Marxism was conceived as a reaction to 
the base-superstructure model. The determinations of the mode of production are here 
mere ideal-type formulations that are not expected to have any necessary 
correspondence with concrete phenomena. The point, rather, is to excavate the 
‘essence’ of social formations through pure formal deduction. An example of this form 
of reasoning can be found in Nicos Poulantzas’ (1974) famous theory of the capitalist 
state. Poulantzas sets out from an ideal-type capitalist mode of production, conceived 
as a broad social structure with economic, political, and ideological ‘levels’ that are 
functionally interrelated. It is on this basis that he proceeds to deduce the ‘political 
instance’ of the capitalist mode of production: i.e. a ‘type’ of state that befits its 
economic logic. The form of the capitalist state, then, is derived from its connection to 
an imaginary theoretical construction, rather than extracted from any concrete 
historical analysis (Wood, 2016:55-56). The overall result is a reformulation of the 
base-superstructure model in ethereal form: capitalist logic is assumed to override 
everything else, but only as a thought experiment. In reality, concrete relations 
between the state and capital accumulation may have little to do with the logic of 
capitalism and could be almost accidental. An implication here is that actually-existing 
social formations are exceedingly complex objects of inquiry, best left to historians, not 
Marxists. The job of the latter is  thus rigorously limited to armchair speculation.  
 
Traces of these forms of structural reasoning live on in contemporary Marxist thought, 
including the Marxian-infused accounts of the Spanish crash examined in the previous 
chapter. For example, the core-periphery narrative, which borrows heavily from 
Wallerstein, tends to read from the global plane a series of conclusions with respect to 
national formations without substantive treatment of those social formations, as if 
their particular histories and domestic political agencies did not matter (Lapavitsas et 
al., 2012; Fouskas & Dimoulas, 2013; Álvarez, 2013). Likewise, the spatial fix narrative 
tends to put deductively-crafted theory before historical evidence, relegating the latter 
to a mere confirmationist role (López & Rodríguez, 2010; Charnock et. al, 2014). In the 
end, the analysis of the political is surrendered to the caricatured view of neoliberal 
economics, according to which political agency matters very much indeed, but only to 
disturb an otherwise perfectly functional market economy. The question is: how can 
the political be reintroduced into a critical narrative of the Spanish crash? 
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2.2. Beyond Marxist Structuralism: Searching for a Historicist Ethic 
 
Having examined the pitfalls of Marxist structuralism, I will now look for inspiration 
for how to bring the political back in. To do so, I will examine the backlash against 
structural Marxism in the 1970s and 80s, particularly by two critics who sought to 
emphasise themes like subjectivity and historical contingency: Michel Foucault and 
E.P. Thompson. From Foucault I shall borrow the principles of his anti-teleological 
method of historical analysis (genealogy), as well as his notion of ‘apparatus’, which 
captures how social formations evolve through the deployment of immaterial 
discourses and material practices to address a perceived urgent need (dissolving the 
base-superstructure dichotomy in the process). The problem with Foucault, however, 
is that he displays a great ambiguity when it comes to the question of how to integrate 
agency into his method. To address this issue, I will turn to the anti-structuralist 
Marxism of E.P Thompson, which shares many parallels with the historicist ethic of 
Foucault, but with a much greater emphasis on the creative capacity of human agency. 
Thompson’s reformulation of key Marxist concepts (e.g. class, mode of production) 
will also contribute to setting my Marxist method on a historicist course.  
 
2.2.1. Michel Foucault’s Genealogy: Tracing Apparatuses of Power 
 
Perhaps Marxism’s greatest contender in the 1970s was philosopher and historian 
Michel Foucault, whose thought sought to cast light upon historical contingency at the 
expense of teleological reasoning. Though the term ‘post-structuralist’ is a shaky one 
(it often lumps together a number of French theorists with little in common and 
Foucault himself rejected it, see Cusset, 2008), the label applies to Foucault insofar his 
work was a response to two preceding structuralisms: semiology and Marxism. 
Semiology here refers to the import of structural (or Saussurean) linguistics into the 
social sciences and the humanities (e.g. Lévi-Strauss, 1966). Put simply, semiology 
stresses that human culture ought to be analysed by reference to broad structures of 
meaning operating beneath the thoughts and actions of social actors – a 
methodological separation between ‘theory’ and ‘history’ that was later imported into 
Marxism by the hand of Althusser. Foucault criticised the way this theory disinfected 
social theory from the messiness of conflict and contingency. Likewise, Foucault was 
also critical of French Marxists for their rigid reduction of historical change to the 
internal contradictions of economic structures (here referred to as ‘dialectics’): 
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Neither the dialectic, as logic of contradictions, nor semiotics, as the structure 
of communication, can account for the intrinsic intelligibility of conflicts. 
“Dialectic” is a way of evading the always open and hazardous reality of conflict 
by reducing it to a Hegelian skeleton, and “semiology” is a way of avoiding its 
violent, bloody, and lethal character by reducing it to the calm Platonic form of 
language and dialogue (Foucault, 1991:56-57). 
 
In short, in his critique of structuralism, Foucault emphasised political struggle and 
historical contingency. To do so, he developed his famous ‘genealogical method’: a 
mode of historical inquiry that ‘rejects the metahistorical deployment of ideal 
significations and indefinite teleologies’, and instead ‘record[s] the singularity of 
events outside of any monotonous finality’ (Foucault, 1991:76-77). The role of the 
genealogist is to trace the development of techniques of power by patiently following 
‘the accidents, the minute deviations – or conversely, the complete reversals – the 
errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations’ in the historical process 
(ibid.:81). This focus on contingency is an invitation to get rid of analytical prisms that 
subordinate social developments to macro-structural logics, be it the collective 
unconscious of semiology or the functional determinations of the Marxist mode of 
production. The ultimate purpose is to uncover how ‘the forces operating in history are 
not controlled by destiny or regulative mechanisms, but respond to haphazard 
conflicts’	(ibid.:87).  
 
For Foucault, there was no deeper (structural) truth to history beyond the realm of 
struggle and strategy. A methodological implication here is that it is pointless to focus 
our attention on structural formulas: we should always prioritise the study of power 
‘with its specificity, its techniques and tactics’, and in a manner that cuts across both 
material practices and immaterial discourses (ibid.:57). This allowed him to subvert 
the residual metaphysics scattered across Marxism (e.g. social totality, historical 
necessity, etc.) and its tendency to award priority to the imperious logic of the mode of 
production. Instead, Foucault preferred accounts of historical change, emphasising the 
combination of many ‘little causes’ (Gutting, 2005:43). For instance, in his genealogy 
of the penitentiary system (Discipline and Punish), he traced the birth of a radically 
new system of social control to the combination of a myriad of different practices: 
invention of new rifles, new techniques for the organisation of hospitals, etc. (Foucault, 
2016). The overarching themes of this intellectual project are condensed in his notion 
of dispositif (often translated as ‘apparatus’), a concept that designates the 
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heterogeneous ensemble of practices and discourses that get mobilised in a given 
historical period to address an urgent need (Peltonen, 2004).  
 
Yet, for all his powerful criticisms of the macro-structuralism of Marxism, Foucault’s 
work does have a tendency to fall into a sort of micro-structuralism of his own. His 
‘microphysics of power’, as he termed it, describes the imposition of rationalities upon 
historical actors in a manner that leaves a question mark around their political 
autonomy (Foucault, 2016). Here it is important to note Foucault’s origins in 
modernist literary theory, according to which language is a source of thought in its own 
right rather than a device to convey meaning. In other words, the author is no longer 
conceived as a self-expressive agent but as a vessel through which language expresses 
itself (Gutting, 2005:10). This ‘anti-humanism’ imbues Foucault’s historical work: 
‘[o]ne has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself […] 
this is what I would call genealogy’ (Foucault, 1991:58-59). To be sure, Foucault was 
charging against the idea of a ‘transcendental’ subject, a transhistorical agent that 
thinks and acts according to a pre-political identity. Instead, he insisted that particular 
identities, interests, and desires are themselves produced by discourses of power. 
Though this constitutes a powerful corrective against the Marxist presumption that 
specific ‘objective’ conditions automatically give rise to specific subjectivities (e.g. class 
consciousness), the problem is that Foucault’s erasure of the foundational subject 
sometimes dissolves human agency altogether. Though Foucault detested being 
labelled a structuralist,13 it seems hard to avoid the implications of such a strict anti-
humanism: inviting us to see history like he does literature, the historical subject is 
reduced to a vessel through which power ‘fights itself’ out.  
 
Before his premature death, Foucault himself noted these limitations and began to 
explore the creative capacities of human agency:  
 
Perhaps I’ve insisted too much on the technology of domination and power. I 
am more and more interested in the interaction between oneself and others, 
and in the technologies of individual domination, in the mode of action that an 
individual exercises upon himself by means of the technologies of the self. 
(Foucault interviewed by Martin, 1998:19) 
 
                                                        
13 ‘In France, certain half-witted “commentators” persist in labelling me a “structuralist”. I have been 
unable to get it into their tiny minds that I have used none of the methods, concepts, or key terms that 
characterize structural analysis’ (Foucault, 2012:xiii). 
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Yet Foucault never properly outlined the connection between these individualised 
‘technologies of the self’ with the dimensions of power that he explored in his earlier 
work (Konings, 2015:27-30). In a way, the technologies of the self could simply be read 
away as the transmission belt of an ordering logic of domination. Contemporary 
Foucauldian theorists are seeking to reconcile these two facets by excavating some of 
the concepts advanced in his later writings, such as ‘governmentality’ (Lemke, 2002; 
Foucault, 2010). The jury is still out on the question.   
 
2.2.2. E.P. Thompson’s Marxist Humanism: Historicising Creative Agency 
 
Foucault’s work offers invaluable insights to subvert Marxist structuralism. 
Particularly useful is his emphasis on how power is exercised through concrete 
practices and on patiently historicising ‘apparatuses’ of power – a notion that I shall 
return to in the next chapter. Yet it is often forgotten that in Foucault’s time there were 
Marxist dissidents of structuralism who fought to reassert the historicist pedigree of 
their tradition without trying to jettison the human subject at all. Indeed, it is hard to 
read Foucault without hearing the echoes of E.P. Thompson (2001), who at the time 
was charging against structural Marxism from the other side of the English Channel. 
From there, he fiercely invoked the necessity to re-centre Marxism not only around 
history and contingency, but also around the creative capacities of human agency: 
‘[t]he homeland of Marxist theory remains where it has always been, the real human 
object, in all its manifestations (past and present)’ (ibid.:452). Here is where 
Thompson’s ‘humanism’ parts ways with Foucault’s ‘anti-humanism’, which he saw as 
a mere extension of Althusserian philosophy: ‘It is significant that the only historian 
commended by Althusser is Foucault, his former pupil, who in his earlier work […] also 
gives us history as a subject-less structure, and one in which men and women are 
obliterated by ideologies’ (ibid.:475).14 
 
Contra Althusser, Thompson (ibid.:451) saw Capital not as Marx’s most mature work, 
but as an expression of his entrapment in the ‘the theoretical whirlpool’ of bourgeois 
political economy. In The Poverty of Theory, he argued that historical phenomena can 
never be comprehended through scientific ‘laws of motion’ akin to those of physics, 
because historical knowledge is always necessarily incomplete and open-ended: ‘[in 
history] the “laws” (or, as I prefer it, logic or pressures) of social and economic 
                                                        
14 Here Thompson is referring to works such as The Order of Things (2012), where Foucault seeks to 
elucidate the ideational structures (epistemes) underpinning the production of knowledge in a given 
historical period.  
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processes are continually being broken into contingencies’ (ibid.:446). Yet the 
response cannot be to retreat into a fictitious realm of pure antiseptic theory or to turn 
Marxism into ‘the plaything of scholasticism’. On the contrary, the point should be 
precisely to intensify the dialogue between theory and history. The messy disorder of 
history can be theorised, but only if we are ready to craft theoretical devices capable of 
grasping an object as fluid and elusive as historical knowledge. This includes softening 
rigid ‘laws’ into mere ‘expectations’, all while being aware that history may always be 
on its way to thwart them. Moreover, it requires us to jettison static concepts like ideal-
types, as they tend to obscure the processual nature of social institutions (ibid.:445). 
In short, Thompson’s historicist method invites us to abandon purified categories and 
to replace them with open-ended concepts, built around the variable of political 
agency.  
 
These methodological concerns are crucial to understand Thompson’s reformulation 
of  Marxist concepts such as ‘class’, which he saw as a lived process: ‘I not see class as 
a “structure”, nor even as a “category”, but as something which in fact happens (and 
can be shown to have happened) in human relationships’ (Thompson, 2013:8). In 
short, class is not a ‘thing’ that can be measured with mathematical precision, nor a 
‘location’ that can be observed by taking geological sections of the social structure, but 
a collective subjectivity that arises out of processes of struggle. This method was 
applied in The Making of the English Working Class (2013 [1963]), which deploys a 
painstaking historicisation of working-class agency in the cultural and political context 
of the English nineteenth century.  
 
Yet at the same time, this does not mean that Thompson thought of classes as mere 
‘identities’, fully autonomous from structural determinations. On the contrary, for 
Thompson class formation is a ‘structured process’, shaped – but not determined – by 
shared experiences of material antagonism (Wood, 2016:96). Thompson’s point was a 
methodological one. The determinacy of material pressures in the formation of class 
subjectivities cannot be predicted a priori, only empirically demonstrated post facto, 
by historicising how the link between material pressures and class subjectivity works 
itself out in concrete struggles. The implication here is a frontal challenge to economic 
determinism: structural factors, even when they act as contextual preconditions, 
always remain insufficient explanations requiring a further historicisation of creative 
agency.  
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Similarly, Thompson’s conception of the mode of production is not something ‘which 
is somehow “material” as opposed to “social” [political, legal, cultural], but rather as 
itself irreducibly social – indeed, a conception of the “material” as constituted by social 
relations and practices’ (Wood, 2016:63-5). For instance, in Whigs and Hunters, 
Thompson denounced a certain ‘schematic Marxism’ for its representation of law as a 
superstructure that ‘adapt[s] itself to the necessities of an infrastructure’ (Thompson, 
2001:433-5). For Thompson, law is, rather, ‘deeply imbricated within the very basis of 
productive relations’. It does not exist in a regionally separate ‘level’ of society, but is 
‘at every bloody level’. This captures the overarching project of his career: to tease out 
how the pressures of capitalist social relations are constituted, and express themselves, 
through the fabric of social life.  
 
Here is where Foucault’s genealogical sensibilities can be recombined with Marxism 
without needing to relapse onto the foundations of a pre-political subject nor the 
metaphysics of the mode of production. For Thompson, classes are collective subjects 
made in the midst of political struggle, and thus do not exist prior to their discursive 
articulation. Likewise, the mode of production appears as nothing more than an 
institutional complex that is being permanently contested and reformulated over time. 
To build upon Thompson’s insights, I will now turn to a current of Marxist thought 
inspired by his focus upon historically concrete struggles: political Marxism (Wood, 
1995:76-107; Blackledge, 2008; 270-3). 
 
2.3. Political Marxism: Outlining a Procedure 
 
For all the power of their challenges to structural Marxism, Foucault’s and Thompson’s 
insights provide more of a ‘ethic’ than a clear procedure. When it comes to their 
methodological pronouncements, their statements were usually rather vague. To 
explore how to implement their historicist insights, I will now turn to the approach 
known as political Marxism, which will act as the central core of my method. Though 
political Marxism built mostly on Thompson’s focus on historically-concrete struggles, 
its historicism shares much with Foucault’s genealogical approach. The first step will 
be to provide some background to political Marxism by exploring its source: Robert 
Brenner’s thesis on the origins of capitalism and his historiographical method. The 
next step will be to address the pitfalls of political Marxism, revealed by the relapse of 
Brenner himself into the kind of structuralism he once criticised, as well as the 
methodological corrective provided by the ‘radical historicism’ of Samuel Knafo and 
Benno Teschke.  
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2.3.1. The Brenner Thesis: Lessons from its Historiographical Method 
 
Political Marxism developed within the field of historical sociology, largely around 
Robert Brenner’s highly debated thesis on the origins of capitalist development. 
Brenner challenged the dominant perspectives on the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism, which he criticised for an excessive emphasis on the determinacy of 
‘objective economic forces’, a term which he used to refer to the structural pressures 
radiating from intensified trade or demographic fluctuations (Brenner, 1976, 1977, 
1985). Instead, he argued that the most determinant factors in the emergence of 
capitalism were not raw structural pressures at all, but the concrete social struggles 
that arose over them, as well as the crystallisation of their outcomes in institutions 
regulating relations of property and domination (what Brenner termed ‘social-
property relations’). 
 
Brenner’s method to reach this conclusion is best illustrated by his rebuttal of neo-
Malthusian explanations of the transition to capitalism (see Brenner, 1976, 1985). 
According to the ‘demographic model’ of Leroy Ladurie (1985), the basic dynamic of 
feudal disintegration rested upon fluctuations in the person-land ratio. Labour 
shortages and falling rates of feudal rent in periods of demographic decline allowed 
peasants to negotiate lower rents and better tenurial terms from their lords, resulting 
in the decline in serfdom and in the rise of a commercial (capitalist) peasantry. Though 
Brenner never denied the importance of these structural pressures, he did question 
that these structural patterns themselves were sufficient to account for specific 
patterns of social change.  
 
To challenge this view, Brenner deployed a comparative analysis of late-medieval shifts 
in different European agricultures, showing how areas equally exposed to the same 
demographic pressures went on to experience radically divergent paths of 
development (Brenner, 1976:21-36). In Eastern Europe, where the landowning 
aristocracy responded to a fall in feudal rent by reasserting their physical domination 
over the peasantry, serfdom experienced a revival. In Western Europe, however, 
similar efforts were successfully resisted by the peasantry by flight or revolt, forcing 
their aristocracies to adopt creative solutions to reproduce their power. In cases like 
France, the landowning aristocracy merged with the monarchy to form a state 
apparatus capable of taxing a free peasantry directly (i.e. absolutism). By contrast, 
England saw the emergence of competitive leaseholds for access to the land, where the 
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peasantry entered into dynamics of productive competition to socially reproduce their 
position. This set in motion a long train of self-reinforcing pressures towards the 
intensification of the productive process, leading Brenner to the conclusion that 
English agriculture was the unique birthplace of capitalist development.   
 
It is worth zooming in further to what Brenner identified as the distinctive features of 
English social-property relations. According to Brenner, around the early fifteenth 
century, the peasantry succeeded in consolidating personal freedom and freehold 
tenure, which afforded them the right to buy or sell property or to pass their farms on 
to their children. The aristocracy was thus forced to respond to falling feudal rents by 
different means of ‘political accumulation’, such as expanding their domains via 
military conquest or developing institutional mechanisms to exact further surplus 
from a free peasantry (Brenner, 1985:236-246). Competition within the landowning 
nobility made political accumulation imperative, as failure to expand their domains 
could result in the encroachment of other lords. To increase their rent-levying capacity 
over the peasantry, the English aristocracy turned to some of their remaining feudal 
powers, in particular a ‘loophole’ within the English feudal regime which allowed them 
‘to charge fines at will’ whenever peasant lands were sold or inherited within their 
domains (Brenner, 1976:46-9). In the long run, these regular fines mutated into short-
term leaseholds, allowing landlords to hike rents at will. Peasant tenants were thus 
forced to regularly increase productivity in order to renew their access to the land. This 
pressure pitted them against one another, as the farmers that succeeded began to 
agglomerate lordly leases into large estates, dispossessing fellow farmers. By the 
seventeenth century, this pattern had given rise to commercial forms of ‘improved 
agriculture’, a productive revolution that fascinated contemporaries (Wood, 2012:273-
8). By the eighteenth century, England was home to a unique form of large-scale 
competitive farming that employed waged labour, a landscape of social relations that 
provided the locus of the Industrial Revolution (Zmolek, 2014).  
 
The Brenner thesis, as it came to be known, stunned Marxist historians and stirred 
considerable debates beyond it, as it bore implications that stretched far beyond the 
specialist literature (Aston & Philpin, 1985). While this is not the place to dive into 
these debates, I shall tease out four important lessons from Brenner’s historiographical 
method:  
 
(1) In showing how structural pressures had to be refracted through the concrete 
agencies of historically-situated classes, Brenner placed the weight of world-historical 
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change on highly contingent foundations: the differential outcomes of political 
struggle. This disturbed the structuralist assumption that there is an internal logic to 
history, one that can be captured without historicising the outcomes of concrete 
agencies. Moreover, Brenner’s focus on the political was broad; he refused to award 
historical priority to some forms of social struggle over others. Whereas Marxism 
traditionally has a focus on vertical class relations (e.g. between capitalist and 
worker), Brenner’s account gives equal significance to horizontal class relations, be 
they between lords engaged in processes of ‘political accumulation’ or between 
capitalist farmers engaging in ‘economic’ accumulation (see Wood, 1999).  
 
(2) Brenner’s account centres around institutional complexes, what he termed social-
property relations, a broad range of institutions mediating relations of property and 
domination. Unlike the more economistic notion of relations of production, the notion 
of social-property relations weaves into the analysis a broader set of institutional forms 
that orthodox Marxism had traditionally confined to the ‘superstructure’. This is 
reflected in Brenner’s demonstration of how the mode of production itself is 
inseparable from the legal institutions that make it operable, as well as their path-
dependent effects and unintended consequences.  
  
(3) Rather than assuming what capitalism looks like first and turning to history later 
– a method which inevitably reduces historical evidence to a confirmationist role – 
Brenner uses a comparative analysis to historicise difference in order to elucidate what 
capitalism itself is. Historians (Marxist or otherwise) often tend to assume a 
connection between capitalism and commerce and thus automatically trace its 
emergence to the expansion of commercial practices (for a discussion, see Wood, 1997, 
2002).15 By contrast, Brenner refused to take the social form of capitalism for granted 
in this way (Brenner, 1977). In his analysis, capitalism appears as a highly distinct 
commercial dynamic, one centred around competitive productivity. Though this 
dynamic may exist in a symbiotic relation with non-capitalist forms of accumulation 
(e.g. colonial monopolies, craft guilds, etc.), it is not reducible to simple profit-making 
through commercial exchange. For example, in his later work on merchants during the 
                                                        
15 The connection between capitalism and simple commercial profit has a long lineage. One of its most 
prominent theorists was Max Weber, who assumed rather than explained this connection: ‘capital always 
means wealth used to gain profit in commerce. Otherwise the term loses any classificatory use. Therefore 
we should expect a capitalist economy to be based on commerce’ (Weber, 2013:48). With this simple 
deductive reasoning, Weber opens his major study of ancient societies, a fascinating text that represents 
ancient forms of exchange – all the way back to Mesopotamian agriculture – as ‘capitalist’. For a more 
recent example of this vision of capitalism, see Kocka (2016). Of course, this transhistorical representation 
the notion of any historical specificity, as it basically fuses capitalism to sedentary civilisation itself. This 
position is hardly tenable for Marxism.   
 71 
period of the English Revolution, Brenner argued that the trading classes were split 
between an old pre-capitalist establishment, whose business rested upon typically pre-
capitalist practices (e.g. privileged forms of arbitrage), and a new class of specifically 
capitalist merchants, who were invested in the intensification of production methods 
(Brenner, 2003; for a discussion, see Blackledge, 2008:273).  
 
(4) Brenner’s analysis focuses on the emergence of historically-specific rationalities. 
His view of capitalism challenges narratives of  the ‘bourgeois revolution’, which centre 
the emergence of capitalism around the insurrectionary energies of a mercantile 
bourgeoisie. Brenner criticised that these narratives assumed the existence of 
capitalist rationalities before the advent of capitalism itself  (Brenner, 1977). Instead, 
Brenner’s story is one in which capitalism developed in the countryside, gradually and 
unintentionally, out of the struggles between ‘lords and peasants, in certain conditions 
peculiar to England, involuntarily setting in train a capitalist dynamic while they acted 
to reproduce themselves as they were, as essentially non-capitalist classes’ (Wood, 
1997:15). Though Brenner’s work was directly inspired by the Marxism of E.P. 
Thompson, the methodological lessons I have extracted from his work can easily be 
recombined with the anti-teleological ethic of Foucault’s genealogy, and in particular 
with his refusal to ascribe a transcendental rationality to any historical subject.  
 
2.3.2. Beyond the Brenner Thesis: A ‘Political’ Marxism 
 
The Brenner thesis prompted considerable backlash from other Marxists, who 
denounced it as a ‘“political Marxism”’: ‘a voluntarist vision of history in which the 
class struggle is divorced from all other objective contingencies and, in the first place, 
from such laws of development as may be peculiar to a specific mode of production’ 
(Bois, 1985:115). While the term was originally articulated as a slur, Brenner’s 
followers embraced it with pride, most prominently Ellen Meiksins Wood, seeing it as 
a reasonable description of their work. However, Wood denied that political Marxism 
implied a ‘voluntarist’ vision of history. Rather, she argued, political Marxism 
 
simply takes seriously the principle that a mode of production is a social 
phenomenon […] The objective of this approach is to illuminate the terrain of 
struggle, by viewing modes of production not as abstract structures but as they 
actually confront people who must act in relation to them (Wood, 2016:57). 
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Wood fleshed out the theoretical implications of the Brenner thesis into a distinct 
framework under this label. Central to her work was a theory of capitalism’s unique 
‘separation of the economic and the political’ into different legal spheres (Wood, 
2002a; 2012). Following Brenner’s historical observations, she theorised that the 
capitalist drive towards the intensification of productivity was a consequence of 
detachment of accumulation from visibly ‘political’ means (e.g. military expansion, 
feudal land-rent extraction, or absolutist tax farming). Instead, the lack of such direct 
coercive means at the hands of the capitalist class means that accumulation takes on 
the appearance of abstract ‘economic’ forms, such as the need for cost-effective 
production and technological improvement. In turn, she also argued that the 
experience of these pressures is what makes it phenomenologically possible to displace 
processes of exploitation onto the imperatives of supply and demand – ‘the market’. 
This carries an important corollary: to represent capitalism with law-like formulas is 
to take its appearance for granted. Despite its distinct ‘economic’ pressures, the secret 
of the capitalist market remains a ‘political’ one, for it only exists ‘in the shape of social, 
juridical, and political forms — in particular, forms of property and domination’ 
(Wood, 1981:69). This has profound methodological implications for Marxist theory, 
as it implies that we should be able to trace the relation between base and 
superstructure ‘without great conceptual leaps because they do not represent two 
essentially different and discontinuous orders of reality’ (ibid.:78).  
 
On the whole, Brenner accepted Wood’s theorisation of his work. However, they came 
to disagree over the source of capitalism’s unique ‘market imperatives’. Though this 
tension was not apparent at first, it eventually surfaced around the turn of the 
millennium (see Brenner, 2001; Wood, 2002b; Post, 2002).16 For Brenner, the 
capitalist market imperative arose in England out of the ‘market dependence’ of the 
tenant farmers, who had to produce for the market in order to reproduce their access 
to the means of production. These structural pressures automatically locked them into 
a competitive dynamic that led to capitalist accumulation. For Wood, however, to claim 
that structural conditions are sufficient to account for emergence of capitalist 
rationalities amounted to a relapse into the kind of reasoning that Brenner had once 
criticized, as the birth of capitalism comes to be seen as an outcome of ‘objective 
economic forces’, in this case, of the pressures of market dependence (Wood, 2002b). 
Instead, she argued that whereas market dependence may act as a contextual 
                                                        
16 This dispute surfaced over the Dutch transition to capitalism (see Brenner, 2001; Wood, 2002b; Post, 
2002).  
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precondition for the emergence of capitalist rationalities, causal primacy needs to be 
tracked further down, to a historically-concrete analysis of social-property relations.  
 
At first glance, Brenner’s plain focus on market dependence does seem to run counter 
to the original premise of his thesis, which purported to de-centre macro-structural 
laws of economic causation. Yet upon closer inspection, Brenner’s concept of social-
property relations always had a structuralist bent: ‘social-property systems, once 
established, tend to set strict limits and impose certain overall patterns upon the 
course of economic evolution’ (Brenner, 1985:213). These ‘patterns’ are in fact rigid 
‘rules of reproduction’: ‘certain limited options, indeed quite specific strategies, in 
order best to reproduce themselves – that is, to maintain themselves in their 
established socio-economic positions’. The assumption here is that social structures 
impose a specific rationality upon economic actors, who merely act out a pre-ordained 
script.17 The problem is that this assumption, in the long run, results in a greater 
salience for abstract logics of systemic reproduction that pushes into the background 
the role of concrete agencies around social-property relations, as the latter can be 
safely assumed to be a mere reflex of the former (Knafo & Teschke, 2017).  
 
The result is, put simply, a structuralist relapse, one that has been openly embraced 
by some of Brenner’s most prominent followers. For example, Charles Post openly 
argues that ‘[we need] a structuralism that allows us to understand 
the limits and possibilities of historical evolution and variation’ (interviewed by Souvlis 
et al., 2017). For Post, all sets of social-property relations 
 
have strong laws of motion/‘rules of reproduction’ which produce distinctive 
patterns of growth and crisis, and distinctive forms of class struggle. It is in 
phases of crisis that conflictual class relations are intensified, opening 
the possibility (not necessity) of systemic-modal transitions – the emergence 
of new social property relations as the unintended consequence of attempts by 
producers and appropriators to reproduce their social position.18  
 
                                                        
17 The view that social structures prescribe specific forms of rationality bears the residual marks of rational 
choice Marxism, another of Brenner’s intellectual influences. Along with G.A. Cohen, Brenner was part of 
the Marxists who in the 1970s formed the ‘No Bullshit Marxism Group’, the original gathering of analytical 
Marxism (Smith, 2011).  
18 A former Althusserian, Post has sealed this turn with a rebrand of ‘political’ Marxism as ‘Capital-centric’ 
Marxism, a change to emphasise that Marx’s Capital remains ‘the bed-rock for concrete studies of 
historical and contemporary capitalism’.  
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This reveals a major pitfall of the Brennerite version of political Marxism: political 
agency tends to be deprived of any meaningful autonomy throughout most of the 
historical process, as it is only reduced to the interstitial moments between fully-
fledged economic systems. All of a sudden, we are dealing with a vision of history 
identical to that of ‘suspend and resume’ structuralism outlined above (e.g. like that of 
Wallerstein).  
 
In order to give the political in political Marxism more prominence, the pitfalls of its 
Brennerite strand ought to be rejected in order to reassert the historicist promise of 
this tradition as theorised by Wood. To this end, Samuel Knafo and Benno Teschke 
(2017) have called for a radicalisation of political Marxism’s historicism by grounding 
it more firmly in Wood’s understanding of the mode of production as a permanently 
contested phenomenon. This requires a loosening of the notion of social-property 
relations so that it becomes sufficiently elastic to adapt to historical evidence. In other 
words, rather than projecting onto them prescribed rationalities and outcomes, the 
notion of social-property relations should remain an open-ended category that has to 
always be completed by a historicisation of political agency in concrete contexts. 
However, to do so is incompatible with nomological categories: theoretical devices 
based on law-like patterns, such as ‘laws of motion’ or ‘rules of reproduction’. The 
problem with such categories is that they often take history for granted. Committing 
us to the workings of a higher logic in advance, they relegate historical examples to a 
confirmationist role.  
 
For Knafo and Teschke, the point is to use the plasticity of history to explain social 
developments, rather than to merely illustrate them. To revitalise political Marxism in 
this manner, they make the following methodological suggestions (Knafo & Teschke, 
2017:21-24; Knafo, 2017): 
 
(1) We should start off by clearly identifying the actors involved in a process of 
historical change, characterising their agencies in terms of their specific features. For 
example, instead of starting from the premise that the actors under consideration are 
capitalists, we should look at what distinguishes this particular set of capitalists from 
other capitalists. The point here is to force ourselves to tread cautiously when handling 
concepts that are loaded with strong associations and expectations. The ultimate 
purpose of this is to avoid the trap of ascribing social change to causal mechanisms 
that are imposed upon actors by their structural position.  
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(2) Following the example of the Brenner thesis, comparative analyses should be 
deployed to grasp the difference made by the innovations of social actors. Whereas the 
comparative method is often deployed to design taxonomies of social systems, the 
point here is precisely the opposite. It spots specificities and thus determines what 
needs to be explained, for difference is often a marker of what is socially constructed 
rather than structurally determined. Historical comparisons can be temporal 
(diachronic), to mark a qualitative departure from a previous norm, or spatial 
(synchronic), to show how differential courses of action were taken in parallel to 
address similar concerns. The point is to tease out the specific qualities of a particular 
path of development in order to isolate the critical junctures at which history is steered 
in a particular direction. The ultimate aim is to develop ‘a question driven mode of 
research, systematically asking what was new, different, innovative in the resolution of 
a social contradiction’ (Knafo & Teschke, 2017:19).  
 
(3) Social developments ought to be analysed as the outcomes of intended and 
unintended effects of social struggles. As Knafo puts it (2017:100), ‘an account can only 
become truly historicist if we detach agency from intentions. For what agents produce 
through their strategies or actions rarely conforms to their expectations or intentions’. 
Acknowledging that social actors can never fully control what emerges out of their 
innovations is important to avoid projecting functional schemes onto the past. The 
disadvantage of hindsight is that it encourages us to assume that certain events 
happened because they were necessary (e.g. for the reproduction of a particular social 
system). The point here is to expose us to the unintended and the counterintuitive, 
factors that are often difficult to grasp from our historical position.  
 
2.4. The Sedimentation of Politics: Borrowing Conceptual Tools  
 
If the methodological pronouncements of Foucault and Thompson imbues my method 
with a historicist ethic, political Marxism equips it with procedural guidance to put 
historicism into practice. What needs further development are the conceptual 
instruments that the method will be using when it comes into contact with concrete 
historical evidence. Beyond Thompson’s reformulation of key Marxist concepts (e.g. 
class, mode of production, etc.), so far my conceptual toolbox includes Foucault’s 
‘apparatus’, and Brenner’s notions of ‘social-property relations’ and ‘political 
accumulation’ – instruments that I will hone further in the next chapter. But before 
doing so, I will move on to gather further conceptual tools of greater precision. This is 
a preventive move, one that seeks to get a better grip on concrete social-property 
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relations in order to avoid getting caught by the structuralist inertia. Of particular 
urgency are instruments that can capture how social structures are constantly in flux, 
in reflection of the sedimentations of political agency – a theme that figures 
prominently in Foucault’s ‘genealogy’, in Thompson’s notion of ‘structured process’, as 
well as in political Marxism’s instinct towards the longue durée. To represent the 
sedimentation of politics at the level of material practices, I will be borrowing from the 
conceptual toolbox of historical institutionalism, whereas to do so in the realm of 
immaterial discourses, I will be turning to the concepts of performativity.  
 
2.4.1. Historical Institutionalism: The Evolution of Practices 
 
Historical institutionalism is an approach highly compatible with a radical historicist 
political Marxism.19 On the one hand, the assertion that the agency of social actors 
ought to be interpreted within a historically-constituted context already situates this 
tradition in the epistemic vicinity of historical materialism. On the other, the term 
‘institution’ encapsulates the ‘building blocks of social order’. They represent socially-
sanctioned and collectively-enforced expectations, ‘with respect to the behavior of 
specific categories of actors or to the performance of certain activities’ (Streeck & 
Thelen, 2005:9) – a deliberately broad definition that can be easily adjusted to 
designate concrete social-property relations. Moreover, historical institutionalism 
carries in-built a healthy distrust of the functionalism. Authors within this tradition 
operate with historicist instincts, reserving an important space for unintended 
consequences in their frameworks of analysis (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002:705; Steinmo 
& Thelen, 1998). All of this chimes well with a radically historicist political Marxism. 
It is not an accident that Knafo and Teschke (2017:8) have traced the source of 
Brenner’s structural relapse to the moment when ‘institutions took a back seat’ in 
favour of ‘invoking an abstract notion of the market’ as if ‘a market (or capitalism) can 
exist as an extra-political tangible reality when abstracting from the institutions that 
                                                        
19 Historical institutionalism emerged in the context of the ‘new institutionalist’ turn of the 1970s and 80s, 
when a new generation of political scientists and historical sociologists reacted against a previous wave of 
behaviouralist thought (Steinmo & Thelen, 1998:5-10). Modelled after the natural sciences, 
behaviouralism claimed to observe political behaviour in a neutral manner with positivist methods. This 
project crumbled in the aftermath of the global crisis of 1973, when it became evident that the social 
sciences needed a more nuanced understanding of why interest groups and classes demanded different 
things in different contexts. This spawned two institutionalist responses, a rational choice and a historical 
one. The main division between them was their understanding of preference-formation: whereas the 
former saw actors as driven by the universal reason and utility-maximisation, the latter argued that the 
preferences of actors ought to be examined against their historically-situated context. By the early 1990s, 
historical institutionalism had coalesced around a research agenda that focused on explaining 
‘divergence’: the forms of structural variation between national contexts. 
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mediate social relations’. In particular, Knafo’s work (e.g. 2009, 2013) often bears a 
strong historical institutionalist flavour.  
 
The distinct value of historical institutionalism resides in the toolbox of operative 
concepts that it has produced over the decades. An early contribution is the notion of 
path dependence, geared towards explaining historical continuity without having to 
resort to functionalist explanations. Put simply, the notion of path-dependence 
denotes the ‘dynamics of self-reinforcing or positive feedback’ into which institutional 
formations enter once they go down a particular trajectory of development (Pierson & 
Skocpol, 2002:699-700). Though making increasingly difficult to reverse course once 
history has ventured down a particular path, ‘these processes can be highly influenced 
by relatively modest perturbations at early stages’. These unsettled moments are 
referred to as critical junctures, an abstraction that captures the historical crossroads 
at which a number of alternatives are available, even if some of those alternatives will 
be irretrievably lost once historical development bends in a particular direction. 
Additionally, the concept of sequencing captures how the timing and order of 
developments can matter a great deal. Similar chains of events taking place in a slightly 
different order can produce dramatic variations across contexts.  
 
Though this triad of concepts can be very helpful, it has also been criticised for 
encouraging a perception of history that is dominated by long stretches of self-
reinforcing stability (path-dependence), and only punctuated by occasional moments 
of radical innovation (critical junctures). This image of historical change is not unlike 
that of Marxist structuralism, according to which social structures run their own course 
until they fall by their own weight, at which point – and only then – a window of agency 
opens up for steering the course of history (see Hay and Wincott, 1998). To counter 
such a sharp continuity-discontinuity divide, a certain strand of historical 
institutionalists has crafted a battery of concepts that capture the elusive workings of 
gradual and adaptive change (Streeck and Thelen, 2005:18-30; see also Thelen, 2002; 
Shickler, 2001):   
 
(1) Layering denotes how new institutions are often patched onto pre-existing ones. 
This is done to work around elements that have become entrenched, as over time the 
dismantlement of certain institutions becomes too costly in economic, political, or 
social terms. This dynamic does not preclude institutional change. On the contrary, it 
addresses how the gradual addition of new practices can dramatically revise older sets 
of institutions.  
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(2) Displacement refers to the increasing salience of subordinate institutions at the 
expense of dominant ones. Institutional formations are never entirely coherent, as 
different institutional arrangements that took shape in different time periods tend to 
coexist within them.  This may have happened because older, dormant institutions are 
given a ‘rediscovered’ role that displaces more recent ones, or perhaps the import of 
practices foreign to the system end up assuming the role of more traditional ones.  
 
(3) Conversion refers to the redirection of an already existing institution towards new 
goals and functions. This repurposing may reflect a change in orientation of 
institutional actors in response to new pressures, or perhaps the takeover of new actors 
who had previously been excluded from the running of such institution. This carries 
an implicit recognition that institutions ‘often constitute common carriers for 
coalitions of actors who support them for highly diverse reasons’ (Streeck and Thelen, 
2005:26). 
 
(4) Drift captures how some institutions are deliberately left to decay. Without active 
tending and maintenance, rules and expectations cease to be enforced until they 
become obsolete. This process often carries an instrumental purpose in mind, such as 
facilitating the future dismantlement of an otherwise entrenched institution.    
 
(v) Exhaustion reflects the dynamic by which institutions fall by their own weight, as 
their contradictions deplete and weaken their operations. This is what Marxist 
structuralism identifies as the basic thrust of historical dynamism, yet here it merely 
denotes one amongst many possibilities of change.  
 
2.2.3. Performative Agency: Integrating Discourse 
 
To complement my method with performativity may seem striking to people working 
within the Marxist tradition, so accustomed to defining their ‘materialism’ against the 
‘idealism’ of interpretivist approaches. However, this misses how Marx’s ‘materialist 
conception of history’ was foremost a focus on how history is made by people in 
concrete struggles, as opposed to quasi-religious notions of historical change based on 
an abstract providential force (e.g. Hegel’s absolute Idea): ‘human history differs from 
natural history in that we have made the former, but not the latter’ (Marx, 1990:493). 
The paradox here is that structural Marxism’s insistence on speaking of economic laws 
independently from human will relapses into a certain ‘idealism’ of its own, even if the 
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Hegelian ‘world-spirit’ is nominally secularised into an economic ‘world-system’. In 
this sense, political Marxism, or at least the anti-structuralist version of it, implies a 
radically materialist conception of history, for the separation between an economic 
base and a social superstructure is dissolved into a single vector of political struggle, 
one that includes the social construction of identities, interests, and expectations.   
 
The problem, in my view, is that political Marxism still lacks the necessary conceptual 
tools to weave the role of culture and ideas into its framework. Here I shall turn to 
Judith Butler’s notion of ‘performative agency’, according to which discourses (i.e. 
cultural expressions) do not just designate a given social reality, they also produce the 
reality they purport to designate. Borrowing the term from language philosopher J.L. 
Austin, Butler describes ‘performativity’ as ‘not [just] the act by which a subject brings 
into being what she/he names, but, rather, as that reiterative power of discourse to 
produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains’ (Butler, 1993:2). Famously, 
Butler has deployed this notion for the formation of gender identities, questioning the 
existence of a natural and stable gender prior to the expressions ‘acting it out’ over and 
over again. This emphasis on social construction has been celebrated as a powerful 
corrective against Marxist structuralism. If our social reality is constructed by a thick 
layer of discourses and performances, then social structures themselves should be seen 
as a product of these expressions and not as a priori determinants of our actions.  
 
According to Butler, there are two types of performative iterations or ‘utterances’: 
illocutionary and perlocutionary (Butler, 2010:147-8). (1) Illocutionary utterances 
are those forms of expression that automatically bring about certain realities, for 
example, when the head of a central bank gives the order to implement a change in 
interest rates. Such a speech act has the power to set in motion the institutional 
machinery of the monetary authority that makes it happen. (2) Perlocutionary 
utterances involve speculative wagers that require others to ‘take up the utterance and 
endeavour to make it happen’. An example would be Mario Draghi’s intervention at 
height of the Euro crisis (see chapter 1), when a vague sentence void of actual measures 
was sufficient to prompt an immediate positive response from bond markets. Either 
way, the point here is that social structures do not simply reproduce themselves. They 
always require a chain of human actions to do so, and in this process there always is 
potential for ‘misfire’, a variable that always needs to be factored into our analysis of 
social structures. In short, the continuation of social structures cannot be taken for 
granted.  Their workings must be tracked all the way down to the performative agencies 
that reproduce them, but also to those that circumvent, sabotage, or renegotiate them.  
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The next question is how to represent the layering of these performative agencies over 
time. To do so, I will draw from the insights of Martijn Konings. Interestingly, Konings 
started out as a critic of Brenner’s structuralist relapse (see Konings, 2005:95-99). 
However, over the last decade, Konings has sought to ‘bring agency back in’ by going 
down a path very different to that of Knafo and Teschke. He has turned to study of the 
politics of signification, the active creation of meanings.20 For Konings (2015:53-58), 
the process of communication involves the active creation of connections between 
previously existing signs in order to make one sign comprehensible in terms of 
another, an assemblage he terms ‘indexation’. The practice of indexation is most 
visible in the use of metaphors, the symbolic association between heterogeneous 
elements. This involves invoking the authority of a sign and transplanting its meaning 
elsewhere in order to construct a new entity. For instance, when speaking of ‘austerity’ 
or ‘the deficit’ conservative politicians often address the public finances as if they were 
a household budget: ‘more money needs to go in than it goes out’. This connection, 
designed to be readily commensurable for the public, is of course inflected with 
subtleties. The metaphor conceals certain possibilities that are available to states but 
not to households, such as increasing revenue by raising taxes, or printing more 
money.  
 
The process of indexation is always a perlocutionary utterance; it involves a speculative 
wager that may or may not take hold in those who is targeting. For example, the public 
may have built up a resistance to rhetoric of that sort, recognising the loaded nature of 
the metaphor and rejecting it as misleading. Conversely, the public (or sections of it) 
may accept the leverage carried by the household metaphor, maybe even adopting it as 
a template for their future conversations around the state of the public sector. In this 
case, the metaphor has ‘sunk in’ to become part of the symbolic order of a particular 
society. As the performative utterances of the public enter into feedback loops, the new 
sign gains currency and acquires a sense of familiarity that conceals the assemblages 
that once coined it. Eventually, the sign accrues ‘iconic’ features. That is, it comes to 
organise a complex web of semiotic connections that have become invisible over time. 
                                                        
20 To do so, Konings draws from the tradition of pragmatist semiotics. Semiotics or semiology refers to 
the study of how meaning is made and carried through permanently mutating ‘signs’ – the basic unit of 
human communication. It must be noted that Konings’ approach does not draw from the Saussurean 
structuralism that Foucault criticised earlier in the chapter. Rather, his inspiration harks all the way back 
to the nineteenth-century philosopher Charles Peirce (2015.:32-33, 53-54). The difference is the 
following: whereas Saussurean approaches understand the mutation of meaning as a feature inherent to 
signification itself (i.e. signs are arbitrarily floating apart), Peirceian pragmatism sees the production of 
meaning as an active process, constructed through the establishment of creative connections between 
existing signs.  
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For Konings (with Cooper, 2016), the quintessential icon is money. Even though the 
complex network of power and debt that confers value upon it is not readily 
understandable to the everyday spender, money ‘works’ because it has come to 
command a great deal of meaning by itself. This reflects a process of ‘semiotic reversal’, 
where the icon has become a source of authoritative meaning that can be used for 
further indexations.  
 
The usefulness of this approach is that culture appears as the result of a perpetual 
struggle to give shape to the symbolic order. The notions of ‘performative agency’ and 
‘indexation’ lend themselves to be incorporated into any analysis of political agency, as 
they involve an extension of struggle into the realm of signification. At the same time, 
the notions of ‘iconicity’ and ‘semiotic reversal’ are perfectly compatible with the 
conceptual apparatus of historical institutionalism (e.g. path-dependence, layering), 
according to which agencies crystallise and have long-lasting effects. Overall, this 
provides a series of conceptual instruments to capture the politics and historicity of 
discourse, facilitating the integration of the role of culture and ideas within a political 
Marxist framework.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
The method outlined in this chapter is a response to the problems identified in the 
previous one. As I have shown, Marxist narratives of the Spanish crash struggle to 
accommodate the political into their accounts. Rather than highlighting how the 
Spanish experience was shaped by a historical trail of social antagonisms, they tend to 
emphasise the workings of social structures themselves, as if the rules that govern our 
social relations had a life of their own. In the end, they surrender the analysis of the 
political to the caricatures of neoliberal accounts. Thus, the question this chapter out 
with was the following: how can we reclaim the political away from immaturity 
narratives in order to build a Marxist narrative of the Spanish crash around it? 
 
To explore this question, this chapter has gone back to the source: Marx himself. For 
him, the secret of historical development was a political one – that people make their 
own history, even if they do not choose the conditions of their own making. This 
political sensibility extended to his famous analysis of the capitalist mode of 
production, which he always insisted was a historically recent creation that had arisen 
out of specific class struggles and their crystallisation in particular institutions (e.g. 
private property). Yet the problem was that, when he sought to conceptualise the 
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specificity of this capitalist economy, he did so in the terms of preceding political 
economists. That is to say, by distilling purified laws of motion that seemed to explain 
away the role of political agency. The result was a contradictory methodological 
message for his successors, who ever since have battled over how to look at social 
phenomena: does a Marxist approach prioritise political struggle, or theoretical form? 
Many Marxists since Marx have opted for the latter, developing theoretical frameworks 
around abstract-formal and law-like categories, often reserving a secondary role to 
concrete historical analysis. The examples cited include the infamous base-
superstructure model, what has been referred to here as ‘suspend and resume’ models, 
or the methodological separation between theory and history. The result is a purified 
outlook that reserves little analytical space to the contingencies of political struggle in 
the making of history.  
 
To re-centre Marxism around ‘the political’ (i.e. the ways in which power struggles 
between groups and classes are constantly reshaping social structures), this chapter 
has embarked on an exploration of historicist methods. The thought of two prominent 
critics of Marxist structuralism – Michel Foucault and E.P. Thompson – have cast light 
on what historicism means. Though not a Marxist, Michel Foucault’s crafted his 
genealogical method precisely to centre historical analysis around the variables of 
power and contingency. Here the main lessons extracted from his work are his 
subversion of structuralism with a focus on how power is exercised through concrete 
practices and discourses, and his insistence on patiently historicising the lineages of 
institutions in order to not presuppose a particular finality in their development. 
However, at the same time, Foucault’s work carries an implicit structuralism of its own, 
as his erasure of the subject leaves agency in an awkward position. Thompson’s 
humanism provides a corrective in this regard. Challenging structuralism from within 
Marxism, Thompson, too, insisted on the importance of historicisation against 
abstract theory, but also on the role of conscious agency in the making of history. To 
do so, he did away with law-like and ideal-type categories and eliminated the 
conceptual separation between a ‘material’ base and a ‘social’ superstructure. 
However, while the insights of these authors provide an invaluable historicist ethic, 
their methodological pronouncements lacked instructions for their translation into 
practice.   
 
For a more procedural approach, I have turned to the tradition of political Marxism, 
which forms the core to my historicist method. This tradition emerged around the work 
of Robert Brenner on the transition from feudalism to capitalism, where he argued that 
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this world-historical shift depended, in the last instance, upon the contingencies of 
political struggle rather than upon macro-structural causes. The historiographical 
method of the Brenner thesis bears important methodological insights for the 
historicisation of political agency, lessons that were later theorised and fleshed out by 
Ellen Meiksins Wood. This section finishes by noting the structuralist sway of 
Brenner’s later work, identifying the source of the problem and taking the 
methodological insights of Samuel Knafo and Benno Teschke to buttress the historicist 
promise of political Marxism. The chapter then concludes with a final section exploring 
analytical complements from non-Marxist traditions, namely, from historical 
institutionalism and performativity. Rather than develop a fully-fledged synthesis 
between political Marxism and these traditions, the purpose of this section was to 
borrow some of their conceptual instruments to facilitate the rollout of my political 
Marxist method. In particular, I will have recourse to the terminology that historical 
institutionalists have crafted to capture long-term processes of historical change, and 
the framework of certain performative approaches, which capture the historical role of 
culture and ideas in terms of political agency and contingency.  
 
Altogether, the method that emerges from this chapter tells us how to look at the 
history of the Spanish crash in a manner that highlights the political. Thus, the task of 
the next chapter is to use this historicist method to sketch out an alternative Marxist 
narrative of the great crisis of Spanish residential capitalism. To do so, it will deploy 
political Marxism’s focus on political agency as the motive force of social change, 
supplementing its approach with the concepts of historical institutionalism (for 
material practices) and performativity (for immaterial discourses) in order to 
represent the political in motion.  
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3. The Political in Motion: Towards a New 
Narrative 
	
3.0. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has outlined a framework of analysis that revolves around an 
open-ended historicisation of political struggle, a method inspired by the anti-
structuralist tradition of political Marxism. This approach starts out from a rejection 
of structural models of social change, on the grounds that these tend to construct rigid 
theoretical prisms with an inbuilt confirmation bias. Putting abstract theory before any 
concrete reality, such approaches encourage us to pick historical evidence on an ad-
hoc basis so that it befits an a priori model. Instead, rather than telling the evidence 
what it needs to tell us, we should be constructing a framework of analysis that is 
malleable and open-ended, so that it can adapt itself to the shape of the evidence and 
be completed by it. For political Marxism, this is inseparable from a radical focus on 
political agency as the driver of social change, for if social change were merely the 
product of the internal logic of social structures, then the past could simply be 
‘predicted’. Taking history seriously thus requires us to see it as a trail of political 
contingencies in motion, the outcomes of which are constantly sedimenting over one 
another to reshape the field for further political action – a process which the concepts 
of historical institutionalism (for material practices) and performativity (for 
immaterial discourses) capture particularly well.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to apply the historicist method fleshed out in the 
previous chapter in order to sketch a new critical narrative of the Spanish crash. My 
aim is not so much to ‘uncover the true story’ of the Spanish experience, but to use the 
corrective lenses provided by the previous chapter in order to tell the story from a 
perspective that the existing literature has missed. The narrative that emerges from 
this perspective is one that awards causal priority to the historicity of political 
dynamics, showing how these have incubated a historically specific form of residential 
capitalism. This alternative narrative will be centred around the interplay between two 
political processes that are highly neglected in the existing literature: (1) the evolution 
of an institutional apparatus of residential provision to address a near-perennial 
housing deficit, and (2) the historical patterns of political accumulation binding 
together the interests of public officials and those of the propertied classes. By the 
2000s, the combination of these processes had given rise to a financialised form of 
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residential capitalism driven by a logic of clientelist transactions that culminated in a 
peculiar wave of residential overproduction.   
 
The chapter is structured in four parts. The first part (3.1) acts as a theoretical 
discussion of how the methods and concepts articulated in the previous chapter have 
been deployed to make sense of the evidence, and of how these, in turn, have been 
shaped by the evidence itself. Put simply, it will serve to clarify what the concepts 
discussed in the previous chapter – e.g. ‘social-property relations’, ‘apparatus’, or 
‘political accumulation’ – have come to mean in my historical analysis of the Spanish 
property market.  
 
Following this theoretical synthesis, the remaining three parts articulate a genealogical 
analysis of the two processes outlined above. Each part corresponds to a distinct 
historical period, defined by a particular arc of political struggles that culminate in 
lasting institutional settlements. This structure serves to highlight the build-up toward 
particularly important turning points in the narrative (what historical institutionalists 
call ‘critical junctures’). To be sure, this does not mean that instances of political 
agency are limited to start and finish of these periods. Indeed, the sedimentation of 
politics, in the manner outlined in the previous chapter, is a constant process, one that 
gradually leads up to the next major turning point of the narrative. Part two (3.2) 
focuses on a long nineteenth century of struggles around the establishment of liberal 
private property (ca.1834-1939). Part three (3.3) revolves around General Franco’s 
long dictatorship (1939-1975), and the creation of an apparatus of residential 
provision. Part four (3.4) will focus on the democratic period that followed (1975-
2008), tracing the legacies of the previous two periods until the advent of the global 
financial crisis. Each part is split into two parallel sections: one examining the patterns 
of political accumulation and struggle in the period, another tracing the evolution of 
the property market throughout the same time span. 
 
3.1. Applying the Method: Theoretical Synthesis 
 
As established in the previous chapter, the answer to the contingencies of historical 
knowledge cannot be to retreat into a realm of purified theoretical analysis. The point 
should rather be to intensify the dialogue between theory and history, so that they both 
complete one another. This is the purpose of this opening section: to clarify how the 
conceptual tools acquired in the previous chapter have informed the examination of 
 86 
the Spanish case, and, vice versa, to examine how these concepts have been shaped by 
the historical evidence encountered.  
 
The first task is to clarify how the method outlined in the previous chapter has served 
to narrow the object of historicisation through comparison. As addressed earlier, 
comparative analyses are not only useful to establish structural regularities and craft 
taxonomies (e.g. varieties of capitalism, housing regimes), they can also be deployed 
for the opposite purpose, namely to isolate irregularities that cannot be accounted for 
by macro-structural patterns. This is because these inconsistencies highlight that 
which needs to be historicised. The previous chapters have already deployed 
synchronic comparisons across spatial contexts to map out how similar structural 
pressures were refracted into different outcomes (e.g. the macroeconomic imbalances 
of the single currency). In the case of Spain, the most peculiar aspect of the crisis was 
an unparalleled wave of residential overproduction, an irregularity which still sits 
uncomfortably in existing narratives. Having problematised this object of inquiry, the 
next logical step is to use history to explain why this happened. To do so, this chapter 
will deploy diachronic comparisons – across time periods – to identify the critical 
junctures in the path towards the Spanish crash, and to historicise the build-up of 
political agencies leading up to them.  
 
To historicise how the institutions of the Spanish property market have evolved over 
time, political Marxism lends us the useful notion of social-property relations, 
meaning the institutions mediating relations of production, property, and domination 
in a given time period. The broadness of this category is deliberate, as it is meant to 
remain open-ended and elastic so that it can adapt to a particular historical context. 
This gives us a good grip over concrete practices and discourses and prevents us from 
inadvertently slipping into macro-structural explanations (e.g. the generic laws of 
capital accumulation). In the analysis of the Spanish property market that ensues, the 
analysis of social-property relations will be extended to a broad ensemble of 
institutions: e.g. property rights; urban planning structures; land valuation 
procedures; taxation systems; forms of tenure; mortgage regulations; cultural 
expectations of property.  
 
An important feature of the notion of social-property ‘relations’ is that the term itself 
builds power dynamics into the analysis of institutions, turning them into objects of 
inquiry that are inseparable from the political agencies that traverse them. It is through 
this prism that political Marxists understand the notions of class and class conflict, as 
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‘structured processes’ – a notion borrowed from E.P. Thompson (see Wood, 2016:76). 
This means that, though material grievances constitute the locus of political conflict 
over social property-relations, the class agencies that arise over these grievances are 
social constructs of their own; they must be historicised rather than deduced from an 
actor’s structural position. In the Spanish context, struggles over social-property 
relations have played out around issues such as housing deficits; the affordability of 
housing; the right to hoard land; the dearth of urban infrastructure; and the uneven 
distribution of mortgage finance. Political conflicts over these social-property relations 
have manifested in diverse forms of class conflict, both vertical (e.g. between urban 
dwellers and property developers) and horizontal (e.g. between different factions of 
landowners or public officials). Though not exclusively, these class conflicts have most 
often played out through the structures of the state, either by capturing the nodes of 
public power (e.g. via election, corruption, or revolt), or by forcing public authorities 
to bend to class demands (e.g. through social unrest or by withholding investment).  
 
An analysis of contemporary patterns of class conflict over social-property relations 
reveals a long lineage. Indeed, their genealogy forces us to trace their origin to the very 
foundations of liberal modernity, when private property became legally enshrined as 
the dominant form of ownership. This process turned up the pressures of market 
dependence on vast swathes of the population, who became increasingly reliant upon 
commercial exchange to provide for themselves, be it by forcing them to produce for 
profit or to sell their labour to others. The needs of this market-dependent population 
came up against the privileges of the wealthy propertied classes, who were now 
equipped with hardened property rights to profit from their necessity. The result were 
mounting tensions over liberal social-property relations, as a market-dependent 
population pressed against what was now the socially available land. These structural 
tensions cut across the urban-rural divide. In the countryside, they usually manifested 
as class conflicts over access to farmland, whereas in the city, they usually manifested 
as class conflicts over access to housing. It was only in the second half of the twentieth 
century, with the evacuation of the countryside during the rural exodus, that the 
pressures over farmland were eased as the rural poor relocated en masse to urban 
areas.  
 
It is important to note that reference to liberal social-property relations here does not 
imply capitalist relations of production. For the sake of precision, liberal social-
property relations will refer to all those institutions and social dynamics that trace their 
source to a legal framework in which property ownership is protected, both from the 
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whims of the state (i.e. arbitrary expropriation) but also from the social needs of the 
majority (which under Spanish law is codified as ‘public interest’). Even though they 
have often acted as a necessary precondition, liberal social-property relations do not 
warrant the emergence of capitalist relations of production, which denote a much 
more specific commercial dynamic of competitive productivity (even if the former 
often act as a precondition for the latter). Indeed, the development of capitalist 
accumulation in Spain began prior to the implementation of liberal property rights, 
and in some areas it appeared long thereafter.21 For this reason, it would be extremely 
misleading to use frameworks such as the ‘laws of motion’ or the ‘circuits of 
accumulation’ of capitalism as a prism for historical analysis, as this would require us 
to assume precisely what needs explaining.  
 
The conceptual framework outlined above has served to sketch an alternative narrative 
of the Spanish crash that revolves around political conflict over liberal social-property 
relations. This narrative centres around an interplay between the following two 
processes: (1) the evolution of an institutional apparatus to address the perennial 
problems occasioned by liberal property and (2) the historical patterns of political 
accumulation binding together the interests of public officials and those of the 
propertied classes.  
 
(1) Borrowing the term from Foucault, the notion of apparatus (dispositif) here refers 
to an ensemble of material practices and immaterial discourses that are mobilised in a 
given historical period to address what is perceived to be an urgent need. In this 
chapter, I shall examine the formation of an apparatus to address the problems derived 
from liberal property: first as a ‘property’ apparatus that addressed how liberal 
pressures manifested across city and country, and, after the rural exodus of the 
twentieth century, as a specifically ‘residential’ apparatus in urban areas. Most often, 
the design of the property apparatus has reflected the power of the classes that have 
held a disproportionate power over the state: the propertied. Thus, the issues 
occasioned by liberal property have been mostly problematised through the prism of 
propertied interests, often with the explicit purpose of working around the problem 
with palliative measures. By the turn of the millennium, the layered development of 
                                                        
21 In Spain, capitalist accumulation traces its origins to the textile proto-industries of eighteenth-century 
Catalonia, which were experiencing bouts of overproduction as early as 1786-9 (Thomson, 2005:725; 
Moreno, 2018). It would take a very long time for similar patterns of accumulation to spread to the 
industrial and agricultural productive sectors of other regions. For example, the capitalist steel industry 
of the Basque country dates of the 1880s (Sáez, 2017). In the case of residential production, patterns of 
capitalist accumulation are not evident until at least the 1960s (see chapter 5).  
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this apparatus had incubated a property development industry with a peculiar 
tendency toward residential overproduction.22  
 
(2) The grip of the propertied classes over state power has adopted different forms in 
different time periods, though it has always involved patterns of political 
accumulation. Brenner’s term ‘political accumulation’ refers to processes of elite 
competition mediated by non-commercial mechanisms. In what follows, this applies 
to landowners or property developers mobilising personal or financial means to secure 
political favour, but also to a political class engaging in clientelist dynamics to 
reproduce their access to state power (either by raising illicit campaign finance from 
bribes or by rigging elections outright). In the Spanish real estate market, the 
allocation of public resources through clientelist transactions is of particular 
importance, as these dynamics were immanent to the logic of the property bubble of 
the 2000s. 
 
Highlighting the autonomy of political agency, both in the construction of a particular 
residential apparatus as well as in the social dynamics of elite competition, this 
theoretical framework provides a corrective lens to the structural bent of existing 
narratives of the Spanish crash. In teasing out the historical specificity of the Spanish 
experience, it provides a perspective that is inevitably lost in accounts that reduce this 
case to the outcome of an external economic imbalance, or to a generic structural law 
of causation.  
 
3.2. The Long Nineteenth Century (1837-1939) 
 
In the century that span from the fall of absolutism to the Spanish Civil War, Spain saw 
the consolidation of a liberal ‘state project’ – i.e. a particular strategy to give 
operational unity to the state (see Jessop, 1990:9) – that was founded upon the 
enshrinement of private property as the dominant form of ownership. The politics of 
this state were dominated by the interests of a propertied oligarchy, who succeeded in 
excluding the urban and the rural poor from the political process. This exclusion first 
happened formally – with heavy restrictions on the suffrage – and later, in response 
to the continuous agitation of the underclasses, informally – through a clientelist 
system of rigged elections (‘turnismo’). These political structures ensured that the 
                                                        
22 Though, as we shall see, in some cases alternative apparatuses have been set up outside of the purview 
of the state: e.g. the formation of Catholic credit cooperatives and the communisation of property by 
anarchist militias during the Spanish Civil War.  
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spatial problems occasioned by the social-property relations of liberalism (e.g. 
shrinking access to rural property, the dearth of urban housing) were addressed 
through the prism of the interests of a propertied oligarchy. Over time, a series of 
measures were deployed to work around these problems, but always without tackling 
their source, namely the institutionalised class power of the propertied classes. The 
result of this ‘muddling through’ was a liberal property apparatus that, more often than 
not, tended to reinforce the power of the urban and rural landowners. The failure to 
find a hegemonic basis for this order – i.e. the resolution of conflicts between particular 
interests and the general interest (see Jessop, 2009:161) – resulted in mounting social 
grievances that culminated in the Spanish Civil War. 	
 
3.2.1. The Contradictions of Liberal Property: Pacifying the Masses 
 
After two decades of violent struggle between the supporters of absolutism and 
liberalism, the Liberal Revolution of 1836-7 brought a decisive victory for the latter. 
Central to their state project was the extension of private property – a form of 
ownership protected from arbitrary public expropriation – and the abolition of 
alternative forms of ownership (Fontana, 2008:176-183). This posed a frontal 
challenge to the feudal powers of aristocracy and clergy, whose seigneurial estates 
exempted them from paying taxes and conferred them powers to extract rents from 
peasants (e.g. tithes). Starting in 1837, these assets were expropriated by the state and 
auctioned to the highest bidder as private property. In the process, the estates were 
stripped of their feudal privileges, which were effectively abolished (Shubert, 1990:57-
60). This universalisation of private property also came at the expense of the pre-
modern ‘moral economies’ that had previously been at the disposal of everyday people. 
For example, the guilds protecting the urban crafts were abolished and common lands 
were privatised. Around these property relations crystallised a rationalised state 
structure, with a provincial administration and a unified fiscal regime, capable of 
levying money taxes – rather than goods-in-kind – across all segments of the 
population. This forced social groups that were previously insulated from market 
pressures to engage in commercial exchange in order to meet their fiscal duties.  
 
The liberal settlement created a constitutional monarchy where the public realm was 
no longer the personal property of the monarch, but the collective ownership of an 
imaginary ‘nation’ that had to express itself democratically. And yet, this liberal state 
only made itself accountable to the wealthiest males. As the Marquis of Miraflores, a 
prominent liberal ‘moderate’, put it: ‘Political freedom ought to be based on the rich 
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proprietors, the traders, on the great number of enlightened members of the clergy, on 
the great part of the army, in short, on every man of worth in the social order […] a 
gathering of the country’s essential interests’ (quoted in Fontana, 2003:147). In 
practice, this meant that until the end of the nineteenth century, successive electoral 
laws restricted the vote to between 0.5% and 5.7% of the census (Linz et al., 
2005:1089). The urban and the rural poor, who found themselves on the sharp end of 
the liberal order, saw themselves deprived of any democratic means of political 
struggle. Perhaps for this reason, the advent of liberalism ignited a century of political 
violence around its institutions of property and domination, what political Marxists 
call ‘social-property relations’.  
 
Political violence became the dominant form of struggle between 1833-1875, 
something that would lead to Marx’s observation (2009:29) that the revolution in 
Spain had taken on ‘the appearance of a permanent condition’. In the countryside, 
Spanish liberalism would meet ‘Europe’s most tenacious reactionary movement’: 
Carlism (Vincent, 2009:10-11; Shubert, 1990:57-60).23 Carlism was an unholy alliance 
between the lower nobility and the rural poor that was instigated from the pulpits of 
the Catholic Church, where the clergy gave ideological cogency to an anti-liberal 
movement by appealing to the affective power held by tradition at the everyday level. 
In the coming decades, three Carlist uprisings detonated successive civil wars that 
shocked Europe with their brutality (1833-1840, 1846-1849, 1872-1876). Even though 
Carlism found some supporters in urban areas (particularly amongst artisans of 
decaying crafts) cities were generally seen as a hotbed of ‘liberal’ agitation, a label that 
at the time applied to a broad spectrum of opponents to the return of absolutism, from 
mild reformers to proto-socialist activists (Fontana, 2008:168-9). The resulting 
contradictions within this liberal movement erupted cyclically. On the one hand, the 
horizontal class struggles within the political class (i.e. between ‘moderate’ and 
‘progressive’ elites) were often fought out via their respective factions in the military, 
which staged innumerable coups d’état in this period. On the other hand, this liberal 
elite often found itself fighting hierarchical class struggles against the more radical 
urban masses, who regularly revolted against the conservative bent of Spanish 
liberalism to demand a further democratisation of the state, the expansion of civil 
liberties, and the public provision of those in need. The radicalism of the industrial 
working class found its highest expression in the Paris Commune-style uprisings of 
                                                        
23 Carlism was a coalition of the lower nobility of the Basque-speaking regions, who wanted to preserve 
their self-governing institutions from a unitary liberal state, and the rural masses, especially impoverished 
small peasants and landless labourers. Indeed, the earliest Carlist uprisings spread across the country 
following the movements of seasonal harvest workers (Fontana, 2008:130). 
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1873, when the urban poor in a number of cities rose up in arms to proclaim municipal 
republics (the Cantonal rebellion) (ibid:385-408, Brennan, 2011:246-252). 
 
The liberal elites emerged from the Cantonal rebellion with a renewed awareness of 
the need to suspend their horizontal struggles in order to dominate more effectively an 
agitated underclass. The political class thus proceeded to renew their state project in 
order to pacify the masses and ensure the continuity of liberal social-property 
relations. Starting in 1875, the democratic process was reduced to an empty shell. 
Liberal conservatives and progressives agreed to peacefully alternate governments via 
a system of rigged elections, the so-called turnismo system (Brennan, 2011:31-40). In 
this two-party state, the theatricalisalisation of elections was orchestrated at the 
highest echelons of the state. The orders would pass down to provincial governors, who 
would determine which candidates should win and by what margin, in urban areas 
often coordinating the process themselves. In rural areas this process was delegated to 
local strongmen, colloquially referred to as caciques (‘tribal chiefs’). These figures were 
usually large landowners, who used their power over indebted peasants or waged 
labourers to coerce the locals into choosing the designated candidates. In exchange, 
the caciques received protection from provincial governors, active support from the 
local police, the judiciary, and the local government. Variations of this system allowed 
the country’s elites to steer the direction of the state over the next four decades, 
creating a façade of democratic process that included the (purely cosmetic) 
introduction of universal male suffrage in 1890.  
 
The clientelist governance of the turnismo period created several decades of artificial 
political stability at the parliamentary level, but this did not prevent social tensions 
from continuing to mount beneath the surface. In the meantime, the rise of capitalist 
economies of scale had crushed an older artisanate, turning them into strike-prone 
industrial proletarians (Martínez, 2007). Agrarian day labourers, who abounded 
around the large estates of the south, saw their meagre wages fall 20% throughout the 
nineteenth century (Shubert, 1990:80). Peasant smallholders held onto their farms to 
avoid this fate, but it was hard to resist the encroachment of the large landowners, from 
whom they regularly borrowed at extortive interest rates. These grievances facilitated 
the dissemination of ideas subversive of liberal social-property relations, especially 
anarchism, which called for an outright reconstruction of the commons and the 
abolition of the central state. Anarchist activism inspired anti-colonial riots in 1909, as 
well as the country’s first general strike in 1917 (Bookchin, 1998). These social struggles 
became more virulent after the Russian Revolution, when landowners and 
 93 
industrialists began to hire gunmen to terrorise their workers, actions that were in turn 
reciprocated by anarchist groups (Brennan, 2011:129-133). 
 
The liberal state also faced the threat of regionalism. The liberal project of a unitary 
state came with attempts to ground this structure in a single national identity largely 
defined by Castilian culture. Yet this wager came up against the decay of Spanish power 
in the international arena and the concentration of industrial development in areas 
with distinct cultures that refused to assimilate, resulting in the emergence of 
competing national identities with liberal elites of their own (Heywood, 1988:14-17).24 
This process was particularly pronounced in Catalonia and the Basque Country, where 
regional nationalist forces emerged as significant electoral actors by the 1920s. 
 
As the fraudulence of the democratic process became increasingly evident over time – 
sometimes, the state bulletin would announce election results even before the vote had 
taken place – the turnismo system collapsed under the pressures of public disorder in 
1921 (Brennan, 2011:130). The army intervened, the electoral process was put on hold 
and a military dictatorship under the auspices of Primo de Rivera was installed (1923-
1930) (Shubert, 1990:28). This regime attempted to ease the pressures of liberal social-
property relations through public spending (i.e. by investing in public infrastructure 
works and in social housing), but it failed to remain in control in the wake of an 
industrial crisis in 1928 and the banking crisis of 1931. Despite new attempts to rig the 
elections, local elections that year saw the populace punish the establishment (and, in 
particular, the monarchy) for its compliance with dictatorial rule in the previous 
decade. The overwhelming result of left-wing republican parties prompted the flight of 
the King and the proclamation of a republic in the streets of Madrid.  
 
The frail republic of 1931-1939 was the first democratic experiment in Spanish history, 
an experience that was torn apart, again, by violent struggles over liberal social-
property relations (Brennan, 2011:85-190). An initial left-wing administration 
introduced a series of reforms that eased the pressures of the liberal order on the 
masses: the 8-hour working day; the right to strike; the creation a public (and secular) 
education system; and, perhaps most controversially, the redistribution of the lands of 
a powerful landowning class. This was a particularly delicate subject, as it confronted 
                                                        
24 Unlike other European countries, for Spain, the nineteenth century was an age of imperial 
dismemberment. After the loss of continental Latin America in the period between 1810-1830, what 
remained of Spain’s global empire was reduced to a few African footholds after defeat in the Cuban War 
of 1898. In the aftermath of this strenuous military defeat, Catalan nationalists adapted the flag of a 
recently independent Cuba into their own national imagery (the estelada flag), and began to push for 
secession as well.  
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the interests of an oligarchy that had grown accustomed to unrivalled power (indeed, 
some sections of this class went to the lengths of financing a failed coup d’état in 1932). 
When a coalition of radicalised right-wing parties seized power in the elections of 1933 
(which included the landowners’ party, the Partido Agrario), the new government 
proceeded to revert the land reform and began to inspire fears of a fascist-style 
takeover resembling those taking place elsewhere in Europe at the time. One year later, 
a recently devolved Catalan parliament proclaimed the ‘Catalan State’ and asserted its 
sovereignty to undertake land reforms without the consent of Madrid. The same 
month, a general strike culminated in a massive armed uprising in the mining region 
of Asturias. Both challenges were put down by the military, the latter under the orders 
of a rising star in the Spanish military: General Franco. These events propitiated the 
victory of a coalition of left-wing parties and anarchists in the elections of 1936, an 
event to which the military responded with a new coup d’état. The Spanish Civil War 
had begun.  
 
3.2.2. A Haphazard Edifice: The Liberal Property Apparatus  
 
To understand the conflicts riddling the long nineteenth century, one needs to 
understand how the Liberal Revolution of the 1830s preserved the concentration of 
lands at the hands of a small oligarchy. The original promise of the liberals was to 
redistribute the lands of the aristocracy to create a peasant democracy grounded in an 
electorate of small proprietors (see Fontana, 2003). However, to realise this 
hegemonic strategy, they had to strike a deal with a paradoxical ally: the landowning 
aristocracy. Once the upper nobility realised that the crumbling of the old system of 
feudal rents was irreversible, they agreed to a settlement that would expropriate their 
estates and auction them off as private property (Fontana, 2008:176-183). However, 
in exchange, they demanded extremely generous compensations that ensured them 
the necessary liquidity to repurchase their lands in such auctions, thus preventing the 
redistribution of lands that was originally envisioned (Shubert, 1990:86). The 
contingency of this settlement also solidified the legal notions of ‘private property’, as 
well as lawful ‘expropriation’. Both legal categories further institutionalised the power 
of the propertied oligarchy by limiting the purview of the state.25 The aristocracy’s 
manoeuvre is a good example of how the exercise of political agency in critical 
junctures can have lasting historical consequences: the success of their wager meant 
                                                        
25 For the law of ‘disentailment’ abolishing the seigneuries, see Ley de 21 de Febrero de 1836, de 
desamortización (1836). For the law generalising the juridical form of private property, see Ley de 6 de 
Septiembre de 1837 (1837); for the law first regulating the practice of public expropriation, see Ley de 17 
de Julio de 1837, de expropiación forzosa (1837). 
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that the landowners of the ancien régime entered modernity with a renovated form of 
class power, inflecting a highly elitist and conservative bent upon Spanish liberalism 
for decades to come. 
 
The new liberal social-property relations unleashed harsh material pressures on city 
and country. In the countryside, the fiscal reforms of the liberal state forced the 
peasants to pay their taxes in money. This made them market dependent, as they were 
forced to sell their products at urban markets (Fontana, 2008:99-100). The lack of 
credit available meant that many smallholders regularly depended on moneylenders 
to pay their taxes or buy seeds, a dependence that exposed them to large landowners, 
who charged the extortive interest rates, locked them into debt traps, and then took 
over their farms (Shubert, 1990:88-90). The resulting dispossession of the peasantry 
swelled up the agrarian proletariat and exerted a downward pressure on their already 
meagre wages.  
 
The result was a general deterioration of rural conditions which pushed many to 
migrate abroad or to try their luck in the cities. At the time, there were two ongoing 
rhythms of urbanisation. On the one hand, there was a ‘bureaucratic’ rhythm derived 
from the reform of the state administration in 1833, which created 50 provincial 
divisions with their respective capitals. The needs of a rising bureaucracy meant that 
the new administrative centres would sustain levels of growth well above average in 
this period (Shubert, 1990:45). On the other hand, there was the ‘industrial’ rhythm of 
capitalist production, a pulsation confined to specific regional pockets in this period – 
foremost, Catalonia and the Basque Country (Nadal et al., 2003; Sánchez, 2012:14-5; 
Fontana, 1978:73). The problem is that there was no specialised construction industry 
to address the unprecedented pressures upon urban space. Back then, residential 
development was an occasional affair, carried out by urban landlords who generally 
lacked the access to the finance or expertise to engage in construction operations at the 
scale necessary to keep up with modern urbanisation (Tafunell, 1992). 
 
In short, the advent of liberal social-property relations resulted in the growth of a 
market-dependent population that began to press against the socially-available land, 
both in city and country. As unrest spread, a number of institutional fixes were devised 
to palliate the problems occasioned by liberal property. This was a liberal apparatus 
devised by a propertied elite who interpreted the problems through the prism of their 
interests. These measures were mostly financial, designed to improve the access to 
mortgage credit for those who wished to purchase or develop property. In other words, 
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these solutions could only work around the problem by widening access to the 
property ladder, rather than by tackling the problem of liberal property itself. 
 
Reflecting the balance of forces represented by the state, the urban property apparatus 
was founded upon a settlement highly favourable to the urban landowning class. To 
address the demographic pressures building in urban areas, the Spanish state 
imported French planning methods to build spacious Haussmann-style boulevards 
around old medieval city centres, the so-called ensanches or ‘enlargements’ (Angosto, 
1998:35-37). Owners of farmland in the newly designated urban plots were expected 
to build according to the plan, by costing the development of housing and urban 
infrastructure themselves, or else to sell the lands to developers who would be willing 
to do so. The state, building on the legal framework of the agrarian reform of a couple 
decades prior, reserved for itself the power to expropriate them and auction the lands 
to the highest bidder. However, long gone were the days of the old absolutist 
monarchy, when the whims of kings were enough to justify the confiscation urban 
property without compensation (ibid.:35). Private property was now the norm, and 
mass processes of expropriation required costly compensations that the state was 
incapable to finance. The idea of giving the state a heavier hand in urban development 
was floated by the Posada Herrea Ensanhce Bill of 1861, which included the notion of 
forcing landowners to build according to the plan under the threat of punitive 
measures. However, running counter to the spirit of the times, this measure was 
rejected in favour of its polar opposite: the liberal Ensanche Law of 1864 (see Orduña, 
2002:291-5). Rather than curbing property rights, this law devised a peculiar system 
of public valuations that would artificially inflate the value of ensanche lands by 
factoring in the potential costs and profits from derived from building homes upon 
them. The logic of this measure was that it would incentivise urban landowners to 
build, as they could use the inflated value of their assets as collateral, thus facilitating 
the process of raising the capital necessary to build (Fernández, 2005, 2009).  
 
The problem was that these measures created a perverse structure of incentives at an 
everyday level: landowners began to hoard their lands in order to taunt the state to 
expropriate them, knowing that they would be compensated not only for the lands 
themselves but also for the imaginary cities that they could build on them 
(Marcinkoski, 2016:68-72) – a performative gesture if there ever was one. Speculators 
began to purchase lands around city centres ahead of their designation, only to wait 
for a change in the urban plan to inflate the value of their assets. Once these social-
property relations had settled in, they became deeply entrenched, particularly given 
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the clientelist politics of the turnismo period, when one could corruptly secure local 
‘tip-offs’ about imminent planning decisions. The result was a surrendering of the 
urban process to the interests of an urban landowning class, and, in pace with these 
hoarding patterns, planned ensanches often took decades to be completed. In the 
meantime, slum towns mushroomed around industrial areas out of sheer necessity 
(Pedro, 2001:187). 
 
The lack of a dynamic property market prevented the emergence of a specialised 
construction industry that could countervail the hoarding tendencies of urban 
landowners. A major problem was the scarcity of mortgage credit available. Banks were 
generally averse to mortgage lending due to the long amortisation times, which made 
it a long-term and unattractive investment. Moreover, the absence of mortgage credit 
in urban areas meant that the overwhelming majority of city dwellers were renters, so 
that property development projects were almost invariably build-to-rent operations 
(Tafunell, 1992). The dominance of rent made property development a risky and 
unattractive venture, as it required large sums of investment with long amortisation 
times (just like mortgages for banks). Thus, property development remained an 
occasional affair, a business typically driven by urban professionals who owned a patch 
of land in the ensanche, and who were ready to make a long-term investment that 
would secure them a regular stream of rents from their tenants, which in any case only 
served to complement their main source of income.  
 
The lack of mortgage credit available was a problem that extended into the everyday 
life of the countryside. The problem was particularly acute amongst small peasants, as 
these required regular credit to purchase seed or to pay workers for harvest operations 
(Shubert, 1990:88-90). To raise this finance, smallholders often turned to the 
moneylending of large landowners who would usually charge them interest rates of 
20%, sometimes more. The scale of this problem was huge: 200,000 small farms were 
repossessed between 1880-1886 alone. The state recognised the issue and proceeded 
to devise institutional fixes that cut across city and country. The nineteenth century 
saw creation of local savings banks (cajas de ahorro) to address the scarcity of 
mortgage credit for small debtors and to educate working people on the values of 
creditworthiness and discipline (Comín, 2012:147; Cabello et al., 1987). Placed under 
the purview of the state from 1880, these institutions palliated the problem in city and 
country. However their efforts were ultimately confined to small-scale operations 
within a local radius. Thus, they could not cover the true scale of the demand (Martín-
Aceña et al., 2014:44).  
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To increase the pool of available mortgage credit, the state regulated the practice of 
mortgage-backed securities, allowing financiers to circumvent the long amortisation 
times of mortgage credits by selling them as bonds in stock markets. In 1873, a 
monopoly over this practice was given to a large, semi-public bank, the Banco 
Hipotecario de España (BHE), which quickly became the largest financial institution 
of the country (Orti, 1995). These efforts, however, were quickly captured by elite 
interests. The BHE had notorious links to the establishment and focused its operations 
on large rural and urban ventures rather than on the needs of lay people (Cabello et al., 
1987). For example, in the countryside, the BHE provided cheap finance to large 
landowners, who would in turn lend to small peasants at extortive rates. Early-
twentieth-century attempts to spread mortgage securitisation to other credit 
institutions, including the cajas de ahorro, in order to expand the amount of finance 
available to the populace were repeatedly blocked by a BHE fiercely protective of its 
monopoly.  
 
The neglect of the needs of the small peasantry was particularly acute. The dominance 
of an agrarian oligarchy ensured the passivity of the political class between 1872 and 
1919. Instead, forms of cooperative finance (cajas rurales) had to be pioneered by 
Catholic institutions from outside of the state. These institutions were created with the 
explicit purpose of saving small farmers from ‘capitalism and ruin’, but also to contain 
the spread of subversive ideas amongst the rural poor that were harmful to the 
continuity of Catholic traditions (Shubert, 1990:88-90). The success of these 
institutions – which boasted 600,000 members by 1920 – resulted in the 
entrenchment of reactionary ideas amongst the northern peasantries, which remained 
a hotbed for Carlist agitation well into the twentieth century.  
 
The dearth of urban housing did inspire a few attempts to erode property rights to 
facilitate the public expropriation of urban landowners, particularly given the growth 
of working-class agitation in this period. However, none prevailed (Dávila, 1991). Only 
around 1910, and against a backdrop of intensifying working-class unrest, did local 
governments begin to develop public housing (casas baratas), which could be rented 
or sold to their occupiers. These efforts were stepped up in the 1920s under the 
paternalistic dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, remaining, however, a largely palliative 
measure. Slum conditions and overcrowded attic rooms remained the norm for 
working people throughout this period. In the context of a highly oligarchic state, 
public officials were more responsive to the horizontal conflicts between the urban 
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landowning class. Whereas downtown landlords insisted on having lax hygiene 
regulations so that they could cram tenants into their attic rooms, the landlords of the 
ensanche insisted on introducing such regulations to increase demand for properties 
in the outskirts (Pedro, 2001:187-194).  
 
In the end, the most ambitious projects to redress the problems of liberal social-
property relations would have to wait until the instauration of democracy in Spain’s 
interwar republic. These efforts, particularly the attempt to redistribute large landed 
estates amongst small peasants, were perhaps the most immediate cause of the Civil 
War. For the prominent social historian Gerald Brennan, who witnessed the build-up 
to the conflict himself, ‘the obstinacy of the Spanish wealthy classes to not cede an inch 
on this question [land reform]’ was ‘the foremost cause of the civil war’ (Brennan, 
2001:200). Indeed, the social revolution that unfolded during the Spanish Civil War 
quickly escalated into attempts to rebuild the commons, as anarchist militias 
proceeded to communise lands and confiscate urban property, the dramatic 
culmination of a century of escalating tensions around liberal social-property relations 
(Shubert, 1990:98).  
 
3.3. The Francoist Dictatorship (1939-1978) 
 
The long dictatorship that emerged from the Spanish Civil War employed a populist 
rhetoric that promised to protect the working classes from the predations of a liberal 
elite. In practice, however, the Francoist state simply redirected the oligarchic 
clientelism of the previous age through the structures of its opaque bureaucracy, which 
excluded the populace from its decision-making and ensured commercial success to 
the most well-connected private actors. This authoritarian state project had a 
paradoxical relationship with liberal social-property relations. On the one hand, it 
restored the class power of the rural landowners, who had been foundational to it. On 
the other hand, it attacked the interests of urban landowners and financiers in order 
to protect the working classes, setting up systems of public housing and finance. The 
inability of these measures to effectively address the problems inherited from the 
nineteenth century (e.g. the housing deficit only became more acute), resulted in a 
volte-face in the 1950s, when the state began to encourage property developers to build 
as much as possible by incentivising their profit motive. The result was the incubation 
of a capitalist apparatus of residential provision, a development that transformed the 
dynamics of the property market for decades to come.  
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3.3.1. The Francoist Paradox: Fascism and Liberal Social-Property Relations  
 
At the helm of the insurrection against the Spanish Republic were General Franco and 
his brutalised colonial troops, who ‘regarded the Spanish proletariat in the same way 
as [they] did the Moroccan, as an inferior race that had to be subjugated by sudden, 
uncompromising violence’ (Preston, 2011:71-92). The military uprising was flanked by 
a series of right-wing militias. (1) The Falangists, a fascist movement founded by Primo 
de Rivera’s eldest son. The Falangists believed Spain’s problems to lie in three axes of 
struggle – party politics, regional separatism, and class conflict – and vowed to smash 
all three under the shell of an authoritarian state. (2) The remnants of Carlism amongst 
the small peasantries of the north, who rose up one last time to defend a Catholic 
Church that had blessed the insurrection as a ‘holy crusade’. (3) The paramilitaries on 
the payroll of rural landowners, who undid the Republic’s land reforms in lockstep with 
the army (Barciela, 1996). From this coalition emerged the totalitarian dictatorship 
that would rule the country over the next four decades. Though political struggle 
between parties was banned in this period, the Francoist state was governed by a 
complex political equilibrium between competing state projects, in which Franco acted 
as an ‘arbiter to whom different factions in power [could] appeal in the last instance’ 
(Soler, 1969). Indeed, the dictatorship was rife with horizontal struggles between the 
ruling bureaucracy, to the point that Franco referred to his government council as his 
‘pocket parliament’ (Cardesín, 2016:268).  
 
The leading faction in the immediate post-war years were the Falangists, who imbued 
the new state project with a markedly fascist character. The backbone of this new 
formation were a series of institutions known as Movimiento Nacional, which included 
the single party (Falange Tradicionalista) and a web of corporatist trade unions 
(Sindicato Vertical) (Babiano, 2008). An extremely repressive apparatus ensured the 
physical destruction of a previous generation of working-class activists. In the terror 
that ensued, the anarchist movement of the interwar years effectively abandoned the 
stage of history (Soler, 1969). State power was exercised in a highly centralised 
manner, without democratic checks, as local governments were generally designated 
by appointment, regional governments vanished, and cultural minorities saw their 
languages and symbols suppressed.  
 
A revolutionary movement of sorts, fascism carried an anti-capitalist streak that vowed 
to protect the working classes from the predations of a parasitic liberal elite. This 
populist project translated into an initial threat to liberal social-property relations, 
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extending the grip of the state over private enterprise by commanding the financial 
sector, setting wages, and developing public housing. These projects came up against 
a dire economic situation. After the Spanish Civil War, the country plunged into a long 
economic depression, particularly in the context of Spain’s commercial isolation after 
the defeat of Nazi Germany and the denial of Marshall aid by the US. Fifteen years after 
the War, an average Spaniard continued to subsist on the minimum calories necessary 
for survival (Harrison, 1993). Hunger caused productivity to decline across the board, 
and in response wages were dramatically squeezed (Soler, 1969). At the same time, a 
populist rhetoric clashed with the political influence of rural landowners and the 
soaring profits of the finance industry, which had been made strongly dependent upon 
the state for the allocation of resources (e.g. licenses, finance, etc.). The public control 
of private enterprise without democratic checks translated into a rife clientelism, as 
firms developed clientelist ties with state officials to ensure the continuity and 
expansion of their businesses: ‘irregular practices were the direct result of the very 
nature of the political system’ (Cardesín, 2016:268). In short, corruption acted as a 
form of political accumulation that continued to reproduce old patterns of class 
domination under the shell of a supposedly populist state.   
 
The Falangists lost their grip on power in the 1950s, when Spain came out of its 
isolation because the United States legitimised the regime as an anti-communist ally 
at the onset of the Cold War. The Spanish state received a large US-dollar loan in 
exchange for military bases and a clearer alignment with the Western camp in the Cold 
War (Amodia et al., 1998). In exchange, the government toned down its anti-capitalist 
rhetoric and began to adhere to the instructions of the Bretton Woods institutions. The 
Falangists started to fall from grace, not least because of the disaster caused by their 
policies in the previous decade. Their downfall was accelerated by the rise of a new 
generation of working-class activists around the mid-1950s – this time of communist 
inspiration – whose pressure forced the government to command an increase in wages 
(Soler, 1969). In this context, a market-friendly faction of government officials, 
generally drafted from the ultra-Catholic sect Opus Dei, began to rise through the 
ranks. The Falangists slipped out of government in 1957, when the country’s dollar 
reserves were on the verge of depletion, threatening a much-needed stream of imports. 
After some years of turf war within the state bureaucracy, the remaining Falangists 
were purged from key positions around the turn of the 1960s.  
 
From this horizontal struggle within the bureaucratic class emerged a ‘second’ 
Francoism, one much more open to ‘the market’, even if still within the parameters of 
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a dirigiste state. The centrepiece of the technocratic state project was the Stabilisation 
Plan of 1959, which set in motion a decade of extremely fast industrial growth, a period 
remembered as the age of desarrollismo or ‘developmentalism’ (Amodia et al., 1998). 
This fast wave of industrialisation was based on the privilege of Spanish 
‘backwardness’ (Gerschenkron, 1962): the country began to import obsolete 
equipment from more technologically advanced countries in order to improve 
production at great leaps (Catalán, 2003:238; Charnock et al., 2014:35). To pay for 
these imports, the dictatorship opened up the borders of its ‘moral reserve’ to mass 
tourism, which brought in a steady flow of foreign currencies. This period was 
publicised by the dictatorship as an ‘economic miracle’, and it was expected to keep 
working-class subversion in check.  
 
Yet the promise of ‘development’ failed to appease an unruly working class. By the late 
1960s, an enlarged industrial proletariat was demanding democratic accountability, 
higher wages, and better housing conditions, looking to northern European countries 
as the standard to match (Martínez, 2011). Unlike the western European ‘Fordism’ of 
the post-WWII years, ‘Spain did not join the welfare state model that was emerging in 
western Europe within the framework of the Bretton Woods system […a] fiscal policy 
based on redistribution was unthinkable’ (Cardesín, 2016:290). In response to growing 
working-class unrest, the state of exception was declared in 1969 and a new wave of 
brutal repression and extrajudicial killings ensued (Soler, 1969). These signalled the 
death throes of Francoism.  
 
Into the 1970s, the dictatorship lost control of the situation. A clandestine Partido 
Comunista (PCE) was organising unofficial trade unions so strong that employers had 
to informally recognise them as negotiating parties (Comisiones Obreras). 
Neighbourhood assemblies sprouted to struggle for better housing conditions and 
participative local governments in the tradition of the socialist municipalism of the 
nineteenth century (Martínez, 2011). This atmosphere of resistance and political 
violence was aggravated with the inflation crisis and the closure of factories in the 
period. At the same time, regional grievances resurfaced, as minorities demanded the 
restoration of their devolved regional governments. The build-up of these pressures 
meant that the floodgates of change burst open when General Franco died of old age 
in 1975.  
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3.3.2. Nurturing a Capitalist Residential Industry 
 
The first measures of the Francoist state reveal an urgency to reform the property 
apparatus of the previous age, a mission that was pursued in its distinct paradoxical 
manner. In urban areas, the new state posed a frontal challenge to liberal social-
property relations. Only nineteen days after the War, Franco decreed the creation of 
the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda (INV), a public agency equipped with wide powers 
over housing policy. The INV had the capacity to devise housing provision plans, 
purchase land, commission housing projects, and issue credit (Pedro, 2001:203-7). 
Through this institution, the state effectively nationalised the power to build housing, 
setting in motion the first ever mass public housing plans. Though the state did not 
nationalise the financial sector altogether – a demand of its Falangist base – it did 
establish a series of new public banks to outweigh the ‘bastard interests’ of the BHE 
(García, 2014). The state also forced private credit institutions to funnel finance into 
sectors deemed of priority, including the construction industry. In the countryside, the 
story was different. There, the regime sanctioned the land grabs carried out by the 
landowners during the War to pay them back for their support. That being said, the 
populist strain of the regime insisted on finding a solution for the rural poor, even if 
with much less vigour. Thus, a new agency was created for the purchase of land to settle 
small farmers (Instituto Nacional de Colonización), land that in any case had to be 
willingly sold by landowners who were never expropriated (Barciela, 1996).  
 
In any case, in the 1940s, fascist attempts to reform the liberal property apparatus 
delivered catastrophic failures. The distribution of rural land failed to advance at the 
desired pace due to the unwillingness of the large landowners to voluntarily relinquish 
their estates (ibid.). Similarly, attempts to seize urban lands failed due to a lack of 
public economic means and an unwillingness of local governments to cooperate with 
the property register (Dávila, 1991:107). Moreover, economic depression and the lack 
of construction materials strangled the construction of public housing, a problem 
severely aggravated by the acceleration of the rural exodus after 1950.  
 
The mechanization of agriculture and a state-sponsored expansion of irrigation 
translated into the extinction of traditional agriculture and its replacement by large-
scale capitalist farming (Simpson, 2003:243). The rural poor began to evacuate the 
countryside at a breath-taking pace. Though the population movements of this period 
are hard to measure, Leal et al. (1975:187) estimate that out of the 4.8 million people 
working on the agrarian production in 1950, more than 3 million had abandoned the 
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sector by 1970. Indeed, by 1980, provinces like Teruel or Jaén had lost 40% of the 
population they had had in 1950 (See INE). As the market-dependent populace moved 
to the cities, the pressure they exerted upon the socially-available land eased in rural 
areas, where the property problem effectively ended before its resolution. Instead, the 
everyday pressures of market dependence were turned up to new heights in urban 
areas, where housing deficits became ever more acute.  
 
It is at this point that the property apparatus, which I have previously assessed across 
city and country, bifurcates into two different trajectories that should be considered 
separately, as each addresses different problems with different means. In what 
remains of the chapter I shall thus focus on the residential apparatus, which in this 
period responded to the demographic pressure forming in urban space by nurturing a 
capitalist residential industry. 
 
The failure to give birth to a mass public housing system during the 1940s encouraged 
the dictatorship to give up all future attempts to rebuild the commons. To address the 
mounting problem of urban housing in the 1950s, the government toned down its 
statist principles and performed an about-face. Now, the priority was to encourage 
private property developers to build as many homes as possible for profit, without 
regard for the quality of the dwellings or planning considerations (Naredo, 2010). The 
state began to offer generous ‘brick and mortar’ subsidies per housing unit, as well as 
cheap public finance and lax planning regulations. The central state began to go over 
the head of local governments on planning matters, overruling their land-use 
designations, purchasing or expropriating land from local landowners, only to hand it 
over to friendly property developers. The results repeatedly exceeded the planned 
targets and became an intrinsic part of the industrialisation policies of the 1960s and 
70s, when the country experienced the fastest processes of urbanisation in its history 
– as well as the fastest in Europe at the time (Cardesín, 2016:289). The slums that had 
mushroomed in the previous age were quickly cleared and replaced by dwellings that 
stretched into poorly-connected industrial parks with deficient infrastructure (Naredo, 
2010).  
 
Another major development of this period was the fast spread of homeownership. 
Though these subsidies applied to both build-to-rent and build-to-sell operations, a 
paternalistic rent policy encouraged developers to focus on the latter: price hikes in the 
rental sector were completely frozen between 1946-1964, and after this date they were 
only allowed to adjust to inflation (Bertrán, 2002:30-32). At the same time, the state 
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mobilised a number of discourses to encourage developers to build homes for sale and 
to educate the population in the values of homeownership (Naredo, 2010). Owning 
one’s home echoed the peasant values of a rapidly urbanising rural population, who 
had long cherished access to property as a form of family enterprise, independent 
living, and social reproduction and thus easily adapted to the idea of homeownership. 
Altogether, between 1950-1980 Spain witnessed a massive shift in home-tenure 
analogous to that of other southern European societies, though the Spanish was the 
most vertiginous (Castles & Ferrera, 1996). Within a few decades, homeownership had 
become a widespread cultural expectation in the everyday life of Spaniards. 
 
The diffusion of homeownership created a dynamic property market and a permanent 
residential construction industry of increasingly capitalistic qualities. Before, urban 
landowners had had much in common with pre-modern rural landlords, as their 
business had more to do with passive forms of rent-extraction than with capitalist 
forms of competitive commodity production. It was only when public subsidies turned 
the production of home-property into a lucrative commodity that a swarm of new small 
construction firms began to build en masse. Initially, most of the housing built was 
subsidised, which required developers to adhere to strict price controls set by the state. 
Yet from the late 1960s, as a construction industry coalesced and land inputs became 
more costly, developers began to turn down the subsidies in order to build homes at 
prices that surpassed the caps set by the state (Pedro, 2001:212-227). An industry 
dedicated to the cost-effective production of housing with self-reinforcing pressures 
towards overproduction had been born. These pressures outweighed the hoarding 
instincts that the urban landowning class had held onto from the nineteenth century, 
as they encouraged landowners to sell their land-assets at rapidly inflating prices or to 
become property developers themselves to exploit these opportunities. The result was 
that, for the first time in modern Spanish history, residential output succeeded in 
keeping pace with urban demand.  
 
It must be noted that this capitalist industry was not a spontaneous creation of the 
market itself. Rather, it was actively engineered by the state’s residential apparatus and 
assisted by non-capitalist means. The nexus between the dictatorship and the 
construction industry was forged in the immediate aftermath of the War, when the 
state issued large public contracts for reconstruction tasks, civil engineering projects 
(e.g. dams for irrigation), and monuments to Franco’s victory (Baquero, 2014; Vadillo, 
2015). The dictatorship arranged ‘leases’ of prisoners – many of them political – to 
work on these labour-intensive projects under forced labour, a practice that continued 
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until the late 1960s. This arrangement guaranteed enormous profits for the developers 
who could stomach the practice, forging close links between them and state power; 
relationships that they would continue to tap into for vital political favour. For 
example, to claim the state’s important subsidies one had to previously register as a 
‘real estate promoter’ (promotor), a license that required one to be on good terms with 
the regime. Similar processes regulated building permits, social housing contracts, or 
land designations. Around these practices grew a number of medium-sized 
construction firms with strong ties to the establishment, via marriage or revolving 
doors. The overall result was a capitalist residential apparatus driven by a clientelist 
relationship between the state and private construction firms, for whom competitive 
accumulation was often an ‘economic’ affair as much as it was ‘political’.  
 
Yet this residential apparatus ran into trouble into the 1970s. A reinvigorated working-
class movement demanded better urban conditions and greater access to social 
housing (i.e. publicly-built and rented at low prices) (Martínez, 2011). These social 
struggles posed a frontal challenged to the ‘developmentalist’ logic underpinning 
urbanisation in these years. In the midst of the ‘stagflation’ crisis of these years, the 
construction subsidies driving a good part of residential production were abolished in 
1973, as economic planners became aware that these incentives had turned out to be a 
major source of inflation (Pedro, 2001:227). In turn, the skyrocketing interest rates of 
these years strangled the financial capacity of the real estate industry and prompted 
the demise of a large number of small firms. Half of all those newly unemployed lost 
their work in this sector. Starting in 1975, residential production entered a phase of 
sharp contraction, restarting the housing crisis that has been the norm throughout 
most of Spanish modern history.    
 
3.4. The Post-Franco Era (1975-2010) 
 
The Francoist dictatorship was succeeded by a federal democratic state, devolving the 
Francoist bureaucracy into a complex structure of democratically-elected local and 
regional governments. Whereas this was (and remains) the first sustained experiment 
with mass democracy in Spanish history, the new democratic state failed to uproot the 
oligarchic interests that had entrenched themselves in the Francoist period 
(particularly those of the construction industry). Previous patterns of clientelism 
adapted themselves to a new context in which political elites were immersed in 
processes of political accumulation through electoral competition, pressures that 
encouraged political parties to levy illicit campaign finance by systematically 
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exchanging political favour for bribes. These reorganised patterns of clientelism 
intensified in a context of urban entrepreneurialism, as the local and regional scales of 
the state used their devolved powers to compete with one another to attract private 
investment. On top of this, the capitalist apparatus of residential provision was 
rebooted with the techniques of financialisation (e.g. securitisation), which enabled a 
vast layer of homeowners to use the rising value of their homes to boost their 
disposable income via mortgage-backed debt. The alignment of all of the above turned 
the inflation of a real estate bubble into a political imperative, thrusting Spanish 
society toward the great crash of 2007.  
 
3.4.1. The Pluralisation of Politics: Political Accumulation Intensifies 
 
The democratic political system that came out of the dictatorship was a product of the 
balance of forces crystallised in the Constitution of 1978 (Heywood, 1995:37-82). This 
document re-established a constitutional monarchy and reached a federal settlement 
to accommodate Catalonia and the Basque Country, transferring wide-ranging powers 
to regional administrations. At the local level, the neighbourhood activism of the PCE 
secured the constitutional enshrinement of municipal democratic structures with 
considerable powers over planning decisions (Martínez, 2011). The combined result 
was the conversion of a highly centralised dictatorship into a federal apparatus in 
which state governance was devolved to a web of local and regional democracies. This 
pluralist principle extended to other state institutions like the Constitutional Court, 
which would have its magistrates appointed by democratically-elected representatives 
(Cardona, 2013). The logic of these measures was similar to the process of de-
Nazification in Germany: the point was to uproot the old fascist bureaucracy and 
replace it with an army of public officials under democratic scrutiny.26  
 
After an unstable period of transition – which included a failed military coup d’état in 
1981 – leadership over this complex political machine passed on to the state project of 
the social-democratic Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE). This party, formed 
by moderate left-wing dissidents, successfully side-lined the more radical PCE that had 
led the resistance during the Franco years (González, 2004:121). Winning a series of 
landslide majorities between 1982-1993, PSOE reigned supreme on the basis of a 
‘catch-all’ electoral strategy centred around three principles: (1) the consolidation of a 
                                                        
26 Importantly, however, Spain did not hold its own version of the Nuremberg Trials: on the contrary, the 
threatening vigilance of the armed forces ensured a full amnesty for all human rights violations committed 
by the Francoist state.  
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pluralist democracy, (2) economic stabilisation, and (3) the prospect of European 
integration (ibid.). (1) Throughout this decade, PSOE deepened the democratisation of 
the state. Thus, the regime of devolution of Catalonia and the Basque Country was 
extended to every other region in the country, and a system of political representatives 
was created to overlook the executive boards of the savings banks system. It must be 
noted that the biggest victor of this process was PSOE itself, which at this time 
commanded an enormous amount of electoral power in every region of the country. 
(2) The process of economic stabilisation became synonymous with cutting loose a 
crisis-stricken manufacturing industry, a painful process of de-industrialisation that 
pitted the government against the main trade unions of the country (Marín, 2006).27 
Perhaps paradoxically, this arrived with a fiscal reform to boost a welfare state that had 
been severely underfunded by the dictatorship (measures implemented not without 
pressure from a series of general strikes). Over time, the old workers’ movement 
became fragmented by the pressures of an increasingly ‘post-industrial’ division of 
labour, giving way to new forms of class identity with different electoral manifestations 
(e.g. young urban professionals, highly-educated precarians), and unsettling 
traditional patterns of social struggle. (3) The process of de-industrialisation was 
presented as the price to pay for European integration, which came to signify the 
international recognition of the Spanish transcendence of fascism. This cherished 
milestone materialised in 1986, followed by an intense cycle of growth that was mainly 
driven by European investment in Spanish real estate.  
 
As the economy boomed in the second half of the 1980s, PSOE traded its old workerist 
élan for the ethic and aesthetic of neoliberal ‘modernisation’. The party’s leadership 
became openly hostile to ‘failed’ statist ideas and embarked in wide processes of 
privatisation and ‘liberalisation’. In the meantime, leading figures of the party became 
involved with celebrities, began to display lavish suburban lifestyles, and to assume 
executive positions in Spain’s largest companies upon their retirement from politics 
(Heywood, 2007:696-7). Perhaps unsurprisingly, this embrace of ‘sleaze culture’ 
(cultura del pelotazo) resulted in the eruption of all sorts of financial scandals by the 
1990s. Highly-ranked government officials became involved in embezzlement affairs, 
and the party itself was rocked by evidence that they had been running networks of 
shell companies to launder the stream of bribe monies that were regularly entering its 
                                                        
27 The communist Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) and the social-democratic Unión General de 
Trabajadores (UGT) had become institutionalised as the negotiating representatives of the workers’ 
movement in 1979. 
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coffers.28 As became more evident later, pre-democratic patterns of clientelism were 
not uprooted by the pluralisation of the state. Rather, elite processes of political 
accumulation merely adapted themselves to the structures of the new democracy, 
where executive power over the allocation of public resources was decentralised to a 
myriad of democratically-elected nodes, and to financial needs of an elective political 
class, which needed campaign finance to reproduce their access to state power.  
 
These revelations were coupled with the arrival of economic troubles after 1992. 
Unemployment soared after the crisis of the European Exchange Rate mechanism 
disturbed the capital flows nourishing Spain’s economic growth in previous years. In 
the midst of this instability, the government had the difficult task of implementing the 
measures required to ensure Spain’s entry into a Eurozone in construction (i.e. the 
Maastricht criteria). PSOE lost its majority in 1993, resuming horizontal struggles 
within the political class in the parliamentary realm. To stay in power, PSOE required 
the support of the Catalan liberals of Convergència i Unió (CiU), who demanded that 
the deficit caps stipulated by the Maastricht Treaty should be financed with social 
spending cuts rather than by increasing taxation (Navarro et al., 2012:108). By the 
mid-1990s, PSOE’s ‘catch-all’ electoral base was bleeding from all sides, to the point 
that an opposition formed by Franco’s amnestied heirs began to appear as a decent 
alternative. After more than a decade of electoral defeats and a series of marketing 
efforts to blur their link to the dictatorship, the right had regrouped around what 
became the conservative Partido Popular (PP), a collection of late Francoist elites and 
liberal-conservative dissidents (Moya et al., 2014). Their rise to power finally arrived 
in 1996, driven by large electoral gains amongst urban professionals, the youth, and 
the unemployed (González, 2004).  
 
The new government swiftly adopted the standard of neoliberal modernisation from 
their predecessors. PP engaged in aggressive measures to meet the terms of the 
Maastricht criteria and to ensure Spain’s entry into a nascent Eurozone. To cut back 
the public deficit, they engaged in a massive of privatisation of state assets between 
1997-2001 (Tudela, 2015). Once again, Spain’s entry into the Eurozone was perceived 
as a milestone in the country’s modernisation, allowing PP to revalidate their electoral 
victory in 2000, this time with a landslide majority. Feeling secure thanks to its firm 
parliamentary majority, PP took a sharp turn right and recovered their reputation as 
                                                        
28 And yet, perhaps the biggest scandal was not financial at all, but the government’s involvement in state 
terrorism operations – the ‘dirty war’ against Basque separatist terrorism – for which two PSOE ministers 
went to prison. 
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the ‘nasty party’. After a failed aggressive labour reform; a dramatic cutback in social 
spending by half; and an imperial venture with American neoconservatives in Iraq, PP 
lost control of government in 2004 with a dramatic loss of votes among professionals 
and the youth (González, 2004). A rejuvenated PSOE administration took their place, 
rolling out a series of highly publicised measured centred on civil rights issues and 
symbolic gestures (talante), e.g. improvement of abortion rights, same-sex marriage, 
the dismantlement of fascist monuments. Yet the ‘culture wars’ of these years 
concealed an underlying neoliberal consensus: ‘lowering taxes is left-wing too […] it 
seems incredible that our intellectual positions could have been so narrow-minded in 
the past’ (President Zapatero quoted in El País, 2003).  
 
The basis of this neoliberal consensus was an economic model centred around 
processes of real estate speculation, nourished by cheap capital imports facilitated by 
the Euro and catered by a highly precarious workforce in the construction and 
hospitality industries (von Zeschau, 2011). Despite warnings of an imminent economic 
meltdown as early as 2004, both parties were eager to ride the wave of the real estate 
bubble until the bitter end, and when everything came crashing down between 2007-
9, they descended into mutual accusations.  
 
The unravelling of the economy of these years came with a constant stream of 
corruption scandals, the majority radiating out of public decisions around the real 
estate market (Jiménez & Villoria, 2012; Romero et al., 2012). There is now widespread 
evidence that wherever a party held public power, it took bribes at every devolved scale 
of the state – local, provincial, and regional – only to then funnel these funds into their 
coffers through opaque foundations or shell companies. The primary function of these 
bribe networks was to provide a boost to their electoral war chests. In other words, 
bribery acted as a form of electoral ‘doping’ that boosted the capacity of political parties 
to engage in political accumulation. In the cases of PP and the Catalan CiU, these 
criminal efforts were coordinated by a hierarchy fused into their national financial 
structures. Despite a myriad of local and regional scandals along these lines, a criminal 
structure on a national scale is yet to be discovered within PSOE, though it is extremely 
likely that the scandals that rocked the party in the 1990s were of an identical nature 
(Heywood, 2007).  
 
The neoliberal consensus of this period shows great parallels with the liberal consensus 
orchestrated by the turnismo system of the previous century, a state project now 
relaunched around the patterns of real estate clientelism engendered by Francoism. As 
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in the late nineteenth century, a period of popular upheavals was stabilised by the 
creation of a two-party system organised around the collusion between oligarchic 
interests and an elected political class. In both examples, clientelism constitutes a form 
of hierarchical class struggle, as it serves to exclude the populace from state power, to 
narrow the economic agenda and to obscure how public resources are allocated. The 
difference is that in recent decades, clientelism has not been mobilised to suspend the 
horizontal competition between a (neo-)liberal political class in order to facilitate their 
peaceful rotation in power. Instead, during the post-Franco period clientelist networks 
have been mobilised as a means to intensify the horizontal class struggles between the 
political classes by boosting the competitiveness of each party’s electoral machine.  
 
3.4.2. The Financialisation of the Capitalist Residential Apparatus 
 
With the year of Franco’s death (1975), Spanish residential production entered a 25-
year-long phase of decline. The patterns of land hoarding that had been the norm until 
only one generation before resurfaced. With the disappearance of commercial 
opportunities in the housing sector, urban landowners preferred to exploit the 
potential compensations of a public expropriation instead of investing in property 
development or selling their land to developers. Housing deficits returned to the cities 
of Spain despite an end of the migratory pressures of the rural exodus, which ended 
around 1980 (Pedro, 2001:224-2231). Indeed, the everyday problem of a market- 
dependent population pressing against the socially-available land did not cease, it 
merely shifted its form. Moreover, in an increasingly post-industrial economy, high 
demand for office space drove up land and house prices in city centres, pressures that 
then rippled outward as processes of gentrification began to push the urban poor 
towards the outskirts. 
 
At first, and in the context of surging working-class unrest, the state opted for 
challenging the logic of liberal social-property relations. In 1976, the first post-
Francoist government embarked on a mass public housing project in order to converge 
with the housing systems of the European north (Fernández, 2004:148). However, just 
as in the 1940s, this was complicated by the poor financial situation of the state. The 
project was abandoned one year later and attempts to rebuild the housing commons 
would never be renewed again. Once again, the failure to find an alternative to liberal 
social-property relations resulted in an invigorated faith in the need to work around 
their problems rather than to mount a frontal challenge to their logic. Like in the 
nineteenth century, this was achieved through everyday financial incentives. From the 
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late 1970s tax breaks were offered to home-buyers, and private-public partnerships 
were established with credit institutions to finance developers who agreed to build 
price-controlled dwellings (López & Rodríguez, 2010:272-9). These measures were 
dramatically expanded in 1985, when the rent regulations of the Francoist period were 
lifted (e.g. rent caps, minimum duration of contracts) and the tax breaks to home 
purchase broadened so that they could apply to an unlimited number of properties 
purchased.  
 
This ‘liberalisation’ of the residential apparatus failed to provide lasting solutions and 
created new sets of problems. Rent conditions became quickly precarised as tenants 
became subject to short-term rolling contracts enabling a quick surge in rent prices 
(Fernández, 2004:153-160). The tax breaks to home purchase made property a 
remarkable storage of value for investors, who could now dodge taxes while buying 
assets of escalating value. These processes only intensified when Spain joined the 
European Economic Community in 1986, as this buoyant property market functioned 
like a magnet for most foreign investment. Even though residential production picked 
up somewhat, this was mostly driven by processes of suburbanisation for the wealthy. 
The property market was booming, but the housing deficit was integral to the boom. 
Real estate investment was being driven by rises in property prices, which in turn were 
being driven by an underlying scarcity of homes. The paradox was that, had 
construction outpaced the deficit, the whole edifice would have collapsed onto itself. 
As it would become clear later, Spain had just inflated the first housing bubble in 
continental Europe (López & Rodríguez, 2011b).  
 
These developments occurred as the state devolved broad competencies over urban 
affairs to its local and regional scales. The local democracies secured by the 
neighbourhood movement in the wake of the social struggles of the 1970s equipped 
municipal executives with extensive powers over the allocation of urban resources. 
Municipalities could now to tax land away from landowners, or reach agreements with 
developers to grant them social housing contracts if in exchange they costed the 
regeneration of degraded areas (Romero et al., 2015). A grassroots victory against 
previous excesses of the central state, this strong local power was at first put to use to 
contain the excesses of property developers, resulting in carefully crafted urban plans 
throughout the 1980s. Regional parliaments – 17 of them by the mid-1980s – gained 
broad legislative powers over the built environments, most prominently, the approval 
of their own land-use planning laws (Coq-Huelva, 2013). The local and regional scales 
of the state also gained the power to appoint executives to the boards of the savings 
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banks within their territories, which were placed under the oversight of regional 
administrations. The savings banks had come out of the Franco period with heavy 
public involvement, though their operations remained locally-bound. Over the course 
of the 1980s, however, these institutions attained full operational equality with the 
commercial banks and were allowed to operate across Spanish territory (Santacruz & 
Donoso, 2011:12-15). Ultimately, the decentralisation of the nodes of decision-making 
power over the built environment failed to provide a democratic counterweight to the 
clientelist dynamics of Franco’s authoritarian urbanism. As the working-class activism 
of the 1970s fizzled out over time, the municipal democracies that it had engendered 
experienced a process of degeneration (De Terán, 1993:347). The checks and balances 
within local bureaucracies gradually disappeared, leaving only strong municipal 
executives with unprecedented capacities to reach opaque deals with property 
developers. This happened with the complacency of regional governments, who 
sometimes neglected their land-use planning and oversight functions (Coq-Huelva, 
2013). Indeed, the savings banks gradually became the financial wings of a new form 
of intra-elite social struggle – instruments of political accumulation in the hands of 
regional elites competing with one another to attract flows of private investment into 
the built environment.   
 
In the meantime, the capitalist construction industry that had grown in the shade of 
the Francoist regime manoeuvred to poise itself in the new conjuncture, both 
‘economically’ and ‘politically’. As the crisis in residential production deepened, the 
vast layer of small construction firms that had emerged after 1960s, largely specialising 
in residential construction, were obliterated (Galindo, 2003). The mid-size firms of the 
sector opted for weathering the crisis of the sector by merging into large conglomerates 
with a diversified range of operations. These conglomerates began to turn to urban 
infrastructural tasks (e.g. street repair, cleaning) in order to offset their losses. 
Needless to say, these are business segments heavily reliant upon public contracts from 
local councils and regional governments. To secure access to the public allocation of 
vital resources, these construction conglomerates resorted to means of influence 
peddling to reproduce their power. By the early 1990s, the practice of influence 
peddling was extensive in all scales of the new state administration, with different bribe 
rates reported across different regional governments, usually around 3% of the cost of 
the briber’s profit (Missé, 1991, 1994). The factoring in of political corruption as 
another input cost in the construction business was not new. For the largest 
construction firms, this simply meant a continuation of older practices of political 
accumulation in a new electoral context.  
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Into the 1990s, the dearth of affordable housing was a major political issue, to which a 
neoliberal political consensus responded with further ‘liberalisation’, this time of the 
land market. After much struggle between the central and regional scales of the state 
over the course of the 1990s, the Land Law of 1997-8 introduced the first series of 
reforms that radically altered the mechanisms of land valuation passed down since the 
nineteenth century. This was an instance of horizontal struggle between accumulating 
classes. The Law attacked the property rights of the landowners by allowing local 
councils to privatise their planning functions to property developers (Gaja, 2005; 
Burriel, 2008). This meant that specially-licenced developers, should their planned 
developments be approved by the local council, could cost and enforce the necessary 
expropriations themselves. To facilitate this process, the law also changed the way land 
valuations were carried out. Now, to compensate landowners for their assets, the 
potential value of their losses would be benchmarked against average house prices. The 
idea was that the new legal framework would make home construction flourish, under 
the assumption that an increase in residential supply would bring land prices down 
(Matesanz, 2009).  
 
The outcome was just the opposite: house prices skyrocketed and formed a new 
housing bubble. A burst of speculative demand kicked in around that time, with a 
combination of investors fleeing the low yields of the stock market and money 
launderers buying property in cash to facilitate the conversion of their old peseta 
reserves into euros (Burriel, 2008). The opportunities for investment in house-price 
increases were such that they outpaced the rising cost of land inputs. In fact, the 
benchmarking of land against average house prices pushed asset-price increases in an 
upward spiral, despite a massive increase in residential production. The process was 
magnified by the entry of low-interest capital from Europe, cheap finance that was 
recklessly funnelled into the real estate market by the savings banks. 
 
A dual process of political accumulation became immanent to the logic of the bubble. 
On the one hand, property developers continued to purchase their access to key public 
decisions to ensure their profits: e.g. tailored land designations, licenses, or project 
approvals, preferential savings bank credit. On the other hand, different factions of the 
political class engaged in these clientelist transactions so that they could please their 
electorates by making their regions attractive to investment, but also to extract a 
section of the profits they afforded their clients. These two processes were mutually 
reinforcing: the yields of clientelism went on to boost the campaign finance of the 
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corrupt parties, boosting their capacity to reproduce their access to state power, from 
where they could return the favour to their clients, and so on. Without taking this into 
account, these patterns of horizontal competition, the dynamics of residential 
overproduction of the 2000s, as well as the extravagant expenditure in unnecessary 
infrastructure (e.g. rail lines, airports, etc.), would be unintelligible. At the same time, 
this clientelist nexus between the political and developer classes should be seen as a 
form of class struggle against a populace that had to withstand rising housing costs.  
 
Paradoxically, the boom in house prices met the acquiescence of an electorate that only 
a few years earlier saw the affordability of housing as a major problem. This 
acquiescence was the result of the formation a new class of ‘semi-proletarian’ home-
owners at the everyday level. Wage-earners began to depend on the booming value of 
their property assets to raise debt to cover their daily expenses. The Euro brought an 
injection of capital imports from northern Europe, which combined with record-low 
interest rates and new techniques of mortgage-backed finance. It also boosted the 
spread of everyday credit, which for many became an alternative to stagnating real 
wages (López & Rodríguez, 2010:236-246). This tied the purchasing power of many 
households to the continued impetus of housing speculation, an association that was 
easily conveyed by the comparison to the boom of the 1960s. Since residential 
production skyrocketed to an unprecedented rate, it appeared as if a second ‘economic 
miracle’ had arrived. The everyday acquiescence of the homeowning class served to 
reinforce this regime of accumulation because to please this electorate, local 
governments began to use their extensive powers to freeze property taxes in order to 
raise cash through taxes on property development and urban land transactions 
(Jiménez, 2009:263-7). 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
	
Thus, broad swathes of Spanish society marched in lockstep into the abyss of the global 
financial crisis. The coherence of this social formation was a remarkable achievement, 
the culmination of a long interplay between two historical processes that sought to 
address the problem of a market-dependent population pressing against the socially-
available land: (1) The development of an apparatus to pacify intense conflicts over 
liberal social property relations. At first, this took the form of a property apparatus, 
an ensemble of mostly financial measures seeking to provide fixes to grievances 
occasioned by a limited access to farmland in the countryside and housing in the cities. 
Into the twentieth century, as the rural population relocated to the cities, the property 
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apparatus became a specifically residential apparatus built around a capitalist industry 
oriented towards build-to-sell operations. After the crisis of the 1970s, this capitalist 
residential apparatus was relaunched in a financialised form, to facilitate the purchase 
and development of property. (2) The evolution of patterns of political accumulation 
mediating the bond between the political and propertied classes. In the late 
nineteenth century, this nexus was formalised through the turnismo system of rigged 
elections, by which politicians traded political favours to landowners in exchange for 
the manipulation of local electoral procedures. Under Franco, this process mutated to 
revolve around the exchange clientelist favours between bureaucratic officials and real 
estate developers. During the liberal democracy of the post-Franco era, patterns of 
political accumulation became dual. On the one hand, real estate developers continued 
to purchase political favour to compete with one another, while on the other, political 
parties accepted their bribes to boost their electoral finance, and also to compete with 
one another. Because parties usually exacted a small percentage of the profits they 
ensured for their clients, this encouraged a process of overproduction in the built 
environment in the 2000s. 
 
This focus on domestic factors does not mean that global macroeconomic pressures 
did not play a role. Indeed, had it not been for cheap European finance, it is unlikely 
that the Spanish bubble could have acquired the magnitude that it did. Rather, the 
point here is that the influx of European finance cannot explain the inflation of the 
bubble, and certainly not Spain’s unique pattern of residential overproduction. Indeed, 
my method of analysis has cast light on two crucial features of the Spanish experience 
that are grossly neglected in the existing literature: the political pressures derived from 
sustained housing deficits, and the role of political corruption as a driving force behind 
the bubble. The result is a critical narrative of the Spanish crash that is centred around 
‘the political’ – i.e. power conflicts over social-property relations – rather than based 
on the causal primacy of macro-structural factors or objective economic forces. 
 
Overall, this chapter exerts a dual function within the thesis. On the one hand, it is the 
conclusion to the theoretical inquiry opened in the previous two chapters, as it 
advances a historically specific explanation for the peculiar form of the Spanish 
pathway to the crash that revolves around political factors. In doing so, the chapter 
addresses directly the underlying research question of the thesis: why did the Spanish 
path into the crisis manifest as two seemingly contradictory processes – as a house-
price bubble and as a wave of residential overproduction? On the other hand, this 
chapter also acts as an introduction to the next part of the thesis, since the narrative 
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sketched here will be fleshed out in the coming four. As such, the chapter should be 
seen as a historical background to themes that will be dissected in subsequent ones: 
urban planning, housing policy, finance, and political corruption.  
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Part Two 
	
 
 
     ‘The moment we were to stop building, everything would collapse’ 
El Roto (2011 [2005]) 
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4. The Origins of Residential Overproduction: 
A Genealogy of Urbanism  
 
4.0. Introduction 
 
In 2007, a report by the European parliament noted:  
 
What is spreading along the Spanish coastal region of the Mediterranean […] is 
too often the spoliation of community and culture, the concretisation of the 
coastline, the destruction of the fragile flora and fauna and the massive 
enrichment of a small minority at the expense of the majority. Hillsides are 
invaded by a cancer of identikit dwellings not because they are needed but 
because they provide a profit for the urbaniser and the builder, for the architect 
and the lawyer (Libick & Cashman, 2007:2). 
 
The report was referring to the effects of the now infamous ‘build anywhere law’ of 
1997-8, the start of a decade of booming house-prices and residential overproduction. 
As I have shown in previous chapters, the combination of these two processes raises 
the question of how house prices could sustain a decade of skyrocketing increases 
despite an increase in residential supply that dwarfed even the rates of the largest 
economies of the Eurozone. However, as chapter 1 has argued, equally puzzling is how 
uncomfortably this feature sits in critical narratives of the Spanish crash. On the one 
hand, the core-periphery narrative, in presenting the Spanish crisis as a mere 
appendage of the broader crisis of the Eurozone’s periphery, hollows out the Spanish 
property boom from any history of its own – to the point that it misses how the piece 
of legislation that jumpstarted the bubble preceded the formation of the Eurozone 
itself. On the other hand, the spatial fix narrative, in framing processes of residential 
overproduction as a generic reflex of industrial restructuring, neglects how the Spanish 
experience as I will demonstrate, was born out of the peculiarities of its own urbanism. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to historicise the wave of residential overproduction that 
afflicted Spain during the 2000s, arguing that it should be seen as the culmination of 
a slow institutional maturation. While the ‘build-anywhere law’ is widely 
acknowledged as the starting point of this anomalous construction frenzy, what is often 
overlooked is that this piece of legislation was only the latest response to age-old 
patterns of land hoarding – speculative dynamics that have historically strangled 
residential production and resulted in continuous housing shortages. Attempts to 
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combat these pressures have a long history that harks back to the origins of the modern 
city in the nineteenth century, when Spain developed a legal matrix for urban planning 
practices without parallel in Europe.  
 
In making this case, I hone in on a central claim of the thesis’ narrative: that the 
Spanish crash is not reducible to a generic structural formula, but was, rather, the 
contingent outcome of a historically specific experience. This claim is showcased by 
looking at the ways in which contemporary urban planning practices are the result of 
a lineage of political efforts to give shape to the housing system that sedimented into 
lasting institutional outcomes – what I have previously termed ‘layered struggles’. To 
capture this historicity, this chapter will deploy the historical institutionalist notion of 
‘layering’ (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002:708; Thelen & Streeck, 2005:22). As addressed in 
chapter 2, layering denotes the processes by which institutions build cumulatively over 
time, cementing over one another and making the replacement of old practices 
increasingly costly, both economically and politically. This concept represents a form 
of path-dependence, but it does not preclude change nor determine the direction of 
change. Indeed, the amendment or revision of previous institutions requires an active 
sponsorship by political actors and, more often than not, the mediation of political 
conflict. To represent these political dynamics, this chapter will historicise the 
evolution of urban planning institutions alongside the strategic positioning of the 
different actors that promoted them.  
 
Although the process of layering is continuous, the chapter has abstracted three 
different ‘layers’ in the development of urbanism in Spain. This is a purely conceptual 
distinction, one that carries the purpose of identifying and periodising which phases of 
institutional change were most conducive towards the property boom and bust of the 
2000s. The chapter is structured in accordance with these three layers. The first 
section (4.1) traces the origins of modern urban planning to the establishment of the 
ensanche,  a distinct urban planning system that came to incentivise urban landholders 
to withhold their lands from construction. The second section (4.2) traces the 
responses to the problems of the previous system developed in the mid-twentieth 
century. These efforts set in motion a capitalist industry of residential production 
capable of countervailing the hoarding tendencies of the urban landowning class. The 
third section (4.3) discusses the responses to the crisis of residential capitalism in the 
1970s, creating the conditions for a 25-year-long housing crisis. The fourth section 
(4.4) traces the advent of the ‘build-anywhere law’ of 1997-8 in response to housing 
shortages. It dissects how its radical innovation in land valuation and urban planning 
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procedures triggered a massive wave of residential overproduction that, unexpectedly, 
was accompanied by a house-price bubble.  
 
4.1. First Layer: The Ensanche and its Legacy  
     
A distinct response to the demographic pressures of a nascent urban society, the 
technique of the ensanche (i.e. ‘enlargement’ or ‘extension’) laid the foundations for 
modern urban development in Spain. This development had long-lasting path-
dependent implications. The main legacy of the ensanche would be the primacy of 
urban landowners in the process of urbanisation – meaning that the state had little 
power if they refused to build according to the plan – and a highly peculiar system of 
land valuations. The latter allowed the state to price greenfield sites as if they had 
already been developed, making the expropriation of urban land exceedingly 
expensive. The institutionalisation of this performative form of valuation equipped the 
landowning class with remarkable legal powers to speculate with urban land by 
hoarding it, capacities regularly used at the expense of the housing needs of the 
majority. 
 
The ensanche system constitutes the first expression of the Spanish residential 
apparatus, as it was designed to ensure the provision of housing in the context of the 
spatial pressures over urban areas during the context of  the nineteenth century. This 
first layer of modern planning practices was laid against an uneven terrain of pre-
modern institutions. The ensanche was the result of unsuccessful attempts in the mid-
nineteenth century to build Parisian-style Hausmann boulevards by knocking down 
old medieval quarters (Angosto, 1998:35-37). These attempts were fought in court by 
different local and regional corporations of medieval origin (e.g. policía), bodies which 
succeeded in reasserting their traditional jurisdiction over matters of sanitation and 
public order within city walls (see Nieto & Rupiérez, 1998:361). The entrenchment of 
these bodies preserved the integrity of the old labyrinthine city centres and pushed the 
new planning techniques outward. As a result, unlike most European countries in this 
period, the new broad and geometrical neighbourhoods would have to be built on 
newly developed land by means of urban ‘enlargements’ beyond old city walls (Fig.6). 
This system was first tested in the planned expansions of Madrid and Barcelona in 
1860 and was standardised for application elsewhere in 1864. From the 1870s onward, 
many localities approved ensanche plans of their own, in pace with the advance of 
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industrialisation in the northern and eastern seaboards of the country.29 Two pieces of 
legislation in 1876 and 1879 extended the state’s jurisdiction to urban centres, 
effectively disempowering the old municipal authorities whose resistance had made 
the ensanche necessary to begin with. Yet, by then it was too late: the institutional 
mechanisms of the ensanche had already settled in and had begun to spread across the 
country. Due to this sequence of development, the system of the ensanche would 
remain established for decades to come. 
 
FIG.6. THE ENSANCHE OF BARCELONA: THE CERDÀ PLAN OF 1859 
 
 
 
Source: Base map extracted from Oficina Coordinació Any Cerdà 
 
The crystallisation of the ensanche was shaped by the recent advent of liberal social-
property relations. In the age of absolutism, when urban planning was driven more by 
aesthetic and military considerations than demographic pressures, Kings could 
requisition lands to build palaces and fortresses without legal constraint and without 
need to compensate landowners (Angosto, 1998:35). This changed with the decisive 
political victory of liberal forces in 1836-37, who succeeded in abolishing the legal form 
of the seigneuries (señoríos), aristocratic properties conferring juridical powers and 
                                                        
29 The decrees of ensanche of every different locality can be found through a simple word search of their 
usual opening lines (‘Real decreto aprobando el proyecto de ensanche’ or ‘Real decreto aprobatorio del 
proyecto de ensanche’) in the digital archives of the official bulletin of the Spanish state (BOE). See 
https://www.boe.es/buscar/gazeta.php.  
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fiscal exemptions on their owners. Feudal lords were expropriated and their properties 
stripped of their privileges and auctioned off to the highest bidder as ‘individual 
property’ (propiedad particular) (Shubert, 1997:57-60). The resulting transformation 
of private property into the universal form of ownership came attached to a regulation 
of its boundaries and to a restriction in the instances in which the state could seize 
private property in the name of the ‘public interest’. One of such instances was urban 
reform. From their inception, the ensanches were equipped with the legal instruments 
used to enforce the liberal revolution. The process of ensanche included the valuation 
and expropriation of properties in the way of planned new neighbourhoods, 
compensation for the original owners, and the public auction of the expropriated site 
to interested property developers.30  
 
The problem was that at the time of the approval of the first ensanches, the state was 
deep in a fiscal crisis. This was a time of failed colonial invasions (Vietnam, 1858-1862; 
Chile, 1864-1866), banking meltdowns (1866-1869), and civil war (Third Carlist War 
1872-1876) (Sudrià, 2014:480). The financial strain of this period ruled out the mass 
expropriation of land around city centres. To circumvent these expenses, the state tried 
to displace the costs of urbanisation onto the landowners whose properties fell within 
the bounds of a planned ensanche, providing them with incentives to build according 
to the plan. A new system of land valuations was introduced, one that valued the 
greenfield sites in the space of the ensanche as if they had already been developed: i.e. 
as if all the necessary infrastructures (i.e. roads, etc.) and residential buildings had 
already been completed. Thus, in anticipation of future values, even the most barren 
patch of rural land would see its price soar as soon as it fell within the bounds of a 
planned ensanche. These imaginary cities were meant to allow landowners to take 
building loans by using the artificially inflated value of their properties as collateral 
(Fernández, 2005, 2009; Matesanz, 2009).  
 
Not only did this system make the procedures of expropriation much more costly as 
landowners had to be compensated for the loss of urban property that did not yet exist. 
It also failed in its objective to incentivise private urban development, not least because  
an industry specialised in residential construction was lacking. At the time, the typical 
builders were middle-class professionals who, seeking a steady source of rents to 
complement their incomes, would occasionally purchase a patch of land in the 
ensanche and build a block of flats for lease (Tafunell, 1992). For these occasional 
                                                        
30 These mechanisms are detailed in articles 9 and 10 of the General Law of Ensanche, cited in the 
bibliography as Ley de 30 Junio de 1864, de ensanche (1864).  
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developers, the new system of land valuations simply made the business of land 
hoarding more lucrative. The threat of expropriation became a speculative 
opportunity, as urban landowners could rest assured that they would be exorbitantly 
compensated and that their profits would be higher the less they had invested in 
developing their greenfield sites. Thus, it became common for ensanche landowners to 
simply withhold their lands from construction and wait for the scarcity of homes to 
drive up the price of their lands. At the same time, investors began to purchase lands 
adjacent to urban centres with the expectation that a change in urban plans would 
make their lands fit for development, a change in classification automatically inflating 
the value of their property (Marcinkoski, 2016:68-72). Indeed, in the context of the 
corrupt local politics of the turnismo period (1875-1920, see previous chapter), a 
timely tip-off from the local government could result in enormous returns. Constrained 
by these hoarding dynamics, cities grew slowly and the planned ensanches took 
decades to densify. 
 
These patterns of land speculation worsened with a ‘deepening’ of the notion of private 
property in the late nineteenth century. The original rationale of private property was 
to secure private interests from arbitrary exercises of state power to ultimately 
subordinate them to the general interest. This was still patent in the early stages of the 
ensanche, when the 1861 Posada Herrera Bill – a piece of legislation that was never 
passed – proposed the expropriation of hoarding landowners who refused to build 
according to the plan (Linares, 1991:105; Orduña, 2001). However, by the end of the 
century, this rationale had given way to a much more radical understanding of private 
ownership, an ‘absolute’ form of private property detached from any social obligation. 
This notion was enshrined in the Civil Code of 1889 which represented private property 
as not only desirable but natural, thus reducing any breach of its sanctity to an 
exceptional aberration (Angosto, 1998:35). Spain here diverged from the spirit of the 
times, as by then growing working-class unrest was already forcing many European 
countries to adopt less radical conceptions of property.  
 
Such ‘hardening’ of liberal social-property relations would henceforth lock the 
categories of ‘public interest’ and ‘private property’ into a perpetual juridical tension 
that lives on until this day. It has had a lasting impact on Spanish building law (ius 
aedificandi), which has shifted even more power over the urbanisation process to the 
landowners. In short, the state could plan, regulate, and delimit the space of the 
ensanches, but the actual process of urban development – the construction of the 
necessary infrastructure and residences – had to be initiated by the owners of the 
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greenfield sites. The state was further disarmed of means to enforce the planned urban 
expansions and instead became completely dependent on the good will of the (urban) 
landowning class. If the owners of the land plots refused to build according to the 
urban plan, then the urban process was effectively brought to a halt. Thus, with the 
advance of industrialisation, overcrowded cities were made hostage to the whims of 
the urban landowning class. As the middle classes slowly moved to the bright and 
spacious ensanches over the course of the next few decades, the working classes 
crammed into downtown attic rooms in insalubrious conditions, as well as into 
irregular developments in the outskirts (Pedro, 2001:187). Indeed, vast slum towns 
mushroomed around every industrial centre. As early as the 1880s, irregular 
developments proliferated from Barakaldo (Bilbao) to Russafa (Valencia). During its 
first experience with industrialisation in the 1920s, Madrid saw the sudden spawning 
of large shantytowns to its south; these are now the districts of Carabanchel and 
Vallecas. Vallecas, a village of only 2,000 in 1870, saw its population swell to 49,000 
by 1930 (Valenzuela, 1978:41). In other words, the residential apparatus inaugurated 
with the ensanche system was born with severe institutional weaknesses that came to 
negate its very purpose.  
 
These patterns of land hoarding, constraining residential production, would outlive 
the ensanche itself. From the 1920s, with the advent of rationalist planning ideas, the 
ensanche system was gradually superseded by a hierarchy of metropolitan and 
regional planning agencies that replaced it with modern zoning practices (De Terán, 
1972; Valenzuela, 1978).31 However, the sophistication of planning instruments did not 
address the central obstruction to the urban process: the institutionalised power of an 
urban landowning class. As social unrest gathered strength in the interwar period, it 
became evident that, given the rigid conception of property in Spain, the only way to 
enforce urban planning on the landowning class was for the state to literally assume 
the property ownership of the necessary lands. Following the experiences of other 
European countries, the idea of combatting land hoarding via a mass purchase of 
urban land resurfaced from the 1920s (e.g. Joaquín Chapaprieta Bill of 1923). 
However, the enactment of concrete measures in this direction would have to wait until 
after the Spanish Civil War.  
 
                                                        
31 The practice of ‘zoning’ divided the city into different sectors with specific functions. This conceptual 
tool became an important planning mechanism to relocate industry away from city centres (de Terán, 
1972). For a comprehensive account of the evolution of supra-local planning bodies after the ensanche see 
Valenzuela (1978). For a more detailed account of how this process unfolded in Madrid, see Neuman 
(2010). For Barcelona, see de Terán (1977).   
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In 1945, the Francoist dictatorship created a land registry and equipped municipalities 
with legal capacities to expropriate landowners who did not comply with the urban 
plan.32 However, the implementation of these measures unfolded slowly, as a lack of 
financial resources and an unwillingness of local authorities prevented the 
implementation of this law at an everyday level (Dávila, 1991:105). To address the 
limitations of this measure, the dictatorship passed the first national planning law in 
Spain history: the Land Law of 1956.33 The Law’s preamble made the problem of land 
hoarding explicit:  
 
Lands are being withheld by landowners who neither urbanise, nor build 
homes, nor are willing to sell the lands for urban development and residential 
construction at justly estimated prices […] The purpose is often to seek 
speculative prices rather than real ones. In this process, they are making the 
usage of landed property impossible.  
 
To address these issues – again, a legacy of the ensanche – the Law replaced the old 
system of valuations with a rigid system of price controls designed to cap abusive price 
hikes in the event of a public expropriation (Marcinkoski, 2016:65; Matesanz, 2009). 
Yet, the 1956 Law failed to challenge the problems handed down by the nineteenth 
century. It appears that the complexity of the new valuation system was such that it 
was never implemented in practice (Matesanz, 2009). Instead, it was left to drift away: 
on the ground, the obscure land valuation practices of the ensanche simply remained 
the everyday norm for decades to come. This way, landowners continued hoarding, 
reassured that, in the case of expropriation, they would be compensated for the full 
potential of their plots.  
 
However, the makers of the 1956 law contemplated a procedure of urban planning 
enforcement that proved to be more viable in the long-run: cooperation. Going down 
this route, local governments would take the lead in the urban process by assuming the 
costs of infrastructure (i.e. roads, pavements, streetlights, etc.). In exchange, the 
landowners agreed to cost the development of housing on the condition that they 
would not be taxed on their profits (Marcinkoski, 2016:65). This sort of settlement 
                                                        
32 These measures were the result of two pieces of legislation, the Law of Foundations for Local Regimes 
(Ley de bases de regimen local), and the Law of Greenfield Sites (Ley de solares), both passed in 1945 
(Matesanz, 2009). These followed the precedent of the failed Joaquín Chapaprieta Bill of 1923, which had 
already proposed the purchase of urban land to build public housing for the working classes (Dávila, 
1991:106).  
33 For the Land Law of 1956, see Ley de 12 de mayo de 1956 sobre régimen del suelo y ordenación urbana 
(1956), BOE-A-1956-7013.  
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would remain the most common form of urban development for the remainder of the 
twentieth century. And thus, with the nineteenth-century legal powers of the urban 
landowning class almost intact, Spain entered the most intense phase of urbanisation 
in its history.  
 
4.2. Second Layer: The Developmental City 
 
The second layer of urban planning institutions was laid down to mend the legacy of 
the ensanche system and invigorate the state’s residential apparatus. After some trial 
and error, the Francoist dictatorship opted for nourishing a private residential 
construction industry through generous subsidies. Encouraging property developers 
to build as much as possible, without regard for the quality of the dwellings, these 
efforts were rolled out in an authoritarian fashion and without much regard for any 
planning considerations. In order to ensure that housing output kept pace with 
industrial growth, the state began to freely issue licenses to property developers, 
overriding local urban plans and letting cities sprawl in oil-spill shapes.  
 
It would be under the auspices of the Francoist regime, and in an explicit attempt to 
curb social unrest, that the state began to assume greater competences over housing 
provision. Franco inaugurated his dictatorship with the creation of the Instituto 
Nacional de Vivienda in 1939 (‘National Housing Institute’, henceforth INV), a state 
agency of Mussolinian inspiration that would remain the main instrument of housing 
policy until the end of the dictatorship. Its competences included planning of social 
housing provision; dictating national construction targets; approving and inspecting 
building projects; and providing credit and construction materials (Dávila, 1991:104-
5). In the coming decade, this institution would pioneer the first attempts to create a 
large-scale social housing system in the country (see chapter 5).34 
 
And yet, as much as the creation of the INV invigorated the legal capacities of the 
Spanish residential apparatus, attempts to solve the housing problem with public 
residential development were thwarted in the 1940s and 50s. At first, the main setback 
was the deep economic depression into which the country sank in the aftermath of the 
Civil War. Not only was the country devastated, but, after the defeat of Nazism, it was 
also isolated on the world stage (Francoist Spain was denied Marshall aid by the US). 
                                                        
34 As mentioned in the previous chapter, there were some precedents. The ‘casas baratas’ (cheap housing) 
legislation of 1908, 1911, and 1921 pioneered the introduction of social housing. From 1924, local 
governments began issuing bonds to initiate public residential projects (Pedro, 2001:195). In any case, 
these measures were largely palliative.  
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The resulting financial limitations and lack of construction materials made the initial 
plans of the INV a resounding failure (see chapter 5 for details). Contradicting an 
official discourse that exalted the virtues of  strongly regulated urban planning, local 
authorities showed an everyday permissiveness toward planning violations. Slums, for 
instance, were allowed to proliferate in an attempt to palliate the general lack of 
residential construction (Pedro, 2001:206-7). Paradoxically, the arrival of economic 
recovery in the 1950s only aggravated the housing problem. As renewed international 
trade facilitated the mechanisation of agriculture and the re-equipment of industry in 
the 1950s, the process of rural exodus, which had lied dormant in the previous decade, 
re-awakened. This, combined with the aforementioned failures to eschew the power of 
speculating landlords, placed urban areas under unprecedented strain. By 1955, 
300,000 families were living in shared, overcrowded homes (Naredo, 2010), and the 
housing deficit stood at 1.5 million (Pedro, 2001:207). 
 
This coincided with an intensification of the horizontal class conflicts within the 
dictatorship’s bureaucracy, expressed in the factional struggles between falangists and 
technocrats. The falangists, the fascist old guard, remained committed to a paternalist 
and corporatist political economy. They were phased out of power by a rising group of 
ultra-catholic technocrats, who pushed a ‘developmentalist’ agenda more in tune with 
the recipes of the Bretton Woods institutions: market reforms, fast industrialisation 
policies, and the subordination of urban planning to economic growth.  
 
Amid these political pressures, the falangists weaponised the residential apparatus – 
which remained largely under their control – to wage a turf war against their rivals. It 
was no accident that the aforementioned 1956 Land Law, a piece of legislation of clear 
falangist inspiration, insisted on the need for a strong and orderly planning of cities. 
The point was to resist the acceleration of the rural exodus cherished by the 
technocrats:  
 
Urban planning ought to precede demographic changes. Rather than being its 
consequence, it should channel them towards adequate locations, limit the 
growth of the largest cities, and breathe life into areas of balanced development 
that can harmonise agrarian, industrial and urban economies.35 
 
                                                        
35 The quote is from the preamble of the 1956 Land Law. See Ley de 12 de mayo de 1956 sobre régimen 
del suelo y ordenación urbana (1956) BOE-A-1956-7013.  
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The falangists also entrenched themselves in the Ministry for Housing, created in 1957. 
One of the key instruments of the Ministry was the Gerencia de Urbanización 
(‘Urbanisation Bureau’), an agency with powers to bypass the authority of local 
governments and intervene directly, anywhere in the country, to expropriate, plan, and 
urbanise entire areas (de Terán, 1972).  
 
To stave off the rising technocrats, the falangists needed results. As it was becoming 
evident that the state simply lacked the means to create a public housing system, the 
falangist Ministry for Housing began to experiment with different means to boost 
residential production. The laboratory for this shift was the post-war reconstruction of 
Madrid. The difficulties in implementing the Bidagor Plan of 1946, which had 
envisioned a grandiose reconstruction of Madrid under the auspices of state-led 
construction, led to short-term desperate measures by 1953, when a 90% tax break was 
granted to local property developers (Neuman, 2010:105). From this experience 
emerged a policy of fixed ‘brick and mortar’ subsidies to incentivise residential 
construction at all costs. Starting in 1958, developers across the country were rewarded 
with 30,000 pesetas for every housing unit that they built (Pollard, 2008:175-177; 
Pedro, 2001:212). This measure was heralded by José Luis Arrese, Minister for 
Housing and major ideologue of falangism, who proclaimed the need to ‘sound the 
alarm bell of private initiative’ in order to make ‘a springtime of homes bloom in Spain’ 
(quoted in Naredo, 2010). Arrese also theorised the housing problem as a matter of 
public order and saw property ownership as a means to discipline the masses into 
orderly subjects (see chapter 5) (ibid.). In an attempt to engineer Arrese’s vision of a 
property-owning autocracy, the new construction subsidies would almost always fund 
building for sale rather than for rent.  
 
Privileging quantity over quality, the policy of fixed subsidies steered speculative 
impulses away from hoarding and inspired a feverish urge to build. Building as many 
homes as possible became an end in itself. Though the old patterns of speculation 
persisted – e.g. the practice of purchasing lands adjacent to urban centres in 
anticipation of their reclassification continued – this hoarding logic now overlapped 
with quick opportunities for profit in property development. For instance, it became 
common for landlords to evict their tenants just so that they could knock down their 
properties and redevelop the plot with as many properties for sale as possible (Naredo, 
2010). Altogether, these dynamics set in motion a dramatic shift in tenure towards 
homeownership in Spanish cities.  
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Despite their success in boosting residential construction, the falangists were soon 
overpowered and purged by their rivals. In 1959, the technocrats consolidated their 
power with the unveiling of their grand economic programme, the Stabilisation Plan, 
which inaugurated the age of ‘developmentalism’. Launched after two years of 
collaboration with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the Plan 
introduced a battery of new fiscal and monetary measures, removed bureaucratic 
regulations to a number of internal markets (including cement), and adopted an 
industrial policy based on permits and tariffs (rather than quotas) (Catalán, 
2003:238). The state assumed a major role in commanding industrial development, 
funding strategic sectors and drafting French-style five-year plans (Planes de 
Desarrollo). This phase of industrial development came with large trade imbalances, 
due to the necessary imports of industrial equipment, a deficit that was only sustained 
by the parallel emergence of mass tourism industry, which facilitated the influx of 
foreign currency (Charnock et al., 2013:35).  
 
FIG.7. THE PACE OF URBANISATION: POPULATION BY TOWN SIZE 1920-2011 
 
Source: INE 
Note 1: After 1970, official censuses were taken on the first year of every decade. 
Note 2: The apparent urban growth during the 1940s is misleading, as all evidence suggests a 
‘ruralisation’ of the population in this period. In reality, the urban growth registered in this 
decade was largely due to the annexation of 13 adjacent towns to the jurisdiction of Madrid, 
boosting its population by 250,000 ‘on paper’. This was a conscious political move to make 
Madrid, the capital of the nation, bigger than Barcelona (Neuman, 2010:104).  
 
Over the next fifteen years, economic expansion advanced at forced marches of 7% 
annual growth (Amodia et al., 1998). These spectacular levels of growth – only second 
to Japan’s – were due to the initial ‘backwardness’ of Spanish industry: the import of 
industrial equipment allowed Spain to leapfrog to reach the standards of its more 
industrially developed neighbours (Catalán, 2003:238). Combined with the emergence 
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of mass tourism in this period, these processes of accelerated industrial development 
came with the fastest wave of urbanisation in Spanish history (Fig.7): the rural 
population of the southern half of the country relocated en masse to join the ranks of 
the booming industries. As the material quality of life of most Spaniards improved, the 
demand for second homes took off. Whereas in 1960 second homes constituted only 
4.5% of the housing stock, by 1970 this figure would double to 9.3%, and by 1980 it 
would double yet again to 18.2% (Tafunell, 2005:463).  
 
As the purge of falangists progressed, the technocrats co-opted the urbanistic practices 
of their rivals and redirected them toward their own purposes. In particular, they 
hollowed out urban policy from any planning regulations that could prevent 
urbanisation from advancing in pace with industrial growth. Metropolitan planning 
agencies continued to exist, but their authority was deliberately neglected and 
undermined (de Terán 1972, 1978; Neuman, 2010:116).36 At first, to outflank the 
obstructive role of the falangist urbanisation agency (the Gerencia), the technocrats 
had created a second bureaucratic agency with overlapping competences: the 
Comisaría para el Plan de Desarrollo (‘Comissariat for the Development Plan’) 
(Pedro, 2001:212). This agency, firmly under their control, issued housing permits in 
industrial parks (polígonos industriales) that sat upon rural land in the outskirts of 
cities. These areas stood beyond the jurisdiction of municipal councils, and thus 
beyond the jurisdiction of the falangist Land Law, which only regulated urban land. 
This way, the way the technocratic administration equipped itself with powers to go 
over the head of local councils. Municipal plans were thus constantly amended by the 
central state to rezone greenfield sites without regard for local planning considerations 
(Naredo, 2010). Eventually, these practices were extended to areas of touristic interest, 
which were granted a status of ‘special economic zones’, where land-use planning was 
subordinated to the economic potential of beach-side properties and hotel resorts 
(López and Rodríguez, 2010:306).37 The technocrats also applied the falangist policy 
of fixed ‘brick and mortar’ subsidies to residential development, to the point that these 
became homonymous with their economic doctrine. Commentators would henceforth 
speak of ‘developmentalist’ housing policies, and urbanistic excess became associated 
with the cult of economic growth of these years (see chapter 5). 
  
                                                        
36 The institutional drift affecting metropolitan agencies is well documented in the literature (see footnote 
10), especially the decline of COPLACO, Madrid’s metropolitan planning agency, detailed by none other 
than its chief planner in the period Fernando de Terán (1972). For a more recent analysis see Neuman 
(2010:116) 
37 This policy implemented in 1963 by the ‘Law of Centres and Zones of Touristic Interest’ (López and 
Rodríguez, 2010:306) 
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FIG.8. URBAN SPRAWL: THE MADRID METROPOLITAN AREA IN 1975 
 
 
Source: De Terán, 1993:287 
 
Once the restrictions on urban growth were lifted, residential construction accelerated 
and home construction kept up with the pace of urban demand for the first time since 
the advent of nineteenth-century industrialisation: 2.7 million homes were built over 
the course of the 1960s (Tafunell, 2005:463). Cities sprawled uncontrollably in oil-spill 
shapes, as the reckless construction of poor-quality housing in industrial parks 
stretched the urban fabric out into previously isolated areas (Fig.8). These excesses 
were later admitted in the preamble of the Land Law of 1975: ‘the process of urban 
development has been characterised, in general, by a congestive densification of city 
centres, disorder in the peripheries, a lack of planning discipline, and unjustifiably 
steep prices in lands apt for urban expansion’.38 In short, the city was surrendered to 
the whims of a new class of small property developers, sometimes drafted from the 
ranks of the landowning class.  
 
This take-off in urbanisation was buttressed by two structural transformations in the 
real-estate market in this period: (1) The focus on home-ownership of the construction 
subsidies would set in motion the shift in tenure originally envisioned by falangists. By 
1960, ownership had already overturned renting as the main form of tenure in the 
country. (2) The switch in tenure introduced an element of fast turnover in the real-
estate market. Building for sale turned residential development into a much more 
dynamic and profitable enterprise, as it granted developers a quicker amortisation of 
                                                        
38 This piece of legislation can be found in the bibliography under Ley 19/1975, de 2 de mayo, de reforma 
de la Ley sobre Régimen del Suelo y Ordenación Urbana (1975) BOE-A-1975-9250.  
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their investments compared to the build-to-rent patterns of the nineteenth century 
(Tafunell, 1992:6). In addition to encouraging the formation of small residential 
construction firms, these market opportunities also attracted larger construction 
companies, which until then had mostly focused on large-scale projects around 
industrial construction and civil engineering (Torres Villanueva, 2009:116). The result 
was the emergence of a residential capitalism that had not existed before. A permanent 
industry dedicated to property development was born, a significant departure from 
earlier patterns of occasional developers-landlords.  
 
Yet, this new-born residential capitalism quickly unravelled during the stagflation 
crisis of the 1970s. As industrial growth stagnated and the country experienced high 
rates of inflation, the policy of brick and mortar subsidies was abandoned in 1975. 
Around the same time, the state’s economic strategists concluded that most inflation 
was radiating out of a heavily subsidised housing sector (Pedro, 2001:224-230). Thus, 
the accelerated wave of urbanisation of the 1960s came to an abrupt halt. Without the 
support of construction subsidies, home production entered a 25-year phase of decline 
(Fig.9). As if part of a historical layer had been shaved off to reveal another bed of 
sedimentation beneath, the patterns of land hoarding of a previous age – the norm 
until only a few years before –  came to the fore once again.   
 
FIG.9. HOME PRODUCTION 1961-2015 
 
Source: Pedro, 2001; Ministerio de Fomento. 
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4.3. Third Layer: Into the Age of Housing Bubbles 
 
The institutions of the third layer were laid down in an attempt to reinvigorate the pace 
of urban development to address a number of problems, some old – the reappearance 
of land hoarding, renewed housing shortages – some new – the challenges of a post-
industrial urban fabric, the phenomenon house-price bubbles. These pressures fell on 
the shoulders of local and regional governments, to which most land-use planning 
competences were devolved in this period.  
 
With the discontinuity of construction subsidies after 1975, home production declined, 
the housing crisis resumed, and the practice of land hoarding resurfaced. Similarly to 
the 1940s, the state attempted to reboot its residential apparatus with an ambitious 
programme of public housing provision in 1976-1978, a plan that failed due to the weak 
financial situation of the country (see chapter 5). By 1981, there was a deficit of 
234,000 homes, a problem that would only deepen as the decade progressed (Pedro, 
2001:237). Indeed, according to Aurora Pedro’s estimates, the housing deficit stood at 
between 2.5-3 million homes during the 1980s. This shortage is even more striking 
considering the end of the migratory pressures that had determined the pace of 
urbanisation in the past. With the crisis of manufacturing, the century-long process of 
rural exodus had come to an end.  
 
These events overlapped with a deep restructuring of the state, in the process of which 
the functions of urban planning were diffused to lower administrative scales. By the 
time General Franco died in 1975, the streets of Spain were boiling with unrest. A 
resurgent worker’s movement pressed against the repressive grip of the dictatorship; 
cultural minorities demanded regional devolution; and local neighbourhood 
assemblies, tired of developers preying on their cities, pushed for a democratisation of 
municipal structures (Rodríguez, 2015; Martínez, 2011). As these demands were 
addressed in the Constitution of 1978, the Spanish state mutated into a federal 
democracy, with power decentralised into an assemblage of autonomous regional 
governments, and in which municipalities were given extensive powers over the 
process of urban development. The constitutional text that founded this legal order 
explicitly addressed the resurgent problem of land speculation through hoarding:  
 
All Spaniards have the right to enjoy a dignified and suitable home. Public 
powers shall promote the necessary conditions and establish the relevant rules 
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to implement this right, regulating land-use in line with the general interest in 
order to avoid speculation.39 
 
To palliate the problem, municipalities gained the power to levy a share of the housing 
plots urbanised by landowners, usually between 10-15%, in order to ensure the 
existence of a public supply of land to curb hoarding (Marcinkoski, 2016:62-9). Local 
governments also gained enormous discretionary powers over building permits and 
planning amendments. Starting in 1980s Madrid, municipalities began to strike 
bilateral deals with developers to amend urban plans in line with their interests, 
including the re-zoning of lands to inflate their values, as long as beneficiary 
developers were willing to fulfil specific commitments for the council (Benito et al., 
2015:198-199). For instance, it would be common for developers to agree to build free 
housing for the homeless in exchange for favourable permits to redevelop urban areas 
(see chapter 7).  
  
The residential apparatus also adopted wholly different instruments to those of the 
past. A new demand-side approach replaced the old inflationary policies of 
construction subsidies. Starting in 1976, tax breaks and mortgage regulations began to 
supplant construction subsidies as the main instrument of state intervention in the 
housing market. In 1985, this policy culminated in a massive 17% tax break to home 
purchase without limit on the amount of homes acquired and without conditions on 
the ultimate purpose of the operation (Pedro, 2001:292). Combined with an 
expanding supply of mortgage credit, the tax breaks prompted a rush to the real estate 
market, as investors began to purchase properties in bulk. Spain’s entry into the EEC 
in 1986 only added momentum to this process, setting in motion a train of house-price 
increases. Out of the foreign investment that funnelled in, 39% landed in the property 
market, driven by leading international real estate companies (e.g. KIO, Parreti, 
Heron, Reinhold).40 In the case of new homes, prices increased at a year-on-year 
average of 27.4% between 1985-1990, stimulating construction somewhat, but only 
timidly (see Figs.4, 5). Indeed, the asset-price increases proved to be a poor incentive 
to reverse the trend of decline in residential production, precisely because the house-
price increase attracting investors was sustained by the initial scarcity of housing. 
 
                                                        
39 The quote is from art.48 of the Spanish Constitution. See Constitución Española (1978) BOE-A-1978-
31229.  
40 The bulk of this investment concentrated in the Mediterranean regions, first and foremost, the southern 
region of Andalusia (64%), followed by Baleares (11%), Catalonia (7,7%), and Valencia (7,1%) (Pedro, 
2001:297).  
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This was a new phenomenon in continental Europe: a housing bubble had formed 
(López and Rodríguez, 2011). In one of the earliest expressions of a pattern that has 
become all too common in recent decades, price increases began in city centres – due 
to a rising demand for office space – and then rippled outwards to the periphery. The 
pressures of gentrification generated tensions between middle class professionals and 
a growing urban underclass, as the poor were pushed to the outskirts in order to fulfil 
their (by then deeply-rooted) aspirations of home-ownership. As much as these new 
patterns were a result of Europeanisation and financialisation, they would have been 
impossible without specific structural transformations handed down from the 
Francoist age. For example, a property-owning society, which by 1991 already 
amounted to 78.3% of the population (see INE), and consequently, a housing sector 
commodified enough to attract speculators. This bubble ran out of momentum in the 
midst of the European-wide recession detonated by the ERM crisis. Yet, rather than 
causing a freefall in prices, the burst only caused them to plateau, and the problem of 
affordability was dragged over into the middle of the 1990s (Fig.10).  
 
The housing question became a burning political issue during this decade, when the 
historic problem of land hoarding once again reemerged. Although the basic matrix of 
land-use planning regulations remained the same as the one introduced by the Land 
Law of 1956, some important changes had unfolded since.41 The Constitution of 1978 
had devolved planning competencies over ‘territory, urbanism and housing’ to the new 
regional governments.42 Throughout the 1980s, some regions developed instruments 
of territorial development and regional planning legislation, especially those with the 
strongest aspirations of self-government (e.g. Catalonia), whereas others deliberately 
neglected these competencies in order to give developers free rein (e.g. Andalucía) 
(Coq-Huelva, 2015:1220-3).43 In 1990, a new Land Law was introduced to patch up 
these deficiencies, an attempt that was immediately challenged in court by several 
regional governments for overstepping their now federal jurisdiction.44 The Law also 
targeted the growing problem of land hoarding by specifying the obligation of urban 
landowners to build according to the plans dictated by their municipalities. They 
introduced clear sanctions should landowners failed to comply, something that clashed 
                                                        
41 Another national planning law was passed in 1975 to combat the excesses of urban developmentalism, 
a largely ineffective piece of legislation. The effort was too little and arrived too late (Matesanz, 2009).  
42 The quote is from art. 148(3) of the Spanish Constitution. See Constitución Española [1978], BOE-A-
1978-31229. 
43 As early as 1980, Catalonia created a specialist agency for urban planning purposes, the Catalan Land 
Institute. In 1983, the regional government passed a law ‘for the development of a comprehensive system 
of territorial planning that would include changes in the qualifications of lands and the planning of the 
growth of the major cities’(Coq-Huelva, 2013:1220) 
44 The regional governments that challenged the law were those of Catalonia, Aragon, Navarre, Cantabria, 
Castilla & León, Canarias and, later, the Balearic Islands (Matesanz, 2009).  
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with the latters’ strong private property rights, enshrined in Spanish building law since 
the nineteenth century. It was mainly for this reason that the 1992 Law was struck 
down by the Constitutional Court in a 1997 sentence, making the passing of a new 
national planning law a matter of urgency.  
 
FIG.10. NEW HOME PRICES 1985-2015 
 
Source: Sociedad de Tasación 
 
4.4. Fourth Layer: The Entrepreneurial City 
 
The Land Law of 1997-8, the so-called ‘build-anywhere law’, laid down the fourth layer 
of modern urbanism. For the first time, this piece of legislation tackled head-on the 
legacy of the ensanche, introducing highly innovative reforms in the system of land 
valuations and creating the figure of the urbaniser: a property developer empowered 
to override the legal primacy of landowners in the process of urbanisation. Though the 
law was successful in stimulating residential production, it failed to bring home prices 
down, instead inflating a massive property bubble. This unintended consequence 
became a ‘happy accident’. The state embraced the bubble and turned it into an integral 
part of its residential apparatus.  
 
After seizing power in the general elections of 1996, the conservative People’s Party 
(PP) promised to palliate the housing problem with supply-side economics, under the 
assumption that ‘the foremost cause of the housing shortages is the scarcity of building 
land’, as the finance minister Rodrigo Rato put it at the time (quoted in Gaja, 2005). 
In short, the argument was that a liberalisation of the land market would result in an 
expansion of the housing stock, in turn forcing home prices down. This logic was 
inspired by the experiments of Valencia’s regional planning law, an innovative  piece 
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of legislation that traced the source of the housing problem to the excessive regulations 
strangling the supply of land available for construction.45 As Fernández (2009) 
explains, this argument was premised on a factual error: as early as 1993, a report from 
the Ministry of Public Works revealed there were 185,000 hectares of already zoned 
land amongst Spain’s 589 largest municipalities. This meant that roughly 70% of their 
aggregate area was already readily available for urban development. In other words, 
bureaucracy was not a chokehold on the land supply. Regardless, the new national 
government took the premises of the Valencian planning law at face value and 
proceeded to extend its supply-side prescriptions to the rest of the country.  
 
The result was the notorious Land Law of 1997-8, a reform that tackled age-old 
problems of Spanish urbanism with three radical innovations : (1) the figure of the 
‘urbanising agent’ (agente urbanizador); (2) the abolition of the distinction between 
‘developable’ and ‘rural’ land; and (3) a new system of land valuations that used market 
prices as a benchmark.  
 
(1) The ‘urbanising agent’ (or ‘urbaniser’) was a new juridical form that conferred upon 
private developers the right to draft and enforce urban planning regulations 
(Marcinkoski, 2016:68-78). Put simply, through this practice, the local state gained the 
capacity to privatise some of its powers over the urban process to private agents. After 
applying for the necessary authorisations, licenced developers could submit a project 
for the re-development of an area to the respective local council. In order to prevent 
potential conflicts of interest, the urbanisers could not own the lands of the planned 
development before. If the urbaniser’s proposal was approved by the local council, the 
landowner could either (a) cooperate, something which implied paying for costs of 
having their lands parcelled in exchange for a portion of the housing plots that emerged 
from this process; or (b) be expropriated. The municipality would administer the 
expropriation process, but the urbaniser bore the responsibility of enforcing the 
process and compensating the landowners. Urbanisers found this arrangement a 
profitable venture because, once the necessary urban infrastructure was laid down (e.g. 
sidewalks, lighting, etc.), they automatically gained ownership of the resulting 
greenfield plots, which were readily available for residential construction.46 This 
accelerated the pace of building operations, as it removed any ambiguities as to what 
were to happen if landowners refused to build according to the urban plan. Thus, the 
role of the landowners as prime movers of urban development, an institutional power 
                                                        
45 See Ley reguladora de la actividad urbanística (1994), 2602/1994. 
46 See Appendix A for the ruinous effects of this measure in the wake of the bubble burst.  
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that crystallised in the nineteenth century, was subverted and passed onto the 
developer class.   
 
(2) The abolition of the distinction between ‘developable’ and ‘rural’ land was another 
radical rupture with previous planning practices. Until then, all urban planning 
institutions had been premised on a clear demarcation of the space where planning 
operations could take place. This was the whole basis of the concept of the ‘ensanche’ 
(‘enlargement’), the space for a projected urban expansion, which had been defined 
against the notion of the ‘extrarradio’ (‘beyond the city radius’). Likewise, the Land 
Law of 1956 confined urban planning operations to lands classified as ‘urban reserve’, 
as opposed to lands classified as ‘rural’ (Matesanz, 2009). By contrast, the 1998 Law 
inverted this logic. From then on, the starting assumption was that all lands were 
‘developable’ by default, reducing the role of the planner to delimitating which lands 
were not (e.g. wildlife reserves, etc.) (Marcinkoski, 2016:68-78). The purpose was to 
tackle the common practice of buying up and hoarding lands adjacent to urban areas 
in expectation of a change in land denominations that would boost their value. In short, 
by drastically expanding the supply of land available for urban development, this 
change sought to undo the market opportunities underpinning age-old dynamics of 
land hoarding. 
 
(3) The Law also added a twist to the system of land valuations that had been in force 
since the era of the ensanche (Matesanz, 2009). Since the nineteenth century, 
landowners expropriated for the purposes of urban developments had been 
compensated for the full urban potential of their lands, regardless of whether they were 
developed or not. However, the system to calculate the value of such compensation 
employed obscure criteria prone to corrupt manipulations. The Law’s preamble 
condemned such ‘artificial formulas’, and ‘opted for establishing a system that seeks to 
reflect, with the greatest accuracy possible, the real value that the market assigns to 
every type of land’.47 Though the peculiar system of compensation for future values 
continued, ‘real values’ were now meant to be revealed by the rational arbitration of 
market forces – an assumption that encapsulates the neoliberal axioms guiding the 
reform.  
 
The Land Law of 1998 was a resounding success in its attempt to stimulate residential 
production. The new urban planning mechanisms ignited a feverish urge to build that 
                                                        
47 Quote from the preamble of the Land Law of 1998, cited in the bibliography under Ley 6/1998, de 13 de 
abril, sobre régimen del suelo y valoraciones (1998) BOE-A-1998-8788.  
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echoed the ‘developmentalist’ period of the 1960s. Home construction was fostered at 
all costs, and in particular at the expense of urban planning. As early as the year 2000, 
Spain was building more homes than any other European country, and by 2006, more 
than France, Germany, Italy and the UK combined. Indeed, between 2003 and 2007, 
more than 600,000 home permits were issued every year, reaching the extraordinary 
figure of 865,000 in 2006 alone (Romero et al., 2012:469). Overall, in the decade 
between 1998-2008, 6.5 million residential building permits were issued. By the end 
of this period, there were 1.87 homes per inhabitant in the country (Coq-Huelva, 
2013:1223).  
 
However, this desired outcome did not come about for the reasons expected. The law 
did not meet its objectives to curtail speculation, it merely shifted its shape. Indeed, it 
was  speculation that propitiated the construction boom itself, even if not by traditional 
means (i.e. hoarding), but through ‘newer’ forms of asset-price speculation. An initial 
burst of speculative demand for housing came from stock-market investors fleeing the 
low yields of late 1990s, but also from money launderers rushing to purchase 
properties in cash in an attempt to legalise their pools of undeclared pesetas ahead of 
the introduction of the Euro, as the currency change would have rendered worthless 
their ‘black’ money stores. In the initial stages of the boom (between 1999 and 2001), 
it has been estimated, 400,000 homes were purchased by investors seeking to store 
the decaying value of their paper assets in home equity (Burriel, 2008). This 
overlapped with a surge in demand for second homes in the rural areas surrounding 
Madrid but mainly along the Mediterranean coast; a process greatly buttressed by 
international buyers, many of whom were British retirees.48 Thus, the spectacular 
growth of the housing stock did not bring a predicted fall in home prices. Quite the 
opposite: defying the ‘laws’ of supply and demand, prices skyrocketed 197% and 
inflated a new bubble (Coq-Huelva, 2013:1223; Fig.10).  
 
That the growth in construction would translate into a new housing bubble was an 
unintended consequence of the new planning institutions, an accident that created a 
mutually-reinforcing dynamic of speculation between land and housing assets. The 
sudden growth in demand for property pushed up house prices, which in turn inflated 
the value of land across the board, as the new land valuation procedures required land 
prices to be benchmarked against the housing market. In turn, the growth in land 
prices across the board drove up house prices even further as the underlying land 
                                                        
48 61% of all home production agglomerated in only 13 provinces out of 50, the majority of which are along 
the Mediterranean coast (Burriel, 2009). 
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constituted a fundamental input in the value of a given home. The further growth in 
house prices attracted more investment into the market, a process later magnified by 
the influx of cheap credit from the Eurozone, which further increased land prices, and 
so on. But there were other mechanisms driving this vicious circle of price inflation. As 
urbanisers began to expropriate vast swathes of developable land, expropriated 
landowners made enormous profits with the new-market based valuation system, 
which calculated their compensations by factoring in the unexpected price increases in 
the housing market. This further encouraged investors to purchase rural lands in 
expectation of future urban developments, driving up land prices even further. The 
dynamic was so lucrative that even farmers, having lost the traditional attachment to 
agrarian life over time, began to pressure their municipalities to have their properties 
rezoned so they could grow rich on the land plot (Burriel, 2008).  
 
Despite these unintended effects, local, regional and national governments of different 
political stripes were eager to benefit from the effects of the bubble, embracing them 
as a new integral part of their residential apparatuses as rising prices encouraged 
speculative construction (Romero et al., 2012:469). As in the 1960s, the excesses of 
urban development did not seem to matter to political authorities. On the contrary, 
home construction figures were constantly publicised as representatives of the prowess 
of the Spanish economy. Local governments repeatedly meddled in land designation 
procedures in order to keep home prices high.  Indeed, all of a sudden, rather than 
being seen as a problem, keeping home prices high became a priority of 
macroeconomic policy. Of course, this phenomenon, termed has ‘house-price 
Keynesianism’ by Watson (2009, 2010) , occurred simultaneously in other countries, 
such as the UK or the US.  This macroeconomic strategy was possible because the 
problem of housing affordability was temporarily suspended by the Euro and the 
alchemy of mortgage securitisation, the combination of which provided a burst of 
cheap credit and allowed increasingly precarious home-owners to rein in the wealth-
effects of their increasingly valuable of properties (López & Rodríguez, 2010:229). This 
way, the ‘boomtown mentality’ was generalised and neo-developmentalist policies 
spread against a backdrop of strong social support.49 
 
 
 
                                                        
49 Only as the crash seemed imminent, the 1998 Land Law was replaced by a new planning law with anti-
speculative purposes – however, by then it was too late. The Land Law of 2007, still in force, has 
introduced a cap the system of land valuations and restructured the categories of land in an attempt to 
redirect the impulses of Spanish urbanism in more sustainable directions (Matesanz, 2009).    
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4.5. Conclusion 
 
Reached this point, the chapter must come full circle and return to the European 
Parliament report alluded to in the opening: ‘[European citizens] have become the 
collateral victims of many rampant urbanisation programmes founded upon 
legislation which provides privilege and wealth for the urbaniser and which denies 
individuals their very integrity’ (Libick & Cashman, 2007:2, emphasis added). Having 
now traced the pre-history of the build-anywhere law, the report’s alarm at the 
recklessness of so-called ‘urbanisers’ acquires a historical significance. As we have 
seen, the build-anywhere law that brought these empowered developers into being was 
only the latest (and most effective) attempt to invigorate the Spanish apparatus of 
residential provision at the expense of hoarding interests.  
 
Since the advent of the modern city in the nineteenth century, the urban landowning 
class has mobilised its institutional power – crystallised in their legal primacy over 
urban development and in a peculiar system of land valuations – to hoard lands for 
profit at the expense of the residential needs of the majority. Over time, successive 
layers of institutional fixes have been laid on top of these problems in order to address 
a resulting near-perpetual housing deficit, but always while preserving the pressures 
of the systems buried beneath these layers. As I have shown, in the middle of the 
twentieth century, a new layer of institutions was laid down to amend the problems of 
residential provision derived from the previous system. To make residential 
construction more lucrative than hoarding, the state began rewarding developers with 
fixed subsidies for every housing unit built. This policy had the lasting consequence of 
prompting a long-term shift in tenure – from rent to home-ownership – and of creating 
a property development industry. These structural shifts outlived the policy of 
construction subsidies, preparing the field for the inflation of property bubbles as 
Spain entered the age of financialisation. However, the abolishment of construction 
subsidies in the mid-1970s prompted the patterns of urban speculation of the 
nineteenth century to resurface and the housing crisis to resume.  
 
By the 1990s, the state started experimenting with urban planning regulations to 
address the historic problem of land hoarding, the culmination of which was the build-
anywhere law of 1997-8. This radically innovative piece of legislation tackled the power 
of the urban landowning class by instituting the figure of the ‘urbaniser’ – a greatly 
empowered property developer – and by changing the old system of land valuations. 
The law was a resounding success in fostering home construction. However, it did not 
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curtail land speculation nor bring down house prices – its main objective. Quite the 
opposite, it inflated an asset-price bubble, an unintended consequence that the state 
embraced in an attempt to integrate its effects into its apparatus of residential 
provision.  
 
It is worth remarking on the advances that this chapter has made to address the 
underlying research question: why did the Spanish path into the crisis manifest as two 
seemingly contradictory processes – as a house-price bubble and as a wave of 
residential overproduction? The genealogy of urban planning practices traced by this 
chapter shows how the construction boom that swept through Spain during the 2000s 
was the culmination of a slow institutional maturation, a process in which a unique 
lineage of institutions and the unintended consequences of policy experiments 
combined to produce a peculiar outcome. This perspective is the result of deploying a 
method of analysis that emphasises the political – i.e. the vector of power struggles 
giving shape to social structures – with a particular focus on its dimension as layered 
struggle – i.e. how the layering of the outcomes of past struggles shapes the terrain of 
subsequent power struggles.  
  
In making this case, this chapter buttresses the central claim of the thesis that the 
origin story of the Spanish crisis is irreducible to a macrostructural formula. Rather, 
the crash was the outcome of a historically specific experience, the result of a long trail 
of sedimented efforts to build an apparatus of residential provision. If this chapter has 
explored the historicity of the Spanish residential apparatus from the angle of urban 
planning, the next chapter will do so from the perspective of the Spanish housing 
system, focusing on the rise of homeownership and the culture of mass speculation 
that enabled the bubble to assume the proportions that it did.  
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5. The Iconicity of Housing: The Formation of a 
Culture of Mass Speculation 
 
5.0. Introduction 
 
During the 2017 Madrid International Real Estate Expo (SIMA), the stand of 
idealista.com, the main Spanish property portal, offered attendants the possibility to 
have two famous maxims of real-estate investment tattooed onto their skin: (1) ‘renting 
is throwing money away’, and (2) ‘home prices never go down’ (idealista.com, 2017). 
In the years of the bubble, the repetition of these utterances ad infinitum elevated them 
to the status of common knowledge. However, ten years after the crash, idealista.com 
insisted that prospective investors should have these ‘fallacious affirmations’ tattooed 
for the opposite reason: ‘to avoid the mistakes of the past […] lest we forget what 
occurred’. Though the emergence of a housing system geared towards mass 
speculation figures prominently in accounts of the Spanish crash – particularly in the 
spatial fix narrative – these studies tend to take for granted the emergence of a 
subjectivity conducive towards mass property speculation. The ideological expressions 
of mass speculation tend to be represented as logical outcomes of a social structure 
dominated by homeownership. The mechanical analogies used in these narratives are 
telling. For instance, López and Rodríguez write  that a ‘society of proprietors’ acts as 
a ‘true machine of subjectivation for financialisation, the material dynamo driving the 
debt-investment spirals that have captured household economies’ (López & 
Rodríguez, 2010:217, emphasis added). By understanding subjectivities as the 
mechanical outcome of underlying structures, these narratives fail to explain that in 
order to take root in Spanish society, the financialisation of household economies 
necessitated both  interpellations of economic pressures and an active cultural 
construction shaped by successive performative gestures (such as idealista.com’s). 
What is missing, in other words, is a performative dimension that explains how 
household financialisation required subjects prepared to respond to – and, in turn, 
shape – the interpellations of economic pressures. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to capture the political contingencies and intersubjective 
connections that preceded, and enabled, the processes of mass property speculation 
and reckless urbanisation of the 2000s. The chapter traces the emergence of a society 
of speculative homeowners by mapping the changes in the form of housing provision 
over time (e.g. shifts in tenure), alongside the discursive constructions shaping the 
imagination of Spanish dwellers over time. This analysis reinforces the central claim 
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of my narrative that the Spanish bubble needs to be understood through the prism of 
a historically-specific apparatus of residential provision by exploring how Spanish 
citizens made sense of, contributed to, and lived with household financialisation. It 
must be noted that the point of this analysis is not to advance the ultimate perspective 
into the cultural drives of Spanish housing speculation, but to cast some light on a 
crucial side of the story that has been missed by accounts that do not take seriously the 
everyday dimensions of housing politics, i.e. how the housing system is renegotiated 
by daily practices and discourses.  
 
To capture the historicity of everyday processes, the chapter deploys the notions of 
‘performative agency’ (Butler, 2010) and ‘iconicity’ (Konings, 2015) explored in 
chapter 2. To provide a brief recap, the notion of performative agency captures the 
contingency of signification. A discourse carrying a specific political intervention 
always involves a wager which may or may not be accepted by those it targets (i.e. a 
perlocutionary utterance). In the event that it is, however, the intersubjective 
connections created by a discourse (e.g. ‘growth = progress’) can ‘sink in’ and sediment 
over, reshaping the symbolic imaginary of a particular society. In which case, it is likely 
that a sign will accrue ‘iconic’ features, becoming a short-hand symbol for complex 
clusters of meaning that come to be taken for granted. Building upon these notions, 
this chapter will show how the bubble tapped into three historically-grown ‘iconicities’ 
in the Spanish housing imaginary: (1) homeownership as an icon of status and 
intergenerational justice, (2) reckless urban development as an icon of social progress 
and economic growth, and (3) house-price increases as an icon of personal wealth and 
macroeconomic stability.  
 
These iconicities correspond to the chapter’s three parts, split into two sections each. 
The first part (5.1.) will explore the remarkably early (and fast) emergence of a 
homeowning society in Spain, tracing alongside one another the material pressures, 
political strategies, and cultural factors that drove this process. Section 5.1.1. will 
return to the material pressures of urbanisation addressed in the previous chapter, this 
time to examine them through the prism of housing policy (rather than urban 
planning). Section 5.1.2. will explore how the solutions to the dearth of urban housing 
involved the mass diffusion of homeownership, a dramatic change that was quickly 
internalised by a rapidly urbanising rural population. The second part of the chapter 
(5.2.) will explore the role of ideologies of economic progress in the shaping of this 
propertied society. Section 5.2.1. will examine how in the 1960s the Francoist 
dictatorship sought to turn reckless urbanisation and deficient housing conditions into 
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a signifier of economic advance, a performative wager that working-class activism 
successfully subverted in the 1970s. Section 5.2.2. will examine the re-emergence of 
housing speculation and reckless urbanisation as a signifier of economic advance in 
the midst of European integration. The third part (5.3.) will explore how home-price 
increases became an icon of macroeconomic success, enabling the state to rely on 
house-price speculation as a form of economic stimulus – what Watson (2010) has 
called ‘house-price Keynesianism’. Section 5.3.1. will start out by tracing how the defeat 
of the wave of working-class activism of the 1970s led to the formation of what is 
referred to here as a class of ‘semi-proletarian homeowners’ – a layer of propertied 
workers that complemented their incomes by borrowing against home equity. Section 
5.3.2. will examine how this newly-formed class was educated to relish asset-price 
increases.   
 
5.1. ‘Renting is Throwing Money Away’: A Society of Proprietors 
 
The purpose of this first part is to explore the basic cultural matrix of the bubble: the 
society of proprietors that took shape between 1950-1980. The fast diffusion of 
homeownership in these decades, along with the side-lining of social housing, was a 
consequence of public efforts to palliate an acute housing deficit by encouraging 
developers to build for profit (i.e. the formation of a capitalist residential apparatus). 
To legitimise this process, the state exalted the values of homeownership as a family 
enterprise, something that appealed to a quickly urbanising rural population, who 
generally owned property in their towns of origin. The success of this project meant 
that by the end of this period, homeownership had consolidated as an icon of long-
term investment, inter-generational justice, and personal success, whereas alternative 
forms of residential provision came to carry the stigma of precarity and social 
marginalisation. These processes equipped the Spanish housing system with the 
structural potential for mass speculation.  
 
5.1.1. Residential Capitalism Against Housing Deficits 
 
As addressed in the previous chapter, the Francoist dictatorship came out of the 
Spanish Civil War with the urgent mission of addressing the acute problem of housing 
provision inherited from a previous age. The 1940s and 50s saw the first experiments 
with mass public housing in Spanish history, initiatives that were planned and 
commanded by the newly-created Instituto Nacional de Vivienda (INV) (Blasco, 
1993:268). At first, the development of public housing was confined to state agencies 
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and other organisations of the regime (e.g. Sindicato Vertical, the fascist trade union), 
which, in turn, tended to allocate these dwellings to the dictatorship’s protégés. 
Construction firms were banned from developing homes for profit, pushing private 
developers out of the real-estate business altogether. Legally, private housing could 
only be built by savings banks and by businesses developing homes for their 
employees, but they had to abide by the strict price controls imposed by the state. This 
heavily statist system remained in force throughout the 1940s and early 1950s, 
delivering catastrophic results. The first housing plan (1939) envisioned the 
construction of 500,000 homes, yet, largely due to the post-war depression and the 
lack of construction materials available, only 156,000 were ever completed. Moreover, 
despite the state’s insistence on state-led construction, only 4% of these units were 
actually built by public institutions (Pedro, 2001:203-207).  
 
The mounting housing deficit and the inability of the state to develop a public 
apparatus of residential provision forced the hand of the dictatorship to ‘sound the 
alarm bells of private initiative’, as the falangist Housing Minister put it (Arese quoted 
in Naredo, 2010). From the mid-1950s, successive pieces of legislation opened up the 
housing market to the profit motive. While social housing was to remain fully public 
and directly built by the state, the construction of price-controlled housing was opened 
up to the initiatives of private developers, who were welcomed back into the business 
with generous construction subsidies.50 In 1954, developers were offered a 20% 
subsidy on the construction costs of smaller housing units, a measure devised to 
compensate developers for being forced to sell their product at low prices (Blasco, 
1993:270, 282). The good results encouraged the state to step up the incentives in 
subsequent years. From 1958, builders were rewarded with a ‘brick and mortar’ 
subsidy of 30,000 pesetas per housing unit built, regardless of size (Pedro, 2001:209, 
212-225). The objective of these subsidies was, put simply, to turn building as much as 
possible into an end in itself, privileging quantity over quality. In this sense, the policy 
was a resounding success. Even though the state had only envisioned the development 
of 550,000 homes between 1955-1960, more than 3,000,000 housing units were built 
in this short period. These spectacular results consolidated the strategy it in the coming 
                                                        
50 I have applied the term ‘price-controlled housing’ to a number of housing categories of this period: 
‘viviendas bonificables’ (introduced in 1944); ‘viviendas de renta limitada’ (1954); ‘viviendas 
subvencionadas’ (1957); and ‘viviendas de protección official’ (1963). As Pollard (2008) explains, despite 
the constantly changing names, these categories all serve to designate a vast subsidised housing sector, 
mainly for sale. Starting in 1963, ‘price-controlled’ housing and ‘social’ housing (i.e. publicly-developed), 
were lumped together under a single legal category: ‘publicly-protected housing’ (vivienda de protección 
official), a nomenclature that persists to this day and that serves to hide the role of public housing from 
view. Irrespective of the legal category in force, this chapter will insist on continuing to distinguish 
between the two forms of residential provision. 
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decade, when planned targets were vastly exceeded once again. Even though the state 
had planned for the construction of 3,000,000 homes in the period between 1961-
1976, this figure was achieved as early as 1968 (ibid.:212-227).  
 
This spawned a dynamic housing market driven by a permanent industry of property 
development that had not existed before – a residential capitalism had emerged. As 
the process of urbanisation heated up in the years of fast industrialisation of the 1960s, 
rising land prices increased the input costs of property developers, who began to turn 
down state subsidies so that they could raise prices beyond the caps set by the state. 
The capitalist drive toward cost-effective production became evident after 1967, when 
price-controlled housing began to be displaced by dwellings built outside of the 
purview of the state’s price controls (vivienda libre) – a mode of housing provision 
which I shall henceforth refer to as ‘unregulated housing’ (see Fig.11 below). Into the 
1970s, this form of housing detached from price constraints came to amount to 40-
50% of all newly built housing.  
 
This capitalist residential apparatus fed off the rising purchasing power of Spaniards 
and an increase in the demand for second homes, which tripled between 1960 and 
1970, and doubled again between 1970 and 1980 (Tafunell, 2005:463). Growing 
demand for housing coincided with the rise in mass tourism. Indeed, great part of the 
demand corresponded with the desire to acquire a beach-side property. However, as 
elsewhere in the European south, the demand for second homes was also part of a 
widespread aspiration amongst rural migrants to build holiday homes in their towns 
of origin (Castles & Ferrera, 1996). Publicly-developed social housing became 
marginalised, reduced to a form of welfare catering to the poorest strata, one that was 
prevalent around industrial parks and in the outskirts of urban areas (Bertrán, 
2002:32-34). Similarly, as unregulated housing took off, the price-controlled sector 
was gradually reconceived to fulfil a similar ‘social’ function, as the reduced prices were 
perceived to be geared towards those of lower means. 
 
Residential production peaked in 1975, when the housing system came up against the 
crisis of ‘stagflation’ (Fig.11). Economic planners identified a major source of inflation 
in the housing subsidies that had been driving residential production since the 1950s, 
proceeding to abolish them (Pedro, 2001:224-230). With the removal of public 
incentives, price-controlled housing entered a steady phase of decline and would never 
recover the rates of production of these years. At the same time, a rampant inflation 
translated into skyrocketing credit costs, as interest rates reached the heights of 22% 
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in 1977 (see chapter 6). Combined with surging unemployment, these factors strangled 
the market for unregulated housing. Altogether, the country entered the second half of 
the 1970s with a sudden drop in residential construction, plunging the housing stock 
into renewed shortages.  
 
FIG.11. CONSTRUCTION BY HOUSING SECTOR VS. HOME PRICES (1960-2016) 
 
 
Sources: Data for housing output from Tafunell (2005:492); Pedro (2001:234-236, 332-333);  
Ministerio de Fomento. Data for home prices from Sociedad de Tasación. 
Note: Data for the ‘protected’ sector includes both social housing (publicly-developed) and 
price-controlled housing (privately-developed but subject to price controls). See footnote 49 for 
further clarification of the distinction between housing nomenclatures in this chapter.  
 
The initial response by policy-makers was to reboot the country’s social housing system 
with an ambitious programme of public development in 1976 (Blasco, 1993:282-283). 
The purpose of this project was to converge the Spanish housing market with the social 
housing systems of the European north. If successful, this initiative would have 
disturbed the pattern of residential production set in motion two decades earlier. 
However, the extremely high interest rates complicated the financing of this project, 
which consequently delivered very poor results. The plan was abandoned only two 
years later, when only 27,000 units out of the envisioned 450,000 had been completed. 
This setback would mark the last attempt to establish a public residential apparatus, 
consolidating the role that residential capitalism and unregulated housing came to play 
in the subsequent history of Spanish housing.  
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Facing the difficulties in reinvigorating construction, the state opted for sounding the 
alarm bells of private initiative once again. Rather than returning to a policy of 
subsidies, state planners began to experiment with different ways of stimulating the 
capitalist residential apparatus. State planners introduced a new instrument of 
intervention in the housing market: tax breaks to home purchase.51 Starting in 1978, 
new tax legislation introduced 15% tax deductions to the acquisition of first homes 
(López & Rodríguez, 2010:272). These measures were dramatically stepped up in 1985, 
when a major round of tax breaks increased these deductions to 17% and extended 
their reach to the purchase of second homes, without limit on the number of units 
acquired. In an increasingly post-industrial economy, where a high demand for office 
space was pushing up land prices in city centres and fostering processes of 
gentrification, these fiscal measures turned property into a formidable investment, 
prompting a rush to the property market (Pedro, 2001:292-299). This process was 
later magnified by the entry of foreign capital after Spain’s accession to the European 
Economic Community in 1986, setting in motion a train of self-reproducing price 
increases: a housing bubble had formed (see chapter 4). This context boosted 
construction in the unregulated housing sector somewhat, as the lack of pricing 
constraints was attractive to investors driven into the market by the prospect of price 
increases. Despite this stimulus, the surge in residential construction brought by 
speculative investment failed to cover demand. Throughout the 1980s, housing 
shortages remained the norm.   
 
When the bubble burst in the context of the ERM crisis of 1992, the only option that 
state officials could fathom was sounding the alarm bells of private initiative even 
louder. The response to this recession was unlike that of previous ones. This time, there 
were no counter-cyclical efforts to reinforce public intervention in the housing market. 
On the contrary, successive housing plans re-packaged price-controlled housing as a 
form of means-tested welfare, formally relegating it to a ‘safety net’ function (López & 
Rodríguez, 2010:278-9). The further marginalisation of price-controlled housing was 
a result of European prescriptions in housing matters in the context of the deficit 
restrictions imposed by the Stability Pact of 1992. This consolidated the dominance of 
unregulated housing and acted as a precondition for the inflation of a much more 
                                                        
51 In addition, the state also stimulated the construction of price-controlled housing by facilitating access 
to credit for property developers. To do so, the state mobilised public finance and formed partnerships 
with private financial institutions to ensure that developers would receive credits at below market levels 
(Blasco, 1993:295). These measures kept home construction afloat in the first half of the 1980s, when 
price-controlled dwellings came to amount to 70% of all newly built stock. Yet these results were purely 
palliative: in absolute terms, this form of residential provision had entered a phase of terminal decline 
(see above Fig.11).  
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virulent bubble only a few years later, as it generalised the potential for house-price 
increases.  
 
The new bubble arrived when the land market was ‘liberalised’ in 1997, in line with the 
supply-side prescriptions of neoliberal urban planners: the so-called build-anywhere 
law (see chapter 4). The reform succeeded in fostering the construction of six million 
homes in a mere decade, an astonishing feat that was buttressed by continued tax 
breaks to property.  
 
5.1.2. ‘A Country of Proprietors, Not Proletarians’  
 
If the previous section has provided an overview of the material pressures shaping the 
residential apparatus in the second half of the twentieth century, the next step is to 
examine the parallel emergence of homeownership as a basic cultural expectation. The 
origins of this process hark back to the destruction of the rental market in the 1950s, 
with the extension of brick-and-mortar subsidies to property developers (see chapter 
4). The main reason for this were the highly paternalistic rent policies of the 
dictatorship, which discouraged real-estate developers from investing in build-to-rent 
projects (Bertrán, 2002:30-32). Existing legislation fixed rent prices at a certain 
proportion of the tenant’s income and forced landowners into perpetual rolling 
contracts that were to remain in force as long as their tenants wished to remain in the 
property. Moreover, the state dictated the complete freezing of rent prices between 
1946-1964, and even after that only allowed landlords to adjust rents to inflation. Thus, 
even though construction subsidies were available irrespective of whether dwellings 
were built for rent or sale, developers found it much more lucrative to focus on build-
to-sell operations only. The differential profitability of build-to-sell operations was 
such that urban landlords began to let their rented properties decay in order to get 
them filed as ‘ruinous’ – a pretext that enabled them to evict their tenants for safety 
reasons – only to knock down the building and redevelop the plot with flats for sale 
(Naredo, 2010).52 Policy-makers were well aware of the everyday displacement of rent 
tenure for owner-occupation and actively encouraged the process, realising that build-
to-sell operations offered developers the incentives of higher returns and a faster 
                                                        
52 According to Naredo (2010), this practice is the reason why there remain less buildings dating prior to 
1940 in Spain, a non-belligerent in World War II, than in Germany. It is also noteworthy that only 8% of 
the housing stock was destroyed in the Spanish Civil War (Pollard, 2008:178). 
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amortisation of their capital investments (Bertrán, 2002:32-34).53 Fostering 
residential product at all costs was of utmost priority.  
  
This process was assisted by discourses exalting the value of homeownership from the 
1950s, a process that needs to be situated within the context of the horizontal class 
struggles unfolding at the heart of the Francoist bureaucracy. As previously discussed 
in chapters 3 and 4, at the time two political factions within the dictatorship were 
engaged in a turf war over the levers of the state: falangists vs. technocrats. The 
falangists, the fascist old guard, were pushed out of key government positions in 1957, 
but as a consolation prize were given control of a new government agency: the Ministry 
for Housing with, at its helm, José Luis Arrese. A major falangist ideologue, Arrese 
promptly  mobilised housing policy to promote the cause of his faction (Naredo, 2010; 
Bertrán, 2002:34-36). It was under his command that the Ministry devised the 
previously discussed policy of construction subsidies, a measure that was highly 
successful in stimulating residential construction but that contradicted the purported 
‘social’ character of falangism, as it surrendered housing to the profit motive of 
property developers. Indeed, this policy came under criticism for benefitting the 
middle classes the most. Even though the subsidies applied to the construction of all 
price-controlled housing units regardless of size, real-estate developers began to focus 
on building larger properties geared at wealthier buyers, as the state’s price-controls 
reserved higher price caps for these dwellings, making them more cost-effective to 
build and to sell (Pedro, 2001:207-212). These measures, then, appeared to be a volte-
face of the dictatorship on its populist priorities.  
 
It was in this political context that Arrese repackaged his housing policies around the 
vision for a property-owning autocracy: ‘we want a country of proprietors, not 
proletarians’ (Arrese quoted in Naredo, 2010). His idea was that the commitments of 
homeownership would discipline a population of orderly subjects: ‘man, without a 
home of his own, takes to the streets and, driven by his mood, becomes subversive, 
sour, violent’ (Arrese quoted in ibid.). As the regime’s propaganda assured the 
populace that subsidised housing had ‘arrived to abolish the labyrinth of social classes’, 
public discourses presented the acquisition of a home as a chance for the working 
classes to acquire a stake in the system: ‘the home is the primary enterprise that the 
family requires to cease being rabble and become a people’ (Arrese in NO-DO, 1958). 
At an everyday level, Arrese’s message tapped into rurally-grown associations of 
                                                        
53 A similar logic had already been applied in the 1930s by the Italian fascists, a perennial source of 
inspiration for the Spanish falangists (Aalbers & Felicantonio, 2017).  
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property ownership with family enterprise. As the rural migrants rushed to the cities, 
the promise of urban property became a metaphor for independent living that echoed 
the historical aspirations of rural communities: saving, self-reliance, and social 
reproduction via property ownership. It is noteworthy that, although in 1950 almost 
all urban dwellers were renters, statistics reflect that half of all Spaniards owned their 
homes due to the overwhelming concentration of owner-occupation in rural farming 
communities (Castles & Ferrera, 1996).  
  
The discourse of the property-owning autocracy was so successful that it outlived the 
falangists themselves. From the Finance Ministry, the technocrats sabotaged Arrese’s 
projects by allocating insufficient funding until he was pushed out from his position in 
1960 (Betrán, 2002:34-36). After his departure, the technocrats toned down the 
populist rhetoric in order to subordinate the residential apparatus to their industrial 
strategy. But the main parameters of housing policy would remain the same, for they 
were conducive toward keeping urban development in pace with industrialisation. The 
economic rationale of property-ownership was once again made explicit in a 1960 
decree that regulated the rights and obligations of homeowners towards one another 
in blocks of flats (‘horizontal property’):  
 
The essential reason for a system of horizontal property rests upon an attempt 
to extend the access to urban property [...] Measures geared towards the 
increase in construction combined with a well organised regime of property 
rights will address the housing question and its associated problems […] Taking 
these one step further, the law seeks to maximise the individuation of property 
as much as possible […].54  
 
Thus, the capitalist residential apparatus nurtured by the Francoist regime came with 
a large-scale shift in tenure towards homeownership between 1950-1980 (Fig.12). At 
the start of this period, 88% of households in Bilbao were rented, in Sevilla 90%, in 
Madrid 94%, and in Barcelona 95% (Naredo, 2010). By the end of it, Spain was the 
largest homeowning society in the OECD. In 1981, the general rate of owner-
occupation stood at 73%, and second homes constituted 18% of the total housing stock 
(Tafunell, 2005:463). The drive for homeownership had become widely diffused and 
naturalised, ‘like a lucky genetic code inscribed into our DNA that sets us apart from 
other mortals and determines our behaviour’ (Colau & Alemany, 2012:33). An entire 
                                                        
54 The document appears in the bibliography as Ley 49/1960, de 21 de Julio, sobre propiedad horizontal 
(1960) BOE-A-1960-10906.    
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generation was socialised on the view that it was the most sensible option to invest in 
a mortgage, for a home was the best ‘nest egg’ that could be passed on to future 
generations (rather than, say, an education or a small business). The infamous maxim 
‘renting is throwing money away’ started to circulate, an everyday utterance that 
became elevated to the status of common knowledge.  
 
FIG.12. EVOLUTION OF HOME TENURE (1950-2016) 
 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística; Tafunell (2005:493-494). 
*Includes company housing (perquisites) and dwellings ceded without cost.  
 
By the time the state started to perceive that the housing market was excessively 
skewed towards homeowners, it was too late. This process could not even be stopped 
by the liberalisation of the rental market by the Boyer Decree of 1985, a piece of 
legislation that abolished the rent controls that had been in force for almost five 
decades. With it, landowners gained the power to rescind tenancy agreements, rolling 
contracts ceased to be standard, and rent caps were lifted (Fernández, 2004:153-156). 
The rationale behind this measure was an attempt to correct the distortions that had 
been attracting developers into the higher returns of the property market since the 
1950s. However, the result was just the opposite. In the absence of a public rental 
sector to keep the excesses of the market in check, tenants were generally pushed into 
precarious short-term agreements that had to be constantly renegotiated (Bertrán, 
2002:50-51). In the context of the booming real-estate prices of the late 1980s, this 
translated into yearly rent hikes for tenants, a situation of insecurity that only 
accelerated the flight away from the rental market. As early as 1991, rent had already 
become confined to a mere 15% of the housing stock – a stark contrast with the 37% of 
Britain and the 58% of Germany. In 1994, rolling contracts were set to a minimum of 
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five years in order to give tenants more security and to turn renting into a more 
attractive option. This measure failed to breathe life into the rental market, as it 
avoided the central issue: rent prices had become excessively high (ibid.:52). Indeed, 
what was left of the rental sector after the Boyer Decree was, on the one hand, a large 
mass of tenants holding on to an old system of rent caps that was no longer available 
for new renters, and, on the other hand, a section of deregulated rents (already 20% by 
1994) unaffordable to most (Fernández, 2004:155-159).  
 
The result was an entrenchment of homeownership as an icon of economic success, 
independent living, and inter-generational justice, whereas renting became its inverse: 
a symbol of marginalisation and precarity. Indeed, by then rent was perceived to be 
the option for those with nowhere else to go, such as students or the urban poor. By 
the start of the great property bubble of 1997-8, all developers had to do was to tap into 
these deeply-held cultural perceptions to find a voracious demand for property.  
 
5.2. The Spanish Economic Miracle: Property Brings Development 
 
If the incubation of a housing system dominated by a culture of homeownership acted 
as a structural precondition for the bubble, this process was complemented by the 
parallel consolidation of reckless urbanisation as an icon of broad socioeconomic 
progress. Dating from the ‘economic miracle’ of the 1960s, when policies of fast 
industrial growth were tied to the necessity of a fast urbanisation, this association was 
successfully subverted by urban working-class activism during the 1970s. However, 
when European integration emerged as a new icon of socioeconomic progress in the 
1980s, the inflation of housing bubbles under the symbolic authority of Europe served 
to reactivate the association of reckless urbanisation with growth and progress. With 
renewed talk of a ‘Spanish economic miracle’ after 2004, the iconisation of fast urban 
development as a short-hand for broad economic success was sealed by the widespread 
usage of property market indicators as a benchmark of macroeconomic prowess. 
Altogether, this history of intersubjective connections served to legitimate the excesses 
of the property market of the 2000s in the eyes of the public, something that facilitated 
their integration into the circuits of mass speculation.  
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5.2.1. First Advent: The Working Class Goes to Heaven 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, between 1959-1973 Spain sustained rates of 
economic growth second in the world only to Japan’s, a feat that Francoist propaganda 
celebrated as a ‘Spanish economic miracle’ (Amodia et al., 1998). The forced march of 
Spanish industrialisation depended on the low wages of the workforce and on the 
‘leapfrog’ effect created by recycling the obsolete equipment of more industrially-
advanced Western European nations. Property development played a major role in this 
economic boom, for at least two reasons: (1) the urbanisation of the peasantry provided 
an immense reserve army of labour to keep wages down, and (2) the expansion of 
touristic infrastructure swelled foreign currency reserves and facilitated the import of 
industrial equipment (Charnock et al., 2013:35). Well aware of the interrelationship 
between urban and industrial growth, the architects of this economic project (i.e. the 
technocrats) formalised the marriage between housing and industrial policy in 1964, 
when oversight over the implementation of housing targets was placed under the 
purview of the main industrial planning agency, the Comisaría para el Plan de 
Desarrollo (see chapter 4) (Pedro, 2001:212). And thus, the industrial and housing 
policies of this period came to be known by the same name: ‘desarrollismo’ 
(developmentalism).  
 
This shared label encoded a process of ‘indexation’ (Konings, 2015:54-58). In bringing 
housing and industrial policy under a same common denominator, the notion of 
developmentalism forced an understanding of processes of urbanisation that used the 
terms of industrial development. This automatically conveyed a sense of their common 
rationale and subordinated housing issues to the needs of fast economic growth. The 
indexation of house production as a sign of economic bonanza was a discursive 
innovation of this period. The stimulant effects of home construction had been 
politically mobilised in the past, but only as a countercyclical measure to palliate the 
effects of unemployment.55 By contrast, the rhetoric of developmentalism that 
crystallised in the 1960s came to relate reckless urbanisation with booming growth, 
and thus sought to legitimise its excesses through everyday discourse. This 
triumphalist ideology should be seen as a continuation of the social engineering 
projects of the previous decade. As a 1962 article in the conservative newspaper ABC 
put it: ‘whenever we speak of an “economic miracle” we are in fact referring to a “social 
                                                        
55 For example, the social housing projects of the 1920s and 1940s were launched with an explicit counter-
cyclical purpose to combat unemployment (Pedro, 2001:195; 202). 
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miracle”: the people live better and communist lackeys decrease at a significant rate’ 
(Pemán, 1962) 
 
However, a resurgent working-class activism, reborn after the mass strikes of 1956, 
responded negatively to the injunctions of this ideology. The revolutionary working-
class movements of the interwar period had been obliterated during the Spanish Civil 
War and its aftermath. With the exception of some scattered guerrillas, who continued 
to fight against the new state until the late 1940s, the result was a disappearance of 
mass working-class activism until the mid-1950s, when a series of strikes restored the 
pre-war wage levels and marked the beginning of the end of falangist rule (Soler, 1969).  
Activism continued to proliferate under the façade of liberalisation of the 1960s, when 
the borders were opened  up and censorship controls were relaxed. By the early 1970s, 
the worker’s commissions (comisiones obreras), a grassroots movement of factory 
councils, were acting as unofficial negotiating parties in industrial disputes and 
securing wage increases for the workforce (Soler, 1969). The struggle in the factories 
was flanked by a potent neighbourhood movement (movimiento vecinal) that pushed 
against the predations of property developers in urban peripheries. Developmentalism 
had resulted in the uncontrolled sprawl of cities, as poor-quality housing stretched into 
distant and poorly-connected industrial parks. Urban activists responded to these 
spatial grievances by demanding greater access to public services, infrastructure, and 
culture (Martínez, 2011). The implications of the demands posed a direct threat to the 
whole developmentalist strategy of accumulation.  
 
The traction that these movements gained in this period demonstrates the failure of 
developmentalism to appease the working class with the promise of modernisation. A 
1968 editorial by a local publication of the neighbourhood movement (Can Oriach) 
captures this moment of negation:  
 
[Rural] migrants were asked to offer their strength and intelligence to move the 
machine of progress. Why then are they not the owners of what this progress 
has brought? If we have been generous in leaving [our homes] and in giving 
[our labour], then it is unfair that the same people who called us here are now 
so ungrateful towards us (quoted in ibid.:67). 
 
Urban activism forced the regime’s propaganda into a defensive position. A 1972 
documentary on urban development produced by the Ministry of Housing justified the 
excesses of the past whilst envisioning an imminent improvement of urban conditions: 
 158 
 
The fast pace of industrialisation expected in the coming years will logically 
entail new internal displacements. New conceptions of housing and urban 
planning will be necessary […] the question will no longer be to build thousands 
and thousands of homes, but to erect adequate neighbourhoods and to create 
integrated communities where Man can realise himself (NO-DO, 1972).  
 
But the language of the resistance only became more defiant and articulate in its 
demands. The urban movement called for the instauration of democratic controls on 
urban planning decisions and for the municipalisation of land to avoid speculation. 
Not only did this challenge the policy of developmentalism, but also the authoritarian 
form of the state and the very logic of capitalist accumulation:  
 
As long as the driving force of economic activity remains the accumulation [of 
capital] in fewer hands, the problems of housing and urban services shall 
remain unresolved. […] It is evident that such a change in economic purpose 
implies a new form of social and economic organisation in which decision 
power lies solely with the workers (quoted in Martínez, 2011:72).  
 
State propaganda had turned property development into an icon that condensed the 
social relations of the Francoist order, encoding in it a chain of signifiers that 
ultimately sought to justify the present state of affairs (e.g. sacrifice, order, progress). 
The resistance mounted by the neighbourhood movement tapped into these cultural 
associations, but only to subvert their code. The demand for better housing conditions 
was mediated into a revolutionary movement against the dictatorship and its economic 
system. It must be noted that this process of radicalisation occurred in a context of 
savage political repression. After the declaration of the state of exception in 1969, the 
dictatorship launched a new (and final) wave of state terrorism in an attempt to contain 
the pressure building in the streets (Soler, 1969). This shows the powerful lure exerted 
by this counter-narrative amongst those who felt short-changed by the promise of 
developmentalism. Indeed, despite articulating such an explicit workerist and anti-
capitalist discourse, the social base of the neighbourhood movement was quite broad, 
including activists from diverse backgrounds (housewives, pensioners, shopkeepers) 
and organisations (consumer organisations, youth organisations, cultural institutions, 
sports clubs) (De Terán, 1993:347). 
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This resistance achieved long-lasting successes at the critical juncture of the late 1970s. 
While the Francoist dictatorship crumbled on the streets, the dictator himself died in 
his bed in 1975, an event that opened up the floodgates of political change. As the 
country quickly transitioned into a liberal democracy, an energised neighbourhood 
movement succeeded in having some of their radical demands institutionalised in the 
structures of the new state. Beyond a symbolic commitment to the right of all 
Spaniards to a ‘dignified and suitable home’ (art.47), the Constitution of 1978 created 
a highly decentralised state in which vast powers over urban planning decisions were 
devolved to democratically-elected local governments. Municipalities also gained the 
power to tax land away from urban developers in order to put it to use in public housing 
projects. Urban questions were a burning political issue during the first municipal 
elections of 1979, largely won by candidates that incorporated the demands of the 
neighbourhood movement into their programmes (Martínez, 2011:87). Between 1978-
1980, urban activists began to work closely with urban planning agencies to secure the 
redevelopment of shanty towns, the rehabilitation of public housing, and the 
preservation of historic city centres (Neuman, 2010:113). The legacy of their activism 
left a lasting imprint on the carefully planned urbanism of the 1980s.  
 
5.2.2. Second Coming: The Symbolic Authority of Europe 
 
The transition to democracy was followed by a loss in the vitality of working-class 
activism. Not only did the fall of fascism deprive the worker’s movement of a clear 
enemy to cohesion around, but its sources of militancy ran up against their own 
contradictions. On the one hand, the neighbourhood movement, hitherto based on 
securing demands from the state, ceased to be an autonomous political force when its 
grassroots energies were channelled into state structures, where they gradually 
dissolved (De Terán, 1993:347). On the other hand, factory activism met an important 
strategic defeat when the first left-wing party in power in forty years, the social-
democratic Partido Socialista (PSOE), proceeded to enforce draconian de-
industrialisation and liberalisation policies throughout the 1980s.  
 
The enforcers of the post-industrial transition proceeded to reformulate the idea of 
economic progress – hitherto associated with industrialisation – around the milestone 
of European integration. The idea of converging with the mainstream nations of the 
continent was cherished by the Spanish populace. The exclusion of fascist Spain from 
the league of European democracies had long symbolised the country’s backwardness. 
The indexation of Europe as a standard of socioeconomic advance was already present 
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in the discourse of the urban movement of the 1970s: ‘we paid for [this city] with our 
days of work and our very non-European salaries […]’ (Martínez, 2011:67, emphasis 
added). In the 1980s, PSOE’s electoral strategy capitalised upon this association in 
order to galvanise the broad popular desire to depart from fascist obscurantism. 
Europeanisation became the benchmark of this departure, enabling the government to 
frame policies, however unpopular, as a necessary sacrifice to achieve this objective. 
Thus, PSOE’s strategists built a chain of associations that linked the transcendence of 
fascism to their own party’s success, all mediated by the objective of getting Spain into 
the European Economic Community. At the time, these connections were often spelt 
out by high-ranking PSOE members. The party’s Secretary General put it this way in 
1985:  
 
Despite criticism […] the socialist project enjoys an unspoilt consensus in 
public opinion. […] large masses of voters perceive the message of 
modernisation and regeneration in the policy of European integration, 
industrial reconversion, welfare reform, and devolution (Benegas, 1985). 
 
The socialists’ delivered on their promise in 1986, when European membership came 
into force and was immediately followed by a funnelling of capital investment into the 
real-estate sector. Completing this cathartic moment of international recognition, that 
same year Barcelona was selected to host the Olympic Games of 1992. Indeed, the 
political capital of having presided over this transition allowed PSOE to stay in power 
until the mid-1990s, despite the recession of this period (i.e. ERM crisis) and the 
relentless corruption scandals besieging the party (see chapter 3).  
 
As the indexation of European integration and economic progress continued 
uncontested, a process of ‘semiotic reversal’ kicked in (Konings, 2015:58). 
Europeanisation ceased to be a mediating link within a broader chain of signifiers that 
justified a particular path toward economic progress, and instead became an end in 
itself, a mandatory reference for the Spanish political imaginary. Given the 
increasingly neoliberal bent of the European project, this became a lasting self-
inflicted wound for the Left. To lay the groundwork for monetary integration, the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 stipulated a number of ‘convergence criteria’ for prospective 
members of the currency union, including a cap on public deficits and strict inflation 
controls (Navarro et al., 2012). When the neoliberal conservatives of PP rose to power 
in 1996, they gladly embraced these commitments and proceeded to engage in a 
frenzied privatisation of state assets between 1997-9 in order to lower the deficit and 
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secure Spain’s entry into the Eurozone (Tudela, 2015). This brought Spain into the 
Eurozone against all odds, given that to navigate the recession of the 90s the previous 
government had broken the Maastricht criteria by engaging in successive currency 
devaluations. Entry into the Eurozone was celebrated as a milestone of economic 
‘modernisation’, a process accompanied by booming growth driven by renewed 
investment in Spanish real estate.  
 
The legitimation of these processes was assisted by the validation received from the 
international press. In a much-commented piece, the American magazine Newsweek 
celebrated the arrival of a ‘Spanish economic miracle’ under the auspices of PP’s 
neoliberal reformers (McGuire & Radcliffe, 2004). The American magazine 
highlighted the country’s successful process of European convergence after a series of 
privatisations and liberalisations:  
 
it's no wonder Spaniards these days are the most optimistic consumers on the 
Continent, according to surveys. […] Attracted to this new Spain, expats are 
returning and, perhaps more tellingly, other Europeans are seeing their 
neighbour in a new light. […] Spain is the new princely peacock, after being 
looked down on by the northern Europeans as a poor Mediterranean country. 
 
Perhaps unbeknownst to them, Newsweek had summoned the spectre of Francoist 
developmentalism. The article was widely echoed by the conservative media, who 
mobilised the discourse with revanchist undertones. The first  right-wing government 
since the fall of the dictatorship – headed by a party founded by Franco’s ministers – 
had supposedly come to save the economy from a long, failed left-wing experiment 
(Estefanía, 2013). But when a new PSOE administration from 2004 picked up the 
baton of PP’s neoliberal policies, the metaphor was adopted by media outlets aligned 
with the centre-left. For example, a 2007 analysis in the newspaper El País, the 
spiritual guide of the social-democratic electorate, celebrated Spain’s economic 
success within the European Union under the title ‘The Spanish Economic Miracle’ 
(Missé, 2007).  
 
In the context of this neoliberal consensus, the idea of a ‘second coming’ of the Spanish 
miracle tapped into a cultural memory of immense symbolic power. After all, the 
comparison with the 1960s was not that far-fetched. At the centre of the growth of the 
2000s was an extremely buoyant property market devouring the Mediterranean 
coastline as well as 50% new job posts to cater for a reinvigorated residential apparatus 
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(Von Zeschau, 2011). The ‘old’ developmentalism justified the sacrifices of precarity 
and reckless urbanisation with the promise of economic progress; an idea that lost its 
lure when it became evident that such progress would not be shared amongst those 
who had sacrificed the most. The ‘new’ developmentalism entailed a similar trade-off. 
However, its appeal was much stronger as it managed to deliver on its promises 
through the magic of financialisation. Even as wages went down, the homeowning 
majority was seemingly getting richer (see below). In short, the result was a 
‘reactivation’ of the old cultural associations binding together property, development, 
and property development.  
 
It was also no small detail that this ‘miracle’ came through the Euro, as the symbolic 
authority of Europe conferred veracity on its ‘miraculous’ effects. Pro-European 
sentiments ran high in this period: in 2004, 69% of Spaniards believed to have 
benefited from EU membership (Eurobarometer, 2004). For most, the cost of 
European convergence (de-industrialisation, privatisations, liberalisations, etc.) had 
seemingly paid off – Spain had left fascist backwardness behind to join the first rank 
of European nations. However, if in the 1980s the idea of European integration had to 
be justified with promises of modernisation and regeneration, by the 2000s, the idea 
of Europeanisation had become an authoritative source of meaning in itself. Herein 
lied the distinct power of the ‘second coming’: it reanimated an exhausted sign of 
economic progress – i.e. reckless urban development – with the power of the sign that 
had replaced it – i.e. Europeanisation. 
 
Tapping into these home-grown affective connections, the speculative prowess of the 
housing market was restored as an icon of macroeconomic success. Real estate expos 
were encouraged by the visits of high ranking public officials, who referenced them as 
an indicator of the vitality of the economy, and the news media began to measure the 
economic prowess of Spain by the number of housing units built every quarter (e.g. 
Cabrales, 2006). In this triumphalist atmosphere, disturbing the real-estate sector did 
not seem politically convenient. Miguel Sebastián, a prominent minister during the 
PSOE years of the bubble, would later admit the difficulty of ‘stopping the music in the 
middle of the party’, as it would have ‘triggered an enormous reaction’. After all, ‘the 
people were happy’ (quoted in El Mundo, 2015).  
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5.3. ‘Home Prices Never Go Down’: A House-Price Keynesianism 
 
The previous two parts have shown how in the decades preceding the bubble Spain 
developed a layered terrain of discourses and practices that would make its housing 
system prone to the processes of mass property speculation during the 2000s. The 
purpose of this final part is to move beyond these enabling conditions to show how the 
integration of everyday homeowners into the circuits of financial speculation actually 
happened. Without delving too deep into the financial techniques that made this 
possible (a theme reserved for the next chapter), it will be shown how the defeat of the 
working-class movement of the 1970s pushed many homeowners – by then the vast 
majority of Spaniards – to rely on the rising value of their homes to compensate for the 
fall in their wages. The examination of this process, described here as a form of ‘semi-
proletarianisation’, will be followed by an analysis of the channels through which the 
public was educated in the values of risk, debt, and property speculation. This will 
culminate in an examination of how, and when, the state began to encourage mass 
property speculation as a means of demand-management, what Watson (2010) refers 
to as ‘house-price Keynesianism’. Altogether it will show how, if only temporarily, 
rising home values became an icon of personal wealth and macroeconomic stability, 
further magnifying the effects of the bubble.  
 
5.3.1. Leveraged Investors: The Semi-Proletarianisation of Homeowners 
 
The fragile political balance that followed the death of Franco created a power vacuum 
around an ever-intensifying class struggle. As the crisis of stagflation struck, mass 
unemployment resurged with the first wave of factory lockouts in 1975. An energised 
worker’s movement responded with a dramatic escalation in the number of strikes: in 
1976 alone 110 million working hours were lost to industrial action (Rodríguez, 
2015:34). The problem of inflation – which soared from 8% in 1973 to 28% in 1977 – 
was tackled in the ‘Moncloa Pacts’ of 1977 (datosmacro.com). With the backing of the 
main political parties and trade unions, wage increases were pegged to inflation, which 
by 1980 had been successfully brought down to 15% (López & Rodríguez, 2010:149-
154). By contrast, large-scale reform to redress the problem of industrial stagnation 
would have to wait until the 1980s. This process would happen under the 
deindustrialisation policies of the Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE), which in 1982 
achieved the first of three successive landslide victories. In 1984, the first PSOE 
administration introduced a first plan of industrial restructuring that envisioned the 
redundancy of 72,500 workers (Marín, 2006:64). Under the pressure of the 
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negotiations for joining the European single market, the competitive steel industry of 
Sagunto (Valencia) was dismantled, an event that had a negative knock-on effect on 
the profitability of manufacturing elsewhere in the country. By 1985, 20% of the 
workforce was unemployed.  
 
Equipped with the rhetoric of European modernisation, successive administrations 
headed by PSOE’s Felipe González traced Spain’s paradoxical path to the neoliberal 
age. On the one hand, PSOE governments dramatically expanded an underfunded 
welfare state. Under the pressure of four general strikes at the turn of the 1990s, social 
spending increased from 15% of GDP in 1975 to 24% in 1993 (Navarro et al., 2012:107). 
On the other hand, González’s government pushed an agenda of wage repression and 
privatisation, and over time became less apologetic about their neoliberal drift. In 
1985, the introduction of a regressive value-added tax was accompanied by a wave of 
market liberalisations (the ‘Boyer Decree’). Shortly after, state assets began to be sold 
off. Large public companies in a broad range of industries (automobiles, steel, 
shipbuilding, energy, transport, telecoms, banks) were gradually privatised over the 
coming decade (Carreras et al., 2000:225-236). Many of these companies were 
purchased as part of the massive entry of foreign direct investment following Spain’s 
access to the single market, a process that also inflated a housing bubble. With the 
bubble came real-wage increases and buoyant levels of GDP growth (5% between 1987-
1990) (datosmacro.com). The underside, however, was a normalisation of high levels 
of unemployment (15%-19%) and increasingly unaffordable housing costs.  
 
This sealed the strategic defeat of the counter-narrative of the worker’s movement, not 
least because such an aggressive programme of de-industrialisation was pursued by a 
nominally left-wing and working-class party. The combined cultural effect of these 
developments was the everyday entrenchment of what Fisher (2009:2) has called 
‘capitalist realism’, the widespread feeling that capitalism is the only viable and 
imaginable economic system. The defeat of the working-class offensive was followed 
by a generalised political disenfranchisement (‘desencanto’), particularly amongst the 
youth; a process accompanied by cultural trends that turned apathy and individualism 
into an aesthetic (‘pasotismo’). This resulted in the disintegration of the working class 
as a self-conscious political subject, giving way to symbolic distinctions between the 
employed and the unemployed; between public employees and private wage-earners; 
between the employees of large companies and the precarised workers of smaller 
productive units; between wealthier gentrifiers and the urban poor (López & 
Rodríguez, 2010:154). At the same time, the long crisis of the 1970s had seemingly 
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come to an end with the inflation of a real-estate bubble, which reasserted the meaning 
of housing as an index of macroeconomic performance. 
 
With the disarticulation of a radical alternatives, the neoliberal consensus deepened in 
subsequent decades. After PSOE lost their parliamentary majority in 1993, the last 
González administration was forced into a confidence and supply agreement with the 
Catalan liberals of Convergència i Unió (CiU) (see chapter 3). Pressed by these 
parliamentary allies, the government opted for meeting the demands of the Maastricht 
Treaty to curtail the public deficit by lowering social spending rather than by raising 
taxes (Navarro et al., 2012:108). On top of that, in 1994 the government tackled the 
effects of the ERM crisis with an aggressive labour market reform that facilitated 
redundancy and undermined collective bargaining mechanisms (El País, 2010). Felipe 
González’s long rule came to an end in the general election of 1996, which saw the 
openly neoliberal People’ Party (PP), headed by the conservative José María Aznar, 
win. At first, the conservatives attempted to stop the unpopular social spending cuts of 
their predecessors, presenting a centrist image of themselves that helped them secure 
a landslide re-election in 2000 (Tudela, 2015). However, once firmly in control of 
parliament, they proceeded to slash social spending in half and to pass an aggressive 
labour reform by decree.  The return of PSOE to power in 2004 under the leadership 
of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero gradually restored social spending, but it refocused 
the agenda of the parliamentary left around ‘post-material’ struggles (e.g. LGBT rights) 
whilst side-lining labour issues.  
 
The inflation of a massive real-estate bubble in these years was accompanied by a 
relentless deterioration of work. Real wage stagnation and temporary work became the 
norm. Even at the height of the boom, Spain sustained rates of unemployment of 8-
10% due to the fast rotation of insecure contracts rather than structural unemployment 
as such (López & Rodríguez, 2011b). The expansion of the construction industry, which 
doubled in size in this period, extended its traditional precarity to the large number of 
wage-earners that joined its ranks, particularly to a large number of foreign migrants. 
The occupations that experienced the worst decline in working conditions were in the 
hospitality and care industries, the latter of which became almost completely 
dominated by female migrants. A new term gained currency: ‘mileurista’, the 
‘thousand-euro earner’, in reference to a growing precariat amongst the university-
educated (Jiménez, 2005). For first-time buyers amongst this group, the increase in 
house prices became a major source of worry. If in 1996 the average cost of a home 
equalled four years of an average household’s disposable income, by 2007 this had 
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increased to 7.7 years of a household’s total income: a figure that implies dedicating an 
expenditure 30% above disposable income to 40 years of mortgage repayments (López 
& Rodríguez, 2010:415-6).  
 
However, for those wage-earners who already owned property, the decline in real 
wages was compensated by an unexpected process of semi-proletarianisation, as the 
growing value of their property became a source of disposable income. This paradox 
stemmed from a combination of new financial technologies and an abundance of cheap 
credit, allowing large swathes of the population to borrow against their most valuable 
asset – their homes. This growing financial power was magnified by booming property 
prices, which allowed expectations of future price increases to be turned into everyday 
consumer credit. Thus, household debt doubled in only a few years: from 80% of a 
household’s net disposable income in 2000, to nearly 160% in 2007 (OECD). This 
generated a paradoxical ‘wealth effect’, by which vast swathes of the workforce saw 
their purchasing power increase even as their wage earnings declined (Fig.13). In 2007, 
the nominal wealth of Spanish households reached the heights of €8 trillion, a 
threefold increase since 1990 (López & Rodríguez, 2010:246-7). This was a process of 
‘semi-proletarianisation’ because large sections of wage-earners no longer relied solely 
on the sale of their labour-power for survival, but rather were turning to their property 
as a means of producing value. Given the widespread extension of homeownership in 
Spanish society, the opportunity to jump on this upward spiral of asset-price 
speculation was open to the vast majority of Spaniards. The underside of this process, 
however, was a sharp contraction of household savings (from 6.7% of disposable 
income in 2003 to -1% in 2007) (Fig.15).  
 
FIG.13. ANNUAL GROWTH IN HOUSEHOLD INCOME, SPENDING, & REAL WAGES 
 
Source: INE, OECD. 
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FIG.14. INDEBTED HOMEOWNERS: 1990 VS. 2011 
 
     1991                   2011           
 
 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística  
*Note: includes properties purchased, inherited, or ceded.  
 
 
FIG.15. GROWTH IN HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS (% OF DISPOSABLE INCOME) 
 
Source: OECD 
   
5.3.2. Mass Speculation: Learn to Stop Worrying and Love the Bubble 
 
The new dynamic tapped into long-held cultural associations of property as a durable 
investment. If renting was already deemed a waste of money, this perception was 
certainly reinforced by a new capacity to mine one’s property for consumer credit. 
However, the homeowner culture that emerged between 1950-1980 privileged safety 
– a home was an investment to be passed on to the next generation as a ‘nest egg’. The 
problem, thus, was the socialisation of debt and risk into the consciousness of everyday 
investors. In short, the success of financialisation depended on spreading idea that 
high home prices were not a problem, but a market opportunity. The integration of 
semi-proletarian homeowners into a class – i.e. into a collective subject with a shared 
conscious interest – required a complex process of social construction to align their 
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identities and desires with the ongoing processes of real-estate speculation. This 
entailed a normalisation of mortgage-backed debt, as well as a dissemination of the 
idea that, in the event that they would no longer be able meet their loan repayments, 
they could always count on selling their home to pay off their debts. Provided that 
property prices rose high enough, they could even sell their home equity at a higher 
price than they originally paid for it, making a substantial profit in the process. And 
thus, with the promise to become ‘leveraged investors’ (Langley, 2009), vast swathes 
of the workforce were invited to stop worrying about high home prices and love the 
bubble.  
 
Financial institutions and real-estate firms acted as effective capillaries to diffuse this 
message. In a series of post-crisis interviews with evicted homeowners, García-
Lamarca and Kaika (2016:318-9) record that ‘[w]hile many heard that renting was 
“throwing money away”, half-a-dozen mortgage-affected informants recounted the 
words of estate agents or bankers explaining why indebting oneself was the most 
sensible option’. As I will discuss in the next chapter, under the spell of mortgage 
securitisation, credit institutions felt compelled to generate as much debt as possible, 
particularly the savings banks (cajas de ahorros), then the largest mortgage-lending 
actors in the country. The cajas grew deep roots in local communities and built their 
business on long-term relations of trust with their customers, which they mobilised to 
normalise the risks of financialisation. From 2003, it was not uncommon for financial 
institutions to push onto their customers mortgages at 100-120% of the property’s 
purchasing price, all the while encouraging them to use the excess credit as consumer 
finance to buy a new car or television (ibid.). This practice came attached with all sorts 
of abuses: mortgages were often cross-collateralised with the guarantee of several 
friends and relatives (who fictitiously appeared as co-owners of the property). This 
allowed financial institutions to clear their books so that the Bank of Spain’s regulators 
would not meddle with the operation. The lenders did not hesitate to exploit their 
customers’ lack of financial literacy, providing them with highly asymmetric 
information while loading the agreements with hidden costs or pointless insurance 
requirements (Pisarello & Asensi, 2009).  
 
The rise of real-estate expos was also instrumental in shaping the market expectations 
of everyday buyers. Real- estate expos are gigantic marketplaces where real-estate 
firms exhibit their produce and are geared towards everyday buyers as much as 
towards investors aiming to purchase property wholesale. These monumental 
gatherings started off with the unexpected success of Barcelona Meeting Point (BMP) 
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in 1996, which, contrary to what the organisers had anticipated, attracted a large 
amount of everyday buyers (Lamelas, 2013). As the housing market boomed shortly 
after, similar expos were set up in Madrid (SIMA, from 1998) and in Valencia (Urbe, 
from 2001). The size of these events cannot be underestimated: in 2006 alone, BMP 
attracted 200,000 visitors, SIMA 150,000, and Urbe 45,000 (El País, 2006; 
Interempresas.net, 2006; Tucasa.com, 2006). The combined number of visitors 
equalled half the output of residential production that year. This is significant given 
that a star product of these events were ‘blueprint purchases’ of homes yet to be built. 
Overall, these big events acted as formidable sites of ideological interpellation, as they 
offered everyday buyers professional advice on home investments and an assortment 
of options for mortgage-finance.  
 
The success in educating the public on mass speculation can be tracked alongside a sea 
change in public discourses on the affordability of housing, when rising home prices 
went from being an economic problem to an icon of economic success. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, the housing bubble of the late 1980s turned the unaffordability 
of housing into a burning political issue: ‘the acquisition of a home remains one of the 
vital concerns of any Spanish citizen or family, not only due to the scarcity of shelter 
available, but also due to the financial burden that [purchasing] a house involves’ (El 
País, 1992). In 2002-2003, the affordability of housing remained a throwing weapon 
in parliamentary debates: the PSOE opposition showed alarm at the high levels of 
household debt while the PP government insisted that the problem of house prices 
would solve itself through an increase in property development (Expansión, 2002; El 
País, 2002). When the Bank of Spain first expressed its worry at the formation of a 
credit bubble in 2003, Luis de Guindos, at the time deputy Finance Minister, insisted 
that the current conjuncture was merely ‘a rising trend in prices that will eventually 
moderate itself as more homes enter the rental market and more transparency is 
introduced in urban development procedures’ (quoted in Gómez, 2003).  
 
Yet something changed around 2004.56 That year, the OECD forecasted a ‘brutal 
collapse in [Spanish] house prices in the mid-term’ (Cinco Días, 2004). The response 
was not one of celebration, but of denial. Real-estate pundits, financial advisors, and 
political figures across the political spectrum rushed in to insist that everyone should 
rest assured that home prices were going to stay high. In 2004, Gregorio Mayayo, the 
                                                        
56 That being said, around 2005 polls continued to suggest that housing remained the second largest worry 
for Spaniards, only after unemployment. These worries, however, concentrated amongst the youth, ‘the 
collective most disadvantaged by the elevated cost of property’ (El País, 2005).   
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president of an association of the country’s leading mortgage providers (AHE), 
responded to the OECD report with the assertion that it was ‘metaphysically 
impossible’ that home prices were on the verge of collapse, for that would imply ‘an 
economic catastrophe of such proportions that it is envisioned by no one’ (quoted in 
ibid). Two years later (2006), Guillermo Chicote, president of the real-estate 
developers’ employer’s association (APCE), boldly claimed that ‘property prices are 
never going to go down’ (quoted in Expansión, 2014). And, just as property prices were 
about to veer off the cliff in 2007, Fernando Martín, CEO of Martinsa-Fadesa, a real-
estate giant who would default only a few months later, ‘envisioned a vertiginous 
increase in home prices’ (quoted in ibid.). Interestingly, the discursive turning point 
(2003-2004) matches the rapid collapse in net household savings (see Fig.15 above), 
suggesting a widespread extension of financialised practices amongst homeowners.  
 
As rising house prices became an icon of macroeconomic success, the different scales 
of the state became heavily invested in encouraging the process of home-price 
inflation. The local scales of the state were the most directly invested in this process. 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the Spanish constitution devolved wide 
competences over housing and urban policy to the municipalities and to the newly 
established regional governments. The municipal devolution that the neighbourhood 
movement had so hardly fought for (and won) during the 1970s, including the transfer 
of urban planning powers and the right to exact taxes from urban development to local 
governments, was repurposed to further urban entrepreneurial strategies rather than 
to curtail speculation (see chapter 7). In a context of renewed faith in reckless 
urbanisation, local governments mobilised their powers to unleash vast processes of 
urban development. Although political economists have represented the increasing 
economic specialisation of cities in real-estate speculation as a consequence of the 
dearth of alternative income sources (e.g. Coq-Huelva, 2013:1223), a detailed report 
by Fundación Alternativas suggests that the financial dependence of municipalities 
upon the monetisation of the built environment was a self-imposed political choice 
(Fundación Alternativas, 2007:133-145). Throughout the bubble, it was common 
practice for municipalities to increase their taxation of construction projects and 
capital gains, while freezing the main municipal levy, the property tax (Impuesto sobre 
Bienes Inmuebles or IBI). To put it in electoral terms, local governments were building 
coalitions of homeowners.  
 
Devolution was a convenient way for the central government to ‘depoliticise’ housing 
policy. The PSOE administration that presided over the peak of the bubble (2004-
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2008), after having criticised the previous government’s housing agenda from the 
opposition, deflected criticism by pointing to the responsibility of regional 
governments.57 In reality, the role of the central state in inflating prices was important, 
even if more indirect than that of local councils. Despite the high degree of devolution 
over the built environment, the central state retained the power of determining the 
broad contours of a federal policy on these issues (a regulatory ‘grammar’ that each 
regional legislation must abide to), as well as crucial fiscal and financial regulations. 
Indeed, when the crash became evident in 2008, it was this government which rushed 
to approve a 45 billion€ plan to keep home values up. This measure included the state 
acting as a guarantor for home purchase, or as the purchaser of urban land directly 
from real-estate agents in order to keep land prices high (López & Rodríguez, 
2010:398). Similarly, a series of measures were passed in 2009 to accelerate home 
repossessions with the explicit purpose of shoring up the housing market (Expansión, 
2009).  
 
5.4. Conclusion 
 
This morning the Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca [PAH] has stormed 
the real-estate expo Barcelona Meeting Point, and occupied the stand of Sareb 
– the bad bank – demanding to have a meeting with the bank’s leaders. By 
midday, having completely shut down the event, they succeeded. […] PAH 
demands that the bank’s properties should become part of the public housing 
stock so they can be leased out as social housing (França & Català, 2013) 
 
The meltdown of the Spanish property market in the wake of the crisis has blown up 
the ideological layering forming the Spanish housing imaginary, providing a 
remarkable opportunity to reshape cultural coordinates around housing issues. In this 
context, the activism of groups like PAH is invariably both material and discursive, as 
                                                        
57 Long gone were the days of the 1990s, when the central state did not hesitate to overstep the 
competencies of the regional governments in these matters. As discussed in chapter 4, land-use planning 
legislation had sparked continuous jurisdictional conflicts in this decade. However, regional governments 
forgot their jurisdictional tensions with the central state too. Challenged by several regional governments, 
the first version of the ‘build anywhere law’ was struck down by the Constitutional Court in 1997. The 
revamped version of the law (1998) was again successfully challenged by regional governments: in 2001 
the Constitutional Court struck down two important clauses of the law, rendering inoperative the 
important figure of the ‘urbanising agent’ (see chapter 4) (Expansión, 2001). Indeed, the Constitutional 
Court ruled that the only purpose of a national planning law was to only regulate ‘the most basic guiding 
lines’ of urban planning, leaving specifics to regional authorities’ (El País, 2001). Ironically, by then many 
of these regional governments were in the process of introducing the figure of the urbanising agent in their 
own regional legislations. The regional governments were also highly complicit with the bubble through 
their negligent oversight over the cajas de ahorros and the urban plans of municipalities. See Marcinkoski 
(2016:68-70) for more details.  
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it not only demands better housing conditions, but also seeks to reshape the 
expectations of the public, bringing to the fore demands that have been unheard of for 
decades, such as a return to public housing. But these political agencies are in turn 
shaped by past traditions of struggle. In her book, Ada Colau, former spokeswoman of 
PAH and now mayor of Barcelona, argues that the success of her movement relied on 
‘conditioning the rules of the game and the parameters of debate’, an insight which she 
describes as a major lesson from the neighbourhood movement of the 1970s (Colau & 
Alemany, 2012:162). The point is that the cultural meaning of housing is always in flux, 
shaped by political struggles over a terrain of engrained cultural meanings. The culture 
of mass speculation of the 2000s was no different in this regard. Rather than the logical 
subjectivity arising out of a homeowning society in the age of financialisation, it was 
the product of a lineage of cultural associations.  
 
The matrix to this symbolic order was provided by the fast diffusion of homeownership 
between 1950-80. Originally a pragmatic response of the Francoist residential 
apparatus to the pressures of housing deficits, the dictatorship packaged the need to 
surrender urban development to the profit motive of property developers as a chance 
for working-class families to acquire a stake in the system through property ownership. 
To do so, the regime’s propaganda tied homeownership to a sense of family enterprise 
and inter-generational justice, an association that successfully tapped into the rural 
values of a rapidly urbanising population. Thus, homeownership became the ‘new 
normal’ amongst urban social formations, reserving rent for a small section of the 
urban poor. At the same time, the resulting wave of urbanisation that accompanied 
these developments in the 1960s and 70s was associated to the ‘economic miracle’ of 
industrialisation and the promise of broad socioeconomic progress. However, the 
inability to deliver better working-class conditions was capitalised upon by a powerful 
neighbourhood movement in the 1970s, whose activism succeeded in subverting the 
association of reckless urbanisation with socioeconomic progress. With the defeat of 
the working-class movement in the 1980s, Europeanisation rose as a new icon of 
socioeconomic progress. When Eurozone finance served to inflate the bubble of the 
2000s, the symbolic authority of Europe served to ‘reactivate’ reckless urbanisation as 
a sign of progress; a process that was sealed by renewed talk of a ‘Spanish economic 
miracle’.  
 
It was in this context, building upon these prior cultural associations, that house-price 
Keynesianism gained a broad base of social support. Housing, almost invariably held 
under ownership tenure, already appeared as a long-term family investment in the 
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cultural imaginary of Spaniards. Moreover, property development, and particularly in 
the form of reckless urbanisation, appeared as a driver of socioeconomic success 
sanctioned by Europe. Thus, it only was necessary to educate Spaniards in the virtues 
of indebtedness, risk, and mass speculation with rising house prices. The transmission 
of these values diffused through channels such as savings banks and real-estate expos, 
prompting a sea change in public attitudes towards rising house prices around 2004. 
It was only then that the political class began to openly speak of the need to keep prices 
high for the sake of macroeconomic stability, repackaging the old problem of 
unaffordable prices into a market opportunity for their electorates.    
 
By showing how the Spanish housing bubble arose out of sedimented cultural 
developments, this chapter reinforces a central claim of the thesis: that the Spanish 
crash needs to be understood in the terms of a particular apparatus of residential 
provision, one shaped by a trail of political agencies that cuts across both material 
practices and immaterial discourses. This analysis speaks directly to the underlying 
research question of thesis: Why did the Spanish path into the crisis manifest as two 
seemingly contradictory processes – as a house-price bubble and as a wave of 
residential overproduction? Had it not been for a contingent history of intersubjective 
connections, it is unlikely that this peculiarity of the Spanish bubble would have found 
a suitable cultural environment to develop. This becomes visible through the lens of 
the everyday, the daily renegotiation of social structures, which is the dimension of 
the political that has figured most prominently in the narrative of this chapter.   
 
The next chapter will explore in greater depth the financial dimensions of the Spanish 
residential apparatus, mapping their development alongside the patterns of political 
accumulation of every age.    
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6. The Conversion of the Cajas: A Genealogy of 
Finance  
 
6.0. Introduction 
 
After two years of illusory stability, the Spanish financial system began to crumble in 
2009-10. Credit institutions began to implode one after the other, prompting a series 
of costly public bailouts that amounted to 5.8% of GDP (Martín-Aceña, 2014:92-95). 
Yet no major commercial bank experienced extreme losses or required state 
capitalisation (Quaglia & Royo, 2015:491). On the contrary, the resilience of the largest 
banks was ratified by the European ‘stress tests’ of 2010, all of which revealed them to 
be in a financial situation solid enough to absorb potential losses in the event of a 
worsening macroeconomic scenario (Poveda, 2012:261). The problem, rather, radiated 
out from the savings banks, the cajas de ahorro, which constituted almost half of the 
financial system. As discussed in chapter 1, the debacle of the savings banks is a 
favourite event of immaturity narrative scholars, who regularly invoked it to highlight 
the inherently distortive effect of ‘the political’ (specifically, party politics) in the 
economy. This argument centres around the complex stakeholder system of the cajas, 
which gave local and regional politicians control over their corporate governance, 
allowing ‘politicians to play bankers’, as the leader of the new neoliberal party 
Ciudadanos put it (quoted in Picas & Agustina, 2015). The problem with this narrative 
is that it cannot explain why ‘up until the current crisis the savings banks had achieved 
very satisfactory results’, nor why they ‘wrestled market share away from the banks, 
maintained high levels of profitability, and under[took] significant amounts of 
community work’ (Vives, 2012:48). Moreover, unlike the savings banks of other 
countries, the cajas de ahorros successfully weathered the pressures of financial 
disintermediation from the 1980s onwards. Indeed, it is the historical record of the 
commercial banks that has been punctured by periodical financial crashes and 
scandals, whereas the meltdown of 2009-10 was the first (and last) major crisis of the 
cajas in the nearly two centuries of existence (Martín-Aceña, 2014).  
 
This chapter analyses the relationship between political power and property finance 
which, despite mutations in line with changing patterns of political accumulation, has 
been the norm since the nineteenth century. It does so in order to disturb the 
immaturity narrative by doing away with the assumption that the political ‘distortions’ 
of the cajas were antithetical to their positive market performance. This new narrative 
‘solves’ the paradox of why the cajas de ahorros were able to spearhead a successful 
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financial liberalisation and simultaneously act as a formidable instrument of political 
accumulation. For the sake of clarification, the term ‘liberalisation’ here does not mean 
the clearing of an institutional vacuum for markets to operate without restraint – to do 
so would fall into the trap of presuming that markets have a pre-political essence 
(Knafo, 2009). Rather, in this chapter, ‘liberalisation’ denotes an active process of 
institutional engineering, according to which a preceding system of statist finance was 
rewired to heighten competition between financial intermediaries. The notion of 
‘political accumulation’, to recap from the discussion in chapters 2 and 3, refers to 
patterns of elite competition by non-commercial means (Brenner, 1985:236-46). In 
this chapter, political accumulation refers more specifically to the different ways in 
which the financial system has been used by different business or state elites for the 
purpose of furthering their interests; a pattern that has been historically immanent, 
rather than distortive, to the financial economy.    
 
To make this argument, the chapter weaves a broad genealogy of financial institutions, 
including commercial and public banks, in order to enable the reader to cross-
reference how political meddling has not been historically-unique to the cajas, but the 
norm in the financing of the Spanish residential apparatus. In doing so, the chapter 
addresses one of the central claims of the thesis: that the patterns of political 
accumulation of the post-Franco political class were central to the boom and bust of 
the 2000s. Indeed, the process of financial liberalisation furthered the objectives of the 
new elites after the fall of the dictatorship, who sought to displace the old Francoist 
bureaucracy from power, but also to inherit its clientelist grip over the real-estate 
market in order to gain competitive advantages in the electoral process. To capture this 
historical dynamic, this analysis deploys the historical institutionalist concept of 
‘conversion’ (see chapter 2), which refers to the way in which old institutions are 
redeployed to perform new functions or purposes over time, generally reflecting the 
takeover of certain actors previously excluded from the ‘converted’ institution (Thelen 
& Streeck, 2005:26). Overall, the genealogical approach of this chapter means that the 
dimensions of the political that will figure most prominently are those of ‘layered 
struggle’ – i.e. the crystallisation of historical struggles into lasting institutional 
outcomes – and ‘social conflict’ – i.e. the collective struggles between groups and 
classes over the shape of institutions.   
 
This genealogy is divided into five sections: The first section (6.1) traces the 
foundations of modern financial institutions into the nineteenth century, tracing how 
cajas and a semi-public bank, the Banco Hipotecario de España (BHE), were 
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established to counter the reluctance of commercial banks to engage in mortgage 
lending. Reflecting the politics of the age, this financial system was heavily skewed 
towards the interests of large landowners. The second section (6.2) explores how the 
Francoist regime built a heavily statist financial system in response to the problems of 
the previous age, establishing public banks and commanding financial institutions as 
to where to direct their investments. However, rather than tackling the class power of 
financiers, this statist financial system merely redirected it through the opaque 
structures of the Francoist bureaucracy, where the best-connected private banks were 
able to concentrate commercial success.  
 
The third section (6.3) shows how the conversion of the cajas came as a response to 
the crumbling of the dictatorship and its financial system. The ‘liberalisation’ brought 
on a dismantling of public banks and the intensification of competition between 
commercial banks and cajas, all to ‘update’ the Spanish economy to European 
standards. Parallel to this process was a ‘politicisation’ of the cajas to turn them into a 
support of the new federal democratic state, a process that transformed them into 
instruments of political accumulation for political parties in the new liberal democracy. 
The fourth section (6.4) shows how the newly-politicised cajas were the great winners 
of the process of liberalisation, outcompeting the banks in the credit market and 
pushing them outward to foreign markets. The fifth section (6.5) reveals the source of 
the cajas’ competitiveness: their specialisation in business segments tied to real estate 
(i.e. construction, real-estate services, mortgage credit, etc.), from where they financed 
the urban entrepreneurial strategies of cities and regions. Thus, the cajas bound their 
fate to the fortunes of the property market. While the real-estate markets boomed, the 
cajas were the cutting edge of Spanish finance. When real-estate markets crashed, they 
suffered accordingly.  
 
6.1. The Origins of Modern Credit 
 
The origins of modern credit institutions are deeply intertwined with the advent of 
liberal social-property relations in the nineteenth century, and in many ways their rise 
reflects the contradictions at the heart of this order. On the one hand, new credit 
institutions performed an important function in the liberal property apparatus, 
facilitating access to property ownership through the diffusion of mortgage credit. On 
the other hand, the patterns of class domination of this period ensured that the 
resulting financial system would be skewed in favour of large proprietors, who used it 
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as a means of political accumulation at the expense of small peasants and the urban 
poor.  
 
The savings banks (cajas de ahorro) were established in 1835 in the midst of the 
transition out of feudalism, when the abolition of the seigneuries and the auctioning of 
aristocratic estates made the dissemination of credit amongst prospective landholders 
necessary (Tello, 2001). In this sense, the provision of mortgage finance was 
fundamental to the creation of a peasant democracy, the original vision of the liberal 
hegemonic project. Their lending was expected to force down the extortive interest 
rates charged by traditional money-lenders, as 30% interest was common (Comín, 
2012:147; Cabello et al., 1987). Originally, the cajas exerted their function outside of 
the public property apparatus. Tied to pre-modern Catholic pawn-lending institutions 
(montes de piedad), the savings banks could be freely established. Often,  they were 
set up by philanthropists who saw themselves as performing an everyday moralising 
function. Their lending was to educate the poor about the virtues of saving and credit-
worthiness. The creation of new cajas went largely unregulated until 1880, when they 
became officially designated as charities and placed under loose supervision by the 
state (Martín-Aceña et al., 2014:44). In any case, the cajas would remain small credit 
institutions, lending operations restricted to a small territorial radius (usually a city or 
a province). Their mortgage lending palliated the property problem, but could not fully 
address it.  
 
The problem was further aggravated by the general aversion of commercial banks to 
engage in mortgage lending due to the high risks and long amortisation times (Orti, 
1995). Instead, commercial banking developed in the second half of the nineteenth 
century around the practice of private note-issuing, which allowed banks to quickly 
raise capital by issuing banknotes as debt securities. This practice spread, like 
elsewhere in Europe, with the boom in railway investment in the 1860s (Sudrià, 
2014:478-483). However, when it became evident that the original expectations of the 
profitability of the railroad had been overly optimistic, a series of bank runs prompted 
the collapse of half of the note-issuing banks within a few years. The worst banking 
crisis of the century to come, the crash of the 1860s extinguished the credit system in 
entire regions of the country. It would take until the turn of the twentieth century for 
the sector to recover. In 1874, the Bank of Spain assumed the monopoly of note-issuing 
operations, absorbing a number of faulty regional banks and creating a highly 
centralised financial system in the process (Martín-Aceña & Pons, 2005:648). 
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To expand the supply of available mortgage credit, the bank’s practice of issuing debt 
securities to quickly raise capital was extended to mortgage-lending in 1871 (Orti, 
1995). This would have likely incentivised commercial banks to engage in mortgage 
lending, as securitisation enabled a fast turnover on these investments. However, due 
to the wide distrust they inspired after the crash, the commercial banks themselves 
were excluded from issuing mortgage-backed securities. Instead, the practice was 
confined to the Banco Hipotecario de España (‘Mortgage Bank of Spain’, henceforth 
BHE) in 1875, a private institution that had been created only a few years earlier to 
palliate the scarcity of mortgage credit and to facilitate the construction of the new 
urban ensanches (Cabello et al., 1987). The BHE was granted a 99-year monopoly over 
the issuance of mortgage-backed securities, conferring it a highly privileged status. 
Indeed, issuing mortgage-backed securities allowed the BHE to quickly dominate the 
market, as these paper assets were very popular in the stock markets of Madrid and 
Paris.  
 
The proximity of the BHE to state elites turned it into a powerful instrument of political 
accumulation. The provision of mortgage credit became highly stratified along class 
lines. Whereas the savings banks concentrated their lending amongst the working 
classes and peasantry, the BHE catered mostly to the financial needs of urban property 
developers and large farmers (Cabello et al., 1987). Though this facilitated the 
construction of new housing in the urban ensanches (the first borrower from the bank 
was the Marquis of Salamanca, the developer of the Madrid district of the same name, 
who had instigated the creation of the BHE himself), in the countryside it only 
aggravated the property problem. Small peasants outside of the reach of the local caja 
had to continue to borrow at extortive rates from large landowners, who could cheaply 
finance their money-lending activities through the BHE.  
 
By the turn of the twentieth century, the volatility of the commercial banks eroded the 
‘laissez-faire’ values of the liberal nineteenth century and prompted a rise in financial 
regulations. The restrictions on the securities trade forced the commercial banks to 
turn to industrial lending, a risky specialisation that resulted in periodic of crashes: 
1881-1882, 1890, 1913, 1914, 1920 (Martín-Aceña et al., 2014:45-46). In 1913, the Bank 
of Spain assumed lender of last resort functions and in 1921 it began to exercise 
supervisory functions over the commercial banks’ operations. That same year saw the 
creation of the Supreme Banking Council, an agency of corporate self-regulation that 
was entrusted with broad regulatory powers. It could set minimum capital 
requirements; set maximum rates for current accounts and deposits; establish the 
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proportionality between different items of the banks’ balance sheets; or publish the 
banks’ income statements. However, these regulations did not prevent the eruption of 
a new banking crisis in 1931, an event that caused widespread indignation in the 
already volatile political atmosphere of this decade. In parallel, the savings banks were 
also subject to increasing regulation. In 1926 they were granted a self-regulatory 
council of their own: the Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros (Martín-Aceña, 
2014:86-89). In any case, the cajas de ahorro had a low-risk investment profile that 
focused on short-term small personal loans and mortgage credit for the local in their 
area. In a time of banking turbulence, depositors (correctly) perceived them as a safer 
choice for their savings. Even though the commercial banks still dominated the 
deposits market – their share fluctuated between 55-60% during the interwar period 
– the savings banks saw a steady increase in their share of deposits, from 12-13% in 
1920 to 24% in 1934 (Comín, 2012:147). This also coincided with initiatives on the part 
of local authorities to promote of the establishment of new cajas. Consequently, 
between 1900-1935 the number of savings banks experienced a steep increase from 55 
to 171 (Martín-Aceña, 2014:86).  
 
This period also saw the expansion of publicly-managed finance or, as it came to be 
known later, ‘official credit’. At first, these institutions were of a semi-public nature: 
though they were to remain privately capitalised, these finance providers were placed 
under the purview of public agencies, where they enjoyed a privileged status (García, 
2014; Martín-Aceña, 2012:114). Usually, the state reserved the right to appoint their 
head executive, and in some cases other members of the board as well. Prior to the 
interwar period, the only institution of this semi-public nature was the Bank of Spain 
itself, but from the 1920s there was an outgrowth of credit institutions of this sort in 
order to channel investment toward industrial and agrarian ventures: e.g. Banco de 
Crédito Industrial (BCI, established in 1920), Servicio Nacional de Crédito Agrícola 
(SNCA, established in 1925).58 A similar fate awaited the Banco Hipotecario de España 
(BHE), turned into a semi-public body when its executive board was ‘nationalised’ and 
placed under state control. By then, this bank was not only the largest mortgage 
provider in the country, but also the largest financial institution by a considerable 
margin, commanding a substantial political influence not least due to its close ties to 
the landowning elite. Fiercely protective of its cornered market over mortgage-backed 
securities, the BHE mobilised this influence time and time again to halt attempts to 
extend this practice to other institutions, which would have increased the supply of 
                                                        
58 In addition to the semi-public banks mentioned, this included (García Ruiz, 2014): Banco de Crédito 
Local, Banco Exterior, Caja Central de Crédito Pesquero y Marítimo, and Caja Postal.  
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credit. Thus, the BHE blocked attempts to allow the SNCA (in 1925)  and the cajas de 
ahorro (in 1933) to raise capital in securities markets, which would have served to 
disseminate mortgage credit amongst the rural and urban poor. As a result, the 
shortage of mortgage credit and the elitist skew of the Spanish financial system 
dragged on into the middle of the twentieth century.  
 
6.2. The Rise and Fall of Statist Finance  
 
The authoritarian regime that emerged after the Spanish Civil War was imbued with a 
rhetorical despise of urban elites, a populist rhetoric that extended its rage to the 
financial sector – often with antisemitic overtones.59 The Francoist state did not 
hesitate to extend its grip over the financial industry in order to challenge liberal 
property, either by creating fully-public banks (i.e. both managed and capitalised by 
the state) or by commanding where private finance should direct its investments. 
However, rather than countering patterns of elite domination through finance, the new 
order merely redirected them through the structures of an opaque and arbitrary 
bureaucracy, where the banks with greater capacities for political accumulation (in this 
case, clientelist connections) were able to secure – and concentrate – commercial 
success.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the conflict (1939), a government dominated by 
falangists created a command financial economy to cater to the Francoist residential 
apparatus. The backbone of this system would be two new fully-public banks designed 
for the provision of housing finance: (1) the Instituto de Crédito para la 
Reconstrucción Nacional, a bank established to finance reconstruction projects as a 
supposed counterpoint to the ‘bastard’ (vested) interests underpinning the BHE; and 
(2) the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda (INV), an agency created for the purpose of 
drafting plans of housing provision, but which was also equipped with bank status and 
could finance building projects directly (García, 2014:164). Both public banks were 
equipped with the power to issue debt securities that commercial and savings banks 
were then forced to acquire (see below). In turn, the public banks used the capital 
raised to ensure the flow of cheap credit (and later, ‘brick and mortar’ subsidies) to 
sanctioned property developers, who in exchange agreed to sell homes at set prices 
(Blasco, 1993:262-270; Bertrán, 2002:36-38). Mortgage legislation of 1946 
established a down payment of 20% and forced property developers to loan 30% of the 
                                                        
59 The denunciation of ‘jewish and masonic financial capitalism’ figured prominently in Francoist 
propaganda during the Spanish Civil War (Domínguez, 2009:232).  
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value of the property to their buyers. The mortgage lending of credit institutions was 
capped at a 50% loan-to-value ratio.60 Given the narrow market opportunities, the 
private commercial banks continued to stay away from the mortgage market 
throughout the Francoist period. Instead, mortgage lending functions continued to be 
dominated by the BHE (which retained its monopoly over the issuance of mortgage-
backed securities) flanked by the operations of the savings banks.  
 
Contrary to the original demands of the falangist grassroots, the new regime did not 
nationalise the private banks after the war. However, it did impose a ban on the 
establishment of new banking firms. The state consolidated its power over private 
finance with a battery of regulations in 1946. The public sector assumed wide 
regulatory powers over the banks, including the capacity to set maximum and 
minimum interest rates on deposits and loans; to set preferential rates for industrial 
sectors deemed of priority; to establish quantitative credit ceilings; and to impose 
heavy restrictions on long-term commercial loans (Martín-Aceña et al., 2014:53-60). 
Importantly, the state also received discretionary powers to determine whether banks 
could expand their branches or not. The savings banks saw their interest rates set and 
their operations highly restricted (Comín, 2012:149). They were also forced to invest 
most of their deposits in public debt bonds, which came to encompass 90% of their 
securities portfolios. Whatever was left was then funnelled to sectors that the state 
deemed of priority. This degree of state command turned the savings banks into semi-
public financial institutions de facto.  
 
Despite the ideological hostility of falangism towards the banks, the new financial 
system did not curtail the power of banking elites. On the contrary, strategies of 
political accumulation enabled well-connected banks to navigate an opaque and 
authoritarian bureaucracy. By resorting to clientelism, a small number of informally 
privileged firms concentrated the licences necessary to expand their branches 
(Harrison, 1993:88-69). At the same time, the credit restrictions imposed by the state 
guaranteed a crushing dominance of the largest firms in the financing of industry. This 
way, under the shell of an authoritarian state, a small number of banks grew at an 
unprecedented pace, quadrupling their profits over the course of the 1940s and 50s. 
Out of this process emerged the oligopoly of the ‘big five’: Banco de Bilbao, Banco de 
Vizcaya, Banco Hispano Americano, Banco Español de Crédito, Banco Central. 
Conversely, the losers of this process were the savings banks. Their share of deposits 
                                                        
60 For details, see Decreto de 8 de febrero de 1946 por el que se aprueba la nueva redacción oficial de la 
Ley Hipotecaria (1946) BOE-A-1946-2453.  
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fell and would not recover their pre-war rates until the 1960s (Martín-Aceña & Pons, 
2005:657).  
 
As the falangists lost their grip over the state in the 1960s, the development of statist 
finance accelerated in lockstep with the forced march of industrialisation commanded 
by their rivals: the technocrats. To support their developmentalist policies, the first 
fully technocratic government launched a major financial reform in 1962 to 
subordinate the banking sector to their plans for a French-style industrial dirigisme: 
 
The setting in motion, in the near future, of a General Development Plan for 
the Spanish Economy requires a previous examination of the instruments at 
our disposal to carry out this momentous task. One of these instruments, 
perhaps the most valuable, is the banking system and public credit 
organisations.61  
 
To this end, the majority of the semi-public banks were nationalised, including the 
Bank of Spain and the BHE (García, 2014).62 From this point forward, these 
institutions would be fully public, that is, not just managed by the state but also 
capitalised by the taxpayer. With regard to the commercial banks, there was a 
relaxation of legal barriers to entry, allowing the emergence of a new generation of 
smaller banks. After all, the technocrats, as discussed in earlier chapters, were less 
distrusting of ‘the market’ than their predecessors. That being said, branch restrictions 
as well as interest rate ceilings on deposits and loans continued to be subject to strict 
government controls (Martín-Aceña et al., 2014:114). The banks were also required to 
hold a certain proportion of government securities in their portfolios, a role previously 
reserved for the savings banks.63 Shortly afterward, in 1964, both private banks and 
cajas became subject to ‘industrial coefficients’: mandatory investment quotas that 
forced them to channel a share of their resources towards the manufacturing sector 
(Comín, 2012:168). Even though the cajas were already subject to mandatory 
investment rates, the coefficients meant a dramatic loss of autonomy. They now lost 
control over the allocation of 80% of their deposits. Giving the cajas a more prominent 
                                                        
61 The quote is from the preamble of the following law: Ley 2/1962, de 14 de abril, sobre bases de 
ordenación del crédito y de la Banca (1962) BOE-A-1962-6692.  
62 This also included most of the semi-public institutions created in the 1920s, such as the BCI. The only 
exceptions were the Caja Postal and Banco de Exterior (García, 2014). 
63 The 1962 Law also included a separation between ‘commercial’ and ‘industrial’ banks in an effort to 
protect everyday savers from risky industrial ventures (Faus, 2001:170; Harrison, 1993:70). The banks, 
however, frustrated this partition as they preferred to remain mixed. Both types of banking were often 
performed by divisions within the same conglomerate. The measure would be of little practical use and 
was eventually abolished in 1974. 
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role in Spanish finance was a suggestion of the Bretton Woods Institutions, who 
collaborated with the technocratic government in the drafting of their 
developmentalist programme between 1957-9. A World Bank report of 1957 stated that 
‘[t]he cajas de ahorros, even as they have social duties, should be regarded as financial 
institutions equipped with the flexibility to be an integral part of the financial system 
as a whole’ (quoted in Casares, 2003:50).  
  
This heavily statist financial system began to display signs of wear around the turn of 
the 1970s. In a context in which political accumulation was necessary for commercial 
success, public sector banks had made a habit of allocating credit to preferential 
customers, often for arbitrary reasons, resulting in corruption scandals. For instance, 
the notorious ‘Matesa affair’ of 1969 invovled a textile manufacturing company 
embezzling and laundering large amounts of money from Banco de Crédito Industrial 
loans (García, 2014:168). In response, public-sector banking was reorganised in 1971 
in an effort to ‘depoliticise’ credit allocation mechanisms. Henceforth, all public credit 
was to act in coordination with private finance and be channelled through the capital 
market (Martín-Aceña, 2012:131). The weight of public banking quickly declined 
thereafter, a trend that reveals the extent to which public credit had been dependent 
upon clientelist transactions. But fraudulent practices were common in the private 
sector as well. The largest commercial banks operated as a cartel that fixed interest 
rates behind the scenes, driving up the cost of credit in the process (García, 2001). Two 
reforms (1969, 1974) challenged this oligopoly by exposing it to the eager competition 
of small newcomer banks. Barriers to entry were further relaxed, geographic 
restrictions to the establishment of new branches were lifted, and interest rate controls 
were somewhat loosened (Martín-Aceña et al., 2014:62). Importantly, these measures 
were extended to the savings banks in 1974 in an effort to promote competition 
between financial intermediaries (Martín-Aceña & Pons, 2005:653). These changes 
reflected the flickering of a new liberal sensibility in financial policy and foreshadowed 
the transformation of the cajas de ahorro into powerful financial institutions.  
 
Statist finance entered a terminal phase of decline when the economy became 
consumed by escalating inflation. Even though the most immediate cause of the 
inflationary pressures was the hike in oil prices, the mechanisms of the statist financial 
system were also to blame (Santacruz & Donoso, 2011:11). The practice of forcing 
financial institutions to purchase public debt securities had translated into a 
continuous expansion of the money supply, while the diversion of liquidity into the 
manufacturing sector was generating shortages in other areas, driving up the cost of 
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credit for non-industrial activities. Moreover, the rising inflation was being matched 
by surging interest rates on loans as credit institutions displaced the costs of money 
onto their customers; a further choke point to the supply of finance.64  
 
FIG.16. GENERAL RATE OF INFLATION 1962-2017 (%) 
 
Source: OECD 
 
Under the weight of these pressures, the Francoist residential apparatus crumbled. As 
discussed earlier, the ‘brick and mortar’ subsidies that had propelled property 
development since the 1950s were abolished in 1975 due to their high inflationary 
effects. Residential output contracted sharply given the lack of incentives and the 
excessive cost of credit. Once the BHE’s 99-year monopoly over mortgage-backed 
securities expired in 1971, the liberalised savings banks gained a greater share of the 
mortgage market (Orti, 1995:91-92). However, they began to concentrate their lending 
in the unregulated housing market to take advantage of the high interest rates they 
could charge on loans, leaving neglected other sectors of the housing market. The 
government responded with a temporary extension of the BHE’s monopoly in 1975, a 
measure that was designed to finance an ambitious project of public housing 
development. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the high interest rates 
made the plan unfeasible – it was abandoned one year later.  
 
 
 
                                                        
64 Public-sector banking experienced a disappointing revival in 1975, as it became lender of last resort, 
providing finance to municipal corporations (via the Banco de Crédito Local, an institution set up during 
the 1920s), to the manufacturing sector (via the Instituto de Crédito Oficial), and to home buyers (via the 
BHE) (Martín-Aceña & Pons, 2005:653).  
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6.3. The Conversion of the Cajas: Liberalisation and Politicisation 
 
When General Franco died in 1975, the dictatorship unravelled and the country 
entered a convulsive transition to democracy, a process coupled with a crisis without 
parallel in the banking sector. It was in this context that the ‘liberalisation’ of the cajas 
de ahorro allowed them to assume a more prominent role in Spanish finance, not only 
to fill the void left by a crumbling system of statist finance and a crisis-ridden private 
banking sector, but also to buttress a new democratic regime grounded in a federal 
state and pluralist party politics. To do so, the executives of the cajas were filled with 
representatives of political parties, turning these institutions into instruments of 
political institutions in the context of the new state. In this sense, rather than two 
contradictory processes, the ‘liberalisation and ‘politicisation’ of these institutions 
formed two sides of the same coin.  
 
The transition out of the dictatorship was steered by a post-fascist government of late-
Francoist bureaucrats, who refashioned themselves as liberal centrists. In this context, 
the liberalising trends flickering earlier in this decade came to the fore. A series of 
major disinflationary reforms arrived in 1977, under the aegis of finance minister 
Enrique Fuentes Quintana, signalling a historic turn in economic policy:  
 
Our problems will be addressed from a firm belief in the advantages of 
economic freedom and of the market economy, in the creative force of liberty, 
seeking to eliminate inefficient and pointlessly centralising interventionist 
policies.65  
 
Interest rate controls were eased off, industrial coefficients were gradually dismantled, 
and, most importantly, the savings banks were granted full operational equality with 
the commercial banks. This last measure allowed the savings banks to move into the 
realms of commercial and industrial lending, business segments previously reserved 
to public and private banks, who now became fierce competitors (Santacruz & Donoso, 
2011:12-15). Paradoxically, the 1977 reforms also served to reassert the savings banks’ 
distinct features. The cajas were to remain peculiar foundation-like institutions, 
unable to go public or to have shareholders, and all of their profits had to be reinvested 
in charitable ‘social works’ (obras sociales). Nor were their localist principles 
disturbed; their geographic radius of action remained restricted to their home regions. 
However, for most cajas the regionalisation of their operations entailed a considerable 
                                                        
65 The quote has been extracted from a televised speech by Fuentes Quintana  (1977: min.13:15).   
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increase in the scope of their markets. Until then, 60% of all savings banks had their 
operations restricted to a single province, yet only ten years later the majority of 
savings banks had spread their reach to additional provinces within their regions 
(Saurina, 2012:317).  
 
These changes came at a time when it was hoped that the cajas could supplement the 
functions of a commercial banking sector in distress. The crisis of manufacturing in 
this period struck the small- and medium-sized banks opened after 1962 hard. To 
compete with the sector’s behemoths, sheltered by political power, these smaller banks 
had been pursuing risky strategies of expansion without sufficient expertise. This 
included opening up a vast number of branches in areas where it made little economic 
sense, or insisting on keeping afloat uncompetitive industrial firms under their control 
(Martín-Aceña et al., 2014:61-62). The first banking crash arrived in 1975 but 
symptoms of wider failure only became patent in 1977, when a growing number of 
banks began to display problems of liquidity that culminated in a financial meltdown 
of enormous proportions (Sudrià, 2014:489). The government was caught by surprise 
and had to improvise the creation of a deposit insurance fund. As months passed, the 
crisis spread to banks of increasing size. The smaller banks affected were bailed out by 
the fund but the larger ones were absorbed by more solvent institutions. After a brief 
respite in 1980, the crisis reignited with a vengeance in 1982. Problems of liquidity 
spread to the larger banks, including those who had previously taken over smaller 
banks in distress. A succession of bailouts followed until the haemorrhage was 
contained in 1985. Along the way, half of the private banks had collapsed and 27% of 
the sector’s capital had vanished; a banking crisis without contemporary parallel. It 
was also the worst that the country had seen since the ‘railway mania’ of the 1860s. 
This dramatic experience had important consequences. The liberalisation of 
commercial banking was temporarily suspended. As the banks became eager to let go 
of their industrial liabilities, the government had to soak up the damage to steer the 
process of de-industrialisation. Mandatory investment rates in government bonds 
were raised for both cajas and banks in 1984 (Saurina, 2012). As in previous decades, 
the funds raised were then channelled to the manufacturing sector through the Banco 
de Crédito Industrial. But perhaps the most lasting consequence was the growing 
salience of the savings banks, which began to take over the vacuum left by the 
commercial banks.  
 
In sharp contrast to the commercial banks, the cajas had weathered the tempest 
remarkably well. A dozen or so closed in this period, but the overall impact in the sector 
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was less dramatic and more gradual. A number of them were bailed out and in many 
instances solvency problems were easily fixed through mergers (Martín-Aceña, 
2012:88). Apart from their relative insulation from manufacturing, the secret of the 
savings banks’ resilience lied in their culture of mutual solidarity. Their corporate 
body, the Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros, promoted internal 
cooperation. Whenever one of its members was in need of liquidity, the confederation 
discretely mobilised funds to avoid possible failure. Moreover, echoing the 1920s, the 
prudent investment profile and evident stability of the cajas at a time of financial 
turbulence became a powerful competitive edge. In subsequent years, the cajas 
became formidable competitors in the deposits market. As a newspaper article put it 
at the time: ‘when offered to choose between fairly similar interest rates, clients prefer 
to save their money in the cajas given the greater solvency of these institutions’ 
(Arancibia, 1985).  
 
The state also granted new functions to the liberalised savings banks in the provision 
of mortgage finance as the old financial command economy catering to the residential 
apparatus began to be replaced with market-based policy instruments. As discussed in 
previous chapters, once public housing fell off the agenda for good in 1976, a new 
system of tax breaks for home purchase was instituted in 1978 to replace the old system 
of brick and mortar subsidies to home construction (Pedro, 2001:252). To support 
these new demand-side incentives, the housing plans of the 1980s introduced public-
private partnerships in the provision of mortgage credit. These arrangements secured 
the coordination between public credit (i.e. the BHE) and private finance (primarily 
the savings banks), so that they could jointly provide mortgages at low interest rates 
and at fixed amortisation times. These measures sought to facilitate the purchase of 
price-controlled housing in a context of very high interest rates on the market (Fig.17). 
Later they would be extended to the financing of home reforms and to the rental sector 
in an effort to stimulate the depressed levels of residential production of the 1980s.  
 
In a further attempt to stimulate the property market, new mortgage legislation in 1981 
increased loan-to-value ratios from 50% to 80% (López & Rodríguez, 2010:286). But 
more importantly, the practice of issuing mortgage-backed securities was extended to 
the savings banks, breaking the century-long monopoly of the BHE, and from 1988, to 
the commercial banks as well (Orti, 1995:91-92).66 After a century of deprived access, 
                                                        
66 To be precise, the monopoly of the BHE had already been broken once before: in 1978, when another 
public bank (the Credit Institute for National Construction) was allowed to issue such bonds to finance 
the purchase of price-controlled housing (Orti, 1995:91-92). However, the Credit Institute was then 
merged with the BHE in 1982.  
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this encouraged the commercial banks to enter a market that they had previously 
neglected. Attached to these reforms came the creation of a secondary market for 
mortgage-backed securities, boosting the liquidity of financial circuits. These measures 
would inaugurate the financialisation of the Spanish residential apparatus – 
something which I shall return later.  
 
FIG.17. REFERENCE RATE 1977-2017 (%) 
 
Source: Banco de España. Data includes Mibor and Euribor figures.  
 
The transformation of the financial system was subjected to political calculations in 
the context of the ongoing restructuration of the state. With the restoration of liberal 
democracy in 1978 came a political settlement that promised to devolve a considerable 
amount of competences to a large number of newly-created regional and local 
governments. The transfer of powers accelerated after the massive landslide victory of 
the social-democratic PSOE in the general elections of 1982. Devolution addressed a 
major concern of the new government: the ‘defascistification’ of the state. Thus, 
devolution diluted the power of the old elites into a multi-scalar structure of 
democratically-elected governments. The political convenience of this strategy must 
be framed within the context of the crushing degree of electoral power held by PSOE 
at the time, as devolution and democratisation allowed ruling parties to extend their 
grip on broad areas of the state bureaucracy. These considerations extended to the 
financial industry, where the old establishment held considerable power after a long 
period of statist financial policies.  
 
To this end, in 1985 control over the savings banks passed on to the new regional 
governments. At the time, these institutions were still run by managers appointed by 
their original founders (usually the families of nineteenth-century philanthropists or 
the Catholic Church). Yet, ‘with the impetus of their founding fathers long gone, the 
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process of appointment of senior executives had degenerated into a co-option process 
prone to nepotism and inefficiency’ (Poveda, 2012:262). The 1985 reform restructured 
the internal organisation of the savings banks to neutralise the power of the founders 
and ‘fully democratise their governing organs, so that they represent the genuine 
interests of the areas in which they operate’.67  
 
This meant filling the governance structures of the cajas with representatives from a 
vast array of interest groups: depositors, employees, and, most importantly, public 
authorities. Each one of these interest groups was assigned a different degree of power 
to appoint representatives to the General Assembly, the highest ruling body of every 
savings bank. The local councils of those areas where a caja was present were granted 
the power to appoint 40% of the members of the General Assembly, whereas the power 
of the founders was reduced to a symbolic 11%. In addition, regional governments were 
granted supervisory oversight of the operations of the savings bank. However, there 
was an important caveat: since some savings banks had originally been founded by 
public bodies (municipal or provincial corporations rather than wealthy 
philanthropists or the Catholic Church), in many cases the combined power of public 
authorities amounted to 51% of the Assembly.68 On top of this, the governments of 
regions where the savings banks’ were headquartered could appoint representatives to 
the internal supervisory organs of every caja. Altogether, these changes effectively 
turned the cajas de ahorro into a semi-public financial institutions.  
 
Moreover, as addressed earlier, the Fuentes Quintana reform had granted the savings 
banks the capacity to operate in the same business segments as the commercial banks 
but had maintained a restricted geographical range for their activities. This changed in 
1988, when the cajas were allowed to expand their operations across all Spanish 
territory (Saurina, 2012). Thus, in subsequent decades, the savings banks became 
instruments of political accumulation through which regions projected their financial 
power over others.  
 
                                                        
67 The quote is from the preamble of the following law: Ley 31/1985, de 2 de agosto, de Regulación de las 
Normas Básicas sobre Órganos Rectores de las Cajas de Ahorros (1985) BOE-A-1985-16766 
68 In addition, to the power of municipalities, founders, and depositors gained the power to designate 44% 
of the members of the assembly and employees an additional 5%. The Assembly was then in charge of 
appointing the members of the other two bodies: The Executive Board and the Control Committee.  The 
Executive Board was made of 13-17 members and was in charge of running the day to day operations of 
the savings bank, including the decisions over the allocation of its surpluses. The Control Committee kept 
in check the functioning of the institution according to its regulations. The supervisory role of the regional 
governments was carried out through the appointment of a representative to the Committee. 
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The conversion of the cajas in the decade spanning 1978-1988 cannot be overstated. 
As late as the mid-1970s, the cajas were still small credit institutions confined to low 
investment profiles: small-scale personal loans, mortgages, and government bonds. 
Their governing bodies were eminently technical and only responded to the interests 
of their founders. Apart from the obvious differences, they still very much resembled 
analogous thrift institutions in other European countries. Ten years later, the savings 
banks had become something else altogether. They had become semi-public and highly 
competitive firms, capable of operating in the same business segments and in the same 
geographical territory as the commercial banks and of quickly raising capital through 
the issuance of mortgage-backed securities. In short, whereas the savings banks had 
come out of the dictatorship bearing a great resemblance to the nineteenth-century 
version of themselves, only a decade later they had transformed into something 
radically different. And to the alarm of the banks, the cajas’ market share on deposits 
grew from 33% to 46% during this period (Harrison, 1993).  
 
6.4. Competition Intensifies: The Europeanisation of Finance 
 
With the liberalisation of Spanish finance, credit markets became realms of intensified 
competition between finance providers, a process that prepared financial institutions 
for their exposure to competitive pressures from abroad. In this context, the newly 
liberalised and politicised cajas proved to be worthy competitors of the commercial 
banks, which merged into a duopoly to keep themselves afloat, and eventually turned 
abroad to escape from the cajas’ competition. In other words, even as the cajas were 
becoming highly politicised institutions at the service of their regional governments, 
they remained capable of sustaining high levels of competitive success.  
 
After Spain’s access to the European Economic Community in 1986, foreign 
investment funnelled in. Facilitated by the financial reforms outlined earlier, a bubble 
formed in the property market. As signs of growth returned, the agenda of financial 
liberalisation resumed under the aegis of PSOE’s finance minister, Miguel Boyer, not 
without some internal strife within the ruling party over the increasingly liberal tilt of 
the government. Boyer echoed the rhetoric of Margaret Thatcher to charge against the 
failure of ‘statist ideas’ and announced that his liberalisation programme was the only 
alternative to economic ‘suicide’ (quoted in Matías, 1986). Yet, for all the reformist 
talk, Boyer’s policies were a mere culmination of the trends set in motion by late-
Francoist reformers. Completing the dismantlement of interest rate controls begun 
back in 1969, all remaining restrictions to interest rates on deposits were abolished in 
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1987 (Poveda, 2012:245).69 The creation of a level playing field for cajas and banks – 
a process initiated in 1974 – was finalised in 1988, when the geographic restrictions to 
the operation of savings banks were lifted (Martín-Aceña, 2012:88). The opening of 
the financial system to foreign banks had begun in 1978, and the total elimination of 
barriers to entry (for EU banks) was gradually completed between 1988-1995 to gear 
up for the creation of a European financial space. Indeed, these reforms stemmed from 
a genuine interest to ‘update’ the Spanish economy to European standards, in an effort 
to prepare the groundwork for further European integration (Martín-Aceña et al., 
2014:65). This also conferred the government a great degree of legitimacy in the eyes 
of the public. As discussed in the previous chapter, the idea of Europeanisation enjoyed 
wide electoral support as it was perceived to seal the transition out of a dictatorial past.  
 
For all the removal of prior restrictions, it would be a mistake to suggest that 
‘liberalisation’ implied the clearing of a political vacuum for markets to operate without 
restraint – this is a fantasy that does not hold up to empirical scrutiny. On the contrary, 
the European phase of liberalisation came attached with an extension of financial 
regulations. A notable example is the introduction of capital requirements. The 
equivalent to a risk-weighted liquidity ratio was introduced only in 1985 in an effort to 
prepare for what would become the international regulations of Basel I (1988) and the 
European Solvency Directive (1989) (Poveda, 2012:242-245).70 At the same time, a 
series of European directives inspired the creation of entire legal frameworks to 
introduce new financial actors (e.g. pension funds, from 1987) and instruments (e.g. 
derivatives, from 1989) (Oliver, 1996:120). These additional regulations where 
necessary to adapt and coordinate the juridical matrix of Spanish finance to that of 
European practices; a process of harmonisation that afforded Spanish banks the 
‘passport’ to operate within the new European single market after 1994 (Saiz et al., 
2003:558). Likewise, to make the stock exchanges more accessible to European 
investors, a 1988 reform increased dealing time, introduced controls to insure 
transparency in dealings, and replaced the old monopolistic system of individual 
brokers with a new system of competitive stock brokering firms (Restoy & Sánchez, 
2012:276).71  
 
                                                        
69 The dismantlement of such controls had been suspended in 1981 to soften the landing of the banking 
crisis. However, this logic no longer made sense as the economy boomed with the inflation of a housing 
bubble. In any case, the banks were no longer respecting them anyway (Poveda, 2012:245).  
70 The practice of liquidity ratios already existed. However it was still in its cradle: the first regulations of 
this sort were only established in the period between 1974-1979 (Poveda, 2012:242).  
71 The stock market had a peripheral role in the economy until Spain’s access into the European Union. It 
was criticised for its inefficiency and lack of transparency in dealings. Spanish companies would continue 
to show little interest in going public until the mid-1990s (Amodia et al., 1998:112).   
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Rather than unleashing the market, the liberalising measures at the turn of the 1990s 
are more accurately described as political attempts to re-engineer financial markets as 
realms of intensified competition. This process was most visible in the field of deposit 
banking. The full liberalisation of interest rates in 1987 sharpened rivalries in the 
attraction of savings. Two years later, Banco Santander, a commercial bank still on the 
rise, launched high interest-bearing deposit accounts, detonating the so-called ‘deposit 
war’ (Poveda, 2012:150). The struggle for deposits had an additional source of 
pressure: the de-territorialisation of savings banks. The extension of the cajas’ orbit of 
operations beyond their traditional regional shell turned them into even more mighty 
competitors. Following a quick process of spatial expansion, as early as 1993 the 
savings banks overtook the commercial banks on deposits (although the cajas’ market 
share did decline somewhat in subsequent years) (Harrison, 1993:72).  
 
The intensification of competition was accompanied by a fast process of capital 
concentration. Savings banks began  to join forces with other savings banks from their 
regions. Indeed, some of the most infamous cajas emerged out of mergers in this 
period: the Valencian savings banks Bancaja and Caja de Ahorros del Mediterráneo 
were formed in 1991 and 1992; the Andalusian Cajasur was formed in 1994; the 
Galician Caixanova was formed in 1999, etc. (El Mundo, 2010a). The commercial 
banks responded with a wave of mergers of their own. The members of the old 
oligopoly of the ‘big five’ began to cannibalise one another:  Banco de Bilbao and Banco 
de Vizcaya merged in 1988 to form BBV, and Banco Central and Banco Hispano 
Americano merged in 1991 to form BCH (Saurina, 2012:312). After repelling 
aggressive takeovers and a series of unfortunate mergers of its own, the bank that had 
once led the big five, Banco Español de Crédito (Banesto) collapsed in 1992 and its 
remains were sold off to Santander shortly after. This process of capital concentration 
also engulfed what was left of public-sector banking. Between 1982-1991, the public 
banks were subject to a process of mergers of a very different nature: all public credit 
institutions – including the historic Mortgage Bank of Spain (BHE) and the Industrial 
Credit Bank – were gradually blended together in 1991 into a single public credit bank, 
named Argentaria (Martín-Aceña & Pons, 2005:654). Even though Argentaria 
remained one of the largest banks in the country throughout the 1990s, the weight of 
public credit experienced a sustained decline. By the end of the decade, the total of 
financial assets commanded by public credit institutions stood at 3-4% of the total (a 
stark contrast with the 20% of the late 1960s) (see Banco de España). In any case, 
Argentaria’s existence was short-lived: in the midst of the privatisation craze of the 
first People’s Party government, it was sold off to BBV in 1999. In parallel, Santander 
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merged with BCH (Saurina, 2012:310). In short, by the turn of the millennium, the 
number of savings banks had experienced a dramatic decline (from 78 in 1985 to 48 in 
2000) (Martín-Aceña, 2005:693); the ‘big five’ commercial banks had turned into the 
titanic two (BBVA and Santander); and public-sector banking had become altogether 
extinct. 
 
As was also the case in other countries (e.g. Italy), this process of capital concentration 
was encouraged by the government in an attempt to make Spanish financial 
institutions more resilient to the globalisation of competition (Poveda, 2012:250).72 
And indeed, by the time when all restrictions to the establishment of foreign branches 
were lifted 1995, the retail banking sector was populated by dense networks of home-
grown offices that foreign banks found very difficult to penetrate (Bergés et al., 
2012:355-362).73 To this day, foreign banks have only managed to occupy a modest 
share of the retail market and have decided to focus on wholesale lending instead 
(interbank lending, bond issues, securitisation). Instead, the trend in 
internationalisation occurred in the opposite direction. The Spanish banks turned 
outward and exported their presence, first to Latin America (in the 1990s) and then to 
the European continent (in the 2000s, a process that was buttressed by the 
introduction of the single currency).74 The process of internationalisation was 
concentrated in the commercial banking sector, and in particular amongst the two 
largest institutions: Santander and BBVA, which came to own around 90% of all 
Spanish bank subsidiaries abroad by 2009 (ibid.:362). By contrast, the savings banks 
focused their activities on Spanish territory. This complementary pattern was not an 
accident. The main reason why commercial banks were taking to other countries was 
because they were fleeing the competitive thrust of the cajas in the domestic market 
(ibid.:364-267). Even though the cajas lost market share on deposits after the mid-
1990s, this decline was offset by an increased relevance on the credit market over the 
course of the 2000s.  
                                                        
72 This approach was particularly inspired by the work of academic economist Jack Revell, who in his 1987 
study of Spanish banks offered a number of reasons for banking concentration: ‘to take advantage of 
economies of scale and automation; to meet large customers’ borrowing requirements; to rationalize the 
branch network; to achieve international status; and to stand up to competition from foreign banks’. He 
even suggested specific pairings between banks, a vision that, according to Poveda (2012:250), became a 
self-fulfilling prophecy.  
73 This density only increased over time: the number of bank branches experienced a near 20% increase 
between 1997-2007. This is highly significant given the simultaneous decline elsewhere in the European 
Union: whereas in the EU the average population per bank branch was of 2720 by 2007, by then Spain 
had a bank branch per 977 inhabitants (Vives, 2012:395). 
74 This process followed that of their largest clients: the country’s largest non-financial corporations were 
experiencing a parallel process of internationalisation. The cajas undertook some attempts at 
internationalisation until the mid-1990s. However, this process was rolled back with the onset of the 
property bubble. Legally, commercial banks were allowed to establish branches abroad without 
restrictions from 1985 and the savings banks from 1988 (Bergés et al., 2012).  
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FIG.18. MARKET SHARE OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 
 
Source: Santacruz & Donoso, 2011. 
 
6.5. Financialisation, Urban Entrepreneurialism, and the Cajas 
 
The competitive prowess of the cajas, particularly in the credit market, went hand in 
hand with their specialisation in real-estate lending, a sector that boomed in the 2000s 
with the inflation of a massive property bubble. At the same time, the cajas 
turbocharged the bubble with their lending at the behest of their political patrons, who 
mobilised the savings banks as instruments of urban entrepreneurialism, that is, 
strategies of local boosterism to attract private investment into their areas and please 
their electorates. Underpinning these processes were the patterns of political 
accumulation of a new elective elite, who mobilised their influence over the cajas to 
reproduce the power of their political parties. Thus, the fate of the cajas became tied 
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to the fortunes of the real-estate sector, a relationship that brought them a 
considerable market success before leading to their demise.   
 
At the heart of the rise and fall of the cajas was the financialisation of the residential 
apparatus with the break-up of the BHE’s age-old monopoly over the issuance of 
mortgage-backed securities. Allowing cajas (in 1981) and commercial banks (in 1988) 
to engage in this practice revolutionised the dynamics of real-estate finance in the 
1980s. Hitherto perceived to be a risky and unprofitable venture by financial 
institutions, the ability to quickly raise capital through mortgage-backed securities 
became a central pillar of the financial system. Indeed, over the course of this decade, 
the country’s portfolio of mortgage-loans quadrupled.  
 
The government became acutely aware of the new centrality of real-estate finance, 
particularly after the housing bubble of 1986-1992: ‘The increase of mortgage credit in 
our country in the last few years has been of such magnitude that it could be considered 
one of the most significant features of our economic expansion’.75 Thus, when the 
housing bubble burst in 1992 due to the crisis of the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism, the government opted for deepening mortgage securitisation practices as 
a counter-cyclical measure. To do so, it regulated the creation of ‘securitisation funds’ 
(fondos de titulización) (López & Rodríguez, 2010:287-293). These funds were special 
purpose vehicles specialised in mortgage securitisation. They would purchase large 
amounts of mortgage-backed securities issued by banks or cajas, pool together their 
different income streams, isolate their financial risk, and repackage them as lucrative 
securities of their own. To avoid the ‘moral hazard’ of this originate-to-distribute 
model, Spanish regulations required the bank or caja where the loans had originated 
to retain part of their risks of default (ibid.:292). Securitisations took the form of 
‘covered bonds’ (backed by the originators’ mortgage loan portfolio) or used simple 
securitised bond structures in which the originators retained the first losses. Moreover, 
originators continued ‘to play the role of credit managers with responsibility for 
monitoring and supervision’ (Vives, 2012:387). Ultimately, banks and cajas began to 
use securitisation merely as a wholesale funding mechanism rather than to actually 
transfer risk to securitisation funds (i.e. the original purpose of this practice).  
 
 
 
                                                        
75 The quote is from the preamble to a decree modifying the regulations around home repossessions. See 
Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1992, de 26 de junio, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley sobre 
el Régimen del Suelo y Ordenación Urbana (1992) BOE-A-1992-15285.  
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FIG.19. REAL ESTATE IN THE EXPANSION OF CREDIT (1992-2016) 
 
Source: Banco de España 
 
The issuance securities experienced dazzling growth during the housing bubble of the 
2000s. Prior to the start of the bubble in 1997, the combined weight of the real-estate 
sector (i.e. construction, real-estate services, home purchase and home reform) 
amounted to 33% of the lending by retail financial institutions. As property 
development took off in the coming years, this figure expanded dramatically: at the 
peak of the bubble in late 2006, real-estate loans had grown to encompass 61% of all 
retail credit (Fig.19). This surge in real-estate credit would be unintelligible without 
the financialisation of household economies described in the previous chapter, 
according to which financial institutions encouraged homeowners to indebt 
themselves as much as possible. This was the magic of mortgage-backed securitisation: 
the reliance of banks and cajas on wholesale sources of finance allowed them to expand 
their mortgage lending operations beyond the growth of their own deposits. Indeed, as 
addressed in the previous chapter, household savings experienced a dramatic drop in 
this period (García-Lamarca & Kaika, 2016:318). Yet, the contraction of deposits 
meant that the Spanish financial system became highly dependent upon external 
sources of finance, that is on the issuance of covered bonds and asset securitisations, 
but also interbank lending (Vives, 2012:403). The definitive boost to the expansion of 
securitisation (mortgage-backed or otherwise) came with Spain’s entry into the 
Eurozone, which facilitated the internationalisation of securitisation circuits (Restoy 
& Sánchez, 2012:277; Martín-Aceña, 2014:91). By 2007, the Spanish issuance of 
securitised assets amounted to 15% of the European total; a figure second only to the 
hyperfinancialised United Kingdom (which amounted to 51%) (López & Rodríguez, 
2010:293).  
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This dynamic, by which financial intermediaries relied on sources of external 
wholesale finance to funnel credit into the real-estate market, was dominated by the 
cajas de ahorro. Paradoxically, the institutions that had been historically known for 
their low-risk deposit banking became Spain’s cutting-edge financial intermediaries, 
highly involved in market-based assets and speculative investments. By contrast, the 
commercial banks had a limited amount of market-based assets and relied much more 
on deposits and personal loans. Further, their higher degree of internationalisation 
lowered their exposure to domestic retail finance, by then dominated by the mortgage 
loans (Quaglia & Royo, 2015; Bergés et al., 2012:363). Although the commercial banks’ 
lending was also highly exposed to real estate (an average of 53%), the exposure of the 
cajas to this sector soared to an average of 69% (Vives, 2012:403-405). However, in 
the case of certain cajas, the exposure was much higher: the infamous Caja de Ahorros 
del Mediterraneo had 98% of its investments concentrated in the real-estate sector 
prior to its nationalization in 2011 (Lavezzolo, 2012).  
 
This specialisation in financialised real estate would be unintelligible without 
considering the political role performed by the cajas in the urban entrepreneurial 
strategies of cities and regions. The political conversion of the cajas in the 1980s 
empowered representatives of local councils, allowing them to handpick a large section 
of the executive boards of the local caja, and granted regional governments supervisory 
functions over these institutions. However, the political capture of these institutions 
deepened over time. Some regional governments equipped themselves with the power 
to appoint a certain share of regional parliamentary representatives to the assemblies 
of their savings banks. This was the case of Valencia after 1997, where a hegemonic 
People’s Party subsequently eroded the proportion of representation owed to 
parliamentary opposition parties in order to strengthen its grip over the regional 
financial system (Villar, 2006). In the case of Valencia, the regional government 
claimed a 28% of representation in the cajas’ Assemblies (Lavezzolo, 2012). Another 
example is that of Castilla-La Mancha, where for some time politicians gathered up to 
71% of the voting share in the regional caja. European regulations forced a 50% cap on 
the degree of representation allocated to political officials in 2002.76  However, a lack 
of organised presence of the depositors – the second largest interest group represented 
in the ruling bodies of the cajas – whose representatives were often picked at random, 
gave a disproportionate amount of power to party interests. According to the estimates 
                                                        
76 See Ley 44/2002, de 22 de noviembre, de Medidas de Reforma del Sistema Financiero [2002] BOE-A-
2002-22807).  
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of an IMF report (2012:8), out of the 43 savings banks left in 2009 at least 16 granted 
political representatives a 40-50% share of voting powers in their corporate 
governments. This politicisation of the cajas manifested itself in inter-regional 
political conflicts when savings banks of different regions took over one another. Caja 
mergers often ignited struggles over what share of political control corresponded to 
each regional government.   
 
Once firmly in the grip of local and regional political parties, the lending operations of 
these institutions were put to use in ways that could later afford these parties electoral 
returns. The cajas’ lending was mobilised to finance public infrastructure projects, the 
construction of emblematic buildings, or the development of huge residential areas 
sitting on land re-classifications, all to the benefit of the same local authorities pulling 
the strings within the savings bank (Lavezzolo, 2012). Regional governments, 
supposedly in charge of supervisory functions, often had vested interests in these 
collusions, as they allowed regional parties to strategically direct investment towards 
the areas that were most electorally disputed. As the next chapter will show, this is why 
the cajas financed numerous infrastructure projects: so that the parties of their 
political patrons could reel in the contractors’ bribes. Many of these ended up in ruins. 
Nevertheless, the loans that ended up crashing these savings banks were not so much 
those granted to the different scales of the state but to households and non-financial 
corporations, such as real-estate development firms. Here there was political 
intervention as well. The ‘turbocharged’ lending of the savings banks acted as a 
quantitative easing of sorts. The provision of rocket fuel to the bubble generated a 
‘collective sense of wellbeing’ (ibid.). Wages were falling and savings were running out, 
but jobs were being created, home prices were on  the rise, personal credit was cheap, 
and localities were becoming beautified.   
 
When the property bubble ran out of steam in 2007, and external sources of liquidity 
dried up in 2009-2010, the cajas de ahorro entered the first and last major crisis of 
their long history. For all the corruption that they festered, accounts of the demise of 
the cajas centred around political distortions miss that political corruption and a good 
performance on the market had been perfectly compatible for decades. Indeed, the 
cajas were overexposed to the real-estate downturn because they had previously 
outcompeted the commercial banks in retail business segments. Due to the particular 
sequence of their development (i.e. they only became ‘national’ financial institutions 
in the 1990s), their competitive edge came with a rapid process of geographical 
expansion. This overstretched the savings banks and made them vulnerable to 
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financial shocks, something that their political regulators were unwilling to address. 
And thus, in the midst of the global financial crisis, their half of the financial system 
suffered accordingly.  
 
Conclusion 
 
When the cajas imploded in 2010, public authorities commanded a series of mergers 
to contain the losses. In 2012, in the midst of the Euro crisis, when the immaturity 
narrative was at the height of its popularity, the government opted for the extinction 
of the savings banks sector altogether. Out of the 48 cajas dominating the property 
market in the 2000s, 46 were blended together into a small number of financial 
conglomerates that were then turned into commercial banks (e.g. Bankia). The 
remaining two are local cajas that only ever played a minute role in the financial 
system. This dramatic ending seemingly confirms immaturity narratives of the 
Spanish crisis, which have insisted on framing the cajas as inherently profligate and 
distortive due to their political control. Yet, this narrative forgets how, regardless of 
the financial intermediary at stake, processes of ‘economic’ accumulation in the 
property market have often been intertwined with patterns of ‘political’ accumulation 
in the history of Spanish finance; a relationship that has taken different forms over 
time.   
 
In the long nineteenth century, when the Spanish state was firmly in the grip of large 
landowners, the elites exercised their power through a semi-public monopolistic bank 
– the Banco Hipotecario de España (BHE) – at the expense of the urban and rural 
poor, who had to meet their financial needs through the then small and local cajas (if 
not turn to the money-lending activities of the landowners). At the time, the 
commercial banks were largely disinterested in the property market. Rather, their 
focus was on much more speculative ventures that brought a string of crashes in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Francoist state rose to power with the 
promise of tackling the power of liberal elites and their financiers, establishing a highly 
statist financial system that relied on public financial institutions and the command of 
private finance towards strategic sectors. In this context, the BHE was nationalised and 
the cajas turned, effectively, into semi-public institutions, all to ensure the operation 
of the residential apparatus discussed in previous chapters. Yet, rather than tackling 
elite domination through financial means, the Francoist state merely redirected their 
power through the channels of an arbitrary and authoritarian bureaucracy, where 
dictatorship and commercial bankers developed a symbiotic relationship that resulted 
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in powerful oligopolies. The degree of political accumulation (i.e. via clientelism) that 
was necessary to ensure success in this atmosphere resulted in corruption scandals 
around the 1970s, a process that was followed by a crisis without parallel in the 
commercial banking sector, struck by the stagflation crisis of this period. It was under 
these pressures that the system of commanded finance that catered to the residential 
apparatus collapsed as well.  
 
To address these problems, the financial system was ‘liberalised’, that is, rewired in a 
way that would intensify competition between financial intermediaries. The purpose 
of these reforms was to tackle the dysfunctionalities of previous decades, but also to 
relaunch the property apparatus by stimulating mortgage finance. It was in this context 
that the cajas were gradually granted operational equality with the banks and equipped 
with greater mortgage-lending functions (e.g. the capacity to issue mortgage-backed 
securities) to fill the void the commercial banks had left behind. At the same time, the 
cajas were also ‘politicised’ in order to provide a firmer grounding to the new federal 
democratic state. Local and regional governments were granted representatives in 
their executive boards, allowing them to steer their operations. This conversion of the 
cajas turned them into formidable instruments of urban entrepreneurialism, which 
became a form of political accumulation in a context of inter-party competition. 
Outflanking the banks in a competitive financial market, political control allowed the 
cajas to assume critical positions in the real-estate market, from where they 
turbocharged a financialised residential apparatus. This tied their fate to the 
fluctuations of the property bubble, and eventually led to their downfall.  
 
In showing how the vicissitudes of Spanish finance have always been tied to the 
patterns of political accumulation of a given era, this chapter buttresses a central claim 
of the thesis: that the bubble of the 2000s needs to be understood through the lens of 
the historicity of its political dynamics rather than in terms of structural laws of 
causation. In doing so, the chapter also addresses the central research question of the 
thesis (why did the Spanish path into the crisis manifest as two seemingly 
contradictory processes – as a house-price bubble and as a wave of residential 
overproduction?), as it demonstrates that the relationship between Spanish finance 
and real-estate speculation needs to be understood as an expression, for good and for 
worse, of the clientelist politics of urban governance. The next chapter will build upon 
this claim by examining how these clientelist dynamics were not a mere outgrowth of 
the economic logic of bubble, but, in fact, constitutive of it.  
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7. The Iron Triangle of Real Estate: The 
Political Economy of Political Corruption  
 
7.0. Introduction 
 
When the ‘Bárcenas affair’ broke out in January 2013, evidence surfaced that the 
conservative Partido Popular (PP), had been running a slush fund to manage a regular 
stream of bribes from business potentates, largely from the construction industry 
(Romero, 2013). This was all the more ironic given that the party had won by a 
landslide only two years earlier amid promises to end the country’s sleaze and 
profligacy. The scandal was named after the party’s chief treasurer, Luis Bárcenas, 
whose leaked handwritten documents detailed a parallel bookkeeping system 
stretching back two decades. The ‘Bárcenas papers’, as they came to be known, also 
recorded how the party had put these monies to use. The main purpose of the slush 
fund was to provide a war chest for electoral expenses, suggesting systematic multiple 
election fraud. The books also revealed a system of under-the-counter cash bonuses to 
the leadership, exposing the collusion of the party’s upper echelons.  
 
The Bárcenas affair was merely the high-water mark of the tide of corruption scandals 
relentlessly making the news over the last decade. In 2016, the country’s overstretched 
judicial system struggled to cope with 1,661 ongoing corruption cases (Barbería, 2016). 
The vast majority of these scandals have radiated out of the field of urban development, 
and they tend to bear the distinct  marks of what the corruption studies literature calls 
‘political corruption’: ‘the distortion of a policy process through illicit financial 
interests influencing decision-makers at the state level’ (Heywood, 2007:695).77 And 
yet, as discussed in chapter 1, the question of political corruption remains remarkably 
absent from the critical political economy studies of the Spanish property bubble, an 
omission that is particularly glaring in the spatial fix narrative, given its focus on urban 
development. Indeed, in the rare occasions that corruption is cited in this literature, it 
tends to be described as a consequential phenomenon: ‘the outcome of a failed 
institutional design based on neoliberal governmentality’ (Coq-Huelva 2013:1223). In 
explaining the role of the state in the bubble, the priority of this literature is ‘urban 
entrepreneurialism’, the pressures of inter-urban competition for private capital flows. 
The problem is that the prism of urban entrepreneurialism, understood in purely 
economistic terms, allocates causal primacy to structural constraints, reducing 
                                                        
77 As opposed to ‘administrative’ corruption, which instead refers to abuses around the performance of 
basic bureaucratic procedures (Heywood, 2007:695). 
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corruption to an outcome of the fiscal dependence of the state upon speculative activity 
and to an ‘extra-legal ramification’ of the ‘the fiscal weakness of municipalities and 
their dependence upon real-estate markets’ (López & Rodríguez, 2010:354, emphasis 
added). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how the abuses unearthed in recent years 
suggest that political corruption played a much greater role in the bubble than what 
this literature has been willing to admit. Rather than a mere outgrowth of the 
‘economic’ imperatives of the bubble, corruption should be seen as a ‘political’ logic 
constitutive of the bubble itself. To do so, the chapter will cast light upon the workings 
of an ‘iron triangle’ at the heart of the Spanish real-estate market. The term ‘iron 
triangle’ is, of course, borrowed from American politics, where it famously designates 
the dynamics of institutional capture by special interests, particularly by contractors 
of the so-called ‘military-industrial complex’. The term is here deployed to capture a 
similar process in Spain, one mediated by a three-way relationship between the 
construction industry, the state, and political parties.78 The argument is that local and 
regional governments manipulated their procedures to favour specific construction 
firms not only to create a favourable business environment that would attract 
investment and please electorates, but also so that ruling political parties could funnel 
bribe moneys into their electoral machines, boosting their chances of reproducing their 
access to state power. Over time, this set in motion a self-reinforcing tendency: political 
parties expanded their bribe-levying capacities to compete with one another, firms 
purchased their access to political influence in order to ensure their market success, 
and all of these power flows were mediated by Spain’s peculiar structures of local and 
regional governance.  
 
In arguing that the bubble had a ‘political’ logic, this chapter showcases a central claim 
of the thesis: that the patterns of political accumulation (i.e. elite competition by non-
commercial means) particular to the post-Franco period were a main driver of the 
boom and bust of the 2000s. In short, rather than reducing political accumulation (in 
this case, real-estate clientelism) to a reflex of urban entrepreneurialism, this chapter 
inverts the formula to explore the ways in which urban entrepreneurialism was a 
consequence of political accumulation, though, to be sure, without denying the very 
                                                        
78 This is not unlike what Manuel Aalbers and his team have elsewhere called the ‘real-estate-financial 
complex’: ‘We here propose a new metaphor that can help us to centre attention on the connections 
between real estate, finance and states: the real estate/financial complex, akin the military/industrial 
complex’. A summary of the research project can be found in their page: 
https://ees.kuleuven.be/geography/projects/refcom/project/index.html  
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real material pressures of inter-urban competition. As such, the dimension of the 
political that figures most prominently in this chapter is that of social conflict, as it 
deals, above all, with the struggles of groups and classes to reshape urban governance.   
 
The chapter is structured in three parts, each dedicated to one of the three vertices of 
the iron triangle. In turn, each of one of these three parts is divided into two sections 
each. The first part (7.1) explores the first vertex: the state structures of urban 
governance in Spain. Section 7.1.1. will examine the exceptional amount of power that 
Spanish local and regional executives have over the built environment, as well as the 
degeneration of the controls designed to keep the arbitrary exercise of this power in 
check. Section 7.1.2. examines the pressures of urban entrepreneurialism in the 2000s 
and the specific practices through which inter-urban competition was exercised. The 
second vertex (7.2) is formed by the construction industry. Section 7.2.1. will trace an 
anatomy of the construction industry during the years of the bubble, providing a 
portrait of the business structure. Section 7.2.2. will draw a typology of the clientelist 
transactions that nourished this industry in this period, showing the specific exercises 
of political influence that shaped the market.  The third vertex (7.3) will address the 
role of political parties in the triangle, the aspect most neglected by the literature. 
Section 7.3.1. will dissect the mechanics of electoral fraud in Spain, showing how 
parties could regularly inflate their election spending beyond the limits stipulated by 
the Constitution. And finally, section 7.3.2. will reconstruct the criminal systems 
financing political parties from news data, with a particular focus on the PP, the party 
for which there is most information available.  
 
7.1. First Vertex: The State Structures of Urban Governance 
 
As addressed in chapter 5, one of the greatest successes scored by the urban working-
class activism of the 1970s was the devolution of strong competences over the built 
environment to municipal governments. The original purpose of these demands was 
to bring urban space under democratic control in order to prevent the abuses of 
property developers. However, from the 1980s, the decay of the bureaucratic 
structures keeping in check these municipal governments allowed elected officials to 
exercise their extensive powers in a largely arbitrary manner. This has often meant the 
surrender of the built environment to the rule of local strongmen and women, enabling  
various clientelist transactions that have once again facilitated the subordination of the 
urban realm to the interests of real-estate developers.  
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7.1.1. Petty Kingdoms: Municipal Democracies as Elective Dictatorships 
 
In Spain, urban governance is atomised across a landscape of petty elective 
dictatorships. A legacy of its Roman and medieval past, Spain counts an exceptionally 
large number of remarkably small municipalities. Overall, the Spanish territory is 
parcellised into 8,117 municipalities, 90% of which have less than 10,000 inhabitants. 
These are, on average, the smallest amongst Western countries (Benito et al., 
2015:192). Moreover, as is also the case in other southern European countries (France, 
Italy, and Portugal), Spanish local governments are run by elected mayors who enjoy 
large amounts of executive power within their respective municipal corporations (the 
infamous ‘strong-mayor form’).  
 
In theory, Spanish law stipulates that the powers of local executives ought to be 
balanced out by high-ranking civil servants in charge of ensuring that the measures of 
local representatives are legally and financially sound. This is the bureaucratic triad 
formed by (1) secretaries, (2) auditors, and (3) treasurers: (1) secretaries certify the 
legality of local council decisions and provide legal advice to public representatives; (2) 
auditors examine the expenditure and income of local authorities; (3) treasurers 
organize all payments by the local councils, direct local tax levying, and provide 
custody of funds (García et al., 2013:624-627). In practice, however, over the decades 
this system of checks and balances has undergone a worrying process of erosion 
(Jiménez, 2009:259-260). Many of the positions reserved for these high-ranking 
bureaucrats have been left vacant, and their roles have passed on to unqualified or 
temporary clerical workers employed by the local civil service, rendering them 
dependent upon their controlees for their salary and working conditions. Moreover, 
the tasks of auditing and account execution are often not clearly delimited, so that 
sometimes the same worker may concentrate both roles despite an evident conflict of 
interest (accountants are supposed to monitor themselves). As if this were not enough, 
some local governments have also outsourced public management functions to 
external bodies, allowing them to keep administrative law at arm’s length (García et 
al., 2013:628). The most resounding case is that of Marbella, epicentre of corruption 
in Costa del Sol, where between 1991-2006 the local government created a parallel 
administration of private companies and foundations, which was engrossed with 
handpicked friends and relatives until it became larger than the official bureaucracy 
itself. Ironically, these measures were justified with a neoliberal rhetoric of ‘flexible 
managerialism’ against the dead hand of the state. 
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The devolution of most planning functions to these petty elective dictatorships has 
buried the already peculiar practices of Spanish urbanism in further layers of 
obscurity. The main urban planning instrument in the country are the municipal plans 
drafted and approved by every local government. Municipal plans are a truly powerful 
institution in charge of structuring and redistributing the economic power of land. 
They confer upon local governments the power to classify land as fit for development 
and to estimate and fix the value of the resulting land plots (see chapter 4). Land 
denominations constitute an important mechanism of asset-price inflation, as a simple 
re-zoning to classify land as ‘developable’ is bound to increase its worth, and much 
more so in a context of booming home prices (Jiménez et al., 2014). Local authorities 
are also in charge of issuing building permits according to their municipal plans, and 
through the opaque practice of urbanistic agreements (convenios urbanísticos), they 
are also able to strike bilateral deals with developers in order to tailor amendments to 
the plan for them (García et al., 2013:623). In exchange, developers may agree to 
assume the costs of some local public facility, like building a municipal swimming pool 
or a sports centre. Prior to 2007, the procedure for signing these agreements was barely 
regulated. Negotiations would unfold without any minimum requirements for 
transparency. Thus, the content of these agreements was withheld from the public and 
sometimes from the municipal corporation itself.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the highly discretionary nature of local power structures has 
encouraged speculative developers to build personal and financial ties with local 
councillors in order to tap into privileged information and political favours. In the 
midst of an anti-corruption operation in the city of Alicante, an intercepted 
conversation between Sonia Castedo, at the time Alicante’s urbanism councillor (later 
mayor of the city), and a powerful local developer captured this dynamic well. In a 
casual manner, the builder tells the planner that he will soon be dropping by her office 
to see if she can adjust the city plan: ‘[t]hree land plots […] see if you can make them 
blue [i.e. change land designations], paint them blue for me’ (eldiariocv, 2014). 
However, the formation of clientelist networks around local strongmen has a long 
tradition. The lineage of these practices is personified in the Fabra family, several 
generations of which have controlled the provincial corporation of Castellón at 
different times (Valencia) (Martínez, 2012). Descending from a line of nineteenth-
century caciques (see chapter 3), fascist bureaucrats, and conservative politicians, the 
latest Fabra, Carlos, a man notorious for his regular abuse of power, was recently 
imprisoned on grounds of tax evasion and has corruption charges pending.  
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5.2. The Fever of Urban Entrepreneurialism 
 
After four decades of fascist centralism, the Constitution of 1978 created a highly 
decentralised state that transferred broad competences to newly established regional 
administrations (comunidades autónomas). The result was a multi-scalar apparatus 
formed by seventeen autonomous elected governments and parliaments assuming full 
competence over land-use planning legislation and over the provincial (diputaciones) 
and municipal corporations within their territories (see Fig.21 above). The impetus 
behind this schema was an attempt to weaken the grip of administrators inherited from 
the dictatorship by democratising local governance (Cardona, 2013:95). As discussed 
in the previous chapter, the process of devolution deepened in the mid-1980s, when 
the regional governments were granted jurisdiction over the public savings banks 
(cajas de ahorros) based in their territories, the main mortgage lenders in the country. 
This allowed regional governments to appoint the members of the cajas’ executive 
boards, filling their ranks with representatives of political parties and trade unions 
relative to their electoral support. Originally non-profit institutions designed to 
provide mortgage lending to the working classes, by the late 1990s the cajas had 
become operationally equal to the banks and effectively acted as financial wings of 
their regional governments (see chapter 6). 
 
With this equipment, the new scales of the state entered a dynamic of inter-urban and 
inter-regional competition for private capital flows: urban entrepreneurialism. To 
make their cities and regions attractive for investment, the different scales of the state 
resorted to strategies of ‘local boosterism’ to raise the profile of their localities. Valencia 
constitutes the most tragic example of this phenomenon: ‘The idea, in the words of its 
leaders, was to “put Valencia on the map”. And they succeeded. […] Today, the city 
stands as a symbol of extravagance and public mismanagement’ (Público, 2016). 
Valencia became notorious for hosting one-off grandiose events, like a Papal visit in 
2006, but also for its conspicuous spending on spectacular buildings (Buck, 2017). The 
City of Arts and Sciences, an iconic complex of futuristic buildings with little practical 
use, became the flagship marketing device of city and region during the years of the 
bubble. Designed by local world-class architect Santiago Calatrava, its style perfectly 
encapsulates the reckless extravagance of these years. Subordinating all structural 
function to rhetorical purpose, in Calatrava’s buildings ‘organic metaphor trumps all’; 
they must 'billow, swoop, and spiral, because otherwise they wouldn’t be eye-catching 
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as advertisements’ (Hatherley, 2014).79 The postcard priorities of the Valencian 
regional government become starkly clear when one compares the €1.3bn invested in 
The City of Arts with the prefab primary schools of its vicinity: prison-like structures 
prone to leaks and without heating (Serra, 2016).  
  
The same ‘landmark’ function was performed by costly and unnecessary transport 
infrastructure. Indeed, without infrastructure ‘the story of Spain’s speculative 
expansion of settlement would be incomplete’ (Marcinkoski, 2016:79). Deserted 
airports began sprouting in areas with low population density or in relative proximity 
to already existing ones (e.g. Ciudad Real, Huesca, Castellón). The central government 
was also complicit in this process, as the Ministerio de Fomento granted licenses for 
the construction of high-speed rail lines across rural areas for the benefit of less than 
ten passengers a day (Page, 2015). Despite the low demand, the length of Spain’s high-
speed rail network is today second only to China’s – in absolute terms (Marcinkoski, 
2016:82).  
 
These processes of competitive ‘place-building’ were magnified by a buoyant real-
estate market, particularly as property development constitutes an important source 
of finance for municipalities, making local governments an interested party in the 
bubble. As discussed in chapter 4, the constitution of 1978 granted local councils the 
power to exact a small portion of building rights from urbanising landowners (10-15%). 
Originally, these land levies were devised to combat hoarding and to facilitate the 
public provision of housing. However, during the years of fast land-price inflation, 
municipalities joined the speculative process themselves and turned the sale of these 
valuable land plots into a major source of revenue (Romero et al., 2012:470; Benito et 
al., 2015:198). Municipalities counted on other levies that strictly depended on urban 
development: fees on planning permits, a tax on construction projects, or a sales tax 
on the transactions of urban developable land (Jiménez, 2009:263-267). To this 
should be added the infrastructural expenses outsourced to developers via the 
aforementioned urbanistic agreements as well as the stimuli derived from an 
expanding construction industry and home-price inflation.  
 
The procedure of urban development was usually the following (Benito et al., 
2015:198-99; Burriel, 2008): (1) Constituting itself as an ‘urbanising agent’ (see 
                                                        
79 Admittedly, ‘while most “icon” buildings are demonstratively useless’, Calatrava also happens to 
specialise in infrastructure, or rather, in ‘making things that should be entirely functional utterly useless' 
(Hatherley, 2014; see also Cocotas, 2016). From Valencia to Venice, his bridges may be often dangerous 
to drive or walk across, but always spectacular to look at. 
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chapter 4), a construction company would present a spectacular project of enormous 
dimensions to the local government. Sometimes, large conglomerates were behind 
these urbanisers , though more often small construction companies formed ad-hoc for 
a specific project and dissolved thereafter. If the project happened to fall outside the 
scope of the current urban plan, the developer might have added to the project some 
infrastructure of public interest (e.g. a care home, a public swimming pool) in order to 
‘sweeten the deal’. (2) The proposal would be said to carry enormous benefits for the 
municipality, expanding the revenue of the local government and bringing general 
economic growth to the area. This suited the ‘local boosterism’ needs of municipal 
officials, as the project promised to act as a marketing device to attract further 
investors and to pander to local electorates. (3) Mobilising mechanisms legally 
available to municipalities (e.g. urbanistic agreements, partial modifications), the 
system of checks and balances was often wilfully neglected. Often, the approval of the 
project came attached to a bribe for the adjudicating authority and/or a graft on the 
profits rewarded to the developer (a ‘kickback’).  
 
The processes gained speed as home-prices increased. Echoing the ‘economic miracle’ 
of the 1960s (see chapter 5), a ‘boomtown mentality’ swept across the country.80 
Massive changes in land denominations opened up vast areas of rural land to the 
production of high-rise buildings and row houses, re-zonings sometimes lobbied for 
by the farmers themselves. The small town of Seseña (Toledo), ‘exemplar of the 
surrealism of the bubble’, allowed a single developer (El Pocero, to whom I shall return 
to later) to build 13,000 homes on its outskirts (Domínguez, 2016). This feverish urge 
to build was particularly intense in beach-side localities, where there was a high 
demand for second homes and tourist facilities. The logic of this phenomenon is well 
captured by the words of the mayor of La Vilajoiosa, a small town off the coast of 
Alicante: ‘Every town in our area is succeeding and everyone is growing rich. We 
cannot afford to stand still’ (quoted in Burriel, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
80 As discussed in chapter 4, the property bubble began on the back of the Land Law of 1997-8. From 2001, 
the creation of the Euro accelerated home-price increases, primarily because it facilitated the pumping of 
credit into the already booming housing market, but also because it added a new urgency to the laundering 
of hidden treasures. At the turn of the millennium, pools of soon-to-be obsolete pesetas would surface to 
purchase hundreds of thousands of properties in cash, an invaluable storage of value (Galindo, 2002).  
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7.2. Second Vertex: The Construction Oligarchy 
 
The greatest beneficiary of the opacity of urban governance has been the construction 
business, an industry with historically-grown ties to state power. Through clientelist 
transactions, these ties have become a major source of political accumulation, ensuring 
a great degree of commercial success for a few privileged actors. By the 2000s, these 
clientelist transactions mostly took on three different forms: contractual, urbanistic, 
and financial. 
 
7.2.1. Anatomy of the Construction Industry 
 
TABLE 3. BUSINESS STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY (2006) 
 
Business Size 
 
Number 
 
% of Total 
No employees (self-employed workers) 187,482 43.88% 
Micro (1-9 employees) 184,527 43.19% 
Small (10-49 employees) 49,724 11.64% 
Medium (50-199 employees) 3,788 1.2% 
Large (>200 employees) 378 0.09% 
 
Source: Ministerio de Fomento. 
 
A still shot of the construction industry at the peak of the bubble (2006) reveals a 
highly uneven business structure (Table 3). The immense majority of registered 
construction firms were either small or very small. Indeed, 98.7% of firms had less than 
50 employees, a figure that includes a vast precariat of self-employed construction 
workers. During the property boom of the 2000s, this vast stretch of the sector was 
responsible for 55-60% of the total volume of construction business. Generally 
confined to a local range of action, it specialised in the construction of residential and 
non-residential buildings, only deriving 10-20% of its volume of business from civil 
engineering, a figure that most likely reflects the infrastructure attached to 
urbanisation projects (roads, streets, power lines, etc.) (see Fig.21 below). As a general 
rule, the smaller the company the more it tends to specialise in residential production. 
A business structure of this sort is common in times of heavy residential production. 
In the 1960s, for instance, heavy construction subsidies and the emergence of a 
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dynamic property market encouraged many landowners to set up small property 
development firms. 
 
The remaining 1.3% of the business structure is made up of a small nobility of large 
and medium-sized companies with a long lineage in the sector and a broader 
geographical range of action. However, even this elite displays a great degree of 
stratification. In 2006, the vast majority were mid-sized companies employing 
between 50-199 workers (e.g. the construction divisions of conglomerates like Cyopsa 
or Sorigué) (Table 3). This ‘lower nobility’ was responsible for 20-25% of the total 
volume of business, and could derive up to 35% of its turnover from civil engineering 
operations (e.g. construction of railways or hydraulic infrastructure). Above this layer 
there was a tiny ‘high nobility’ of a 200-400 companies that absorbed 20% of the 
industry’s total turnover. However, even this construction aristocracy was highly 
differentiated: out of the 378 companies in this range in 2006, 230 employed between 
200-500 workers, 100 between 500-1,000 employees, and a small group of 48 
grandees employed more than 1,000 (data from Ministerio de Fomento). Amongst 
these were the construction divisions of giant conglomerates, including the titanic ‘Big 
Six’ – ACS, FCC, Ferrovial, Acciona, Sacyr-Vallehermoso and OHL – all of which 
ranked amongst the top ten infrastructure contractors in the world in this decade 
(Galindo, 2003).  
 
Unlike small firms, which tend to specialise in residential production, the industry’s 
giants tend to be integrated into vast conglomerates that usually diversify their 
business model with urban service contracts (e.g. garbage collection, maintenance of 
street furniture). This pattern is the result of the counter-cyclical strategy devised by 
the titans to navigate the crisis of the 1970s, when the sector was struck by a slashing 
of public investment in civil engineering projects, as well as the abolition of the 
construction subsidies that had underpinned the residential boom of the previous 
decade (Galindo, 2003). This, in turn, was accompanied by an unstoppable process of 
capital concentration. The mergers started in the 1980s, accelerated in the 1990s – 
when many of these companies went public – and heated up into predatory takeovers 
in the 2000s. The most resounding case was the surprise takeover of Dragados, 
historically the largest construction company in the country, by ACS, the fourth largest, 
which assumed the throne instead (Gómez, 2002). A 2003 article in the economics 
section of El País noted this phenomenon: ‘In the 1980s, it would have taken two dozen 
seats to gather the grandees of the construction industry around the same table. Today, 
six seats would be enough’ (Galindo, 2003). In the years preceding the property 
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bubble, service contracts constituted half of the turnover of some of the largest 
companies in the construction sector. However, booming property prices lured them 
into the housing market. At the peak of the bubble, even the largest firms were deriving 
40-50% of their turnover from residential construction. 
 
FIG.21. CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY PER COMPANY SIZE (2001-2007) 
Source: Ministerio de Fomento. 
Note: Official statistics define civil engineering as ‘the construction of bridges, tunnels, 
supply networks (water, gas, oil), etc; power lines, telecommunication lines; electric power 
plants, nuclear power stations; enclosure structures; highways, roads, railways, etc.; 
waterworks; as well as other specialised constructions’. 
 
7.2.2. The Mechanisms of Political Accumulation 
 
The relationship between the construction potentates and the political establishment 
is long, harking all the way back to the early decades of Franco’s dictatorship. The Big 
Six carry in their holdings companies that built their empires from the allocation of 
large-scale civil engineering projects in the aftermath of the Spanish Civil War (e.g. 
Dragados, Huarte, Agromán, Entrecanales, etc.). These companies made enormous 
profits from the forced labour of prisoners leased by the state, a practice common 
under Spanish fascism in all sorts of private developments until 1969 (CGT, 2013; 
Baquero, 2014; Vadillo, 2015).81 The most prominent example is the Valle de los 
Caídos (‘Valley of the Fallen’), a monumental war memorial that would later become 
Franco’s own sinister mausoleum. It is estimated that around 20,000 prisoners, many 
of them political, participated in the construction of this project alone, all under the 
command of prominent companies like Banús or Huarte (Vadillo, 2015). The most 
                                                        
81 Beyond civil engineering, forced labour was also prominent in mining (e.g. Duro, Babero), the 
metallurgical industries (e.g. Babcock & Wilcox, Astilleros de Cádiz, La Maquinista Terrestre) and in 
railway construction (e.g. Norte, MZA, Renfe) (Baquero, 2014).  
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powerful families of the sector (e.g. Entrecanales, Del Pino, Koplowitz) came to 
establish financial bonds or family ties with high-ranking officials of the dictatorship 
to secure valuable political favour. These dynasties have remained at the helm of some 
of the titans of the industry (respectively, Acciona, Ferrovial, and FCC). But the 
political links are also evident in the in the case of the lineages that built new fortunes 
after the fall of the dictatorship. This is the case OHL, long the fief of Juan Miguel Villar 
Mir, former finance minister during the latter years of the dictatorship and now 
replaced by his son of the same name (Vélez, 2016). This close relationship with the 
political establishment has successfully reproduced itself over time. Indeed, today, the 
executive boards of the construction potentates perform a function of class integration. 
Their seats are filled by a blend of old fascist officials and democratic politicians 
emerging from the revolving door of the state.  
 
TABLE 4.  TYPOLOGY OF CLIENTELIST TRANSACTIONS IN REAL ESTATE 
 
 
It is thus unsurprising that the construction industry has become the most frequent 
suspect in the tide of scandals of recent years. Indeed, the companies cited above 
figured very prominently in the aforementioned ‘Bárcenas papers’ (Carreño & 
Requena, 2013). The capture of institutional procedures has become normalised to the 
extent that these firms have come to regularly extract their surpluses from ‘political’ 
Type Patron Client Mechanism 
 
 
 
Contractual 
 
 
 
 
Local, regional, national 
government 
 
 
 
 
Contractor firms 
 
State absorption of 
additional costs in public 
contracts 
 
Rigging of design contests 
to award public contracts 
 
 
 
 
Urbanistic 
 
 
 
 
Local government 
 
 
 
Private 
developers 
 
 
Privileged information 
about re-zoning operations 
 
Tailored urban planning 
decisions 
 
 
 
Financial 
 
 
 
Cajas de ahorros  
(savings banks) 
 
 
Contractors, 
developers, 
local/regional 
governments 
 
 
 
Privileged access  
to credit 
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means that little have to do with ‘economic’ processes such as price competition or the 
quality of their services. These patterns of political accumulation can be grouped into 
three different forms of clientelist transactions: (1) contractual, (2) urbanistic, and (3) 
financial. 
 
(1) Contractual clientelism involves distortions in the legal procedures to allocate 
public contracts. The marks of contractual clientelism are most evident in the 
acceptance of additional costs in public contracts. It is not uncommon for adjudicating 
authorities to assume the unforeseen costs of their contractors, a practice that can 
inflate several times over the original value of a project at the expense of the taxpayer. 
The most notorious examples are found in large-scale infrastructure contracts, such as 
Valencia’s City of Arts and Sciences, built by a consortium between Acciona and 
Dragados (now ACS). Though the original budget was €382m, it ended up costing the 
Valencian regional government €1.28bn (Serra, 2015). Another example is the 
underground routing of the M-30 highway, a project jointly carried out by ACS and 
Ferrovial. Originally estimated to be worth €1.7bn, the Madrid city council ended up 
assuming a final cost of €5.6bn (Garijo, 2017).  
 
Another mechanism of contractual clientelism is the rigging of design contests. This 
refers to the ways in which supposedly competitive contests for the adjudication of 
public contracts are manipulated by insiders to favour specific companies. Often, this 
involves the manipulation of technical reports to arbitrarily inflate the score of a design 
project. An ongoing case investigates the role of the Aragonese regional government in 
the rigging of a design contest to adjudicate the development of an industrial park to 
Acciona. Email evidence suggests that the contest’s technical director had orders from 
his superiors to use discretionary criteria available to him to ‘readjust’ the score of 
Acciona’s offer (López-Fonseca & Montaño, 2014). The practice of rigging design 
contests often folds back on the payment of additional costs. The Aragonese 
government would later pay Acciona €150m for unforeseen costs, a sum that would 
have been, allegedly, used by the company to finance the kickbacks of the political 
officials involved in the rigging of the contest.  
 
(2) By contrast, urbanistic clientelism revolves around the manipulation of the market 
potential of the land. As addressed in chapter 4, the peculiarities of Spanish urbanism 
give a great degree of power to the landowning class in the process of urban 
development, placing upon them the responsibility of costing all planned residential 
areas. In exchange, they are rewarded with an upward revalorisation of their land-
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assets. Thus, when classifying land as fit for urban development, a local government 
estimates the worth of re-zoned land assets as if they had already been developed and 
fixes their value by law. As per the ‘build-anywhere’ law of 1997-8, the procedure to 
calculate the value of reclassified land assets is the so-called ‘residual method’. The 
costs of production are subtracted from an estimate of the market value of the final 
real-estate asset (benchmarked at average market prices). As property prices boomed 
in the 2000s, the price differentials reaped from this procedure were enormous. 
Fernández (2005) has estimated that re-zoning operations would prompt land asset 
prices to escalate, on average, between 2000-6500%. Average land prices for rural 
greenfield sites stood at €2-6/m2 in these years and an urban re-zoning taking average 
house prices into consideration could easily inflate the price of rural grounds to €120-
130/m2. This political mechanism of asset-price inflation – which, as I explained 
earlier, was instrumental in keeping land (and thus house) prices high during the years 
of the bubble – was rife with ‘insider trading’ in privileged information. Numerous 
corruption cases involve politicians rewarding friends and family (or even themselves) 
with a re-zoning of their land assets, or with a tip-off to developers of an impending 
reclassification so that they could purchase rural lands ahead of time (see ABC, 2006). 
This practice, however, long predates the bubble. Back in 1991, developer Francisco 
Hernando ‘El Pocero’ (the builder of the town of Seseña cited earlier), was sued by the 
civil servants of a small town in the outskirts of Madrid for pressuring them to 
reclassify a plot of rural land that he had purchased. Hernando, indignant at their 
refusal, made an admission of political accumulation if there ever was one: ‘It is 
shameful that in this country a businessman ought to make political investments, as 
everyone knows I have done in the past, to make his company work’ (quoted in SER, 
2006, emphasis added).  
 
In addition to these practices, clientelism in land-use planning also revolves around 
the capture of regulatory procedures to facilitate the approval of residential projects. 
This often comes attached to the aforementioned ‘urbanistic agreements’, through 
which local governments can legally tailor amendments to their local planning to 
specific developers; processes that are often accompanied by bribery. Another means 
to this end was the deliberate erosion of environmental controls. This occurred by 
purposefully underestimating or neglecting the environmental impact of residential 
projects. The high number of golf courses in provinces at risk of desertification makes 
this plainly evident (Ordóñez, 2016). In other cases, politicians went as far as violating 
special protection areas: in Caravaca de la Cruz (Murcia), the local council approved a 
residential development to house 8,000 people (as many as the town itself) in a wildlife 
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conservation zone (Serrano, 2014). The politicians involved in this operation are 
currently facing corruption charges for acting in connivance with the developers.  
 
(3) Greasing the wheels of these practices were often forms of financial clientelism, 
which relies on corporate malpractice in public savings banks. As explained in the 
previous chapter, during the bubble, the country’s 48 politically-controlled savings 
banks (cajas de ahorros), acted as reckless financiers of local and regional strategies 
of urban entrepreneurialism, resulting in ‘a delirious cycle of development proposals, 
municipal approvals, and easy credit lubricating this urban transformation’ 
(Marcinkoski, 2016:72). The re-zoning of greenfield sites for urban development would 
be sold to property developers who would then finance their building operations with 
loans from a caja run by the same councillors in charge of urban planning, or by their 
party friends. The same logic applies to grand infrastructural projects, where the cajas 
acted as the financial wings of their regional governments for various ruinous ventures. 
During the bubble, this conflict of interest was intrinsic to the process of urban 
speculation: ‘Poorly run and poorly supervised, the cajas provided the rocket fuel for 
Spain’s housing boom, dutifully funding one unviable project after another’ (Buck, 
2017).  
 
Valencia’s Caja de Ahorros del Mediterráneo (CAM), described as ‘the worst of the 
worst’ by the governor of the Bank of Spain in 2011, provides the starkest example 
(Biot, 2012). This caja would accompany its regional government in all sorts of 
extravagant projects (including the aforementioned City of Arts and Sciences). 
Corporate malpractice was rife. In 2010, with the crisis already in full force, they 
reported €244m in profits, only to admit €2.7 billion in losses one year later. A 
reflection of their unyielding loyalty, three days before the Bank of Spain stepped in 
and nationalised CAM, the institution loaned €200m to the Valencian regional 
government. This bond was rooted in criminal complicity: between 2004-2010, CAM 
loaned its own board members €161m in credits at very low interest (sometimes 0%), 
a practice that the regional government – the legal regulator of the savings bank – 
failed to flag up.  
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7.3. Third Vertex: The Kleptocratic Political Class 
 
Though the political class inherited the clientelist nexus between the state and the 
construction industry from the Francoist regime, this dynamic mutated with the 
transition to an elective form of intra-elite competition. The result has been a pattern 
of political accumulation distinctive to liberal democracy, where the political class is 
immerse in a permanent electoral competition to gain or renew their access to the 
different scales of state power. This has been grossly neglected in the existing 
literature. Corruption around urban development was not a mere expression of the 
pressures of urban entrepreneurialism, but also of the dynamics of political 
competition to raise campaign finance from construction bribes.  
 
7.3.1. The Electoral War Chest: The Basics of Election Spending Fraud 
 
Over the last decade, the majority of political corruption cases have involved illicit 
payments not just to the public officials providing the political favours, but also to their 
political parties, revealing a strong connection between clientelist transactions and 
election spending fraud. In theory, Spanish political parties finance themselves 
through a system of public subsidies allocated to parties in proportion to the amount 
of votes and to the degree of representation they achieve (Jiménez & Villoria, 2012:12-
14). This system was established in 1977 with the aim of supporting the country’s 
nascent liberal democracy. However, it left a number of glaring loopholes when it came 
to private donations that legislators have been reluctant to close ever since. Indeed, the 
often blurred line between private contributions and outright bribery has allowed 
donations to become a major source of distortion in Spanish politics. Private donations 
were unregulated altogether until the mid-1980s. Jorge Verstrynge, general secretary 
of PP during this period, has described this regulatory vacuum in this period as ‘the 
wild west’: an institutional frontier in which business potentates were able to make 
regular cash ‘donations’ without any public control.  
 
The first regulations were introduced in 1985 and 1987 in response to the first party 
finance scandal. Around that time, the ruling party (PSOE) was hit by the international 
ramifications of the ‘Flick affair’, a West German political scandal involving donations 
made by the Flick conglomerate to the foundations of several German political parties. 
Part of these monies, allegedly, ended up in the hands of PSOE (García, 1985). 
Following the affair, private contributions were capped at a certain amount per donor 
per year, and state contractors were banned from making these contributions due to 
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conflict of interest (Jiménez & Villoria, 2012:12). However, the practice of anonymous 
donations persisted, an opacity that allowed parties to split large donations into several 
unidentified contributions as well as to launder other illicit sources of finance. By the 
time anonymous donations were banned in 2007, they made up 95% of all private 
contributions to political parties.  
 
The finances of political parties fall under the purview of the Court of Audit (Tribunal 
de Cuentas), an institution equipped with scarcely dissuasive sanctions and self-
defeating legal technicalities (Bayona, 2017). Perhaps the most self-defeating is that a 
political party is not legally regarded as a single financial unit comprising all its 
different territorial organisations. This means that the accounts that parties submit to 
the Court do not automatically include party foundations, associated companies, or 
local party branches; a legal multiplicity that allows political parties to open back doors 
to their illicit sources of finance.  
 
Another problem is the fact that different rules apply to party foundations with regard 
to private donations. Not only is there a higher cap on contributions, but foundations 
are also exempt from the rule that bans public contractors from donating to political 
parties as well as from the ‘cooling-off’ period, designed to avoid the arrival of delayed 
payments derived from clientelist transactions (Jiménez & Villoria, 2012:15-16). An 
example is the recent Palau affair afflicting the Catalan nationalist party Convergència 
i Unió (CiU), in which companies awarded with public contracts by the Catalan 
government made large contributions to the party’s foundation undisclosed to the 
Court of Audit. In the 1980s, it was common for donors to commission generic reports 
to a shell company that would then funnel the payment into the party’s coffers. This 
fraudulent practice was at the epicentre of the two main political finance scandals of 
the 90s: the Naseiro affair (1992), and the Filesa affair (1991-1997), which struck, 
respectively, the conservative PP and the social-democratic PSOE (Mercado, 2013; 
Heywood, 2007).  
 
Given how rife local government is with clientelist transactions, the finances of local 
party branches are the most usual suspects of illicit activities, but these practices are 
also encouraged by the party superstructure. For instance, in 1999, PP passed its local 
branches in the Madrid region a power point presentation detailing how to camouflage 
electoral expenses (Urreiztieta, 2016). The instructions were to funnel the monies of 
private donations to ordinary accounts outside the purview of the Court of Audit, and 
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to subsequently use the funds to cost electoral expenses whilst forging their invoice 
description.  
 
Indeed, in the years of the bubble, when the bulk of this illicit political finance was 
concentrated in the construction sector, many local candidates ran electoral campaigns 
boosted by the bribes of developers, something that reinforced conflicts of interest in 
urban planning and created patterns of competition between parties over criminal 
sources of finance. Hence why the local urban planning office (concejalía de 
urbanismo) became a highly strategic institution in Spanish politics. This issue was 
openly addressed in a recent televised interview involving several formerly high-
ranking political figures (see Évole, 2016). Discussing the problem of widespread 
political corruption in urban development, Josep Piqué, a man who occupied several 
cabinet positions at the turn of the millennium and is now vice-president of OHL, made 
the following observation: “In local councils, where there is a strong tradition of 
forming coalition governments, the junior partner tends to always demand—”. “The 
urban planning office”, Esperanza Aguirre, president of the Madrid region between 
2003-2012, finishes the sentence. Piqué smiles sardonically and concludes, “What a 
coincidence”. Josep Borrell, Minister of Public Works in the early 90s, adds shortly 
after: “…it seems evident that the more a party holds power at the local level, the more 
these [corrupt] phenomena proliferate, sometimes not as isolated cases, but as 
organised party structures involving many people at once”.   
 
The exact extent to which these practices were extended during the years of the bubble 
is a question that is bound to remain unanswered, not least because the bottomless pit 
of scandals keeps getting deeper by the day. But one indicator should capture our 
imagination: the vast amount of €500 notes in circulation in these years. This 
denomination, with little practical everyday use for most people, is standard in tax 
dodging, money laundering, and bribing operations. Spain gathered 26% of the 
Eurozone’s total at the peak of the bubble, when the notes’ value came to constitute 
80% of all the cash money in circulation (Lázaro, 2016).  
 
7.3.2. Kleptocracy: Illicit Party Finance as Form of Political Accumulation 
 
The shortcomings of the party finance system outlined above facilitated the embedding 
of special interests into the structures of political parties wielding state power, 
particularly in those areas where parties hold safe majorities. This encouraged the 
formation of criminal networks to provide a bridge between a party and its illicit 
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donors. These networks, generally run by a mixture of high-ranking party members 
and businesspeople, acted systematically as intermediators of clientelist transactions, 
collecting tolls on the channels of influence that they facilitated – usually 3% of the 
profits of the rewarded company. Part of this graft, in turn, was then funnelled into the 
coffers of political parties to boost their electoral expenses. This created a perverse 
structure of incentives, according to which entire party structures derived illicit 
electoral finance from inflating the profits of the construction industry. In turn, 
parties derived a competitive edge over their counterparts from this criminal political 
economy, as it enabled higher campaign spending. The result was a logic of political 
accumulation that, though inherited from long-held clientelist ties to the construction 
industry, adopted a form distinct to liberal democracy.  
 
The foremost example of a political organisation corroded by this phenomenon is none 
other than the conservative Partido Popular (PP). Some of the earliest evidence of 
these practices surfaced during the Naseiro affair, named after the party’s chief 
treasurer at the time. The scandal was unearthed in 1992 through intercepted phone 
conversations between the party’s head treasurers and local Valencian politicians 
(Gallero, 2016:137-148; Ugarte, 2015). The conversations openly discussed the bribes 
that the party received in exchange for the modification of urban plans and the 
allocation of street cleaning contracts, as well as the existence of internal power 
struggles to control the illicit finances of the party. The interlocutors involved in the 
conversations suggest that, already then, high-ranking members of the party’s national 
superstructure acted in collusion with corrupt politicians at the local and regional 
levels. The political favours transacted bear the unmistakeable marks of the 
construction industry, allowing us to tentatively date the entry of construction firms 
into the party’s criminal finances to the late 1980s. In a highly controversial decision, 
the court ruled out the intercepted evidence and rejected the case.  
 
Everything points to the continuity, extension, and systematisation of these practices 
until their resurfacing in the scandals of the 2010s. Police reports openly speak of an 
uninterrupted continuum between the practices of the Naseiro scandal and the more 
recent Bárcenas affair, which, as addressed in the opening of the chapter, has revealed 
the existence of an entire parallel bookkeeping system dedicated to the management 
of a slush fund from the very apex of the party’s hierarchy (Gallero, 2016:145). The 
infamous Bárcenas papers detail how bribes came in regularly from representatives 
of mid- and large-sized construction firms, as well as how the party put these illicit 
cash pools to use: under-the-counter bonuses to the leadership and systematic election 
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spending fraud (Romero, 2013).82 Luis Bárcenas, chief treasurer of the party between 
1992-2013, has claimed that the party’s slush fund was set up by his predecessors in 
the 1980s, and that he merely inherited its command. Though one can only take his 
word for this affirmation, it remains a remarkable coincidence that the first entry in 
Bárcenas’ records is the exact same date of Naseiro’s arrest.  
 
Twenty years after the Naseiro affair, the number of illegal networks mediating 
between PP and its illicit donors seems to have grown considerably. Over the course of 
the last decade, successive police operations have uncovered the existence of multiple 
intermediary criminal networks in regions where the party held comfortable 
majorities. The most famous is the ‘Gürtel network’, a criminal organisation formed 
by businessmen and high-ranking party members who operated a number of shell 
companies in Valencia, Madrid, and Galicia. The network cultivated relationships with 
party members in government positions and used their front companies to disguise the 
party’s election campaign activities with false invoices (El Mundo, 2010b). In 
exchange, the network demanded political favours, either for their own companies or 
for the companies that had contracted their brokering services, from which they would 
exact part of their profits. The process was similar in the ‘Púnica network’, another 
criminal organisation operating in Madrid, Murcia, and the Balearic Islands, headed 
by a high-ranking member of the Madrid regional government (El Confidencial, 2015). 
In this case, it was the favoured companies themselves that provided shell companies 
to disguise the party’s electoral expenses (Parera et al., 2017). In any case, the principle 
seems to have always been the same: election spending fraud and clientelist 
transactions were two sides of the same coin (Fig.22).  
 
It appears that some of these criminal intermediaries operated like bribe-collecting 
cartels. In Madrid, it has been reported that at least three coordinated networks 
coexisted in syndicate. They designated their territories, alternated tasks, and even 
covered services for one another (Castillo, 2013:135-140). In Valencia, on the contrary, 
it appears that there were two competing networks, each one headed by a different 
high-ranking member of the regional party. These rivalled with one another and 
engaged in a ‘turf war’ using the party’s factional struggles as proxy (Nieto, 2015).  
 
                                                        
82 Investigative journalist Marisa Gallero (2016:109) documents the existence of under-the-counter 
bonuses as early as 1986 but claims that the practice only became systematic in 1994. 
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 FIG.22. RECONSTRUCTION OF THE ILLICIT FINANCE SYSTEM OF THE PP 
 
 
There is worrying evidence that these practices were systematically carried out 
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the party’s financial apparatus. During his testimony in 2014, Luis Bárcenas claimed 
that ‘PP ran a slush fund in every region and every province for electoral expenses […] 
everybody wanted to make donations during elections’ (quoted in Martialay, 2014). So 
far, subsequent police investigations have corroborated the existence of regional slush 
funds in Madrid and La Rioja, as well as in the Basque province of Vizcaya (Campos, 
2017).  
 
In the midst of the ‘Taula affair’, an ongoing scandal relating to the illicit finances of 
the Valencian branch of the party (PPCV), the leader of an intermediary network 
admitted in court to having facilitated hundreds of clientelist transactions (EFE, 2016). 
During his testimony, he claimed to have exacted 2-3% on the profits of the companies 
rewarded in every transaction, part of which went straight into the party’s coffers, 
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where they were stored in five different slush funds in the Valencian region alone. 
Allegedly, there would have been three slush funds dedicated to finance from the three 
provincial corporations of the region, presumably to then be distributed amongst local 
branches in their respective territories (Zafra, 2016). One slush fund would have been 
entirely dedicated to the city of Valencia, the region’s capital. One final slush fund 
would have stood above these at the regional level, feeding off from the other four. 
Twelve businessmen have already corroborated payments of this sort to the PPCV 
(eldiariocv, 2017). Witnesses to the Taula affair have also claimed that the Valencian 
regional slush fund fed into the one managed by Bárcenas at the national level. This 
suggests the existence of a pyramid structure of criminal finance embedded into the 
party’s official finances.  
 
In a recent televised interview, PP’s former treasurer in the Galicia region, a man also 
convicted for being the second-in-command in the Gürtel network, claimed that 65% 
of party funds came from illicit sources, and described these practices as ‘normalised 
in all parties since the 1980s’ (El Confidencial, 2013). To what extent this is true 
remains unclear. However, evidence of similar practices in other parties is not lacking. 
Ongoing investigations into the mysterious offshore fortune of Jordi Pujol, former 
long-term president of Catalonia (1978-2003), suggest the existence of similar 
criminal structures in his party Convergència i Unió. There is increasingly evidence 
that companies would have systematically paid 3% of their profits to the party in 
exchange for the allocation of public contracts. In this case, it seems that part of this 
graft would have also gone directly to relatives of Pujol, adding a ‘famiglia’ dimension 
to the picture (CatalunyaPlural.cat, 2017).83 There is also plenty of evidence that the 
social-democratic Partido Socialista (PSOE), was engaging in identical practices until 
the 1990s. For example, the following headline story opened the newspaper El País in 
April 1991 (Missé, 1991):  
 
On Wednesday, the Minister for Public Works, Josep Borrell, convened the 
CEOs of the largest construction companies in his office to urge them, "on 
behalf of the President and myself", to stop making illicit payments to political 
parties in exchange for construction contracts. […] Borrell was adamant and 
insisted that if any of the companies gathered there received illicit proposals "in 
                                                        
83 Before a parliamentary inquiry into this issue, Pujol snapped the following (rather cryptic) response, 
which seemed to suggest that other parties were involved in similar practices: ‘if you continue lopping the 
branch of a tree, so to speak, the entire branch will fall apart eventually, and it will drop all the bird nests 
it carries. One after another, all branches shall fall! And in the end it will have been the fault of everyone 
who has practiced this form of politics!’ (La Vanguardia, 2014). 
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the name of PSOE" [his party] they should communicate this to him directly. 
[…] Sources from the construction sector admit that the payment of bribes, 
between 2% and 4% of the value of the project, is a common practice in the 
allocation of public contracts. This corruption extended to every level of the 
state administration: national, regional, and municipal. […] In the sector, 
frequent comments are made about the differential costs of graft across local 
and regional governments. 84 
 
However, despite having been involved in all too familiar clientelist transactions at the 
local and regional level during the years of the bubble, evidence of a system of criminal 
finance as comprehensive as that of PP has yet to emerge. In the meantime, the official 
accounts that parties report to the Court of Audit suggest that between 80-95% of their 
finances come from public subsidies (Jiménez & Villoria, 2012). 
 
Conclusion 
 
After a decade of almost uninterrupted scandals, a long-awaited sentence arrived in 
May 2018:  
 
Spain’s ruling party has suffered a major blow after one of its former treasurers 
[Bárcenas] was jailed for 33 years for fraud and money laundering, and the 
party itself was found to have profited from an illegal kickbacks-for-contracts 
scheme, in a case that has become emblematic of political corruption in the 
country (Jones, 2018). 
 
In their ruling, the judges hearing the case confirmed the existence of an illicit 
bookkeeping system at the heart of PP, describing it as ‘an accounting and finance 
structure that ran in parallel with the official one and which has been in use since at 
least 1989’ (quoted in ibid.). The sentence was clear: this was ‘an effective system of 
institutional corruption by manipulating the awarding of central, regional and local 
government contracts’. Contra to what a certain section of the Spanish literature has 
suggested, this ‘system of institutionalised corruption’ was not a mere extra-legal 
ramification of the pressures of urban entrepreneurialism. Rather, it was a specific 
form of class rule, one inherited from a previous historical epoch (i.e. the Francoist 
                                                        
84 The sector’s potentates clearly did not take heed of Borrell’s words. In 1994, El País broke an identical 
story: 'Yesterday, Josep Borrell asked a group of construction businessmen, for the second time in three 
years, to stop bribing political parties for the allocation of contracts' (El País, 1994).  
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period) but adapted to more recent structures of political accumulation (i.e. federal 
liberal democracy), where patterns of elite competition occurred through electoral 
contests for access to decentralised nodes of state power.  
 
Through this prism, the patterns of political corruption that dominated the Spanish 
property bubble appear not as a mere political add-on to an otherwise purely economic 
logic, but, rather, as the basic substance of a three-way system of clientelist dynamics 
underpinning the governance over the built environment: an ‘iron triangle of real 
estate’. The first vertex of this triangle is the state, and particularly the local state, 
which in Spain holds most decision-making power over the built environment. The 
great degree of discretionary power held by local executives, coupled with the 
pressures of urban entrepreneurialism, has encouraged mayors to strike opaque deals 
with the construction industry over urban development projects. The construction 
industry forms the second vertex, and in particular a small layer of medium- and large-
sized conglomerates who have a long history of clientelist connections with the political 
class – a relationship that harks back to the reconstruction tasks after the Spanish Civil 
War. In return for bringing investment into their areas, these firms received crucial 
political favours from local and regional governments: distortions in the legal 
procedures to allocate public contracts (contractual clientelism); the manipulation of 
the market potential of the land (urbanistic clientelism); or privileged access to finance 
through the cajas de ahorro (financial clientelism). But these transactions were often 
organised outside of the local and regional scales of the state. Indeed, as the sentence 
quoted above stipulates, they were orchestrated by political parties which exacted a 
small portion of the profits that their officials ensured to the construction industry, 
funnelling these monies into their electoral war chests. In turn, the ability to boost their 
electoral expenditures through graft encouraged political officials to set in motion 
grand projects of urban and infrastructural development. Altogether, these political 
dynamics served to magnify the effects of the property bubble to unprecedented 
heights.  
 
This chapter has addressed the central research question of the thesis (why did the 
Spanish path into the crisis manifest as two seemingly contradictory processes – as 
a house-price bubble and as a wave of residential overproduction?) by reinforcing a 
central argument of my historicist narrative: i.e. that the peculiarities of the Spanish 
pathway into the crash need to be understood as a product of the patterns of political 
accumulation of the post-Franco period. In many ways, this chapter expands on the 
argument of the previous, which has demonstrated how the financing of urban 
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entrepreneurialism by the cajas de ahorro was an expression of the patterns of 
political accumulation specific to a historical period. Indeed, this chapter should be 
seen as an exposition of how these patterns of political accumulation imbricated the 
dynamics of Spanish urban entrepreneurialism beyond the reach of the cajas.  
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Conclusion 
 
‘[S]everal thousand people gathered in Puerta del Sol on Wednesday as mass 
demonstrations against unemployment and the government’s social policies swelled 
across the country for the fourth day’ (El País, 2011). The anti-austerity protests in the 
emblematic central square of Madrid inaugurated what the international press came 
to know as the ‘indignado’ (indignant) movement. Emulating the ongoing Arab Spring, 
demonstrators began to hold public assemblies several times a day to take democracy 
into their own hands. The exercise was spontaneously mimicked in cities across the 
country. Resisting one eviction after another, the crowds refused to leave for weeks. 
The movement was led by a youth in revolt: ‘the young took to the streets and suddenly 
every political party grew old’ (El País, 2015). This was the first generation born and 
raised under a liberal democracy, one that had come of age only to realise that they 
would do worse than their parents. The memorable yellow t-shirts of the group 
Juventud Sin Futuro (Youth Without a Future) captured the feeling with a proudly 
defiant short sentence: ‘no home, no job, no pension, no fear’ (eldiario.es, 2017). 
 
Beneath the surface of general indignation, the mottos of the Sol protests expressed a 
host of different grievances (Robledo, 2013). Due to the ongoing local elections, the 
most prominent was the disaffection towards an undemocratic political elite (‘They 
don’t represent us’). But equally important were the chants against generalised 
precarity (‘We lack a house so we stay in the square’) and scandalous levels of 
corruption (‘It’s not a crisis, it’s a swindle’). These mottos reflected the emergence of a 
new political consciousness at the everyday level, one in which representative politics, 
corruption, and precarity were experienced as different facets of a single system. By 
now, the ‘system’ in question already has a name: ‘the regime of 1978’, a term that 
collectively designates the politics of the post-Franco constitutional settlement 
(Grijelmo, 2017; Navarro, 2017; Costantini, 2017).  
 
In many ways, this thesis was also motivated by this experience, and its central 
contribution speaks directly to it. It has provided a novel interpretation of the Spanish 
crisis centred around the historicity of the political dynamics that caused it, be they in 
the form of crystallised past political conflicts (layered struggle), collective struggles 
over the shape of institutions (social conflict), or daily renegotiations of social 
structures (the everyday). This final concluding chapter will bring the thesis to a close 
in three sections. The first (8.1) will provide a summary of the thesis, highlighting the 
connections between its constituting parts. The second (8.2) will restate the 
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contributions of the thesis to the literature. The third (8.3) will examine post-crisis 
political developments through the prism of the thesis and will sketch out some 
potential questions for further research in light of these developments.  
 
8.1. Summary of the Thesis 
 
The thesis has opened with an exploration of existing interpretations of the Spanish 
crash (chapter 1), identifying three broad accounts and teasing out the role of the 
political – the power struggle to give shape to social structures – in their narratives. (1) 
The immaturity narrative: neoliberal accounts tend to represent the Spanish crash as 
a product of domestic political dysfunctionalities (e.g. corruption in the savings banks 
system) (Cuñat & Garicano, 2009; Garicano, 2012; Royo, 2014; JP Morgan, 2013). In 
turn, this narrative has spawned two critical responses that have deflected accusations 
of political dysfunctionality to macro-structural causes. (2) The core-periphery 
narrative: on the one hand, a collection of Marxist, post-Keynesian, and 
institutionalist studies has displaced the causes of the crisis ‘upward’, to the external 
economic imbalances of the Eurozone. According to this narrative, the Spanish crisis 
should be read in terms of the country’s ‘peripheral’ position in the currency union. 
Forced into sustained deficits by the common monetary policy, peripheral countries 
like Spain have had to borrow to finance their growth, inflating bubbles in the process 
(Lucarelli, 2011; Becker and Jäger, 2012; Lapavitsas et al., 2012; Stockhammer, 2016). 
(3) The spatial fix narrative: on the other hand, a group of studies inspired by the work 
of Marxist geographer David Harvey have instead displaced the causes of the crisis 
‘inward’, to the internal logic of capital accumulation. According to this narrative, the 
boom and bust of Spanish capitalism is a product of a generic law of capitalism: 
whenever overaccumulation mounts in the manufacturing economy, capital seeks a 
‘fix’ in the built environment to restore profitability, resulting in the inflation of 
housing bubbles like the Spanish (López & Rodríguez, 2010; Delgado, 2011; Coq-
Huelva, 2013; Charnock et al., 2014).  
 
As we have seen, the political is forced into an awkward position in all three narratives. 
(1) In the case of the immaturity narrative, the main problem is a flawed 
representation of ‘the political’ as something external and inherently distortive to an 
otherwise balanced market economy. This misses how, for good and for worse, power 
struggles (historical, social, and at the level of the everyday) are inherent to the 
dynamics of the market itself. Indeed, political factors (corruption included) were as 
much responsible for the crash as they were for the boom that preceded it. (2) In the 
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case of the core-periphery narrative, the problem is, rather, a tendency to derive 
conclusions about the Spanish economy from the European plane, without a 
substantial treatment of the specificities of the Spanish economy. Hollowing out the 
Spanish experience from any history and political agency of its own, it blurs important 
features of the picture, such as the fact that the Spanish bubble began before the 
establishment of the Eurozone, or the unique wave of residential overproduction that 
accompanied the Spanish boom. (3) In the case of the spatial fix narrative, the 
problem is that it starts out from the assumption that capitalism can be thought of as 
a closed system with laws of its own. This inevitably explains away the role of historical 
power struggles, as specific economic phenomena can simply be deduced from generic 
structural laws of causation. This creates a tunnel vision through which historical 
evidence tends to be chosen on an ad-hoc basis, while uncomfortable factors are simply 
ignored (e.g. the role of housing shortages in the shaping of the housing market).  
 
In turning to macro-structural explanations, both of these critical narratives extricate 
themselves from the political, which ends up surrendered to the caricatured 
representations of the immaturity narrative. In response to this, in this thesis I have 
set myself the task of reclaiming the political away from immaturity accounts, 
concentrating on the pitfalls of critical narratives in order to make room for an 
alternative account of Marxist inspiration.  
 
To do so, I have first delved into questions of method (chapter 2). This chapter started 
out by digging up the philosophical root of the problem (‘structuralism’ or structural 
determinism) and by examining its relationship to the Marxist tradition. Having 
identified the problem, the chapter has sought an alternative foundation in the 
methodological pronouncements of Michel Foucault (1991) and E.P. Thompson 
(2013), whose work speaks to the need to ground explanations of social phenomena in 
historically-situated social practices rather than in abstract laws (historicism). 
Building upon the insights of these authors, the chapter has sought a more detailed 
procedural guidance in the tradition of political Marxism, an approach that provides 
the backbone to my historicist method.  
 
Political Marxism is a strand of Marxist thought emerging out of the historical-
sociological debates on the origin of capitalism (Brenner, 1976, 1977, 1985; Wood, 
1981, 2002, 2016; Teschke, 2003; Blackledge, 2008; Post, 2011; Knafo & Teschke, 
2017). It defines itself against ‘structural’ Marxism, which it accuses of an ahistorical 
bent that refuses human actors any creative agency of their own. Instead, ‘political’ 
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Marxism insists that social structures – the formal and informal rules that regulate 
social relations – should not be treated as if they had a life of their own, but rather as 
they actually confront people who must act in relation to them, often by struggling to 
reshape them. In short, this perspective sees history as the sedimentation of political 
agencies, as opposed to the unfolding of a providential logic. To complement the 
methods of political Marxism, the chapter concluded by borrowing the concepts of 
non-Marxist traditions to better capture this sedimentation: historical institutionalism 
to track the evolution of material practices (Steinmo & Thelen, 1998; Pierson et al., 
2002; Streeck & Thelen, 2005), and performativity to grasp the evolution of 
immaterial discourses (Butler, 2010; Konings, 2015; Cooper and Konings, 2016).  
 
Putting these methodological insights into practice, chapter 3 proceeded to outline a 
new narrative of the Spanish crash, one firmly grounded in the historical specificity of 
this experience rather than in macro-structural laws of causation. This narrative was 
based on an analysis of what political Marxism calls ‘social-property relations’ – the 
institutions mediating relations of property and domination in a given historical 
context (Brenner, 1976; Wood, 1981). From this emerged a vision of the Spanish path 
into the crisis as a culmination of two historical processes, both driven by political 
struggle: (1) the maturation of an ‘apparatus’ of residential provision to address a near-
perennial housing deficit, and (2) the evolution of patterns of ‘political accumulation’ 
forming a clientelist nexus between public officials and the propertied classes. 
 
(1) The residential ‘apparatus’ designates the ensemble of material practices and 
immaterial discourses that have been mobilised over time to address the historical 
problem of housing shortages. This problem was inaugurated with the advent of liberal 
social-property relations, which crystallised the right of the propertied classes to profit 
from the spatial needs of the majority. In the countryside, this manifested as shrinking 
access to farmland, whereas in the cities it manifested as an acute housing deficit. In 
response to changing political circumstances (e.g. outbursts of social unrest, declining 
electoral capacity), a number of institutional ‘fixes’ were laid down over time to address 
the tensions caused by liberal social-property relations, though generally in line with 
the interests of the propertied oligarchies that controlled the state. Over time, the 
layering of these political struggles crystallised in a number of institutions that 
worked around the problems of liberal social-property relations, slowly maturing into 
an apparatus of residential provision that has given shape to the contemporary 
dynamics of the Spanish housing market. The marks of this historical process are 
patent in the peculiarities of Spanish land-use planning mechanisms: the dearth of 
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social housing and the dominance of home-ownership; the widespread access to 
mortgage finance; and the power that the real-estate industry commands in Spanish 
politics. Altogether, by the turn of the millennium, this process had culminated in a 
financialised capitalist residential apparatus distinctly geared towards housing 
speculation and residential overproduction.  
 
(2) ‘Political accumulation’ denotes patterns of elite competition by non-commercial 
means. The dynamics of political accumulation mediating the bond between public 
officials and the propertied classes has had a strong impact on the governance of liberal 
social-property relations. In the nineteenth century, this bond served to regulate 
mechanics of electoral fraud and to solidify the structural power of a landed oligarchy. 
Political parties would agree upon the victors in advance and local potentates, 
generally landowners, would mobilise their influence to rig the vote on the ground. In 
the middle decades of the twentieth century, this clientelist nexus was reorganised 
around the authoritarian bureaucracy of the Francoist regime and a new class of 
property developers, a dynamic that involved trading political favours (e.g. tailored 
land designations, licenses, etc.) for bribes and accelerated property development. 
From the late 1970s, a new liberal democracy inherited these clientelist patterns, 
putting them to use in a context of electoral competition over the nodes of a federal 
state. Political parties began to exchange political favour with developers in exchange 
for bribes, usually in the form of a small percentage of their profits (‘kickbacks’). These 
monies mostly went to their electoral war chests, allowing them to outflank rival 
parties with illicit campaign finance. The mobilisation of these power flows was crucial 
during the bubble, as it enabled developers to tap into tailored decisions over the built 
environment that ensured them commercial success, while allowing their political 
patrons to reproduce their power over the state. Had it not been for this complicity, it 
is unlikely that the Spanish bubble would have been accompanied by a wave of 
residential (and infrastructural) overproduction – the most distinct and destructive 
aspect of the Spanish crisis. As in the nineteenth century, the clientelist nexus between 
parties and developers should be seen as a distinct form of social struggle. It served to 
buttress a neoliberal consensus on the political agenda as it excluded the populace 
from crucial decisions over the allocation of public resources.   
 
Having sketched out the contours of this alternative narrative, the remaining chapters 
of the thesis fleshed out several of its facets with detailed historical studies of different 
aspects of the Spanish housing market. The first two chapters are the ones most 
concerned with the historical specificity of the Spanish apparatus of residential 
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provision. Their purpose was to provide an account of Spanish residential capitalism  
grounded in the historicity of its own political dynamics, showing that the Spanish 
experience is irreducible to macro-structural mechanics. 
 
Chapter 4 explored the roots of residential overproduction during the bubble with a 
genealogy of the layered struggles giving shape to Spanish urban planning practices. 
The story began in the nineteenth century, when in response to the demographic 
pressures of a nascent urban society, Spain developed planning practices without 
parallel in Europe. Perhaps the most important of these was a system of land 
designations that valued urban land according to its potential value (i.e. as if it had 
already been developed). This encouraged a considerable degree of hoarding, as 
speculators would purchase greenfield sites and taunt the state to expropriate them so 
that they could reap exorbitant profits from compensations. This system had lasting 
path-dependent effects, particularly given the reluctance of the propertied oligarchies 
to change it, prompting instead a number of different ‘fixes’ to work around the 
problem of residential supply that it occasioned. After some failed experiments with 
mass public housing, in the middle of the twentieth century the Francoist state opted 
for heavy subsidies to build-to-sell operations in an attempt to countervail the 
hoarding tendencies of urban landowners. These measures, largely driven by the needs 
of an expanding manufacturing base, spawned a capitalist industry of property 
development which had not existed before, as well as a massive shift in tenure to 
homeownership. The resulting dynamic housing market plunged into a crisis in the 
1970s, when the policy of construction subsidies was abandoned because of its 
inflationary effects. The result was a return of land hoarding in urban areas, resuming 
the housing deficit that had been the norm until a couple of decades earlier. 
 
However, in the context of the new dynamism of the property market, combined with 
new techniques of mortgage securitisation and the influx of European investment, the 
return of housing shortages translated into financial bubbles in the second half of the 
1980s. The resulting high cost of housing became a political issue in the 1990s, when 
the different scales of the state began to experiment with land-use planning legislation 
in order to incentivise property development, under the assumption that a greater 
housing supply would bring down prices. The ‘build-anywhere law’ of 1997-8 was the 
culmination of these experiments. The law introduced the innovative figure of the 
‘urbaniser’, an empowered property developer capable of planning and expropriating 
landowners directly, and a new system of land valuations that pegged the potential 
value of land plots to house prices on the market. Rather than bringing prices down, 
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the law prompted just the opposite: an upward spiral in housing and land prices, 
accompanied by an unprecedented (and unparalleled) wave of residential 
overproduction in anticipation of further increases – the housing bubble of the 2000s.  
 
Chapter 5 traced this story from the angle of the everyday, exploring how the bubble 
was enabled by a culture of housing conducive to mass speculation. Throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century, homeownership was nurtured by the state in an 
attempt to incentivise property development, as building-to-sell operations ensured 
faster returns to developers. Between 1950 and 1980, public discourses exalted the 
value of property as a long-term investment for the benefit of future generations, 
something that easily appealed to the peasant values of a quickly urbanising rural 
population. In the process, homeownership became deeply engrained as a ‘normal’ 
cultural expectation, whereas alternative forms of tenure (e.g. rent, social housing) 
became a sign of marginalisation. This was accompanied by the signification of 
reckless urbanisation as a necessary feature of socioeconomic progress. This 
association was first drawn during the ‘economic miracle’ of the 1960s, but it 
resurfaced with force in the construction boom of the 2000s, facilitating the 
acquiescence of the public to the dynamics of the bubble. 
 
The widespread commodification of housing and the acquiescence to reckless 
urbanisation acted as contextual preconditions for the bubble. However, the most 
determinant cultural factor in the emergence of a ‘common sense’ of mass speculation 
arrived around the turn of the millennium. At the time, real-estate fairs, financial 
providers, and economic pundits began to disseminate the idea that booming house 
prices were here to stay, encouraging households to take large mortgage loans to 
purchase homes in anticipation of their revaluation. This allowed a whole layer of 
homeowners to become ‘semi-proletarianised’, as borrowing against a rising home 
equity became a means to complement one’s income. The spread of these dynamics 
widened the electoral constituency of the bubble, giving people a stake in the 
financialised residential apparatus. This resulted in a sea change in public discourse 
around 2004, when the political class ceased to promise affordable homes and instead 
began to ride the wave of house-price increases as a means of demand-management.  
 
The subsequent two chapters of the thesis turn to different aspects of the residential 
apparatus, examining them from the perspective of political accumulation. This served 
to continue to flesh out the historicity of the Spanish housing market, but also to 
showcase that the political is immanent to ‘the economic’, disturbing the claim that the 
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Spanish economy should be seen as a self-reproducing circuit with laws of its own, or 
as a self-equilibrating entity that was disturbed by political factors external to it. 
 
Chapter 6 delved into the history of Spanish finance, addressing the neoliberal 
argument that the crash was prompted by external political distortion of the savings 
banks system (cajas de ahorro). This premise has been challenged by showing how 
politics, and in particular social conflict, has been a feature immanent to the history of 
Spanish finance, both for good and for worse. To do so, the chapter has traced the 
evolution of modern financial institutions, and their real-estate lending practices, 
through the prism of the patterns of political accumulation since the nineteenth 
century. Then, the savings banks and a semi-public bank were created to ensure the 
dissemination of mortgage credit, a system heavily skewed toward the interests of 
urban and rural landowners who had privileged access to finance. The Francoist 
dictatorship erected a heavily statist financial system to challenge these oligarchies. 
However, in reality it merely redirected the power of financial elites through the 
structures of its opaque bureaucracy, where state and finance developed a symbiotic 
relationship. 
 
With the banking crisis of the late 1970s and the advent of a liberal democracy, the new 
state opted for empowering the old savings banks to put them at the service of the 
federal scales of the state. The cajas, traditionally confined to mortgage lending 
operations, were then equipped with the same operational capacities as the 
commercial banks. At the same time, the boards of the cajas were filled with 
handpicked representatives of political parties and unions in an effort to strengthen 
the new-born regional democracies. Over time, the cajas developed a strong (and often 
corrupt) relationship with their local and regional governments, financing their 
strategies of inter-urban competition. In other words, they became subsumed under 
the dynamics of political accumulation distinct to the new federal democratic state. 
The cajas deepened their specialisation in real-estate lending, outcompeting the banks 
and pushing them onto international markets. Their dominance of these business 
segments during the bubble (particularly mortgage lending) was their eventual 
downfall.  
 
Chapter 7 has zoomed into the years of the bubble, dissecting the three-way clientelist 
relationship between the local state, the real-estate industry, and political parties. In 
doing so, it has challenged the assumption that the bubble should be seen as the 
product of a purely ‘economic’ logic, for the patterns of social struggle within the 
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political class under a federal liberal democracy (i.e. political accumulation) were 
equally responsible for the inflation of the bubble. After the fall of the Francoist 
dictatorship, broad competences over the built environment were devolved to a 
multiplicity of local and regional democracies. As these scales of the state entered into 
a dynamic of competition with one another for private investment (i.e. urban 
entrepreneurialism), they began to strike opaque deals with developers. By then, the 
real estate industry had already enjoyed a long relationship with the state – a 
relationship nurtured by the Francoist regime. These clientelist patterns were 
inherited by the liberal democracy that succeeded the dictatorship; however, they were 
relaunched in a different form. In a context of electoral competition, political parties 
began to weave their own clientelist networks in order to raise illicit electoral finance 
so that they could compete with one another. In return for their favours, construction 
firms would reward their political patrons with a small percentage of their profits 
(usually a kickback of 3%). This way, political corruption became a driving force of the 
bubble, as the competitive pressures within the political class became an incentive to 
magnify processes of accumulation over the built environment. 
 
Altogether, this mosaic of historical chapters presents an innovative perspective of the 
Spanish path into the crisis, one grounded in the concreteness of the political – the 
power struggle to give shape to social structures – rather than in abstract structural 
logics or idealised visions of ‘the market’. 
 
8.2. Thesis Contributions  
 
The main contribution of the thesis is the novel narrative of the Spanish crash outlined 
above. This narrative poses a challenge to the existing literature insofar as it disturbs 
the structuralism of the core-periphery and spatial fix narratives, giving primacy to 
the historical specificity of the Spanish experience at the expense of macro-structural 
laws of causation. At the same time, it centres the story around political dynamics 
without falling into the pitfalls of the immaturity narrative. Rather than seeing the 
political as something extrinsic to, and inherently distortive of, ‘the market’, it 
represents it as intrinsic to and inherently constitutive of it. The thesis has drawn 
inspiration from the tradition of political Marxism to advance a different account of 
the crisis, one that explains the run-up to the crash in terms of the historicity of 
political dynamics.  
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In turn, this new perspective allows political economists to patch up some glaring gaps 
in the existing literature on the Spanish crisis: 
 
(1) Rather than explaining away the most distinctive aspect of the Spanish case (i.e. the 
destructive wave of residential overproduction that accompanied the bubble), I 
historicise this irregularity and centre my narrative of the crisis around it.  
 
(2) At the same time, I give new prominence to the politics of housing, and in particular 
to long-lasting social conflicts over housing shortages. This is a central feature of my 
narrative that until now has been absent from the existing political economy literature.  
 
(3) I also cast light upon the importance of corruption in the inflation of the bubble. 
Until now, existing narratives of the Spanish crisis either assumed that political 
corruption thwarted Spanish economic development, or simply reduced it to a function 
of an economic imperative. By contrast, I present political corruption as a feature 
intrinsic to a specific historical pattern of class domination.  
 
The analysis of political corruption advanced in this thesis is also important for a 
different reason: given the recent nature of the campaign finance scandals afflicting 
Spanish political parties, these patterns of political corruption remain uncharted 
empirical territory. The analysis of the patterns of contemporary clientelism thus 
transcends the bounds of political economy and makes this thesis of potential interest 
to specialist fields, such as corruption studies.  
 
Beyond the specialist literature on Spain, the narrative advanced by this thesis is also 
of great relevance to the ongoing debate on the causes of the Euro crisis. Centred 
around the historical specificity of this experience, the domestic focus of my narrative 
poses a frontal challenge to dominant political economy accounts, which tend to read 
the Spanish crisis as a mere appendage to the broader crisis of the European Monetary 
Union (Lapavitsas et al., 2012; Becker & Jäger, 2012; Bagnai, 2013; Gambarotto & 
Solari, 2015; Baccaro & Tober, 2017). In historicising the Spanish path towards the 
crisis in its own terms, I have demonstrated that Spain had a crisis of its own, one that 
cannot simply be reduced to an external economic imbalance. While this does not deny 
that the EMU constituted an important contextual factor in the boom and bust of 
Spanish residential capitalism, it does show that the EMU remains an insufficient 
explanation for the crisis, opening the door for similar interpretations of other 
peripheral crises. At the same time, I have used the thesis to challenge neoliberal 
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accounts of the crisis, which so far have championed domestic interpretations of the 
crisis (The Economist, 2010; JP Morgan, 2013; Stiglitz, 2014). Centred around the 
internal ‘political’ distortions of an otherwise perfect market equilibrium, these 
interpretations focus on how the tendency of politicians ‘to play bankers’ caused the 
crash, but they neglect how political factors (corruption included) were equally 
responsible for the boom that preceded the crisis (Rivera quoted in Picas & Agustina, 
2015).  
 
The final contribution of the thesis is the development of a political Marxist framework 
to apply to contemporary political economy. A major source of inspiration in this 
thesis, political Marxism developed in opposition to structural Marxism, a strand 
within the Marxist tradition that explains social phenomena by privileging the internal 
laws of social structures – particularly ‘economic’ ones. The result is a highly 
deterministic bent that tends to obscure political agency and historicity from view, a 
problem that I have traced in existing accounts of the Spanish crisis. Instead, political 
Marxism reasserts the need to understand human agents as living and creating 
subjects, privileging agency and contingency at the expense of structural laws of 
causation. The problem is that, so far, political Marxists have been mostly concerned 
with historical-sociological themes (Brenner, 1976; Cominel, 1991; Wood, 2002a, 
2002b), and whenever they have brought their approach to bear on contemporary 
political economy they have either done so in disguise (e.g. Knafo, 2009), or they have 
relapsed into the structuralism they once criticised (e.g. Brenner, 2006; for a 
discussion see Knafo & Teschke, 2017). Instead, I have deployed the insights of political 
Marxism for a case of interest to contemporary political economy while seeking to stay 
true to its ‘historicist’ promise, fleshing out a method for others who may wish to do so 
as well.   
 
8.3. Beyond the Crash: Notes for Further Research  
 
 
This final section will briefly examine some of the most important political 
developments in Spain over the last decade, analysing them through the prism of my 
conclusions and raising questions for further research. 
 
Perhaps the most evident sign that the post-Franco settlement has exhausted itself is 
the break-up of the two-party system that had sustained this state project since the 
1980s. This process began with the radicalisation of the left-wing electorate in the wake 
of the indignado protests, which prompted a low turnout in the general elections of 
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November 2011. The collapse of PSOE’s share of the vote was such that PP was handed 
a massive landslide majority despite small electoral gains (Cué, 20122). The 
conservatives then used their majority to redouble the cuts and pass a harsh labour 
reform, prompting an enormous backlash on the streets. In 2012, a permanent 
detachment of riot police was deployed around the Spanish parliament, which became 
fenced off from the public: a perfect visual metaphor for the gulf that had opened up 
between the public and the political elite (eldiario.es, 2013). The high point of unrest 
was the gigantic ‘march for dignity’ of 2014, which demanded ‘bread, work, and roof’, 
and culminated in a night of rioting in Madrid (BBC, 2014). Shortly after, the radical 
left-wing party Podemos was born, taking over half of PSOE’s former electorate in a 
short period of time (Cruz, 2015).  
 
When the Bárcenas affair broke out, Prime Minister Rajoy refused to resign and opted 
for finishing his mandate without offering a convincing explanation as to why his 
party’s treasurer needed a parallel bookkeeping system to manage a large volume of 
bribes (Granados, 2013). But even more outrageous for the PP electorate was his 
passivity with regards to Catalonia, where a series of jurisdictional tensions culminated 
in the Catalan government organising a unilateral referendum of secession. This 
resulted in the emergence of a direct competitor at a national scale: the liberal unionist 
party Ciudadanos, which styled itself as ‘the sensible change’ in opposition to 
Podemos’ radicalism (Rivera & Garicano, 2015). In light of this, the general elections 
of 2015 delivered an unprecedented scenario (later confirmed by the re-elections of 
2016): a four-party system divided between the ‘old’ politics of PP and PSOE, and the 
‘new’ politics of Podemos and Ciudadanos (Garea, 2015).  
 
In the meantime, the ruins of the Spanish residential apparatus have become a major 
political battleground. After 2011, the indignado movement melted into a myriad of 
activist groups. In particular, it swelled the ranks of Plataforma de Afectados por la 
Hipoteca (PAH), the radical housing activists whose staple practices included 
sabotaging evictions; squatting vacant building blocks to house the dispossessed; and 
organising mobs to name and shame politicians and banks (20Minutos, 2013). In 
February 2013, PAH activists submitted 1.4 million signatures to parliament 
demanding a public legislative debate on a number of housing measures: the 
development of public rental housing; a moratorium on all ongoing eviction 
procedures; and, most controversially, the introduction of limited liability on mortgage 
debts with retroactive effect (dación en pago) (RTVE, 2013). However, the PP-
controlled parliament at the time simply reformulated the document and passed a 
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watered-down version of PAH’s demands, one that, amidst concerns about the 
potential harm to financial institutions, reduced the prospect of limited liability to a 
bare minimum and removed its retroactive provision (PAH, 2013). In the end, PAH 
simply opted for fighting evictions by capturing the structures of the local state: in 2015 
PAH’s charismatic spokeswoman, Ada Colau, was elected mayor of Barcelona 
(Blanchar, 2018). 
 
The main ongoing political battle over housing social-property relations revolves 
around the boom in rent prices after 2014, a process that has renewed fears of a 
housing bubble amongst the Spanish commentariat (Letón, 2017; Estévez, 2017). This 
is not the case. Current patterns of speculation are fundamentally different to those of 
the 2000s: they do not seek self-reinforcing asset-price increases, but rather turn 
cheap rentals into undercover hotels. Interest in the rental sector is driven by the 
spread of platforms like AirBnB, a website enabling people to lease out their spare 
rooms to tourists, and which real-estate investors have not hesitated to use – illegaly 
– on an industrial scale (Sanabria, 2018). The advance of these dynamics has brought 
a saturation of Spanish city centres by low-cost tourism, igniting a new source of 
grievance for urban dwellers in these areas, who can no longer afford their rents 
(Rafael, 2018). In regions still ruled by PP (e.g Madrid), the party has demonstrated a 
greater preference for its speculative revenues: e.g. by selling off what little remains of 
the public rental stock to hedge funds, allowing them to force out the tenants and turn 
the buildings into AirBnB farms (Pérez, 2018). In regions where the local elections of 
2015 brought coalitions of left-wing activists to power – such as in Colau’s Barcelona 
– ongoing initiatives include greater regulations for AirBnB, rent caps, and an 
expansion of the public housing stock (del Castillo, 2017; Blanchar, 2018).  
 
These political rifts demonstrate that the collapse of Spanish residential capitalism has 
fractured the ‘regime of 1978’ on at least three fronts, all of which raise questions for 
further research: 
 
(1) The implosion of Spanish residential capitalism has disabled the financialised 
apparatus of residential provision that had previously offset the precariousness of 
wage-earners with the prospect of home-price revalorisations. This has severed the 
bond between the political class and a dispossessed class of homeowners, either 
because they are no longer ‘semi-proletarians’ or because they have been evicted 
outright. This has unravelled the neoliberal consensus of previous decades, opening a 
cycle of unrest and ideological soul-searching in Spanish society, particularly amongst 
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a downgraded middle stratum. Will the age-old phenomenon of housing shortages 
return, or will the financialised residential apparatus be rebooted in the mid-term? If 
the latter is not possible, will the interests of speculators prevail over the demands of 
the electorate (e.g. affordable housing)? Or will it be the other way around? 
 
(2) The exposure of the clientelist nexus binding the real-estate industry and the 
political class has distorted traditional patterns of political accumulation. The 
revelation of these practices has placed the ‘old’ political parties (PP, PSOE, and the 
Catalan CiU) in a difficult position, as it has spawned competitors that make the 
continuation of these practices difficult and the deflection of these rivals through ‘old’ 
methods of campaign finance risky. The new parties – particularly Podemos – have 
already pushed the old out of the most ‘lucrative’ municipal governments (e.g. Madrid, 
Barcelona). Thus, social forces previously excluded from the state are now attaining 
executive power, bringing onto the agenda issues that the regime of ‘78 had excluded 
(e.g. regional self-determination), or left to drift away (e.g. the right to housing in the 
Spanish constitution). But if the systems of political accumulation of the past are now 
disabled for good, what will this mean for the clientelist nexus between the political 
class and the propertied? Will this nexus reconstitute itself around a new residential 
apparatus? Or will its failure to do so open up room to roll back liberal social property-
relations (e.g. a rise in public rental housing)?  
 
(3) The collapse of a model of growth based on house-price speculation and 
overproduction of the built environment has eroded a major source of revenue of the 
local and regional scales of the state, prompting a crisis in the Spanish system of 
regional finance. This has coupled already existing jurisdictional grievances between 
the central state and the Catalan government, which, combined with an eagerness by 
CiU to deflect their own corruption scandals and with the uncompromising attitude of 
the PP, have detonated a full-blown territorial crisis over Catalan self-determination. 
The result was the dramatic scenes of October 2017, when Spanish gendarmes 
assaulted several polling stations in Barcelona and yanked away the ballot boxes by 
force (Noguer, 2017). For many, the federal pact of 1978 is now irreparably broken, 
raising the prospect of a constitutional assembly in the mid-term. But if a new 
constitutional settlement is indeed on the horizon, will the old elites succeed in 
insulating themselves from popular unrest (e.g. by introducing a majoritarian electoral 
system)? Or will the latest wave of social conflict leave a lasting imprint on the 
structures of the new state?  
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Though this thesis provides a historical perspective to chart the path of subsequent 
developments in the Spanish housing market, the outcome of this impasse will be 
ultimately decided by political struggles that are already in motion. In the final 
analysis, what comes out of this critical juncture will be decided by people making their 
own history – even if not under conditions of their own making.  
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Appendix 
	
Appendix A. The Ruins of Spanish Residential Capitalism 
 
As addressed in chapters 4 and 7, one of the key innovations of the ‘build-anywhere 
law’ was the introduction of the figure of the ‘urbaniser’ (agente urbanizador). 
Essentially an property developer empowered with semi-public right, urbanisers had 
a special license to enact their own plans of urban redevelopment provided that they 
costed themselves the necessary land expropriations and urban infrastructure (e.g. 
street lighting, roads, sidewalks, etc.). Once this was complete, urbanisers 
automatically received the housing plots that resulted from their urbanisation projects, 
highly lucrative land-assets in a context of rising housing prices. But when housing 
prices began to turn downward, many of these projects left behind vast stretches of 
perfectly functional infrastructure without any homes to cater.  
 
The following pictures are of one of such cases in Almassora (Castellón). The 
incomplete project is about 1km. long and four blocks deep. The proximity to the 
Mediterranean seafront and the immediacy of farmland makes it an archetypical site 
of a speculative re-zoning during the years of the bubble.  
 
FIG. A1. AERIAL VIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT  
 
 
Source: Google Maps 
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FIG. A2. GHOST STREETS: THE RUINS ON THE GROUND 
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In all likelihood, what happened was that the municipal government approved a 
developer’s project to turn nearby orange tree fields into beach-side properties. As it is 
evident in the pictures, the site has all the infrastructure necessary for urban living. 
There are roads, sidewalks, street lighting, bins, even playparks and basketball courts 
(typically the result of an ‘urbanistic agreement’ struck between the local government 
and the developer). What is missing are the dwellings themselves, suggesting that the 
house-price bubble burst before the ‘urbaniser’ in question could cash in what they 
were truly after – home property. In the meantime, the maintenance of these ghost 
streets is costed by the local government.  
 
The few houses that stand are a number of vandalised condominiums in the eastern 
edge of the development (Fig.A3). One can freely walk through these ruins, which have 
been ransacked from anything of value: toilets bowls have been stolen, window and 
door frames have been smashed out of their place, etc.   
 
FIG. A3. RANSACKED CONDOMINIUMS 
 
 
Photo taken by Yannick Nehemiah Antonio Harrison 
